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3ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation is a metatheoretical survey into the central semantic
concepts of Cognitive Grammar (CG), a semantics-driven theoretical grammar
developed by Ronald W. Langacker.
CG approaches language as a semiotic system inherently intertwined with
and structured by certain cognition-general capacities, and it defends a usage-
based conception of language, therefore denying the strict dichotomy between
language and other realms of conceptualization and human experience. For
CG,  linguistic  meaning  is  thus  defined  relative  to  our  general  cognitive  and
bodily  disposition,  as  well  as  to  the  contents  of  experience  the  former
structure. The cognitive and experiential aspects of meaning are described
relative to so-called dimensions of construal.
In this study, I will provide a systematic critical account of the theoretical
explanation  CG  provides  for  the  dimensions  of  construal.  My  point  of
departure  will  be  in  social  ontology  of  linguistic  meaning  developed  and
defended by Esa Itkonen, who has accordingly criticized CG for inconsistent
psychologism.  According  to  Itkonen,  linguistic  meaning  is  an  object  of
common knowledge and cannot be reduced into an individual’s
conceptualization; the dimensions of construal capture experiential meaning
that is part of language as a social semiotic resource.  This entails that linguistic
semantics assume as its object of description non-objective, perspectival
meanings that are commonly known.
I  argue that  the usage-based nature of  CG provides a way to release this
tension between objective and non-objective aspects of meaning by explaining
how perspectivity of semantics results from the acquisition and adjustment of
meanings  in  actual  discourse.  This,  however,  necessitates  an  ontological
revision of CG and rehabilitation of the sociality of a linguistic meaning, which
is the topic of this study.
In addition to the work by Itkonen, prominent socially oriented cognitive
linguists, such as Jordan Zlatev, have emphasized the necessary
intersubjective basis of experiential meaning. Within the Fennistic studies, on
the other hand, the intersubjective approach to CG and Cognitive Linguistics
in general has taken the form of combining cognitive linguistic methodologies
with Conversation Analysis. This study combines elements from both of these
approaches in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the notion of
construal in CG. In so being, the main task of this study is to critically evaluate
the  cognition-based  explanation  for  the  dimensions  of  construal,  provide  a
socially  grounded  alternative,  and  apply  the  alternative  into  analysis  of
construal in (written discourse).
4The objectives of this study are:
1. clarification of the definitions, contents and analytical functions of the
dimensions of construal
2. metatheoretical analysis of the theoretical justification of the
dimensions of construal
3. description of the conceptual prerequisites necessary for a coherent
conception of construal.
This study shows that  the dimensions of  construal  are not dependent on
the aspects of cognitive theory on the basis of which they are argue for. Instead,
the notion of construal is shown to be inherently intersubjective and context-
sensitive. Construal captures aspects of semantic organization that are
correlates of intersubjective alignment between conceptualizing subjects in a
given discursive context.
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GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS
1SG, 2PL first person singular, second person plural, etc.
ABL ablative case
ACC accusative case
ADE adessive case
ELA elative case
ESS essive case
GEN genitive
ILL illative
INE inessive case
INF infinitive
NEG negative verb
NMLZ nominalization
PASS passive
PST past tense
PTV partitive case
TRANSL translative case
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1 INTRODUCTION
This  study  consists  of  a  metatheoretical  survey  into  the  central  semantic
concepts  of  Cognitive  Grammar,  a  semantics-driven  theoretical  grammar
developed by Ronald W. Langacker (e.g. FCG-11, CIS2, 1999a, CGBI3).
Cognitive Grammar can be described as the most comprehensive grammatical
theory that has emanated from Cognitive Linguistics.
Cognitive  Linguistics  (CL)  is  a  non-unitary  linguistic  school,  the
representatives of which approach language as a semiotic system inherently
intertwined with, and structured by, certain cognition-general capacities.
While Cognitive Linguistics is now well-established as one of the main schools
of current linguistics4, it is a commonplace that it was originally born out of a
deep dissatisfaction with the strict formalistic agenda of generative linguistics.
In contrast to the innatism of the latter, CL has steadfastly defended a usage-
based constitution of language, therefore denying a strict dichotomy between
language and other realms of conceptualization and human experience. For
CL,  the  structure  of  natural  language  is  largely  determined  by  its  semiotic
function;  linguistic  meaning,  in  turn,  is  defined  relative  to  our  general
cognitive and bodily disposition as well as to the contents of experience this
disposition structures.
The three so-called founding fathers of CL, Langacker, George Lakoff, and
Leonard Talmy all manifest this ethos differently. Conceptual Metaphor
Theory, developed by Lakoff together with Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson
1980,  1999;  Johnson  1987;  Lakoff  1987;  also  Lakoff  &  Turner  1989),  has
demonstrated the central role of figurative thought and language in the
constitution and expression of  abstract  ideas.  Leonard Talmy’s  (1978,  1988,
2000a, 2000b) Cognitive Semantics describes linguistic meaning as a distinct
major cognitive system, which nonetheless overlaps and interacts with other
major ones (e.g. perception, attention, and memory). Among the central
figures of  CL,  one should also mention Gilles  Fauconnier and Mark Turner,
whose  theory  on  mental  spaces  (Fauconnier  1994,  1997)  and  conceptual
blending (Turner 1996; Fauconnier & Turner 2002) has significantly affected
the  description  of  conceptual  structure  and  flexibility  within  CL.  While  the
main theories of CL have all been developed on the soil of North America, Dirk
1 I will apply abbreviations for the most central and frequently referred presentations on Cognitive
Grammar. FCG-1 refers here to Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisites
(Langacker 1987).
2 CIS: Concept, Image, and Symbol (Langacker 2002 [1991]).
3 CGBI: Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction (Langacker 2008).
4 The textbook by Evans & Green (2006) and the handbook edited by Geeraerts & Guyckens (2007)
are illustrative of the entrenchment of CL into mainstream modern linguistics and also provide an
excellent general depiction of the scope and variety of cognitive linguistic research.
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Geeraerts (e.g. 1988, see also Geeraerts 1985 [1981]) has intently pointed out
the importance of European pre-structuralist semantics for CL.
Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar is characterized by an economical and
uniform description of language as a structured inventory of linguistic units,
that is, symbolic pairings of form and meaning. Moreover, Cognitive Grammar
extends this description in terms of symbolization from lexical items to
grammatical units, which are analyzed as structural schemas conveying
abstract meaning. Cognitive Grammar, in addition to other classical
representatives  of  Cognitive  Linguistics,  can  thus  be  associated  with
semiotically  oriented  functional  linguistics  at  large  (see  Gonsálvez-García  &
Butler 2006: 42–43). However, Cognitive Grammar also promotes a view that
language  and  meaning  are  primarily  cognitive  entities  and  thus  need  to  be
analyzed as such. This study concentrates on is this combination of the social
and cognitive aspects of meaning, the inherent tension of which characterizes
Cognitive Grammar as a whole.
Cognitive Grammar maintains that linguistic meaning is primarily defined
by  our  cognitive  make-up,  which  serves  as  scaffolding  both  for  how  we
apprehend pre-linguistic experiences and for how we conceptualize them
linguistically. Meaning is thus not an objective (truth-value) relation between
the linguistic sign and external circumstances but consists of mental
conceptual content that is construed according to the current communicative
perspective. Thus, meaning can be defined as non-objective5, to coin a term,
in  that  it  always  manifests  some  restricted  and  perspectivized  take  on  the
matters at hand.
This non-objectivity, or perspectivity, is systematically addressed in
Cognitive Grammar by the so-called dimensions of construal (CGBI: 55–89),
semantic parameters according to which the objectively same entity, situation
or occurrence can be expressed linguistically in multiple different ways. For
instance, I can refer to my dog having its meal not only as my dog having its
meal but  in  a  more  specified  manner  as my terrier gobbled ferociously its
high-end kibble,  and,  to  background  the  temporality  of  the  process,  as  the
nominalization that ferocious gobbling of the high-end kibble.6 Hence,  the
dimensions of construal include parameters such as specificity, i.e. the level of
detail  of  an  explicit  expression,  and  (temporal)  dynamicity,  i.e.  how  the
temporality of the object of conceptualization is represented linguistically.
On a  more  technical  side,  construal  is  posited  as  a  relationship  between
conceptual content and the so-called conceptualizer, (e.g. CGBI: 445–453), an
abstract human position presumed by the perspectivity of the expression. In
5 I refrain, following CG, from describing this aspect of meaning as “subjective”, for the term may be
misinterpreted as an ontological statement (while the question is the on nature of semantic contents per
se). A further reason is the specific descriptive function reserved for “subjectivity” in Cognitive Grammar
(Langacker 1990, 1997; see chapters 2.4.4 & 4.5).
6 The semantic difference between referentially synonymous expressions lead already Frege (1949
[1892] to distinguish between sense and reference of expression.
Introduction
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other words, Cognitive Grammar correctly derives non-objective meaning
from the logically necessary objective and subjective poles that are inscribed
in an expression’s meaning. Cognitive Grammar represents a (relatively) non-
modular conception of cognition, in which linguistic phenomena are sought to
be explained relative to cognition-general operating principles to as large an
extent as possible. The linguistic construal relationship is consequently
presented as structured by psychological principles that also structure
perceptual experience (see e.g. FCG-1: 99–146).
In this study, I will provide a systematic critical account of the theoretical
explanation Cognitive Grammar provides for the dimensions of construal. My
point of departure will be social ontology of linguistic meaning developed and
defended by Itkonen (1974, 1978, 1997), who has accordingly criticized
Cognitive  Grammar  for  inconsistent  psychologism  (Itkonen,  1997,  2008b,
forthc.). Of particular interest is Itkonen’s paper (1997) in which he points to
a  commonly  known  character  of  the  dimensions  of  construal  (or  linguistic
“imagery” in CIS: 5–12): the fact that their ability to be analyzed is dependent
on  the  fact  that  they  can  be  detected  as  a  part  of  the  expression’s
conventionalized meaning. At the same time, however, Itkonen’s analysis
implicitly admits the descriptive validity of the dimensions of construal:
paradoxically, they correctly capture the non-objective properties of meaning
that are part of an expression’s socially shared (objective) contents.
This paradox is illusory, for the objectivity and non-objectivity in question
pertain to distinct analytical levels. Whereas objectivity pertains here to the
constitution and distribution of meanings as objects of common knowledge,
non-objectivity pertains to the nature of the information the meanings consist
of. As Cognitive Grammar points out, language does not simply present
propositions that are either true or untrue but information of things and
relations that are related according to certain canonical, conventionalized
perspectives.  As  important  as  this  observation  is,  it  can  be  extended  by
pointing out that conventionalized perspectivity is not epiphenomenal but a
functional feature of language, actively utilized in discourse to accommodate
expression to the pragmatic context.
However,  the  fact  that  construal  can  be  motivated  functionally  does  not
solve the ontological discrepancy pointed out by Itkonen but rather helps to
specify it. If meaning is primarily social, as opposed to individual or cognitive,
the description of its properties in terms of cognitive abilities is simply
reductionist. But if the human cognitive or bodily disposition cannot be evoked
as  an  explanatory  factor,  then  how  can  we  account  for  the  non-objective
meaning Cognitive Grammar seems to accurately describe?
The  solution  I  provide  in  this  study  is  that  both  social  and  experiential
components are necessary for a comprehensive description of construal.  The
question is then how these components come to interact in the constitution of
meaning. While the full scope of this question cannot be addressed within the
confines of this work, the question can and will be approached in part through
the a priori conditions for a socially grounded notion of construal. The main
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task of this study is thus to critically evaluate the cognition-based explanation
for the dimensions of construal, to provide a socially grounded alternative, and
to apply the alternative to the analysis of construal in (written) discourse.
Before  going  into  the  details  of  this  multifaceted  task,  I  will  introduce  the
background and nature of the survey at hand.
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
This work is a part of a relatively new but well-established cognitive-linguistic
tradition within Fennistic studies (see e.g. Herlin 1998; Huumo 1997, 2005,
2007, 2009; Jaakola 2004; Leino, J. 2003; Leino, P. 1988, 1989, 1993; Leino,
P.  & Onikki  1992; Leino,  P.  & Onikki,  eds.  1994;  Onikki-Rantajääskö 2001,
2006, 2010; Visapää 2008). Pentti Leino can be named as the first author to
introduce CL – especially Cognitive Grammar – to Fennistic research (P. Leino
1988),  while  Huumo  (see  e.g.  Huumo  1997)  applied  cognitive  linguistic
methodology, such as Fauconnier’s mental spaces, to the analysis of Finnish
locatives independently roughly at the same time.
Several  Fennistic  doctoral  theses  (Herlin  1998;  Jaakola  2004;
Jääskeläinen, A. 2013; Jääskeläinen, P. 2004; Leino, J. 2003; Ojutkangas
2001;  Onikki-Rantajääkö  2001;  Siiroinen  2001),  a  majority  of  them
supervised  by  P.  Leino,  canonized  CL  as  a  major  direction  within  the
discipline. At the same time, many of these studies pioneered corpus-driven
cognitive linguistic research, accommodating theory and methodology from
CL to the eminently empirical tradition of Fennistics.
What  is  characteristic  of  more  recent  cognitive  Fennistic  studies  is  the
systematic expansion of CL from syntax and semantics to interaction and from
clause-level analysis to wider pragmatic phenomena in actual discourse. This
expansion has been associated with a corresponding refinement of cognitive
linguistic  theory  and  methodology.  Etelämäki  et  al.  (2009),  Etelämäki  and
Jaakola (2009), as well as Etelämäki and Visapää (2014) have proposed and
developed  a  combination  of  methods  from  Cognitive  Grammar  and
Conversation  Analysis  to  address  the  shortcomings  of  both  paradigms.  A
distinct  yet  similar  strand  is  the  applied  cognitive  linguistic  analysis  of
journalistic  texts,  exemplified  by  Jaakola  (2014;  see  also  Jaakola  2012a,
2012b). This strand seeks to combine analytical concepts and procedures from
fields as diverse as cognitive linguistics, text-analysis and journalistic studies
in  order  to  develop  a  more  holistic  outlook  on  journalistic  texts  and  their
expressive means vis-à-vis the representative readers.
The present study is linked directly to these developments in Fennistic
studies in that it focuses on the limitations of cognitive linguistic theory and
analytical procedure. My approach differs from those mentioned above in that
it has a pronounced metatheoretical emphasis. It is nevertheless fair to point
out  that  the  criticism  of  Cognitive  Grammar  I  present  has  its  parallels  and
predecessors in recent practically-minded Fennistics. It should also be borne
Introduction
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in mind that the very accommodation of CL to the Fennistic tradition has been
accompanied by critical theoretical remarks from the beginning (e.g. Leino &
Onikki 1992). In addition, the present analysis wishes to contribute not only
to  theoretical  considerations  but  also  to  the  on-going  discussion  on  the
boundaries and practical limits of Cognitive Grammar.
One particularly relevant part of this discussion is provided by Jaakola et
al. (2014) who apply the dimensions of construal in the analysis of the reader’s
perspective and its linguistic inscription into magazine texts. While their study
makes reference to narratological studies on the so-called implied reader (e.g.
Eco  1979;  Iser  1974;  Rimmon-Kenan  1983),  the  approach  of  Jaakola  et  al.
(2014)  also  shows  an  affinity  to  the  Bakhtinian  (1984  [1929])  account  of
polyphony, i.e. the presence of multiple “voices” or perspectives within a text.
The method, roughly put, is to seek out for subtle semiotic mechanisms that
lead systematically from lower-level expressive means to the construction of a
perspectival position that can be attributed to the text as a whole. By applying
cognitive  linguistic  methodology  to  achieve  this,  Jaakola  et  al.  (ibid.)  also
associate themselves with cognitive poetic research, advanced inter alia by
Stockwell (2002; see also Harrison et al., eds., 2014) and Tabakowska (1993).
This  study  considers  the  perspectivity  of  meaning  from  a  different  yet
related point of view. Similarly to Jaakola et al., the present study approaches
the dimensions of construal as a means to relate the different perspectives in
a text to each other. The main point of interest, however, is the extent to which
Cognitive Grammar is capable of explaining the existence of these perspectives
in a consistent and comprehensive manner.
Given CG’s emphasis on meaning as an individual’s mental experience,
different textual perspectives could be described, for example, as complex
conceptual  procedures  that  are  carried  out  and  apprehended  by  a  solitary
subject (who may entertain multiple different subjectivities as simulative
constructs).  If  one  accepts  the  social  ontology  of  meaning  envisaged  by
Itkonen (1997), this approach is nevertheless unsatisfactory. Given that the
linguistic sign is social by definition, the different perspectives that a written
or  spoken  discourse  introduces  also  need  to  be  seen  as  primarily  social
symbolic structures. It follows from this that discourse both represents
multiple subjectivities symbolically and presumes a plural subjectivity as its
own a priori condition.  To  account  for  these  mutually  embedded  forms  of
subjectivity, Cognitive Grammar would need to systematically relate its
theoretical assertions and descriptive concepts to level of analysis that is itself
constituted by or between multiple subjects: intersubjectivity.
Currently a fashionable term in linguistics (Foolen et al., eds., 2012; Zlatev
et al., eds., 2008), intersubjectivity has a brief but checkered history. Since its
introduction in continental philosophy (Heidegger 1978 [1927]; Husserl 2001a
[1900–1901]; Merleau-Ponty 2002 [1945]; Schütz 1972 [1932]; Zahavi 2001,
2003), it has been extended to fields of study as diverse as social sciences and
anthropology (Garfinkel 1984 [1967]), infant psychology (Meltzoff & Moore
1977, 1994, 1997; Stern 1971, 1977, 1985; Trevarthen 1979, 1980; Vygotsky
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1978), social psychology (e.g. Gillespie & Cornish 2010), and psychoanalysis
(Atwood & Storolow 1984; Ogden 1994; Stolorow 1997, 2013; Storolow et al.
2002). Illustrative of the term’s strong footing in Fennistic interactional
linguistics  is  the  work  done  in  Finnish  Centre  of  Excellence  in  Research  on
Intersubjectivity in Interaction at Helsinki University, with a publication list
that boasts over 200 items.
However, intersubjectivity tends to be understood in multiple ways,
whether  this  is  stated  explicitly  or  not,  and  is  often  present  in  linguistic
analysis  as  an  implicit  presupposition  rather  than  as  an  epistemological  or
ontological  concept  that  needs  to  be  scrutinized  (cf.  the  volumes  edited  by
Foolen et al. 2012 and Zlatev et al. 2008). In this study, I wish focus on the
concept itself by analyzing the compatibility of the dimensions of construal
with a chosen formulation of linguistic intersubjectivity, namely that by Zlatev
(2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b; see also Blomberg and Zlatev 2014;
Zlatev et al. 2012). In other words, I aim at an intersubjective description of
construal that simultaneously involves a re-evaluation of the analytical scope
of construal in Cognitive Grammar.
This dual emphasis on theory and description is not an end in itself but has
been chosen to serve both illustrative and argumentative needs. My
consecutive  analyses  on  the  theoretical  basis  and  practical  use  of  the
dimensions  of  construal  show  that  the  relationship  between  these  two
domains  is  anything  but  arbitrary.  With  careful  analysis  of  their  mutual
interaction, I ultimately wish to contribute to the ongoing discussion of the
relationship between cognitive and interactional linguistics. My analysis does
not  only  agree  on  their  compatibility,  suggested  by  Etelämäki  and  Visapää
(2014),  but  also  aims  to  describe  in  detail  the  theoretical  implications  their
compatibility puts forward.
Finally, with its metatheoretical emphasis, I hope that my study especially
benefits a further cross-fertilization between Cognitive Grammar, text-
linguistics  and  journalistic  studies  by  mapping  (a  part  of)  their  common
intersubjective semiotic ground. Despite the obvious restrictions involved, I
hope that a precise treatment of select analytical concepts may illustrate the
general  inseparability  of  linguistic  conceptual  tools  and  the  theoretical
preoccupations they are predicated upon.
1.2 NATURE, DATA, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This study is primarily concerned with the theoretical conditions under which
the notion of construal can be rendered coherent, rather than with particular
construal  phenomena.  These  conditions,  and  the  nature  of  construal  in
general, will nevertheless require that the conceptual analysis be informed by
a careful consideration of what the customary analytical concepts reveal about
construal in practice. This research is thus reinforced with text-linguistic
analysis  that  applies  distinct  dimensions  of  construal.  The  method  of
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combining  theoretical  and  linguistic  analysis  also  opens  the  possibility  of
considering how far the scope of dimensions can be extended without
compromising their descriptive integrity.
The metatheoretical criticism proposed here is not justified by the
descriptive utility of the dimensions of construal alone. I argue that it is indeed
the argumentative style and structure of Cognitive Grammar that motivate
(and  provide  a  basis  for)  a  metatheoretical  re-evaluation.  That  is,  the  very
definition of construal as a relation between representative conceptualizer(s)
and conceptual content, combined with a usage-based conception of language,
suggests  a  view  of  semantics  that  cannot  be  reduced  to,  or  explained  by,
cognitive  processing.  Rather,  a  usage-based  approach  to  construal  suggests
that linguistically relevant cognitive capabilities conventionalize into
conventional meanings as constants of linguistic usage-events, thus being
intersubjective by their nature.
This links my analysis to what Zlatev (2010: 427) refers to as a “minority
position” within cognitive linguistics, which includes himself, Itkonen (e.g.
2008b),  Sinha  (e.g.  Sinha  &  Rodríguez  2008)  and  Verhagen  (2005,  2007,
2008):  a  group  of  authors  who  underline  the  necessary  social  grounding  of
cognitive semantics.7 One  specific  merit  of  this  minority  position  is  the
unveiling of the theoretical, methodological and historical debt that Cognitive
Linguistics owes its forebears (see e.g. Sinha 2007). Zlatev (2010) in particular
has pointed out the inconsistent but close relationship between Cognitive
Linguistics  and  phenomenology,  and  has  argued,  in  the  same  vein  with
Itkonen (2008a), for the indispensability of consciousness for both the
emergence and the study of experiential meaning. This dependence, in turn,
suggests that Cognitive Linguistic methodology presupposes an implicit
phenomenological basis, despite the recurrent claims to the contrary (Zlatev
2010: 417).
This inconsistency is  the starting point of  my metatheoretical  analysis  of
construal.  My  own  conviction  is  that  semantics  is  the  study  of  linguistic
representations and that a true representation consists of a consciously
graspable stand-for relation vis-à-vis its object, referent or designatum (Zlatev
2007a,  2007b).  The  nature  of  language  in  turn  necessitates  that  linguistic
representations be publicly available. A viable semantic theory must therefore
be able to account for consciously accessible, intersubjectively available, non-
objective meanings. Since Cognitive Grammar actually fares well in this task,
we can attribute its inconsistency to a lack of self-understanding with regard
to theory’s semantic research object. My treatment of Cognitive Grammar is
therefore aimed at clarifying, instead of refuting, the theoretical structure
Cognitive Grammar posits in order to justify the dimensions of construal.
The objectives of this study thus are:
7 Etelämäki, Herlin, Jaakola and Visapää (2009), among others, can be named as Fennistic
representatives of this position.
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1. to clarify the definitions, contents and analytical functions of the
dimensions of construal, in particular relative to written discourse;
2. to describe in considerable detail the theoretical justification for the
dimensions of construal, to discuss the relevant criticisms of said
justification, and to provide a separate metatheoretical analysis of the
notion of construal with regard to mental imagery; and
3. to provide an analysis of the conceptual prerequisites that are necessary
for a coherent conception of construal, including the integration of the
notion of construal within a chosen model of intersubjectivity.
Whereas the task is to clarify the theoretical basis of construal, the measure
of clarification is actually the analytical use the dimensions of construal. The
first step is therefore to gain a correct understanding of this content. This task
is approached by an introduction to the dimensions of construal that involves
discussion not only of their definitions but also of putative extension of their
analytical scope.
After a coherent overall picture of the dimensions has been given, it is then
possible to evaluate the consistency of their theoretical justification. Given
Cognitive Grammar’s commitment to the psychological validity of its claims,
the reference it makes to the cognitive scientific literature is conspicuously
scarce.  A  substantial  part  of  this  work  is  therefore  devoted  to  mapping  the
reference Cognitive Grammar makes to its essential sources of theoretical
influence.  This  mapping,  however,  is  devised  primarily  to  enable  a  parallel
analysis of the argumentation that is based on said reference.
The critical analysis of Cognitive Grammar’s argumentation lays the
ground  for  our  main  objective,  which  is  to  evaluate  the  compatibility  of
Cognitive Grammatical semantics with an intersubjectively grounded
conception  of  meaning.  This  task  involves  a  rehabilitation  of  the
phenomenological perspective on meaning, which is openly endorsed by
Cognitive  Grammar  itself,  as  well  as  its  incorporation  into  a
phenomenologically informed conception of intersubjectivity. This part of the
study  involves  an  applied  text-analysis  in  order  to  elaborate  the  assumed
theoretical position as well as its practical linguistic corollaries.
 The methodology of this study comprises a conceptual analysis as well as
a  semantic  and  pragmatic  analysis.  The  data  for  the  former  consists  of
literature  on  Cognitive  Grammar,  whereas  the  data  for  the  latter  consist  of
selected Finnish magazine articles. These articles are from Mielenterveys
magazine, the members’ magazine of Mieli, the Finnish Association for Mental
Health (volumes 2010–2011). As a recent participant of Media Concept
development project (see e.g. Helle 2009; Helle & Töyry 2008), which is aimed
at the improvement of both the editorial work process and the journalistic end
product, Mielenterveys-magazine has served as the corpus for the Mallilukijaa
tekemässä project, a multi-disciplinary collaboration between journalistic
studies at Aalto University and Fennistic studies at University of Helsinki. The
Introduction
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present study has been carried out on the data of  Mallilukijaa tekemässä in
order to enable a close analytical exchange with the project.
1.3 GENERAL OUTLINE
Due to the metatheoretical purposes of the present study, a further
introduction  to  Cognitive  Grammar  and  the  dimensions  of  construal  is
reserved for the remainder of this book, which is organized as follows.
Chapter 2, “Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal”, includes an
introduction  to  Cognitive  Grammar  as  a  semantic  theory  (section.  2.2),  a
concise account of the notion of conceptualizer (section 2.3), and a separate
treatment of each dimension of construal (section 2.4). The main function of
this chapter is to describe the research object of this study comprehensively; it
therefore includes not only definitions of relevant theoretical concepts and
conceptions but also linguistic examples acquired from the data that illustrate
the dimensions of construal.
Chapter 3,  “Construal  and imagery”,  consists  of  two parts.  The first  part
(section 3.2) focuses on the ontology of Cognitive Grammar; it examines the
justification the theory provides for its conceptualist outlook and summarizes
the criticisms leveled by Itkonen (1997, see also 2008a, 2008b, forthc.) and
Konstenius ([Kenttä] 2003). The second part (section 3.3) considers the
problematic association Cognitive Grammar establishes between construal
and an ambiguous notion of imagery in order to explain the notion of construal
itself.  The  main  implication  of  this  chapter  is  necessary  dissociation  of
construal  from  cognitive  processing,  which  in  turn  underlines  the  need  to
ground construal in the sociality of language use.
Chapter 4, “The intersubjectivity of construal”, addresses this need with a
constructive revision of construal’s theoretical grounding. What is needed for
a coherent understanding of construal is understanding how conscious
experience comes to define semantic content. This understanding is sought by
embedding construal in phenomenologically informed, multi-leveled model of
intersubjectivity in adults. The disposition of the chapter reflects the
multifaceted  nature  of  intersubjectivity  as  a  subject  of  conceptual  and
empirical interest. The chapter includes an introduction to intersubjectivity as
a phenomenological  (section 4.2) as well  as  theoretical  notion (section 4.3).
After  this  preliminary  work,  the  last  main  section  of  the  chapter  (4.4)
concentrates on the formulation of intersubjective conception of construal.
After this multiphase theoretical treatment, chapter 5 applies the
developed  model  of  intersubjectivity  into  analysis  of  construal  in  linguistic
data.  The notion of  construal  is  applied into analysis  of  series of  construals
observed in written discourse (on selection and sampling of data, see next
chapter). The chapter is divided, in addition to outline (section 5.1) to three
sections,  each  of  which  focuses  on  a  series  of  construal  based  on  certain
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dimension, or dimensions, of construal: specificity (section 5.2), focusing and
prominence (5.3), and perspective (5.4).
The linguistic analyses provided by chapter 5 confirm that a conception of
construal  that  is  both  holistic  and  coherent  requires  an  intersubjective
definition both for conventional experiential meaning and pragmatic linguistic
context. Chapter 6 recollects the main findings that led to this conclusion and
provides a synthesis on the conceptual and linguistic analyses. Most
importantly,  however,  it  will  offer  a  revised  definition  of  construal  as  an
intersubjective linguistic phenomenon.
Finally, chapter 7 provides the concluding remarks of the study, including
the implications the present investigation suggests for the future research on
construal.
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal
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2 CONCEPTUALIZER AND THE
DIMENSIONS OF CONSTRUAL
Cognitive  Grammar’s  conception  of  semantics  is  characterized  by  a
symbolization relationship between phonological form and conceptual
meaning (FCG-1: 77), on the one hand, and a construal relationship between
conceptualizer  and  conceptualization,  on  the  other  (ibid:  130).  The  content
requirement  of  Cognitive  Grammar  (ibid:  53–54)  provides  that  only
phonological, semantic and symbolic units are posited; also grammatical
structures are thus describable as symbolic pairings of meaning and form.
The overall spectrum of symbolic complexity, leading from morphemes at
the  simple  end  to  clausal  schemas  or  constructions  at  the  complex  end,  is
depicted in terms of a structured inventory (FCG-1: 73–76), acquired through
and  adjusted  by  the  actual  use  of  the  units  by  the  speaker/hearer.  Actual
utterances constitute a process of selection and elaboration from this
inventory. The inventory is structured according to host of semantic relations
between the units (e.g. schematicity of one unit vis-à-vis another) that stem
from  the  encyclopedic  nature  of  the  units’  semantic  poles  (see  below).  As
conventional, learned patterns of symbolization, the semantic pole of
utterance does not just represent semantic content but organizes it according
to its experiential prominence and communicative relevance.
The notion of construal (CGBI: 43–44) can be given a minimal definition
relative to the inventory-nature of language. First of all, construal 1) pertains
to selection8 among  conventional  semantic  units  that  can  be  posited  as
referential  synonyms  but  differ  in  the  ways  they  organize  their  semantic
content. Secondly, and resulting from the first point, construal 2) pertains to
the way the selected unit (or combination of units) represents its referent non-
objectively, i.e. according its conventional non-objective organization as
contextually elaborated.
The abstract, non-actual, spoken-into-the-expression selector of linguistic
units  is  the  conceptualizer.  The  dimensions  of  construal  (CGBI:  55–89)  are
semantic parameters according to which alternative expressions for same
8 Originally,  selection  has  been  presented  in  Cognitive  Grammar  as  one  of  the  dimensions  of
construal, or (as in this case) as a focal adjustment (FCG-1: 114–120) that covers the selection of cognitive
domain, the variable scale of an expression (e.g. next to my hand vs. next to Jupiter) and its semantic
scope (including profile/base-distinction). It has been left out of the most current classification of
construal phenomena (CGBI: 55–89), however. This is a logical resolution in at least two respects: the
proposed content of the dimension does not appear all that coherent and, most importantly, it is actually
impossible to give any rational justification for any dimension of construal would not present a case of
selection. If a dimension of construal is a continuum of alternative expressions for a situation that is
objectively the same, construal by any actualized expression is a form of selection that has been carried
out. Hence, in my analysis, I refer to selection as an omnipresent aspect of construal.
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referents and states of affairs can be organized into continuums. Also, in some
cases, the given dimension of construal maps the connection between multiple
expressions that have same the conceptual content but differ in their
conceptual profiles (CGBI: 67), the portion of semantic content that
determines the referent of each symbolic unit. Both forms of semantic
interconnectedness between expressions involve the same two properties of
construal: selection and organization.
If every single linguistic expression is necessarily construed in some
fashion,  selection  is  a  global  property  of  language  use.  The  concept  of
“someone” selecting something thus fails  to give any additional  information
about  construal:  it  is  simply  a  way  of  illustrating  Cognitive  Grammar’s
conviction that  there is  no single right/objective way to describe a situation
linguistically, but instead a spectrum of subjective points of view from which
to choose. The linguistic relevance of construal lies in the specific ‘hows’ and
‘whys’  of  semantic  selection:  how  a  specific  type  of  construal  organizes
semantic content and why is this organization feasible within a certain context.
The first one of these types of questions emphasizes the conventional construal
value of the given semantic unit, while the latter presupposes the context of
expression.  Below (chapter 4),  I  will  defend a notion of  construal  exactly as
reflexive vis-à-vis context, which presupposes interdependence between the
two. In fact, these two aspects pertain to a corresponding analytical distinction
between semantics and pragmatics, specific nature of which is discussed
shortly in relation to Cognitive Grammar.
Ultimately,  each dimension of  construal  has to be described relative to a
spoken-into-the-expression conceptualizer. That is, every dimension of
construal underlines one or more ways in which way meaning is dependent on
the conceptualizer. Conversely, the conceptualizer itself bears no substance
other than its linguistic manifestation in the dimensions of construal.
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal are thus mutually dependent.
They are not inseparable, however, albeit their separation is a complex issue
both  methodologically  and  theoretically.  Their  separation  might  not  be
analytically  trivial  either.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  describe  conceptualizer  and
each dimension of construal separately but my primary aim is to reach a better
understanding of their inherent logical interconnectedness and their function
in actual discourse.
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the  data  of  my  analysis  consists  of
magazine texts sampled from volumes 2010 and 2011 of Mielenterveys-lehti.
The choice of data is motivated by theoretical and expository reasons. First of
all, the metatheoretical topic demands certain amount of clarity, which is best
provided by well-edited written texts. Written format also allows for the
restriction of contextual factors found in face-to-face interaction, enabling a
more detailed analysis of semantic and pragmatic factors in chosen construal
phenomena.  The  primary  function  of  the  data  is  to  illustrate  the  scope  and
applicability  of  the  dimensions  of  construal,  a  task  that  would  only  be
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal
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complicated by including the intricacies of spoken communication and its
formal variation in the analysis.9
Moreover, the present analysis emphasizes the role of the dimensions of
construal in semantic phenomena larger than clauses or sentences; these
phenomena,  while  not  exclusively  textual,  are  best  tracked  within,  and
illustrated  by,  written  discourse.  A  related  methodological  reason  for
analyzing magazine texts is that spoken data would not only require the use of
a Conversation Analytical apparatus but also a methodological integration
with  Cognitive  Grammar,  a  task  what  would  also  pre-suppose  a
comprehensive discussion of the theoretical bases of these two paradigms.10
Considering  these  factors,  it  is  clear  that  a  critical  reevaluation  of  the
dimensions of construal is best served by a careful constriction of the empirical
context. This principle is applied both in the introduction to construal in this
chapter as well as in the later analyses of construal patterns in chapter 5.
2.1 OUTLINE
The  course  of  this  chapter  is  straightforward.  I  will  begin  with  a  general
overview  of  semantics  in  Cognitive  Grammar  and  how  it  gives  rise  to  the
notions of conceptualizer and dimensions of construal (section 2.2). I will then
present the notion of conceptualizer, its analytical purposes and theoretical
implications  in  section  2.3.  Section  2.4  gives  an  overall  account  of  the
dimensions of construal in Cognitive Grammar, as well as their application to
written discourse. Section 2.5 is a synthesis of the preceding themes as well as
an analysis of the relationship between the conceptualizer and the dimensions
of construal. The scope of this chapter is narrowed down to the presentation
of  construal  in  Cognitive  Grammar,  but  when  needed,  other  cognitive
linguistic  accounts  of  construal  will  be  addressed  as  well  (most  notably
Verhagen 2007; see also Croft and Cruse 2004; Talmy 1978, 1988, 2000a).
2.2 SEMANTICS IN COGNITIVE GRAMMAR
Some  preliminary  remarks  on  semantics  in  Cognitive  Grammar  have  been
made in the preceding introductory chapter. The topic has been covered quite
9 The  application  of  the  dimensions  of  construal  to  languages  other  than  English  is  not  entirely
unproblematic. For illustration, see section 2.3.2 below, which touches upon the definitional hindrances
associated with the sc. grounding elements (CGBI: 259–260) in the contexts of Finnish and Dutch.
10 Etelämäki et al. (2009), Etelämäki & Jaakola (2009), and Etelämäki & Visapää (2014) bring
support to the synthesis of Cognitive Linguistics and Conversation Analysis both on theoretical and
methodological grounds, thus providing an excellent start for this discussion.
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extensively in the cognitive linguistics literature11; I will therefore narrow the
scope of the present introduction to those properties of Cognitive Grammar
that are relevant to the current treatment of construal.
The  emphasis  in  this  section  will  be  on  the  descriptive  apparatus  of
Cognitive Grammar, whereas the theoretical foundations of this conception of
semantics will be focused on in chapter 3. Some theoretical prerequisites still
have to be addressed here to facilitate discussion. These include some of the
most well-established theoretical traits of Cognitive Grammar: namely, the
non-modular conception of cognition and language, the prototype- and
schema-based conception of categorization, and the encyclopedic conception
of semantic content. Each of these attributes is operationalized by Cognitive
Grammar  in  accordance  with  the  conviction  that  conceptual  meaning  is
constituted and acquired via actual language use.
While  the  implications  of  the  usage-based  nature  of  Cognitive  Grammar
are discussed more extensively in section 4.4, its general significance needs to
be acknowledged from the start. It is a necessary condition for a non-objective,
experiential semantics that meaning is established as conventionalized use,
including the (language-using) subject’s perspective vis-à-vis the
conceptualized object.
2.2.1 NON-MODULARITY OF MIND
Modularity of mind, a view prevalent in Generative Linguistics and its heirs to
date, is a cognition-theoretical stance whereby the global architecture of mind
consists of distinct task-specific units, i.e. modules, which function relatively
independently  according  to  their  own regularities.  The  successors  of  classic
Generative Linguistics, including X-bar theory (Chomsky 1972, 1975),
Government and Binding theory (Chomsky 1981), Principles and Parameters
(Chomsky  &  Lasnik  1993),  and  finally,  the  minimalist  program  (Chomsky
1995),  have  aimed  at  specifying  the  language  faculty’s  role vis-à-vis other
cognitive systems. The basic tenet of discernible cognitive faculties, however,
has remained the same.
The  minimalist  program,  for  instance,  is  a  radical  revision  of  Chomsky’s
earlier position in terms of the concepts and rules that characterize language
as  a  mind-internal  universal  system.  Minimalism  gives  language  both  a
narrow  and  a  broad  sense;  the  former  refers  to  an  exclusively  human
computational capacity, and the latter covers this capacity together with the
other cognitive subsystems it interacts with. Minimalistic theory, in other
words, involves interfaces between distinct systems – thus presupposing the
discernibility of these systems.
In cognitive science, there are multiple modularity hypotheses that vary in
strength. The hypotheses differ, for example, according to how strongly
11 E.g. Croft & Cruse 2004: pt. I, “A conceptual approach to linguistic analysis”; Evans & Green 2006:
pt. II, “Cognitive Semantics”; Geeraerts & Guyckens eds. 2007: pt. I, “Basic Concepts”.
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posited  modules  are  dissociated,  or  according  to  what  extent  cognition  is
discernible into task-specific units. Most of the posited modularity hypotheses
include the following common denominators: modules are believed to have an
innate basis and their existence is motivated by evolutionary advantages, they
have  both  a  neuronal  and  a  cognitive  constitution,  and  they  are  pivotal  for
explaining  the  functioning  of  at  least  some  well-established  cognitive  sub-
systems.
Fodor (1983)12 is the first one to present the (neuropsychological) concept
of  modularity.  He,  however,  only  argues  for  the  modularity  of  certain
“peripheral” systems, such as vision. Later, competing conceptions, such as so-
called massive modularity, have extended this principle of cognitive
organization  to  cover  the  mind  as  a  whole  (for  discussion,  see  Barrett  &
Kurzban 2006; Gibbs & Van Orden 2010).
Cognitive linguistic enterprise is typically characterized by a strong
rejection of the modular conception of mind. However, despite the centrality
of the topic for both generative and cognitive enterprises alike, modularity has
never been among the most discussed diverging points between the two
paradigms. Modularity nevertheless boils down to a single term a set of mind-
theoretical properties that all contribute to how linguistic meaning should be
understood as such and relative to overall cognition.
It  may  be  generalized  that  a  modular  view  of  cognition  justifies  a
conception of language as a well-defined, autonomous object. The knowledge
of  this  object  constitutes  the  human  linguistic  capacity.  Rohrer  (2007:  25)
assigns  this  view  of  language  to  an  “objectivist  tradition”,  most  notably
represented by generative linguistics, which originally translated its
conception of semantics into so-called interpretive semantics (e.g. Katz &
Fodor 1963). Albeit the interpretive semantics as such did not stand for long,
it serves here to represent the form of semantics CL rose to oppose.
Interpretive semantics can be seen as an objectivist-conceptualist
enterprise, in which semantic representations are derived from abstract
formal syntactic relations. Meaning in this framework is equivalent to truth-
conditions, by which abstract semantic symbols are related to objective states
of affairs. In this sense, meaning is externalized from the subjective experience
of the language user, but at the same time is supposed to be represented within
cognition  by  symbolization;  hence  the  framework  is  conceptualist  and
objectivist  at  the  same  time.  This  line  of  thinking  requires  an  extent  of
discernibility of language processing vis-à-vis other cognitive systems, which
is then provided by positing of a distinct language module.
Cognitive  Linguistics  is  essentially  a  counter-movement  against  the
discernibility  of  language  and  objectivity  of  meaning  propagated  by  the
12 Fodor’s conception of modularity of mind is in line with the tradition of faculty psychology, but
the concept of modularity itself is adopted from (especially evolutionary) biology, where it refers to an
organism’s ability to produce discrete functional units that promote its survival and reproductory
efficiency.
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interpretive semantics and anteceding semantic models within generative
framework. The original motivation for the cognitive linguistic enterprise has
been  an  empirical  and  linguistic  one:  the  view  of  meaning  promoted  by
Generative Linguistics undervalues the semantic function of language, and
does  so  by  ignoring  how  meaning  is  related  to,  and  arises  from,  human
experience and actual interaction. The cognitive nature of Cognitive
Linguistics, in turn, requires a conception of mind that is flexible enough to
allow human perceptual experience to enter linguistic meaning. While there
are  multiple  sources  to  which  Cognitive  Linguistics  has  turned  to  for
theoretical justification (such as prototype-based theory of categorization, e.g.
Rosch  1973,  1978;  Rosch  et  al.  1976;  Rosch  et  al.  1978),  the  Cognitive
Linguistics’ rejection of modularity can be highlighted as the most profound
cognitive-architectural delineation of the movement. This general notion
holds true for Cognitive Grammar as well.
Explicitly, Cognitive Grammar only advocates skepticism against Fodorian
modularity  or  the  existence  of  a  specific  language  module  (note  also  the
reference to Saussure):
Language  is  an  integral  part  of  human  cognition.  An  account  of
linguistic structure should therefore articulate with what is known
about cognitive processing in general, regardless of whether one posits
a  special  language  “module”  (Fodor  1983),  or  an  innate faculté de
langage.  If  such  a  faculty  exists,  it  is  nevertheless  embedded  in  the
general  psychological  matrix,  for  it  represents  the  evolution  and
fixation  of  structures  having  a  less  specialized  origin.  Even  if  the
blueprints for language are wired genetically into the human
organism,  their  elaboration  into  a  fully  specified  linguistic  system
during language acquisition, and their implementation in everyday
language use, are clearly dependent on experiential factors and
inextricably  bound  up  with  psychological  phenomena  that  are  not
specifically  linguistic  in  character.  (FCG-1:  12–13,  italics  in  the
original.)
The stance thus presented does not strictly deny the existence of cognitive
subdomains  specified  on  certain  tasks.  Cognitive  Grammar  simply  assumes
that,  regardless  of  the  existence  of  these  domains,  language’s  most
fundamental (cognitive) properties are not domain-specific. The argument has
a phylogenetic and ontogenetic emphasis, but it nevertheless concerns a fully
elaborated language system as adopted by an adult speaker. Somewhat
paradoxically, it is typically linguistic data that is used by Cognitive Grammar
to support cognitive-psychological arguments, not the other way around.
To see what this means in practice, let us take a look at the dimensions of
construal and the notion of conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). A
Cognitive Linguist would maintain that the semantic phenomena grasped by
these concepts manifest fundamentally cognition-general abilities and aspects
of mental life that speak against independent cognitive modules. At the general
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal
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level, there are two kinds of properties of linguistic meaning that can be taken
as supporting a non-modular stance: 1) domain-general structural properties
of information processing (such as those mentioned in FCG-1 chapter
“Cognitive Abilities”, p. 99–146) that result in schema-level semantic
similarities between the tokens of the same construction type, and 2) domain-
specific world knowledge.
It would be tempting to align these two types of meaning with grammatical
and lexical levels of analysis, respectively. However, Cognitive Linguistics in
general, and Cognitive Grammar in particular, refute a strict dichotomy
between  lexical  and  grammatical  aspects  of  language,  which  constitutes  a
further manifestation of non-modularity. Constructions or grammatical
schemas themselves are constituted by schematization via multiple instances
of structurally similar expressions. They are therefore acquired as inherently
meaningful structures, and they cannot be strictly distinguished from lexical
items on semantic grounds. Instead, the more lexical and more grammatical
semantic units are posited in Cognitive Grammar as a continuum of semantic
schematicity (FCG-1: 449), as mentioned above. Furthermore, the units that
populate different parts of this continuum combine systematically in actual
expressions,  but  their  joint  semantic  contribution  cannot  be  reduced  to  the
sum of distinct semantic components. Rather, Cognitive Grammar manifests
only partial compositionality (ibid. 452–453) in the description of meaning,
assuming a significant effect of non-linguistic knowledge and conceptual
capacity on the constitution of meaning of a complex expression.
Take for example the different verbs that elaborate Finnish negative
necessive construction with the modal verb pitää (’must’/’have  to’)  and  the
subject marked by zero:
1. köyhyyd-en      ei    pidä anta-a laajentu-a
[poverty-GEN NEG must let-INF expand-INF]
‘one must not let the poverty expand’
2. Työvoima-n        ei    pidä  anta-a heikenty-ä
      [workforce-GEN NEG must let-INF weaken-INF]
‘one must not let the workforce get weaker’ (MT 6/2010: 10)
There is a multitude of syntactic/structural similarities between these two
examples that correspond to similarities on the semantic level. These semantic
similarities  are  schematic  or  abstract,  and  are  associated  with  the
organizational  aspect  of  how the  more  specific  aspects  of  meaning  relate  to
each  other.  For  instance,  one  type  of  similarity  concerns  the  semantic
relationships that hold between non-finite verb chains and their predicates (ei
pidä  ‘must not’) and between the predicates and the subject marked by zero.
Most importantly, Cognitive Grammar assumes that actualized grammatical
complexes  such  as  1  and  2  instantiate  syntactic  constructions  or  schemas.
These involve conventionalized semantic substructures, or elaboration sites
(CGBI:  198),  such  as  the  clause-initial  genitival  object,  that  bear  schematic
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meaning  of  their  own.  This  meaning  is  then  elaborated  by  the  actual
expressions that assume the explicit roles of different constituents.
Now, a further similarity between 1 and 2 can be found in the selection of
infinitival complements for the predicate ei pidä ’must  not’:   the  verb
combinations antaa laajentua ‘let expand’ and antaa heikentyä  ‘let weaken’.
These manifest two different metaphorical mappings of the physical domain,
namely its spatial and force-dynamical subdomains, onto the social domains
of labor (‘workforce’) and wealth (‘poverty’). Mapping refers to the matching
of two cognitive domains, so that the schematic commonality between these
two  gives  rise  certain  semantic  attributes  in  the  target  domain  of
conceptualization. For example, the expansion in the spatial domain as
‘gaining in the relevant attribute’  maps onto the social  domain,  yielding the
meaning ‘gaining in poverty’. In order to be graspable, a conceptual metaphor
such as this needs to rely on our everyday experiential understanding of the
relevant  physiological  and  social  phenomena  and  their  commonalities.  It  is
therefore presumed that lexical meanings such as ‘expand’ and ‘weaken’ are
structured by prototypical, concrete meanings, their metaphoric extensions
and the interconnections between these different semantic nodes.
There might also be another conceptual metaphor in play in the examples
above, manifested by the necessive predicate ei pidä, albeit this option would
require the expansion of the term “metaphor” quite a lot. Pitää is an old, highly
polysemic verb with meanings that range from the manual holding of objects
and possession (via having meetings and other events) to necessive and
epistemic-cognitive functions (‘think x as y’, Kielitoimiston sanakirja 2: L–R
[Dictionary of modern Finnish], s.v. pitää).  The concrete motor meaning is
likely to be the oldest, and thus the starting point for the development of the
modal  use  (Laitinen  1992:  137–143).  Conceptual  metaphor  could  motivate
such a development via experiential or conceptual commonalities between the
so-called source-domain (original, concrete ‘hold’) and the target domain
(‘must’, ‘have to’). Given the historical nature of the relationship between these
semantic  variants,  however,  it  is  quite  difficult  to  judge  whether  an  actual
functioning  metaphor  can  found  in  the  use  of ei pidä above. The mere
possibility  of  such  metaphor  is  nevertheless  a  further  example  of  how  the
“grammatical”  or  “constructional”  meaning  of  these  clauses  cannot  be
separated from the “lexical” one in any absolute manner.
There are, in other words, inherent limitations to dividing semantics into
grammatical and lexical counterparts. Conceptual metaphors, to start with,
are usually complex and hierarchically organized, and have also more
grammatical instantiations, such as extensions of spatial cases in Finnish (on
subjective  directionality  in  Finnish  locatives,  see  e.g.  Huumo  2006;  on
metonymy  in  Finnish  locatives  of  state,  see  Onikki-Rantajääskö  2006).  So,
what  appears  as  a  simple  lexical  choice  is  seen  in  the  Cognitive  Linguistic
perspective as motivated by a complex conceptual network both with lexical
and grammatical manifestations.
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal
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On  the  other  hand,  the  interrelations  of  lexical-semantic  units  form  a
structural level of their own, e.g. the selection of a word within a set of options
in  terms  of  specificity  suitable  for  the  current  communicative  need.  As  a
generalization, then, a Cognitive linguist/grammarian would say that ‘lexical’
tends to correlate with the more contentful aspects of meaning, whereas
‘grammatical’  tends  to  express  the  skeletal  and  structural  properties  of
meaning (see e.g.  Talmy 2000a: 21–22).  In reality,  the structural  and more
contentful aspects of meaning are intertwined and can be separated only by a
deliberate change of analytical perspective.
The  premise  of  non-modularity  thus  results  in  the  conclusion  that
grammar and lexicon are both describable in uniform manner as categories of
semantic units. Moreover, the prototypical levels of specificity for these
categories reflect distinct stages in the process of grammaticalization, which is
presumed to relate the categories to each other (see p. 28 above). The fuzziness
of said categories (atemporal perspective) is thus associated with diffusion of
units from one category to another (temporal perspective).
The various motivations for grammaticalization cannot be addressed here.
The very presumption that this process is in part semantics-driven, however,
affects the overall character of Cognitive Grammar in a way that is relevant for
the present concerns.
To  be  specific,  what  should  be  considered  is  the  combination  of  the
following premises. 1) Grammar consists of pairings of form (phonology) and
meaning (semantics);  2)  both phonology and semantics pertain to cognitive
categories (phonological space and semantic space); and 3) cognitive
categories are fuzzy and interacting (atemporal and temporal perspective,
respectively). The standard general conclusion derived from these presemises
by cognitive linguists is that grammatical form is “motivated” (e.g. CGBI: 88),
i.e. defined by factors external to the form itself. On the face of it, this contrasts
directly with the structuralist (and generativist) notion of l’arbitraire du signe.
It is thus somewhat paradoxical that Cognitive Grammar constantly
emphasizes its own symbolicity, which literally entails an arbitrary
meaning/form relationship. In contrast, the types of motivated meaning/form
relationship, especially that of iconicity, are mentioned only seldom.
As  Kleiber  (1993:  105)  and  Langendonck  (2007:  396–397)  point  out,
however,  this  contradiction  is  mainly  illusory.  In  fact,  there  can  be  found
iconicity inherent to Cognitive Grammar that is relatively unpronounced for
the very fact that it resides in the systematic correspondence between
grammatical form and meaning13.  That  is,  the  content  requirement  of
Cognitive Grammar, which necessitates the meaningfulness of grammatical
structures, combines with experiential semantics so that grammatical form
corresponds to a conceptual process, which in turn corresponds iconically to a
way of perceiving an experiential scene from a certain perspective.
13 Langendonck (2007: 400, n. 5) represents the same observation.
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This iconic correspondence needs to be defined carefully. There is a
tendency within Cognitive Linguistics to associate linguistic meaning directly
with experience, at least suggesting an imagic one-to-one correspondence (see
sections  3.3.3  and  4.4,  as  well  as  Blomberg  &  Zlatev  2013,  for  a  critical
discussion).14 In other words, the autonomous activation of semantic content
for a language-using subject seems to gain its semiotic functionality from that
the meaning resembles whatever the meaning is about. This may also in part
explain the apparent attractiveness of imagery-based theoretization for
Cognitive Grammar (see chap. 3).
The semantic entities posited by Cognitive Grammar, however, reflect
experience in a restricted set of correspondences that are traditionally
categorized as forms of diagrammatic iconicity (Peirce 1977; Haiman 1985). In
diagrammatic iconicity, the relations between “parts” of an entity, or between
entities in a constellation, are signified by corresponding relations in the iconic
sign. The analogy between the sign and the signified is thus more scarse and
less restricting than in the case of imagic icon (e.g. a photograph). This makes
diagrammatic iconicity suitable for describing semantic features of a
meaningful grammar.
For instance, Cognitive Grammar associates iconicity with sequential order
(temporal iconicity, CGBI: 79), semantic complexity (ibid. 74), conceptual
focusing (ibid. 209), grounding (ibid. 275, 302), and grammatical markedness
in general (ibid. 376). What these phenomena have in common is that their
formal characteristics reflect the conceptual semantics they prototypically
convey; e.g. sequential order of two distinct motion expressions in she walked
through the  hall  and  went  upstairs conveys the meaning of conceptualized
order of these events. Furthermore, the meant state of affairs in the world is
likely to be reflected iconically by the conceptualization. Likewise, frequent
and communicatively relevant attributes of experience are likely to be reflected
in conceptualization by non-selectional factors, that is, relatively fixed
semantic properties inherent to grammatical structures. In other words, there
14 This is another way of saying that the approach of Cognitive Grammar denies, or at least seriously
questions,  the  possibility  of  genuine  synonymy  in  one  language  (see  e.g.  FCG-1:  378–379;  see  also
Bolinger 1977). As perspectival effects are included in the domain of semantics and associated with
different construals of a referentially same entity, a semantic difference between two structures is not
only  essential  but  necessary.  In  other  words,  one  cannot  express  same  thing  in  many  ways.  In  this,
Cognitive Grammar approximates the traditional structuralist principle of isomorphism, under which
one meaning corresponds to one form and vice versa. The approximation is vague at best, however. First
of all, isomorphism is typically accepted as a functional tendency rather than as a principle not only in
Cognitive Grammar (ref.)  but  in structuralist  approach as well  (e.g.  Goossens 1969). Ceteris paribus,
synonymy is avoidable (and indeed avoided by small children, as noted by Langendonck 2007: 399) and
isomorphism is desirable, under the consistency of the communication itself. Secondly, however,
Cognitive Grammar accepts polysemy, another violation against isomorphism, as one of its key
parameters. Tendency of isomorphism is therefore subordinate to other more cogent conceptual and
pragmatic factors.
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are iconic tendencies that characterize selection between different construals
and the iconic tendency of a type of construal to duplicate, diagrammatically,
an experiential constant or multiple such constants.
Iconicity is thus strongly, even if implicitly, present in Cognitive Grammar;
this is a necessary consequence of combining experiential semantics with
semantically  motivated  grammar.  Note  that  this  implies  in  fact  two  iconic
correspondences that can be distinguished at least analytically: experiential
semantics involves iconic correspondence between experience and meaning,
whereas semantic grammar involves iconic correspondence between meaning
and  form.  What  is  essential  is  that  both  of  these  steps  of  correspondence
involve the possibility of interference by factors other than iconic
representation itself. Cognitive Grammar is therefore not an “iconic grammar”
but  a  grammar  that  includes  iconicity  in  its  list  of  meaning-constituting
factors. It is representative of the theory that it makes repeated reference to
work of Haiman (e.g. 1983, 1985) who presents iconicity as restricted by the
contrasting tendencies of economy, generalization, and association in
definition of grammatical structure.
It can be thus concluded that iconicity in Cognitive Grammar is primarily
of diagrammatic variety and heavily constricted by conflicting conceptual and
pragmatic motivations. Diagrammatic iconicity is nevertheless essential for
the notion of construal, for both of these concepts are related to experiential
meaning and both of them are subject to same external restrictions. It would
even seem tempting to equal the iconicity of grammar with construal. This is
not the case, as construal is restricted and constituted also by other meaning-
constituting factors, as will be demonstrated later on. Diagrammatic iconicity
will nevertheless be mentioned in passing when the experiential basis of
construal is considered.
Despite their complexity, the examples above (with their metaphorically
motivated selection of verbs) should help to illustrate the theoretical influence
of partial non-modularity in the Cognitive-Linguistic and particularly
Cognitive Grammatical description of meaning. In a conceptual-semantic
framework,  partial  non-modularity  allows  for  the  description  of  meaning
relative  to  general  cognitive  principles,  which  are  also  thought  to  organize
domain  specific  knowledge  of  the  world  mediated  by  our  experience.  The
nature of this knowledge, which is often referred to as encyclopedic, is related
intimately to how we categorize our experience.  One of  the most significant
non-linguistic  theoretical  sources  of  influence  for  Cognitive  Grammar  is
provided by models of categorization based on schemas and prototypes.
2.2.2 LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION
While Cognitive Grammar makes relatively scarce reference to it, Eleanor
Rosch’s prototype-based Category Theory (e.g. Rosch 1978) is openly assumed
as a part of Cognitive Grammar’s theoretical basis (see e.g. FCG-1: 16–17). The
notion  of  prototype  in  Cognitive  Grammar  is  somewhat  overshadowed by  a
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strong emphasis on schemas and principles of Gestalt psychology, such as
figure/ground-segregation. Prototype theory nevertheless provides Cognitive
Grammar  with  the  principled  view of  how linguistic  knowledge  is  acquired,
stored and used. The question of linguistic categorization forms another
demarcation line between Cognitive and Generative Linguistics similar to the
question of modularity discussed above.
Rosch’s  prototype-based  Category  Theory,  which  was  put  forward  in  the
mid  1970’s,  was  a  psychological  antithesis  to  the  classical  view  of
categorization.   This  view  had  largely  dominated  western  thought  since
Aristotle  and  was  applied  in  generative  paradigm  and  its  semantics.  The
classical view of categorization has been depicted in length elsewhere; in this
work it  is  sufficient to consider only its  most general  characteristics.  Taylor
(2003: 21), referring to Aristotle [Metaphysics 5.8.3. as translated in Aristotle
1933],  mentions  four  of  these.  The  first  is  that  categories  are  defined  by
necessary and sufficient conditions, so that to qualify for a category, an entity
needs  to  manifest  a  specific  set  of  properties.  The  second  is  that  these
definitional properties are binary, so that the entity either has one or has not.
The third characteristic, a logical conclusion of the first and second point, is
that  categories  have  clear  boundaries,  so  that  category  membership
demarcates the world clearly into those entities that have it and those that do
not. Similarly, the fourth property of classical categories is that the members
of  each  category  are  equal  (relative  to  the  category  membership)  and
categories are thus inherently homogenous. The concept of ‘man’, for instance,
may refer to men with a multitude of differing properties, but as the reference
requires the fulfillment of certain defining properties (a ‘two footed animal’ for
Aristotle, a ‘featherless two-footed animal’ for Plato), the differences are
irrelevant from the outset.
The  main  conclusion  of  Rosch  and  colleagues  is  that  the  Aristotelian
classical  categories  simply  fail  to  reflect  how  categorization  works  among
humans in everyday life. Instead, “prototypical categories” were shown to be
involved at least in the classification of certain frequent perceptual objects and
nouns. The basis of this form of classification lies in the tendency in human
experience for certain experiential objects to stand out among others for
qualitative  or  quantitative  reasons,  so  that  they  become  the  standard  of
comparison  in  classification  of  new instances.  In  other  words,  they  become
prototypes for their categories.
For example, the experiments carried out by cons ([Rosch] 1971, 1972)
showed that perceptual color space is organized according to so-called “focal
colors” (originally established by Berlin and Kay, 1969) that work as cognitive
reference points for their less central variants, so that the former are used to
categorize the latter. This kind of categorization of color is inherently fuzzy and
flexible. Indeed, relative to the four defining properties of classical categories,
the natural taxonomy of things seems to exhibit exactly the opposite
properties, as summarized by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 145; see also
Geeraerts 1989).
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In contrast to the first property of classical categories, prototype-based
categories cannot be given an encompassing definition by necessary and
sufficient  conditions,  for  the  classification  of  x  as  y  is  based  on  analogous
similarity  rather  than  digital  one.  As  opposed  to  the  second  property  of
classical categories, the members of a prototypical category are connected by
family resemblances rather than by binary either/or-features. Indeed, some
members are linked by one set of attributes while others are linked by another,
and  these  attributes  themselves  are  gradual  rather  than  binary.  As  a
consequence  of  the  first  and  second  points,  category  membership  itself  is
gradual property and therefore prototypical categories are inherently
structured and heterogenous.
Regardless  of  its  scope  being  originally  quite  narrow,  Prototype  Theory
made a substantial impact on the emerging paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics,
which resulted in the further development of Prototype Theory for linguistic
purposes (e.g. Lakoff 1987). We may only consider briefly the influence of this
theory in Cognitive Grammar. On a general level, Cognitive Grammar, which
approaches language as a learned set  of  units,  expands the concept of  fuzzy
categories to the description of linguistic (including grammatical) categories
in general. This requires, however, that linguistic classification is
complemented with an additional process of schematization (which in
Cognitive Grammar ultimately receives more attention), while still preserving
the original flexibility of prototype-based categorization.
In brief (see e.g. FCG-1: 371–372), the categorization of a target T (a new
conceptual entity) in terms of a standard S (an existing conceptual entity or
prototype) constitutes of detecting the similarities between the two. These
similarities in turn form the schema for the category now formed by S and T.
A schema itself is dynamic and evasive, and it is not suggested that it would
have any substance outside the categorization event itself. On the contrary, the
concept that fulfills the role of schema in some categorization event indeed has
substance of its own. For example, the fact that the entity ‘fruit’ is schematic
and  works  as  a  schema  with  respect  to  ‘banana’  and  ‘apple’  only  in  their
categorization does not mean it would cease to exist as a concept outside that
categorization. Instead, it implies the interconnectedness of lexical concepts,
which  in  Cognitive  Grammar  is  referred  to  as  “schematic  network”  (FCG-1:
492), and is further developed in the analysis of grammatical units as well.
The  process  of  schematization  provides  Cognitive  Grammar  with  the
theoretical momentum to explain the development of grammatical units from
the lexicon through grammaticalization as schematization over time and the
acquisition of grammatical units as schematization in exposure to their
instantiations in actual speech. This also offers Cognitive Grammar a strong
mandate for rejecting the innatism of language included in the generativist
paradigm. Furthermore, this conception of categorization further encourages
the dissipation of  boundaries between different linguistic  categories such as
morphology, lexicon, and syntax, justifying the treatment of the whole
spectrum of linguistic phenomena as inherently meaningful.
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On  this  complex  issue,  we  only  state  here  that  a  uniform  learning
mechanism  for  all  linguistic  categories  is  assumed.  In  addition  to  the  non-
modular view of cognition, in which linguistic conceptualization exploits
different areas of cognition in a holistic fashion, this implies that meaning is
associated with all linguistic units, (excluding phonological units) from a level
of analysis to another (more of this in the following section). Note also, that
while  phonological  units  as  such  are  not  meaningful,  Cognitive  Grammar
nevertheless approaches them as a cognitive entities, positing “phonological
space”  (FCG-1:  76–77)  as  the  cognitive  domain  of  their  instantiation;  this
domain is largely structured by the same conceptual categorization principles
as its semantic counterpart.
The semantic uniformity of Cognitive Grammar has basically two
dimensions: an inter-conceptual one and an intra-conceptual one. The former
pertains to the categorization of linguistic units into schematic networks,
which has some immediate descriptive advantages with regard to the actual
pragmatic flexibility of speech. Organizing lexical concepts into natural
taxonomies  on  based  on  experience  means  that  they  are  acquired  as
interrelated part-synonyms. This  reflects  back  to  the  use  of  these  same
concepts as mutual motivated interchangeability between concepts under
certain  restrictions.   For  instance,  referring  to  a  fruit  may  involve  a  whole
spectrum of lexemes of variable schematicity, given the pragmatic
circumstances: granny smith, apple, or fruit are  all  adequate  titles  for  the
same experiential object under certain circumstances.15
On the other hand, a schematic network is advantageous as a descriptive
concept because of its utility in analyzing the different senses of a polysemic
word as distinct, yet interrelated, partly synonymous words of different levels
of abstraction. In acquisition through actual use, it is obvious that we expose
ourselves  to  a  wide  range  of  different  uses  of  the  lexical  concept  ‘fruit’.  In
processing these different uses, e.g. for the aforementioned apple and banana,
we are likely to end up judging some uses as more (proto-) typical either for
quantitative  or  qualitative  reasons.  These  uses  again  serve  as  a  standard  of
comparison in the future instances.  This again involves a schematization that
produces  schematic  hierarchy.  This  implies  that  the  meaning  of  a  single
polysemic  concept  is  in  fact  organized  as  a  schematic  network  in  a  manner
similar to distinct, but interconnected, lexical items.
One dictum of Cognitive Grammar is that most lexemes can be analyzed as
polysemic and can therefore be fitted in to description in terms of schematic
networks.  It  still  remains  to  be  explained,  how  a  distinct  sense,  or  a  node,
15 From a Roschian perspective, the choice is not totally pragmatic but subject to what is typically
considered the so-called “basic level of categorization”, which is basically the optimal level of
categorization in terms of abstraction. The level of abstraction, or the amount of relatively fixed semantic
features, amounts to the level of inclusiveness in categorization. Thus the basic level of categorization is
defined so that the concept inhabiting it is semantically rich enough to distinguish the object of
categorization from other objects with the least possible amount of cognitive effort (Rosch 1978).
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within such network should be described. This requires additional concepts,
such  as  cognitive  domains  and  figure/ground  segregation,  which  are
presented in what follows. At the same time, we will consider what is implied
by  the  synthesis  of  the  non-modularity  and  the  form  of  linguistic
categorization presented above.
2.2.3 ENCYCLOPEDIC MEANING AND ITS ORGANIZATION
If  linguistic  meaning  is  learned,  and  moreover,  learned  by  a  non-modular
cognitive system, its necessary property is that it cannot be distinguished by
any  strict  criteria  from  other  categories  of  human  knowledge  (FCG-1:  155–
156).
For Cognitive Grammar, meaning equals conceptualization (CGBI: 30);
conceptualization, in turn, may accommodate anything that is experientially
associated with a concept through the contexts of its instantiation. This view
of semantics is referred to as encyclopedic (for a comprehensive description,
see FCG-1: 154–166). The meaning of a linguistic item cannot be condensed
into a description in propositional form in the way of a dictionary item, or by
feature matrices as in structural semantics; instead, meaning is seen as
consisting of multiple nodes of information that are interconnected by, and
organized hierarchically according to, their centrality for a given concept, its
semantic variant or its specific instance.
Network model  precludes definite boundaries of  meaning:  centrality  is  a
gradient  feature,  a  relative  value  of  which  may  easily  be  overruled  by
contextual factors. Similarly, a usage-based grammar necessarily involves
gradation from pragmatics to semantics (e.g. Langacker 1988: 57, CGBI: 39–
42). A semantic unit acquires its unit status gradually through use but also
continues to be elaborated and adjusted by the pragmatic contexts in which it
is  instantiated  (FCG-1:  157).  The  result  is  that  the  boundary  between
conventional and non-conventional conceptual meaning is indeterminate
both for a semantic change as a process, as well as for an encyclopedic meaning
as a structure.
Langacker (CGBI: 40), however, denies the interpretation that the view of
Cognitive Grammar would preclude the existence of pragmatics altogether.
Rather, context-dependent or pragmatic meaning is the logically necessary
prerequisite of conventional semantics. Semantics and pragmatics are thus
presented in Cognitive Grammar as separate concepts, which, however, do not
correspond to strictly separate ontological categories. Even from the
perspective of Cognitive Grammar, one can point out phenomena that are
clearly  either  semantic  or  pragmatic  (ibid.).  The  mere  existence  of
intermediate cases nevertheless entails that the categories these notions evoke
are ontologically fluid.
The notion of gradation from pragmatics to semantics is a logical extension
of Cognitive Grammar’s theoretical premises. The specific formulation of this
gradation has nevertheless certain weak points that need to be addressed. First
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of all, as is extensively argued by Itkonen (e.g. 1978, 1981, 1997, 2003, 2008a,
2008b) sufficient linguistic communication requires that it is carried out
under rules that are socially constituted and thus commonly known, therefore
transcending the spatiotemporal scope of a single instance. Conversely, the
knowledge  of  language  is  of  normative  character,  i.e.  it  involves  socially
defined criteria of correctness. In so being, linguistic knowledge of speaker of
a language is unfalsifiable a priori (Itkonen 1997: 58), and it cannot be reduced
into a contingent fact about the context in which is instantiated. Furthermore,
the  correctness  is  typically  a  binary  feature,  which  suggests  a  rather  well-
defined category of context-independent linguistic knowledge.
Now, the application of this social definition to knowledge of linguistic
meaning  is  not  totally  straightforward  (for  discussion  see  Itkonen  1997,
2008a, forthc). The vagueness and flexibility of meaning-construction in
actual discourse precludes any specific predictions about what a linguistic unit
will mean on specific instance; just consider the unlimited human creativity in
how  we  establish  novel  animal  analogies  in  our  attempt  to  insult  our
conspecifics.  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  such  creativity  supposes  the
conventional semantics, from which the mutually understandable insults are
derived  from.  Pragmatic  meaning  can  therefore  be  defined,  at  least  to  a
substantial extent, as dependent on conventional meanings.
 It  thus  seems  necessary  that  semantics  and  pragmatics  are  posited  as
separate yet interacting ontological categories. On the other hand, an
analytical distinction between semantics and pragmatics is necessary for any
systematical  description  of  meaning:  any  categorical  judgment  about  a
semantic regularity presupposes the exclusion or abstraction of contextual
variables – or the detection of a contextual constant. The relevant question for
a  theory  of  encyclopedic  semantics  is  how  these  two  distinctions,  the
ontological and the analytical, should correspond to each other.
The  most  practical  answer  is  prefaced  by  defining  the  ontological
distinction  as  ideally  definite  but  empirically  indefinite.  There  can  be  no
partially falsifiable knowledge, so any category constituted by unfalsifiable
knowledge has to have quite precise boundaries ideally, whether the mapping
of these boundaries is a possible task or not. This position, in turn, defines the
nature of the analytical distinction. We cannot to distinguish in any absolute
or comprehensive way between the categories of conventional and non-
conventional  meaning  for  a  specific  expression.  Rather,  we  need  to  assume
that the distinction exists and try to map out the parts of the boundary that are
relevant for the present issue. As the semantic/pragmatic distinction is in any
case operationalized by semantic analysis, the analytical distinction is best
seen as systematic approximation of the ideal goal.
The analytical distinction between semantics and pragmatics is therefore
best applied so that the latter refers to any part of meaning that is defined,
elaborated or disambiguated by any part of the context. This approach makes
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the distinction largely perspectival.16 Any actual  instance of  a  semantic  unit
involves  both  semantically  and  pragmatically  defined  content,  and  the
conventional content itself may pertain to a semantic variant of a polysemic
concept disambiguated by the context. Furthermore, Östman (2005)
demonstrates how the pattern according to which a conventional semantic
unit becomes specified from context may itself entrench into a conventional
pattern of symbolization, that is, a “discourse construction” (ibid. 130). Given
the abundance of potentially conventional discourse structures, it is safest to
define the semantic/pragmatic distinction as an analytical tool, the specific
import of which depends on the level of analysis vis-à-vis the organization of
discourse.17
As faithful to its theoretical proclamations, Cognitive Grammar
nevertheless avoids applying the distinction between semantics and
pragmatics into its descriptive praxis. To prevent the concept of semantics
from dissolving entirely, Cognitive Grammar must present a principled view
of  how  different  encyclopedic  knowledge  associated  with  a  concept  is
organized in its acquisition and usage.
This view is based essentially on the concepts of figure/ground segregation
and cognitive domain.  Cognitive domain,  in brief,  is  a  function of  a  concept
defined  by  Cognitive  Grammar  (FCG-1:  488)  as  a  “coherent  area  of
conceptualization relative to which semantic units may be characterized”. The
different pieces of information associated with a concept are described as
cognitive  domains  or  substructures  within  cognitive  domains,  which
themselves are usually  free-standing concepts of  their  own. The rationale is
that, similar to the way in which different perceptual objects are categorized
in comparison to other objects, the informational substructures of a concept
are categorized in comparison to matching elements within different cognitive
domains. For instance, the meaning of [BALLOON]18 is based on our experience
with balloons, which can be decomposed into different realms of experience;
for example, the shape, feel, typical color, function, physical behavior, cultural
function  etc.,  which  all  become meaningful  as  related  to  different  cognitive
domains (e.g. the basic domain of [SPACE] or the complex domain of [PARTY]).
Figure/ground segregation, in contrast, is a gestalt-psychological core
principle, according to which the perception of an object always involves its
demarcation out of whatever serves as a background (FCG-1: 120–122, CGBI:
58). Cognitive Grammar (following Talmy’s Cognitive Semantics: 1972, 1978,
2000a: chap. 5) claims that this principle is active within conceptual structure
16 This approach is further motivated by the sheer number of possible semantic/pragmatic interfaces
(Turner 2009).
17 In my own analysis of discourse-level construal phenomena, the level of pragmatics is constituted
primarily by intra-textual conceptual relations, especially those between co-referential expressions.
18 Concepts and cognitive domains are not only treated in a uniform manner by Cognitive Grammar,
but they are also expressed using the same notation. Brackets stand for unit status, and capital letters
mark semantic content.
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as well. The linguistic manifestation of figure/ground segregation is referred
to  as  profile/base-structure  (FCG-1:  183–189).  Put  as  simply  as  possible,  a
profile  is  an  “entity  designated  by  a  semantic  structure”  (FCG-1:  491).  CG’s
argument, however, is that profile is not enough to describe the semantic value
of an expression. Rather, “[t]he semantic value of an expression […] derives
from the designation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its
position within a larger whole” (FCG-1: 183). What this means in practice is
that conceptual information is seen as inherently relational: the concept of a
three-dimensional  object  consists  of  configuration  or  a  region  within  a
conceptual domain of three-dimensional space.
Thus, whereas the profile is the “entity designated by a semantic structure”,
the base is the requisite cognitive structure within which the profile delineates
a  sub-part.  According  to  Langacker  (FCG-1:  486),  it  is  “[t]he  cognitive
structure against which the designatum of semantic structure is profiled”. As
in  the  case  of  [BALLOON],  certain  properties  are  more  central  to  a  concept’s
meaning either by default or under pragmatic conditions: the appearance and
use of a balloon are relatively more salient within the conventional meaning of
balloon than  the  knowledge  of  the  balloon’s  capacity  of  being  charged  with
static electricity, or the sound it makes when it deflates. The combination of
the most salient properties stands out as the concepts profile, which is thereby
delineated within the concept’s semantic scope. Most concepts are complex
enough to conflate information from different cognitive domains; the typical
organization of a conceptual base is thus a combination of different cognitive
domains, denoted by concept’s matrix (CGBI: 44).
The definition of profile is straightforward, but it is obvious that its case-
specific application does not yield an exhaustive description of the “entity
designated by a semantic structure”. The profile/base distinction rather
introduces a principled way of describing the vagueness of meaning: what is
profiled  or  un-profiled  is  not  definitive  or  rigid,  but  (once  again)  subject  to
various pragmatic effects. This adds flexibility to the theory, making Cognitive
Grammar  able  to  describe  the  variability  of  lexical  meaning  in  terms  of  an
alteration of conventional organization within the matrix. The visual
appearance of an inflated balloon, for instance, is thus quite peripheral to the
meaning of balloon when the concept is entertained by a technician working
at the balloon factory.
The profile/base distinction has yet one important function. It is the key-
concept  in  Cognitive  Grammar’s  effort  to  provide  the  main  grammatical
categories with a semantic description. What is profiled can be either a “thing”
or a “relation”. Whereas things are designated by a nominal predication (i.e.
nouns),  relations divide into processes (designated by verbs)  and atemporal
relations (designated, for example, by adjectives, adverbs and grammatical
cases). Typically, most concepts involve in relationally organized information
in their  bases.  The point Cognitive Grammar makes is  that  it  is  the profiled
entity that distinguishes major conceptual classes from each other: a region in
a conceptual space or a relation between multiple such regions.
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Categorization based on schemas and prototypes, the encyclopedic
conception of meaning and its organization into cognitive domains according
to the figure/ground-organization are at  the basis  of  semantics in Cognitive
Grammar. This type of semantics blurs the distinction between perceptual and
conceptual information both in positing cognitive mechanisms and properties
shared  by  these  two  realms  and  in  allowing  experiential  meaning  to
conventionalize into semantic units. This is further elaborated by the positing
of so-called basic domains, which relate to distinct perceptually grounded or
otherwise  conceptually  non-reducible  types  of  information,  e.g.  the  basic
domain  of  [SPACE]. The most important analogy between perceptual and
conceptual  information  posited  by  Cognitive  Grammar,  however,  is  the
analogy between the expressive flexibility of natural language and the viewing
or experiencing of a situation from different viewpoints or perspectives. This
capability is explicated by the dimensions of construal, and I will return to it
after discussing how these dimensions depend on a representative
conceptualizer.
2.3 CONCEPTUALIZER
Though I have emphasized the inherent interdependence between the notion
of conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal, Cognitive Grammar itself
does  not  give  much  attention  to  the  conceptualizer  or  this  dependence
relation.  Rather,  the  conceptualizer  is  introduced  in  the  theory  as  a  logical
necessity, on the one hand, and as a technical notion, on the other. Logically,
since it is a relationship, construal presupposes at least two relata. Technically,
the analysis of certain semantic phenomena seems to require explicit reference
to  a  conceptualizing  subject.  I  summarize  two  of  these  in  the  following  two
sections. Most notably, the conceptualizer is presented as a requisite structure
in  the  description  of  temporality.  The  dual  nature  of  temporality  is  then
presented as the conceptual basis for yet another major conceptual segregation
between processes, which are defined by their positive temporal profile (FCG-
1:  244–248),  and  things  and  atemporal  relations,  which  lack  this  type  of
profile.
2.3.1 CONCEPTUALIZER AND TIME
It seems obvious that, in our experience, perceptual objects and the processes
they take part in have very different statuses relative to time. Prototypically,
things exhibit (or are conceptualized as exhibiting) relative continuity through
time: ‘a rock’ remains ‘a rock’.  Processes, in turn, are largely defined by their
temporality both in experience and conceptualization: the  rock  remained  a
rock refers to no-change through time.
However,  the  conceptual  flexibility  provided  by  language  allows  us  to
transcend  what  is  typical  in  our  perceptual  experience.  For  instance,  the
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perceived process can be referred to by a nominal (the throwing of the rock)
instead of a verb. This conceptual flexibility, the fact that the temporal
properties of the target of conceptualization do not dictate the temporal
properties of the expression, motivates the postulation of two distinct levels of
temporality: processing time and conceived time (FCG-1: 167).19
Conceived time is simply the temporal property that constitutes a part of
an expression’s semantic content,20 whereas processing time is the temporal
extension of conceptualization as a process, which manifests in the different
ways temporality is inscribed in the meaning of processes. Processing time is
especially  relevant  to  our  current  topic  because  of  the  role  it  has  in  the
description of (the conceptual class of) processes.
It would be tempting to equate the distinction between the conceived and
the processing time with the segregation between objective and subjective
time,  a  naïve  folk-epistemological  distinction  inscribed  in  the  semantic
structure  of  grammar.  According  to  this  construct,  there  is  an  assumed
objective  temporal  evolution  of  things  in  the  world,  and  then  there  is  a
subjective experience of time embedded in whatever we may experience.
This model does not apply to Cognitive Grammar, however. Cognitive
Grammar maintains that both conceived and processing time are ultimately
properties of conceptualization and therefore primarily cognitive. The point is
that  processes  denoted  by  (finite)  verb  clauses  require  an  extra  level  of
conceptual temporality. This extra-level, in turn, necessitates a distinct form
of processing, or an emergent structure within a processing chain, that enables
detecting  change  or  no-change  between  cognitive  states.  This  form  of
processing is called sequential scanning. As opposed to summary scanning (a
mode of processing associated inter alia with  nouns  that  presents  all  the
relevant information simultaneously),  sequential  scanning is  “[t]he mode of
cognitive  processing  in  which  a  series  of  states  are  conceived  through  the
successive transformation of one into another” (FCG-1: 493; for discussion on
the processing types as applied in Fennistic studies, see Visapää 2008: 111–
114).
Sequential scanning consists of comparing conceptual component states
with each other in order to construe a temporal  relationship between them.
Note that we may, for example, think of a rock for a span of time, but this does
not  mean  that  we  are  evoking  a  conceptual  type  of  process.  To  count  as  a
process, the concept needs profile the relationship between the temporally
19 On  a  more  general  level,  this  is  in  line  with  Cognitive  Grammar’s  habit  of  incorporating  two
distinct perspectives in to conceptual semantics: processing and phenomenological. This dual
perspective is further discussed in chapter 3.
20 Conceived time may be the prominent semantic content of the expression (e.g. as with temporal
preposition such as before, after, etc.) but from an encyclopedic point of view it can be argued that almost
any expression involves some kind of conceived temporality of lesser prominence (e.g. temporal
continuity/discontinuity of physical objects such as a car vs. a flash).
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distinct cognitive states that entertain the concept of rock. This again leads to
the processual concept of a rock being a rock.
Profiling, to which we will return in section 2.4.3, refers to the selection of
profile,  the  designating  portion  of  a  concept’s  semantic  concept  that  was
discussed  above.  In  this  section,  however,  it  is  sufficient  to  characterize
profiling as the selection of conceptual structure that is most prominent in a
given concept or conceptualization, and thus determines the type of gestalt the
concept instantiates.
With respect scanning Langacker states that:
[b]ecause the scenes are viewed successively rather than simultaneously,
recognition  of  disparity  amounts  to  recognition  of  change.  In
contradistinction to summary scanning, the separate components
(states) are conceived as neither coexistent nor simultaneously available;
hence there is no judgment of inconsistency. (FCG-1: 145.)
Langacker’s emphasis on change may be misleading, for imperfective verbs
involve  comparison  that  results  in  the  recognition  of  similarity,  i.e.  no-
change.21 The  point  is  nevertheless  well  made:  if  we  are  to  explain  the
exceptional semantic status of verbs relative to how our experience of the
world is conceptually organized, our analysis has to account for the evolution
of matters through a certain span of time.
This temporality cannot be brought back to objective states of affair in “the
real world”. Under the conceptual flexibility Cognitive Grammar advocates, a
situation that is objectively the same may be construed either in a temporal or
atemporal fashion. The most obvious examples of this in English are finite verb
clauses and their gerund forms based on the present participle: the man beat
his dog vs. the beating of the dog.
Temporality needs therefore to be brought back to the conceptualizing
subject. This subjective account of temporality, in turn, is attained by the two
modes  of  processing  that  have  been  posited.  It  should  be  kept  in  mind,
however,  that  the  logical  necessity  of  a  subjectively  grounded  distinction
between two types of temporality does not by itself prove that different
processing  types  do  exist.  As  Visapää  (2008:  118–119)  has  pointed  out,
Langacker himself appeals to the intuitiveness of a processing-based
segregation of conceptualization (FCG-1: 253–254).
Of special relevance here is the specific way in which the conceptualizer is
presented in cognitive processing.22 This is best approached by taking a closer
look  at  sequential  scanning  and  the  how  is  formalized.  As  we  have  seen,  it
involves a scanning chain of multiple component states (demarcated below by
large  brackets),  which  are  linked  together  by  cognitive  processes  of
21 This aspectual factor is covered elsewhere in the theory, see FCG-1: chap. 7.2.
22 Temporality per se and its semantics in Cognitive Grammar are not of concern here. Cognitive
linguistic semantics of time is addressed in detail in Möttönen (2009, forthcoming).
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transformation of one component state into another (e.g. FCG-1: 145). This
establishes correspondences between the sub-components of the component
states,  and  detects  difference  as  well  as  similarity  through  comparison.
Conventional notation in Cognitive Grammar presents a scanning chain in the
following manner (see e.g. FCG-1: 250):
R0/t0                  R1/t1 R2/t2 Rn/tn
→ → → … →
C                    C                             C                                C
T0 T1                             T2                                           Tn
In this formulation, R marks the relation in a given moment of conceived time,
marked by t.  The  conceptualizer  is  marked  by C and  the  moment  of
conceptualization (or processing time) is marked by capital T. The higher level
in this formulation hence expresses the object of conceptualization, whereas
the lower level can be described as the subjective level. The relation R is
different in every component state. This particular scanning chain thus applies
to perfective verbs.
Note that the conceptualizer is placed inside the brackets. Though it is not
necessarily a part of the explicit content (the figure) of the linguistic
conceptualization, as an element of the ground, it is defined as belonging to
the maximal semantic scope of expression. Processing time, on the contrary,
is not part of the expression per se, but is defined by extra-linguistic factors.
Indeed, conceptualization takes place whenever and to whatever extent that is
required by conceptualizer to form a coherent linguistic gestalt.
Note also the correspondence between conceived (t0 >  ∙∙∙ >  tn) and
processing  time  (T0 > ∙∙∙ > Tn).  It  is  clear  that  actual  cases  of  absolute
correspondence between these two is next to non-existent, so the formulation
above (adopted as such from Langacker: FCG-1: 250) is best approached with
caution. Rather than an absolute correspondence, the relationship between
the two dimensions of temporality needs to be understood as a flexible type of
iconicity. That is, there exists a partial and context-dependent iconic
correlation between the processing time and conceived time for a linguistically
construed process, a relationship which is necessarily subject to adjustment of
temporal scale. Just consider the following: our galaxy has evolved over the
last 13.7 billion years vs. electric cars have evolved over the past decade or
so. It is unlikely at least that the two conceptualizations associated with
evolved would reflect the objective temporal ratios (1 to 1.37 billion) in their
processing.
The  role  the  conceptualizer  fulfills  as  an  element  of  the  ground  in
sequential scanning serves as a representative (while not exhaustive)
illustration of the term’s analytical value in Cognitive Grammar.
Conceptualizer is presupposed by those semantic phenomena which cannot be
rooted  down  to  the  properties  of  events  and  things  in  some  sense  that  is
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independent of a conceptualizing subject. The manners in which distinct
phenomena make reference to the conceptualizer vary substantially, however.
Elsewhere  in  the  theory,  namely  in  its  treatise  of  construal  phenomena
(CGBI: 55–89), Cognitive Grammar presents analytical functions for the
notion  of  conceptualizer  that  are  specific  to  each  dimension  of  construal.
Cognitive Grammar, however, lacks a unified theoretical account of the term’s
justification.  Rather,  it  seems  that  a  conceptualizer  is  presupposed  by  the
ontological standpoint of the theory, in which meaning is necessarily evoked
by  an  individual  subject.  Cognitive  Grammar,  for  example,  does  not
problematize the relationship between conceptualizer as an inherent element
of component states and the scanning event, which chains the component
states together to form a coherent concept.  The theory also does not offer  a
detailed account of the relationship between conceptualizer and processing
time.23
The lack of explicitness in these matters does not pose a serious problem
for CG. Instead, only some complementary analysis is needed. First of all, we
may concur with Cognitive Grammar that a conceptualizer, as a semantic
element  within  the  maximal  scope  of  conceptualization,  is  indeed  a  logical
prerequisite of perspectival or subjective meaning. As a relational element
dependent of the meaning of an expression, conceptualizer needs to be
understood as an expression-dependent, non-ontological concept that has to
be  separated  from  the  actual  flesh-and-blood  speaker/hearer,  or  from  any
analytical abstraction thereof. While Cognitive Grammar does not make this
distinction  itself,  I  consider  it  inevitable:  the  conceptualizer  is  the
conceptualizer of the given expression, regardless of the identity of any actual
interlocutor in a piece of discourse. Conceptualizer of an expression may also
be  given  a  hypothetical  mental  correlate,  but  inasmuch  as  the  correlate  is
hypothesized on the basis of the expression itself, the conceptualizer cannot
be reduced to the said correlate.
In so being, Cognitive Grammar cannot avoid positing a representative,
semantically implemented conceptualizer.24 This raises the question what to
do with the conceived/processing distinction Cognitive Grammar implements
on the temporality. How could a conceptualizer, as a mere semantic attribute
dependent on other semantic  attributes,  be able to “process” anything? The
conceptual divide between linguistic meaning (inherently social) and
processing (inherently cognitive) seems unbridgeable.
I  claim,  however,  that  the  problem  only  arises  if  processing  time  is
understood literally in psychophysiological terms. Instead, if processing itself
is understood as a semantic property of the expressions themselves (a
semantic requirement or a convention), we simply end up with two distinct
but interrelated types of socially encoded information. One type involves the
23 See e.g. FCG-1: 167–168, CGBI: 79.
24 This (intendedly favorable) interpretation places Cognitive Grammar on the long line of research
on subjectivity and message-dependent meanings (e.g. Bühler 1990 [1934]; Jakobson 1971 [1957]).
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position of the conceptualizer relative to whatever is conceptualized: that is,
the temporal construal relationship between the conceptualizer and the
conceived time. The other type pertains to the schematic conceptual model
according to which the relationship is construed on the level of expression. For
instance,  a  tense  can  be  defined  as  an  inflectional  schema  or  construction,
whose foremost semantic function is to determine how temporal information
is related, profiled, and organized relative to other present semantic factors.
There obviously cannot be socially shared directions of how to cognitively
process anything. In contrast, an expression represents information as
construed in some socially specified sense, which may likely favor some non-
specific processing pattern, latter of which is not, however, a determinant of a
linguistic category. I may not know the specific way in which I myself or my
fellow Finnish speaker processes a specific finite verb, but I may be positive
that we share the expression’s conventional semantic organization to a
significant extent.
We may now turn back to conceptualizer and consider how it relates to the
defined  two  types  of  temporality,  on  one  hand,  and  to  the  two  processing
mechanisms posited by Cognitive Grammar, on the other.
From a psychologistic point of view, the different modes of processing and
their relative independence from what is processed actually presuppose a
conceptualizer (or “processor”) that is distinct from the conceptualizer within
the  semantic  scope  of  expression.  This  may  seem  dubious,  but  the  claim
follows quite rationally from the analysis Cognitive Grammar presents. Take
for  example  the  present  tense  of  the  Finnish  copula  in Tällä hetkellä olen
kuopan pohjalla (’at the moment, I am at the bottom of the hole’, MT 6/2010:
13).  The  conceptualizer  of  this  expression  is  also  responsible  for  the  action
marked with the first person. The interpretation of the expression as taking
part in the moment of speaking (and extending over time without involving
change) logically requires two states at a minimum; in both of these states the
conceptualizer corresponds to the trajector25 of the action of being at the
bottom of a hole. The forming of a coherent gestalt of these states requires a
comparison,  a  form  of  processing,  for  which  the  inscribed  conceptualizer
cannot be responsible. In order to describe the expression in processing terms,
we are, in fact, forced to postulate “a conceiving conceptualizer”, a perspectival
position or a vantage-point within the semantic scope, and “a processing
conceptualizer”, that is responsible for evoking distinct component states and
relating them mutually to form a temporal gestalt.
Because  meaningful  linguistic  communication  already  presupposes  the
plurality  of  communicators,  this  analysis  is  quite  redundant.  Indeed,  it  is
questionable whether the “processing conceptualizer” would offer any
25 A trajector in Cognitive Grammar (CGBI: 70–73), refers to the most prominent participant in a
semantic  relationship.  The  trajector  is  not  necessary  a  mover,  but  can  be  described  as  such
metaphorically when the relationship in question involves change. For a more detailed description of the
trajector and its relational counterpart, the landmark, see section 2.4.3.
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analytical  value  –  other  than  the  fulfillment  of  a  contingent  theoretical
requirement.  In  contrast,  as  a  semantic  conceptualizer  can  be  posited  as  a
logically necessary part of non-objective meaning, its dependence of a distinct
conceptualizing  subject  is  a  necessary  truth,  similarly  to  the  subject-
dependence of any facet of experiential meaning. It can therefore be stated that
the processing-based approach to the notion of conceptualizer is a potentially
beneficial theoretical exercise from a psycholinguistic point of view, but it only
causes unnecessary confusion when applied to semantic considerations.
Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  question  of  processing  as  the  demarcation  line
between externalist and mentalist views of meaning.  In Cognitive Grammar,
the mind’s online activity is deemed vital for sufficient semantic description.
In  contrast,  I  consider  processing  to  be prompted or  by required as the
necessary psychophysiological basis of linguistic meaning, but this does not
grant it any explanatory status vis-à-vis linguistic meaning itself. The reasons
for this insufficiency are discussed in further detail in chapter 3. In any case, I
consider the notion of conceptualizer to be separate from any specific mode of
cognitive processing. Instead, it is primarily a feature of an overall semantic
scope of any expression, and it is therefore shared, among the expressions
themselves, by anyone who is capable of using them correctly. In so being, the
notion of conceptualizer is closely tied to that of “ground”.
2.3.2 CONCEPTUALIZER AND GROUND
It has been demonstrated above that a conceptualizer is a logically necessary
part of construal. Consequently, if every possible linguistic expression involves
construal of some kind, then the notion of conceptualizer is necessarily global
as well.  The question is  whether the notion of  conceptualizer has a positive
analytical value in the distinction of different construal phenomena. Cognitive
Grammar’s customary description of a construal relationship does not answer
this question but enables its specification:
“I  will  say  that  the  speaker  (or  hearer),  by  choosing  appropriate  focal
“settings”  and  structuring  scene  in  a  specific  manner,  establishes  a
construal relationship between himself and the scene so structured.
The construal relationship therefore holds between the conceptualizer of
a linguistic predication and the conceptualization that constitutes this
predication.” (FCG-1: 128, emphasis in the original.)
The conceptualizer is  thus not posited merely as a  necessary relatum but as
representative constitutional force behind construal relationship, nature of
which  may  be  specified  reciprocally  from  the  relationship  itself.  What
Cognitive Grammar does not explicate is if the conceptualizer may be specified
only as a  relatum or with semantic  content of  its  own. A further question is
whether the conceptualizer’s status, as a part of a (schematic) interactional
setting, is affected by the alternation of focal settings or vice versa.
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The  interactional  setting  is  referred  to  in  Cognitive  Grammar  by  the
concept of ground.26 Langacker defines the term (CGBI: 78, emphasis in the
original) somewhat peculiarly: “[t]he term ground is used for the speaker and
hearer, the speech event in which they participate, and their immediate
circumstances (e.g. the time and place of speaking)”. In contrast, the way the
term is used in semantic analysis (which, in Cognitive Grammar, is conducted
almost entirely on coined examples) does not evoke some actual speech event
and its participants, but the conventional semantics of the selected expression.
However, as will be discussed below, the meaning of an individual expression
is also shown to involve multiple conventional  conceptualizer positions and
the interrelationship between them.
A useful addition to this definition of ground comes from Verhagen (2005:
7)  who  suggests  that  the  ground  should  also  include  whatever  knowledge,
implied by a linguistic expression, the participants may share. This forms the
“common  ground”  (a  version  of  which  Langacker  later  includes  in  his
treatment of construal as “Current Discourse Space”, CDS. See CGBI: 59–60).
This extension allows for pragmatically constituted shared knowledge. As
long as the conventional, context-independent meaning of an expression is
chosen  for  the  starting  point  of  analysis,  the  ground  must  nevertheless  be
considered  also  as  a  semantically  defined  structure  of  knowledge.  It  should
also be noted that the Langackerian analysis of the ground is quite compatible
with the traditional description of deictic elements or indexicality (e.g.
Benveniste 1966 [1956]; Bühler 1990 [1934]; Jakobson 1971 [1957]; for a
comprehensive review, see Larjavaara 1990). Indeed, the ground only exceeds
the traditional notion of deixis in scope (for discussion, see Etelämäki et al.
2009).
The  best  way  to  illustrate  the  notion  of  ground  is  by  the  Cognitive
Grammar’s concept of viewing arrangement. As we have seen, Cognitive
Grammar assumes a close affinity between perception and conception in the
human experiential realm. A viewing arrangement is defined as their shared
base structure, as it is manifested in the domain of linguistic meaning (see e.g.
CGBI:  73).  It  is  a  metaphorical  way  of  describing  an  expression’s  overall
semantic scope as structured according to a setting in which a subject views a
separate visual object in a shared context. The viewing arrangement includes
the most central semantic concepts of Cognitive Grammar discussed this far:
the object of conceptualization, the conceptualizers, the ground that subsumes
them and the construal relationship between the ground/conceptualizers and
the object (of conceptualization). Verhagen (2007: 59) offers an illustration of
the viewing arrangement, as it is originally presented in Cognitive Grammar
(e.g. FCG-1: 129, Langacker 1993: 454).
26 This is to be separated from the “ground” in figure-ground alignment.
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O: object of conceptualization
S: subject of conceptualization
Figure 1
The interpretation of figure 1 is quite straightforward. What is essential is the
division of the figures content into two levels: the upper level “O” denotes the
object of conceptualization, or what is being “spoken” of, and the lower level
“S”  is  the  subject  of  conceptualization,  that  is,  the  conceptualizer.  In  the
standard Cognitive Grammar formalization, circles represent things. In the
upper level of figure 1, the depicted things are linked by a horizontal line, which
represents a relationship.  The simple constellation of the two upper nodes as
a  whole  stands  for  some state  of  affairs.  The  vertical  line  that  connects  the
conceptualizer to this state of affairs stands for the construal relationship.
It  is  not  that  surprising  that  the  viewing  arrangement  fits  quite  well
together with the constellation consisting of conceptualization,
conceptualizer, and construal. We will see later how the viewing arrangement
proves essential in describing different construal phenomena. At the moment,
we are interested in the subjective level of the arrangement, the conceptualizer
and the conceptualizer’s relationship to other elements the subjective level
may involve. Because the conceptualizer is a self-evident part of the ground,
we will consider them together.
First  of  all  it  should be noted that  Cognitive Grammar posits  a  symbolic
class of so-called grounding elements (CGBI: 263), which serve to relate what
is being said to the immediate situation of speech. The essential factor is that
grounding is directed at other predicates that otherwise would remain generic
and difficult to relate to for the interlocutors. Grounding elements divide into
grammatically distinct groups such as articles, quantifiers and demonstratives
(nominal  grounding);  and  modal  verbs  and  tenses  (clausal  grounding).  The
grounding function of these elements is directed at lexical items such as nouns
and  verbs,  which,  as  an  essential  outcome  of  grounding,  become  clausal
elements:  nominals  and  finite  clauses,  respectively.  In  Cognitive  Grammar,
lexemes,  i.e.  linguistic  types,  serve  classificatory  function  (cf.  section.  2.2.2
above on categorization); whereas nominal and finite clauses, i.e. instances,
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are  referential  (CGBI:  264).  Grounding  is  essentially  a  form  of  linguistic
instantiation, leading from types to instances (ibid. 266–269).
Grounding elements are opposed to those predicates which explicitly
profile some substructure of the ground, for example the demonstrative
pronoun I,  which  profiles  the  conceptualizer.  This  exclusion  may  appear
curious, but it is in fact well-founded. From a logical point of view, a predicate
that profiles a substructure of the ground cannot serve the grounding function,
for instead of relating subjective and objective levels of conceptualization, it
raises some structure from the former to the latter. In other words, these
predicates are connected to the ground and indirectly serve to connect other
elements as well, but this is not their foremost semantic function.
An interesting case in this respect is the person inflection in Finnish (see
e.g. Laury 2002). The Finnish suffixes, e.g. the first-person -n in mä hoida-n
’I  deliver’,  are  in  the  spoken  variant  typically  accompanied  by  a  personal
pronoun which serves as an explicit clausal subject; but the suffixes may also
be the only subject-specifying structure, especially in written texts.
Nevertheless, the semantic content of these suffixes is non-referential: they are
not free-standing conceptual structures that as such evoke the subject, but are
conceptually  dependent  on  verb  clauses,  the  content  of  which  they  help  to
specify  relative  to  the  ground.  In  other  words,  these  suffixes  make  eligible
candidate for grounding elements as defined in Cognitive Grammar.
Langacker’s insight is that a great proportion of so-called grammatical
meaning is exactly about relating the expressed state of affairs to the speech
situation.  As  we  will  see  in  sections  2.4.1–2.4.4,  this  pragmatic/semantic
function happens to be at the core of construal phenomena as well. The focus
of  interest  here  is  nevertheless  is  how  both  grounding  (through  grounding
elements)  and  the  objectifying  of  the  ground  (through  mentioning  some
subpart of the ground explicitly) involves not only relating the conceptualizer
to  the  object  of  conceptualization  but  also  relating  both  the  object  of
conceptualization and the conceptualizer to the other subparts of the ground.
Most importantly, both Verhagen (2007) and Langacker’s (CGBI) analyses
involve multiple conceptualizers. The ultimate question, however, is whether
this in any way affects what is understood by conceptualizer.
Verhagen (2007: 60) asserts that the ground involves not only the time and
place  of  speech  but  also  other  participants  in  the  speech  situation,  and
Langacker’s updated analysis (CGBI: 261–262) involves both the speaker (S)
and the hearer (H). As Verhagen notes, this situation is best described simply
by expanding the diagrammatic presentation of the viewing arrangement (cf.
fig 1.) by one additional node on the subjective level27:
27 Verhagen’s  diagram  is  favored  here  not  only  because  of  its  relative  clarity  but  also  because  of
Verhagen’s treatment of multiple conceptualizers to be discussed in the following.
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O: object of conceptualization
S: subject of conceptualization
                  1                                      2
Figure 2
In figure 2, the right node (1) on the S-level stands for “the speaker” and the
node  on  the  left  (2)  stands  for  “the  hearer”.  This  makes  the  diagram  non-
symmetrical  on  the  horizontal  axis.  Verhagen  states  that  the  more
rudimentary diagram (with one subjective node) is indeed representative for
some restricted cases, but that most semantic compositions involve this more
complex arrangement (Verhagen 2007: 60).
What linguistic expressions do is that they profile different parts of the two-
level configuration. For example, maximally objective expressions, with
minimal or zero reference to the ground, would involve profiling simply the
upper  level  of  the  configuration,  but  these  would  make  quite  artificial
examples, such as non-clausal lexemes (dog).  Nominal  grounding  with  a
definite article (the dog)  would  involve  in  this  description  profiling  the
subjective-objective axis depicted as a vertical line in the diagram.
Let us consider nominal grounding more closely. Neither definiteness nor
indefiniteness per se profiles the subjective level of the viewing arrangement,
but the subjective-objective axis. The profiling of the subjective-objective axis,
however, is not independent of the specifics of the subjective level: this
profiling happens through conventional semantic structures (e.g. articles in
English),  but  is  always  reactive  with  regard  to  the  exact  composition  to  the
ground.  In  other  words,  definiteness  is  naturally  a  matter  of  linguistic
convention  of  English,  but  one  of  its  main  functions  is  to  underline  the
common  pragmatic  availability  of  the  referent  in  question.  Thus,  semantic
description of certain predicates requires a complex ground while it does not
profile any of the ground’s substructures.
The notion of ground in Cognitive Grammar is attractive exactly because it
incorporates the communicative need of profiling different aspects of
epistemic sharedness (or non-sharedness) into the description of conventional
semantics. However, the delineation of grounding elements proves
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problematic  when  we  shift  our  focus  from  English  to  other  languages:  the
problem lies in the criteria for grounding elements, which seem to lack in the
sensitivity required by cross-linguistic application.
To understand the fuzziness of the category of grounding, I will consider
examples of ground-related phenomena that challenge the original delineation
of grounding elements and that also help to underline the close relationship
between  grounding  and  construal.  Finnish,  for  example,  lacks  articles  and
would be expected to lack overt marking for definiteness in general. Therefore,
the nominal grounding in Finnish is fulfilled by the very instantiation of the
noun in its grammatical, semantic and discursive context (on instantiation, see
CGBI: 266–269).
On the other hand, it seems that demonstrative pronouns in Finnish have
partially adopted the function of articles of expressing definiteness in spoken
discourse (see Laury 1997 on development of Finnish demonstrative se ’it’ into
a  definite  article).  The  pronouns  also  have  a  wide  variety  of  other,  non-
referential functions in organizing interaction vis-à-vis the ground (see e.g.
Etelämäki 2009). As the demonstrative pronouns are already included in the
category  of  grounding  elements,  this  does  not  challenge  the  notion  of
grounding as such. Rather, the wide applicability of demonstrative pronouns
suggests  that  a  grounding  function  may  be  secondary  to  referentially
meaningful structures and the category of grounding thus might not be given
precise boundaries.
Verhagen  (2007:  63),  in  turn,  discusses  simple  locatives,  such  as the
ballroom is below,  in  which  the  proximal,  non-profiled  location  of  both
interlocutors, or of the addressee, is by default interpreted as the landmark,
the entity according to which the ballroom is located28, for the adverb below.
In the case of so-called specific grounding, on the other hand, Verhagen (ibid.
65–66; referring to Janssen 2002) demonstrates how the division between
distal and proximal demonstratives, such as this and that, has in fact more to
do with the relative mental accessibility of the object to the interlocutors than
with the actual location of the referent. Demonstratives, in other words, profile
the construal relationship vis-à-vis different subparts within the complex
ground.  Yet  another  instance  of  construal  that  requires  a  complex  ground
involves what Verhagen calls the “process of coordinating cognition” or
“coordination of perspectives” (ibid. 66). Certain grammatical structures, such
as clausal negation and complement-taking mental predicates, have to do with
relating interlocutors’ different views and epistemic stances to each other.
Similar to clausal negation are verbs of inherent negation (Horn 2001: 521–
28 Landmark has a specific technical definition and use in Cognitive Grammar (e.g. CGBI: 70–73),
albeit here a non-technical reading of the term is sufficient. In an expression constituting a relationship,
the landmark is  the entity  of  secondary focus.  The entity  of  primary focus,  i.e.  the trajector (ibid.)  is
characterized by the relational expression (e.g. transitive clause), which relates it to the landmark. For a
more detailed description of trajector/landmark relationship, see section 2.4.3.
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524), such as Finnish välttää (’avoid’). These verbs refer to the non-occurrence
of a form of activity specified by the verb’s complement:
1. Dosentti  Maili Pörhölä […] välttä-ä     käyttä-mä-stä   sana-a     kiusaaja
      [docent    Maili Pörhölä […] avoid-3SG  use-INF-ELA    word-PTV bully]
’Docent Maili Pörhölä […] avoids using the word bully’
         (MT 1/2010: 21)
Verbs of inherent negation are more specific than negative verbs proper in that
they specify the cause that leads from the non-existent state of affairs to the
existent  state  of  affairs,  e.g.  avoidance  in  the  subject’s  behavior  (avoid),
epistemic  stance  (deny),  or  will  and  authority  (forbid, prohibit). Yet these
verbs and “simple” negation are alike in that they evoke and mutually relate
two opposite situations and thus are inherently contrastive in their semantics.
These  contrasting  states,  again,  need  to  be  related  to  some  kind  of
epistemic agents, i.e. conceptualizers. The third-person use of these verbs,
such as välttää (’avoid’)  in  example  3,  somewhat  complicates  the  situation
relative  to  the  conceptualizer,  as  it  involves  not  only  the  perspective  of  the
agent, but also that of the person referring to that agent. We may nevertheless
dismiss  the  extra  level  of  conceptualization  here  and  concentrate  on  the
semantics of the verb as it relates the actual situation (avoidance) to a possible
situation (the avoided action).
The  activity  of  avoiding  in  example  3,  carried  out  by  the  grammatical
subject and referred to by the author of the interview-based magazine-text, is
necessarily contrastive relative to an expectation that the avoided action would
likely occur under normal conditions. It would be reasonable to expect that the
person, talking about bullying, uses the term ‘bully’. The predicate verb thus
evokes  a  complex  ground,  which  includes  the  relationship  between  the
‘avoider’  and  the  ‘expecter’  (of  the  action  that  is  actually  avoided),  and  the
relationship between the complex ground and the object of conceptualization.
It could be argued that a verb such as välttää profiles a mental predicate or an
attitude that  is  essentially  a  substructure of  the ground,  which excludes the
verb from the category of grounding elements. I maintain, however, that the
verb refers primarily to refraining as actual ongoing behavior that evokes the
ground implicitly (i.e. without profiling the ground or any of its substructures).
Construal  as  selection  is  thus  closely  linked  to  the  ground  formed  by
multiple (representative) interlocutors, whose specifications are nevertheless
linguistically rooted. A valid question is whether construal is always based on
non-trivial specifications of the ground. This question is further explored in
chapter 4. Another point is that conceptualizers in this perspective seem to be
semantically empty and contentful at the same time. The conceptualizer does
not carry meaning other than that  available from any given expression,  but
this  is  meaning  nonetheless.  The  primary  conceptualizer  thinks,  knows,  or
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expects a state of affairs, whereas the secondary conceptualizer agrees,
disagrees or is admitted to the piece of knowledge.
Another  challenging  case  for  the  category  of  grounding  is  provided  by
Nuyts (2002), who discusses the Dutch system of epistemic expressions. These
are  shown  to  fit  poorly  in  Cognitive  Grammar’s  definition  of  grounding
because of their (relatively) low level of grammaticalization. As Nuyts points
out, accepting the exclusion of the said epistemic expressions from grounding
elements would result in a situation, in which the grounding function of a vast
variety  of  Dutch  modal  expression  types  would  be  refuted.  The  concept  of
grounding thus seems to be in need of revision.
A  technical  solution  could  be  achieved  by  loosening  the  criterion  of
grammaticality for the grounding predicates. From Nuyts’ perspective,
however,  this  would  ultimately  be  unsatisfactory,  because  it  is  actually  the
theoretical  justification  of  the  ground  that  is  in  need  of  revision.  The
theoretical argument Nuyts defends is that semantics needs to be divided into
conceptual  and  linguistic  counterparts  (ibid.  436–437),  and  that  epistemic
modality, inter alia,  is  primarily  a  “conceptual  dimension”  (ibid.  456).
Conceptual semantics involves pragmatically available information and so-
called world knowledge; these then need to be construed according to the
communicative  situation  with  the  restricted  conceptual  tools  provided  by
conventional  linguistic  semantics.  In  other  words,  there  are  two  separate
cognitive levels that are necessarily involved in linguistic conceptualization
and,  according  to  Nuyts,  these  levels  are  presupposed  by  the  rhetoric  of
Cognitive Grammar (e.g. Langacker 2010: 3) as well. A similar observation is
made by Itkonen on the notion of construal (forthc.).
The  main  implication  of  Nuyts’  analysis  is  that  grounding  should  be
considered  first  and  foremost  a  phenomenon  of  conceptual  domain,  rather
than of linguistic semantics. This interpretation is derived from the fact that
conscious experience necessarily relates information (e.g. sensory data) into
the spatial, temporal, and epistemic here-and-now of self, which again results
in  “full,  qualificational  system”  (Nuyts  2002:  456)  within  the  conceptual
sphere.  Grounding is  then about filling this  system with values and relating
information  to  the  “moment  of  consciousness  […]  of  the  “conceptualizing
subject”” (ibid., referring to Chafe 1994). The expressive repertoire of natural
language  is  largely  isomorphic  relative  to  this  holistic  system  but  it  is  also
instrumental  by  its  ontological  nature,  which  hinders  a  precise  linguistic
description in conceptualist terms.
The more practical linguistic point Nuyts argues for is the true appreciation
of the grounding function of Dutch epistemic expressions. Nuyts’ conceptual
approach implies a substantially more flexible category of linguistic grounding
than that of Cognitive Grammar. Nuyts, for instance, discusses the difficulty
of  separating  grounding-related  linguistic  phenomena  from  construal  as  a
possible source of confusion in combining cognitive and functional linguistic
perspectives (ibid. 438). Viewed from Nuyts’ perspective, construal could be
depicted exactly as forging elements of conceptual semantics according to the
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restrictions of linguistic convention and demands of the communicative
situation. On this general level, construal resembles grounding in that both are
processes leading from conceptual to linguistic semantics.
We  will  return  to  the  relationship  between  conceptual  and  linguistic
semantics, on the one hand, and the relationship between grounding and
construal, on the other, in chapters 4 and 5. Here I simply agree with Nuyts’
observation of the close interrelation between grounding and construal.
Furthermore, I accept Nuyts’ criticism of Cognitive Grammar’s delineation of
grounding predicates, as its application to languages other than English may
exclude semantic units that clearly relate not just to the ground but to ground-
ing as a non-profiling manner of evoking the ground. The analysis of construal
below nevertheless makes reference to the ground as it is presented in
Cognitive  Grammar,  whereas  the  question  of  grounding  is  left  aside  for
economic reasons.
This discussion on the notion of ground has been devised to illustrate two
mutually  related  issues.  First  of  all,  the  ground  that  consists  of  multiple
conceptualizers  and  their  shared  knowledge  is  a  necessary  part  of  the
describing  of  construal  in  full;  the  more  elaborate  the  conception  of  this
subjective pole is, the more nuanced construal phenomena can be detected.
Second, different languages make reference to the ground by different means
that may vary in their degree of grammaticalization. This makes a sharply
demarcated category of grounding elements a rather unfeasible theoretical
objective. On the other hand, this is only expected, inasmuch as the general
spirit  of  Cognitive  Grammar  is  considered:  there  is  no  reason  why  the
continuity of linguistic categories and meaning with other domains of human
experience would not manifest in the reference to the ground as well.
I  therefore conclude that  the overall  notion of  ground involving multiple
conceptualizers  (FCG-1:  91,  CGBI:  256;  Verhagen  2005;  6–7,  2007)  is  both
necessary and sound, but that its linguistic manifestations in explicit construal
cannot  be  given  precise  formal  or  conceptual  criteria a priori. This relative
unpredictability of the grounding phenomena can be translated into a
(partially)  pragmatic  nature  of  construal:  if  construal  is  largely  a  matter  of
relating an expression to the ground, and this process is not (at least entirely)
semantically predefined but conceptually flexible, we are to expect a variety of
manners in which construal depends on, and is motivated by, its context. In
fact, this is apparent in the relationships between alternate co-referential
construals, to which we turn in the following sections.
2.4 THE DIMENSIONS OF CONSTRUAL
This summary of the dimensions of construal in Cognitive Grammar is based
on Langacker’s most up-to-date presentation on the topic, that is, the
presentation given in Langacker (2008 = CGBI: 55–89). When needed, I will
also make reference to previous work on construal by Langacker, as well as to
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other authors that have theorized on the matter from a Cognitive Linguistic
point of view (e.g. Croft and Cruse 2004; Talmy 1978, 1988, 2000; Verhagen
2005, 2007).
I have stated above that construal is about semantic features ascribable to
the relationship between the subject and the object of conceptualization,
rather than to the object as such. Each dimension of construal specifies certain
of these features. On the other hand, this relational nature defines construal
as  the  plurality  of  ways  according  to  which  the  same  object  of
conceptualization can be accessed or expressed. The existence of such plurality
is an important part of the Cognitive Grammar as such; more relevant for the
present  purposes,  however,  is  the  question  of  how  a  specific  construal  is
motivated, at least ideally. One of the pivotal analytical functions of construal
is  thus  to  capture  the  nuanced  regularities  according  to  which  the  object  of
conceptualization is made accessible for the interlocutors in a given context.
In  the  following  sections,  I  will  present  the  different  dimensions  of
construal via co-referential construal patterns found in the data of this study.
By restricting the analytic scope to co-referential expressions, one is able to
scrutinize  simultaneously  the  specific  dimension  as  a  continuum  of
interrelated expressions and the effect of the co-reference itself to the choice
of a specific construal.
The  following  sections  are  organized  according  to  the  complexity  of  the
dimensions they describe29: I begin with specificity (2.4.1), the most unitary of
the  dimensions.  I  then  move  on  to  the  closely  interrelated  dimensions  of
focusing  (2.4.2)  and  prominence  (2.4.3),  and  end  with  a  discussion  on
perspective (2.4.4), a complex dimension, which overlaps with many aspects
inherent  to  the  previously  mentioned  dimensions.  After  discussing  each
dimension separately, I will return to the overall linguistic notion of construal
and present a brief synthesis on Cognitive Grammar’s variation of the theme.
2.4.1 SPECIFICITY
Specificity, or conversely, schematicity, is an undisputable basic property of
any semantic unit. No expression is able to represent an entity, or a state of
affairs, in its entire pre-linguistic richness. Instead, an expression specifies
linguistically some features of the intended entity while leaving others aside or
to be otherwise completed. As the semantic completion of an expression
cannot be restricted a priori, specificity is best understood as the conventional
specificity of a single semantic unit or a semantic composite structure.
This context-independent specificity, on the other hand, is necessarily an
ideal  construct,  as  is  the separation of  semantic  from pragmatics in general
(see above). We may determine the context-independent specificity of an
expression only relationally and imprecisely. Furthermore, the possibility of
29 The  dimensions  of  construal  also  are  presented  in  this  order  in  their  most  recent  general
description (CGBI: 55–89).
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such  analytical  maneuver  does  not  entail  that  the  semantic  and  pragmatic
aspects of an expression’s specificity would be ontologically separate in actual
discourse. The separation needs to be done, however, if one is to consider the
motivation for a particular instance of construal.
The specificity of an expression may correlate (and often does correlate)
iconically with the complexity of the matters expressed.30 This correlation is
nevertheless tendential by nature. As a significant source of expressive
flexibility, specificity is also utilized to accommodate expression according to
the access the different conceptualizers have to the object of conceptualization
or  the  knowledge  thereof.  Being  acquired  from  use,  semantic  units  are
organized, or organizable when needed, into hierarchies of potentially co-
referential expressions according to their relative specificity. These hierarchies
may  involve  lexical  and  idiomatic  items,  but  more  complex  and  less
conventional semantic structures can also be organized as schematic
hierarchies, at least when the expressive needs of a specific pragmatic situation
is considered.
In the analysis of construal, specificity is “the level of precision and detail
at which a situation is characterized” (CGBI: 55). The first aspect of this is the
selection of linguistic units according to their specificity. What is altered
between different construals for the same entity or state of affairs is the choice
among semantic units of variable schematicity: consider, for instance, ‘rodent’
vs.  ‘mouse’.  For  convenience,  I  refer  to  this  aspect  of  specificity  simply  as
“naming”.  The  second  aspect  of  specificity  can  be  referred  to  as  the
“syntagmatic elaboration” of the described entity or state of affairs. This is
essentially  a  function  of  the  amount  of  semantic  units  relative  to  some
experiential dimension of the conceptualized entity. The speaker, when
conceptualizing a motor event (the performance of a gymnast, for instance), is
able  to  choose  the  extent  of  elaboration  relative  to  the  temporal  length  and
internal complexity of the event as experienced.
In  the  following  examples,  I  will  analyze  the  dimension  of  specificity
relative to three partially synonymous expressions that refer to a particular
Finnish social benefit. The first three examples illustrate especially the aspect
of naming but they also exemplify the significance of modification for the
dimension of specificity.
30 The extent to which language imposes its own delimitations on thought, or simply reflects the
limitations of thought itself, is one of the major non-empirical dilemmas related with any conceptualist
account of meaning. The persisting debate on the linguistic relativity unfortunately cannot be discussed
at length here (for discussion, see Levinson 1996; Lucy 1992, 1996). What should be emphasised is that
the level of abstraction in what “enters the mind” should not be interpreted in any naïve-realistic way.
Perception and perceptual objects are results of object-environment interaction and conceptual
unification  of  data  provided  by  multiple  cognitive  systems.  This  is  subsumed  under  the  theoretical
prerequisites of CL (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and acknowledged in the present treatment. On the
invalidity of naïve realism and the conception-dependence of perception, see Konstenius (2014:  100).
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4.  Toki kotihoido-n       tue-ssa         on      monia hyviä puolia
     [surely homecare-GEN support-INE be-3SG  many good side-PL]
     ’surely the homecare allowance has many pros’
5.  Mutta suomalaise-n    tue-n            ongelma   on […]
     [but    finnish-GEN allowance-GEN problem be-3SG]
    ’But the problem with the finnish allowance is […]’
6. Piene-llä    raha-lla       äiti     makse-ta-an  pois     työ-elämä-stä […]
    [small-ADE money-ADE mother pay-PASS      away  working-life-ELA]
     ’With a small amount of money, the mother is paid out from the working life’
                    (MT 6/2010: 12)
These examples are found (in the same order) within a small excerpt from an
article on Finnish welfare policy; the textual context is omitted here for
expository economy. All three examples refer to the same form of welfare, i.e.
the Finnish homecare allowance, and discuss the amount of the allowance and
its effects.
The  noun  phrase  found  in  example  4, kotihoidon tuessa (’the homecare
allowance’) is an official term, and is thus specified, to a relatively high degree,
by  its  position  within  the  larger  juridical  domain  of  welfare.  In  contrast,
suomalaisen tuen (‘the Finnish allowance’), in example 5, refers to the same
thing  by  replacing  the  specification  of  juridical  status  (‘homecare’)  with  the
specification of national context. It should be noted that this context is already
both evident and specified repeatedly earlier in the omitted part of the text.
Finally, Pienellä rahalla (‘a small amount of money’), in example 6, manages
to avoid making explicit reference to welfare entirely. Instead, the expression
is quite schematic as a whole, relative to the modifier and the head alike. The
context nevertheless prompts a co-referential interpretation, through which
example 6 manages to specify the size and form (that is, format) of the benefit
in question.
In  examples  4–6,  we  thus  have  various  construals  of  the  same  entity
present in actual discourse. As these construals differ in their specificity, they
differ in two separate yet mutually correlating functions: semantic and
pragmatic. The semantic function pertains to the amount of information an
expression defines. The pragmatic function pertains to the extent to which the
expression restricts the scope of possible interpretations. As these functions
co-align, examples 4–6 constitute a pattern of decreasing specificity on the
level  of  conceptual  profiles  (note  the  arrows  marking  the  direction  of
categorization):
’the homecare allowance’ ← ’the Finnish allowance’ ← ’a  small  amount  of
money’
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Note that this is a pattern of conventional semantic units and their profiles
and, in examples 4–6, the pattern pertains primarily to the heads of the noun
phrases.  The profile  of  ‘allowance’  refers to an entity explicitly  defined by a
vast  juridical  discourse.  In  contrast,  the  profile  of  ‘money’  refers  to  the
instrument of exchange on a quite schematic level.
The  specificity  of  these  expressions  in  their  actual  context  is  a  more
complex issue however.  As ‘money’  in example 6 is  interpreted as being co-
referential with the expressions in examples 4 and 5, it yields actually a more
specified conception of an allowance – social benefits can also be admitted as
commodities  and  financial  obligations  as  well.  The  analysis  is  further
complicated when we consider the modifiers as well.  It  is  true that,  in their
very general meanings, suomalaisen ’Finnish’ is less specific than kotihoidon
’homecare’, and pienellä ’small’  is  less specific  than ‘Finnish’. One may also
(reasonably) presume that an allowance is primarily a monetary benefit; then
‘a small amount of money’ can be analyzed as the least specific expression in
the quality of the commodity (‘amount’ / ‘money’ vs. ‘allowance’). However,
even in this case, the expression in example 6 is the most specific one in terms
of quantity (‘small’ vs. null). Furthermore, if the context of welfare is taken for
granted,  the  mention  of  nationality  may  also  be  considered  a  restriction  of
scope within the domain of welfare in general.
The development of specificity in examples 4–6 is thus not linear, but this
is actually a predictable characteristic of discourse. Even the simplest verbal
exchange  involves  a  variety  of  semantic  relations,  many  of  which  can  be
captured at least partially in terms of the specificity of the relata. In examples
above, we thus have at least three distinct, yet interrelated, developments of
specificity: the development of the heads, the development of the modifiers,
and, finally, the development of the common ground, relative to which the first
two developments can be motivated.
Once  certain  specifications  of  the  topic  are  given  through  a  relatively
precise  categorization  (e.g.  the  socio-juridical  status  of the homecare
allowance), the specifications can be assumed as easily accessible parts of the
interlocutor’s common ground. In so being, a less specific profile may suffice
in communicating these specifications, for the profile’s semantic background,
i.e.  base,  is  completed  with  the  specifications  from  the  common  ground.
However,  this  enables  the  profiling  of  other  kind  of  specifications  (the
monetary  value  of  given  allowance)  in  a  way  that  does  not,  for  example,
demand for professional mastery of the Finnish healthcare system.
Hence,  the  central  motivator  of  the  construals  in  examples  4–6  is  the
cumulative,  pragmatically  constituted  common  ground,  within  which  the
observed co-referential pattern constitutes a prominent sub-structure. The
order in which the different concepts are presented is based on what is profiled
by the concepts: the previous profiles constitute the conceptual background,
within  which  the  new  profile  is  located.  As  the  discourse  advances,  the
common ground cumulates, becomes richer and, one would argue, becomes
more specific.
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 Every  expression  belonging  to  a  pragmatic  (yet  linearly  constituted)
paradigm of co-referential expressions updates the paradigm, making the each
subsequent expression more specific  (see pp.  25–26).  For instance,  ‘a  small
amount  of  money’  acquires  as  its  conceptual  base  the  knowledge  of  the
monetary welfare discussed in connection with allowance earlier in the text.
We thus have a pattern of negatively correlating specificities of conceptual
base  and  profile.  It  does  actually  make  sense  that  when  the  pragmatic
knowledge between the interlocutors is specified, the need of expressive
precision is reduced. The negative correlation in specificity between profile
and base is therefore quite prevalent in discourse.
Let us look at the same phenomenon in an example of variable syntagmatic
elaboration. Examples 7 and 8 are from an article that discusses various sleep
disorders and their treatment. The noun phrases in the examples differ
grammatically in that example 7 involves a simple noun as the head of complex
noun phrase (including a lengthy infinitival modifier), whereas the noun
phrase in example 8 consists of a single compound noun.
7. Liian vähän ja liian paljon nukkujilla on vaara kuolla keskivertonukkujia
hieman aiemmin.
’Those sleeping too much or too little have the risk of dying slightly earlier
than the average sleeper’
8. [Continuing] Kuolleisuusriski lisääntyi […] ’the mortality risk increased’
(MT 6/2010: 22)
The  appearance  of  the  noun  phrases  in  a  quick  succession  in  the  article
confirms their co-referentiality. The ‘risk’ mentioned in example 8 is not just
a risk of dying but the aforementioned risk of early death. The noun phrase in
example 8 can therefore be analyzed as (semantically but not grammatically)
elliptical  relative  to  the  noun  phrase  in  example  7. Ceteris paribus, the
construal shift from example 7 to example 8 consists of reduction of the
infinitival modifier. A significant part of it is omitted entirely
(keskivertonukkujia hieman aiemmin ’slightly earlier than the average
sleeper’), while the infinitival verb itself is re-construed as the noun adjunct of
the compound noun in example 8: kuolla ‘of dying’→ kuolleisuus- ‘mortality’.
In general, the shift from example 7 to example 8 thus involves reduction in
syntagmatic  elaboration of  the expression.  A previously profiled thing is  re-
profiled, but the relation (earliness) specifying the thing is left to be retrieved
from the context.
While the specificity is reduced on the level of the profiles, the new
expression is not more generic or ambiguous, however. This results from the
fact that the less specific profile is demarcated as a substructure in a complex
domain that itself is more specific than before. That is, it is due to the updated
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common ground that the ‘mortality risk’ is not just the risk of dying in general,
but the probability  as profiled within the complex domain consisting of  the
population with sleeping disorders and the corresponding propensity to an
early death. Similarly to examples 4–6, also the expressions in examples 7–8
manifest the negative correlation between the specificity of their profiles and
the specificity of their bases.
It  is  in  place  to  consider  how  this  phenomenon  may  be  related  to  the
theoretical basis of specificity in Cognitive Grammar, that is, to specificity as a
property and result of linguistic categorization. As described above, Cognitive
Grammar assumes a schema-based approach to language use, acquisition and
categorization,  which  is  a  linguistic  extension  of  the  conceptual  category
theory  advanced  by  Rosch  (1978).  As  the  linguistic  categories  supposedly
develop  as  a  result  of  comparison  between  existing  and  new  conceptual
entities, the categories capture the schematic commonalities between
categorized entities – schemas are therefore inherent in the categorizing
relationship.
As  commonality  is  a  continuous  parameter,  the  schema-based
categorization in Cognitive Grammar is itself continuous from the outset, as is
well  known  (see  e.g.  Taylor  2003).  The  category  membership  in  a  schema-
based system is therefore also a continuous property. As the categorization is
fluid, so are the schemas: any concept may serve as a schema for another, more
specific concept, which then elaborates or instantiates the schema, and on the
other hand, may serve as a schema for another, and so on. As a result from this
conceptual flexibility, a schematic hierarchy needn’t be a conventional-
semantic  structure  but  may  also  be  a  pragmatic  construct,  to  which  the
apparent interconnectedness between expressions 4–6 testify.
In so being, linguistic categorization, or the cognitive processes presumed
behind  it,  is  not  only  a  matter  of  an  expression  gaining  a  status  of  a
conventionalized linguistic unit. Indeed, Cognitive grammar applies the
notion  of  categorization  to  various  phenomena;  the  interaction  between  a
syntactic schema and its elaborations in the formulation of a semantic
composite  structure  is  but  a  prominent  example.  However,  what  Cognitive
Grammar does not scrutinize, is the emergent category-like structures
consisting  of  co-referential  (and  other  semantic)  relations  within  an  actual
discourse (see however CGBI: 457–459, 489).
 Above, I have presented two examples of such structures or patterns. The
first pattern pertains to the naming of the referred entity, whereas the second
involves what I called syntagmatic elaboration, amount of explicated facets of
the conceptualized entity or state of affairs. What I have tried to demonstrate
is  that  both  of  these  patterns  can  be  explained,  at  least  partially,  by  the
interrelations of the expressions involved. This points to the pragmatic,
discourse-related nature of construal. While the analysis started from the
conventional specificity of the expressions, especially the specificity of their
profiles, the analysis also demonstrated that the context-independent
meanings do not simply define the level of specificity. Rather, the profiles of
61
these expressions can be analyzed as an accommodation to the specificity of
the  common  ground  in  the  discourse.  This  reactivity  of  construal  can  be
witnessed in other dimensions of construal as well.
2.4.2 FOCUSING
The  dimension  of  focusing  is  about  conceptual  selection:  placing  one’s
conceptual attention on certain selected facets of a multifaceted situation, and
arranging these facets relative to what Langacker (CGBI: 57) metaphorically
calls the foreground and background of attention. The metaphor in question
is based on the assumption of an analogy between semantic organization and
the phenomenon of figure/ground alignment in perception. As there are
inherent limitations to the human processing capacity, perception must work
selectively, delimiting itself to the manipulation of only a few outlined objects
at  a  time.  In visual  perception,  for  example,  this  would be analogous to the
visual attraction of a flickering light (figure) in an otherwise complete darkness
(the ground).
 The  dimension  of  focusing  comprises  of  three  components:  1)  the
organization of expression’s semantic content according to the
foreground/background asymmetry; 2) the semantic scope of the expression;
and 3) the composition, i.e. the nature and extent of a complex expression’s
dependence  of  its  composite  structures.  For  the  sake  of  economy,  I  will
concentrate on the first one, but I will also present the latter two in brief at the
end of this section. Once again, I will begin the analysis from the conventional
meanings of the selected co-referential expressions in the data, and I will then
move on to consider the contextual factors motivating the selected expressions
as a construal pattern.
The best starting point for discussion on foreground/background
asymmetry is the case in which the base of a semantic unit is constituted by
multiple  domains  (CGBI:  57).  These  domains  as  whole  constitute  the
background  relative  to  their  substructures  that  are  profiled  as  parts  of  the
profile  as  a  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  the  domains  and  their  profiled
substructures are organized hierarchically  so that  they rank in likelihood of
activation, or their centrality (ibid.). The relative centrality of cognitive
domains is a part of a linguistic unit’s conventional meaning, but the hierarchy
is  easily  overridden  by  pragmatic  factors.  For  example,  the  meanings  of  a
polysemic concept (allegedly, most lexical concepts are polysemic) in different
discursive  or  overall  contexts  can  be  explained  by  the  foregrounding  of
different domains.
The first two examples illustrate this phenomenon as manifested on the
syntagmatic  plane of  discourse.  The examples are excerpted from an article
discussing  sleep  disorders  (MT 6/2010:  22–25).  In  this  article,  the  Finnish
noun uni (’sleep’) is mentioned for 29 times, most of which are instantiations
of the prototypical semantic variants nomen actionis and nomen acti: ‘sleep1’
as an activity or as ‘sleep2’ a result of activity. The analytical challenge is that
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both  types  evoke  similar  semantic  content.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the
activity  and  its  result  are  not  easily  distinguished  on  experiential  basis:  we
sleep to get some sleep. The separation is therefore about foregrounding
different elements within the evoked conceptual content. Consider examples
9 and 10.
9. unen merkitystä tulisi korostaa erityisesti lapsille ja nuorille. Nukkumisen
hyvinvointia edistävät vaikutukset ovat yhtä merkittäviä kuin ravinnon ja
liikunnan.
’the significance of sleep should be emphasized to children and youngsters.
The health-promoting effects of sleeping are as significant as those of nutrition
and exercise.’
10. perinteisten unilääkkeiden […] avulla saatu uni ei vastaa luonnollista unta.
’The sleep acquired with the traditional sleeping medications is not equivalent
to natural sleep’
                    (MT 6/2010: 24)
In  example  9,  sleep  is  addressed  in  connection  with  the  “sleepers”  who  are
capable  agents  and  thus  responsible  for  doing  the  right  thing:  to  sleep
regularly for a correct amount of time. The interpretation of this as nomen
actionis is  further reinforced by the use of  the participle nominal  derivative
nukkuminen, which in this case is best translated to the English gerund form
‘sleeping’. In contrast, in example 10, sleep is treated as a medically induced
physiological state. As can be derived from its status as the object for the II
passive participle saatu ’acquired’, the ‘sleep’ in question serves primarily as
the goal for the goal-directed action, not as a type of the action itself. Yet the
actual  activity  of  sleeping  is  present  in  both  of  the  cases.  As  the  profiles  of
‘sleep’ in example 9 and ‘sleep’ in 10 are largely co-extensive (both expressions
can be used to refer to the same entity), it is logical to consider their semantic
difference  as  a  matter  of  focusing:  it  is  what  stands  in  the  conceptual
foreground that makes the difference between the two expressions.
The foreground/background asymmetry is also relevant for the manner in
which  the  so-called  encyclopedic  or  world  knowledge  is  organized
conventionally  or  contextually  by  a  given  instantiation  of  a  concept.  Even  a
common everyday term such as sleep may be related to multiple, more or less
exclusive, realms of knowledge. While ‘sleep’ in examples 9 and 10 is discussed
as a practical necessity shared by all human beings, the article does not focus
on  a  layman’s  experience.  Instead,  the  text  is  characterized  by  a  constant
emphasis on issues related to public health, including the avoidable problems
(häiritsevistä tekijöistä […] ’about factors that disrupt sleep’, MT 6/2010: 22)
and the eligible benefits (unen pidentämisen […] ’lengthening of sleep’, ibid.).
On the one hand, ‘sleep’ is discussed on a generic or representative level:
the  given  facts  about  sleep  pertain  to  public  and  general  level  of  health-
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education. On the other hand, ‘sleep’ is presented within the domain of human
psychophysiology; the article elaborates the concept primarily in terms of its
functions and effects on humans as medical and psychological subjects. This
dual emphasis obviously distinguishes the meaning of ‘sleep’ from any casual
mention of good night sleep.
Cognitive Grammar would describe the overriding of the meaning of ‘sleep’
by  context  in  the  following  manner.  The  cognitive  domain  of  health,  which
normally would be relatively peripheral to the meaning of uni ’sleep’, is in this
piece  of  discourse  foregrounded  by  the  discourse  itself.  The  domain  of
psychophysiological well-being is central not only to the article in question but
also to the Mielenterveys magazine as a whole. The domain may be considered
an  instantiation  of  a  case  in  which  a  publication  with  a  specified  audience
defines a rather stable complex matrix as the background of interpretation.
This background then serves to elaborate, but also to rearrange, the semantic
content of even the most everyday concepts. When uni ’sleep’ is introduced
into this context, the conventional organization of semantic content is
(partially) overruled. The part of its matrix that matches with the
foregrounded discourse-specific domain is foregrounded by this matching
itself. As Cognitive Grammar presumes, the activation of a cognitive domain
as such increases the probability of its re-activation, and this translates into
the relative centrality of a domain within a concept’s matrix.
This  contextually  re-organized  semantic  variant  of uni ’sleep’  is,  by
definition, a paradigmatic construal alternative of the prototypical ‘uni’ in
absentia.  Quite  unsurprisingly,  syntagmatic  patterns  of  this  kind  of  re-
organization  can  also  be  found.  These  patterns  tend  to  involve  complex
interaction with surrounding discourse. An example of this phenomenon can
be found in the following excerpt:
11. Kun Ursula Salo oli nuorena Teatterikorkeakoulun näyttelijäopiskelijana
Sveitsissä, siellä oli vanha korealainen opettaja, joka siveli itseään ja sanoi:
”Keho on teidän hevosenne, jolla te ratsastatte läpi elämänne. Pitäkää siitä
hyvää huolta.”Ajatus omasta kehosta hevosena, johon on oltava hyvässä
kontaktissa ja josta on pidettävä hyvää huolta, jäi Salon, entisen hevostytön,
mieleen.”Keho on viisas, ja oman kehon viestien kuunteleminen on tärkeätä”
’When Ursula Salo, as a young actress student, was visiting Switzerland, there
was an old, Korean teacher, who stroked himself and said: “the body is your
horse you ride through your life. Take good care of it. ”The idea of one’s own
body as a horse, with which one has to have good contact and of which one
has to take good care, stuck in the mind of Salo, a former horse girl. “The body
is wise, and it is important to pay attention to the signs the body shows.’
      (MT 1/2011)
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Mielenterveys magazine publishes profiles of public figures who relate to the
field of mental health either by their profession or by their own experience. In
this excerpt, a Finnish actress discusses her former teacher who emphasized
the importance of  bodily self-care by a peculiar  metaphor.  The metaphor is
introduced first in the form of an equative clause Keho on teidän hevosenne
’the  body  is  your  horse’.  The  import  of  this  metaphor  is  the  mapping  of
animacy, instrumentality, and possibly independent consciousness as well, to
human body. The metaphor also contributes to distinguishing body from self,
so it can be conceptualized as a distinct object of action.
The next paragraph reiterates the metaphor as a nominal omasta kehosta
hevosena ‘one’s  own body as a horse’,  which itself  serves to modify another
noun (ajatus ’idea’). The reiteration, however, involves further elaboration of
the  metaphor  by  a  subordinate  clause  (‘to  which  one  has  to  have  a  good
contact’). This elaboration explicates certain implications of the metaphor.
The first instance establishes the basic structure of the conceptual metaphor,
which involves separateness of self and body. In contrast, the second
expression specifies the desirable relationship between self and the body, so
that the source domain of the metaphor emphasizes the delicate interaction
involved.
Finally,  in  the  last  sentence,  the  body  is  characterized  in  terms  of  an
animate, conscious entity (Keho on viisas […] ‘the body is wise [...]’), although
without  mentioning  the  original  source  domain  of  the  metaphor.  Albeit  the
expression  involves  only  the  other  participant  of  the  relationship,  the
specification of this participant comes to specify the relationship as a whole: if
the body is not just distinct and animate but cognizant as well, the relationship
may construed as involving bi-directional interaction, which requires
receptivity from the human participant as well.
 The  excerpt  can  thus  be  analyzed  as  a  series  of  focal  shifts  relative  to  a
general structure of a conceptual metaphor. The focal shifts, respectively, bear
upon the semantics of each instance of keho ’body’. In the first instance, the
body  introduces  the  target  domain  of  the  metaphor  and  thus  refers  to  the
(generic) human body as such. In the second instance, the metaphor is already
in  place,  and  while  the  metaphor’s  basic  structure  is  re-instantiated  (the
reference to ‘a horse’ as a modifier), the status of the body as the target of the
conceptual  metaphor  can  be  taken  as  pre-given.  Finally,  the  third  instance
makes no explicit reference to the source domain at all, but the body itself is
defined  as  a  conscious  entity  and  thus  dependent  of  the  metaphoric
conceptualization.
This  pattern  suggests  a  constant  subtle  reorganization  of  the  semantic
content of the distinct instances of keho ’body’. The expressions in which the
‘body’  is  situated  focus  on  different  parts  of  the  conceptual  metaphor.
Consequently, ‘body’ profiles the same entity in a constant manner, but comes
to include different parts of the metaphoric structure as its semantic content.
Simply put, what is originally presented as a part of context for a noun phrase
becomes a part of the noun phrase’s content.
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Once again, the construal pattern in question seems to be dependent on the
general unfolding of the discourse, studied under the heading of information
structure (see e.g. Chafe 1994; Shore 2008). Cognitive Grammar provides also
concepts  applicable  to  or  explicitly  devised  for  analysis  of  discourse.  As
discussed above in section 2.3.2, Verhagen (2007) suggests that the notion of
common  ground  should  cover  all  of  the  information  shared  by  the
interlocutors.  In  fact,  as  a  part  of  the  dimension  of  focusing,  Cognitive
Grammar presents a so-called Current Discourse Space (CGBI: 59, henceforth
CDS), the “mental space comprising everything presumed to be shared by the
speaker and hearer as the basis for discourse at a given moment” (ibid.). Here
it will be understood as an analytical abstraction of those cognitive domains
that are contextually most likely to be activated. In so being, CDS preserves the
character of a complex matrix as a hierarchically organized, yet flexibly
reorganizable, radial category.
The relevance of CDS for focusing-related construal phenomena becomes
apparent when we re-consider example 11 relative to what is established by the
excerpt as the pre-given background of interpretation. In example 11, the first
component of the CDS is the discourse-dependent complex domain of
psychophysiological well-being, introduced already with the previous
example. With this part of CDS in place, the actress’ lengthy discussion on the
body  becomes  integrated  to  the  CDS  so  that  the  bodily  part  of  body–mind
unity is focused on as a participant in a binary relationship. This maneuver
both elaborates the schematic CDS attributable to the publication as a whole,
while the focus shifts  onto the specific  substructure of  CDS, reassessing the
conventional  centrality  hierarchy  of  the  domains  within  CDS.  Finally,  the
novel horse-metaphor further elaborates the body while also specifying the
relation  between  the  body  and  self  through  a  cross-domain  mapping.  The
metaphor,  in  turn,  becomes  a  relatively  stable  part  of  the  CDS.  This
stabilization enables the shifting of focus within the metaphoric structure
without the reiteration of the structure as a whole.
While  not  definitive,  this  analysis  should  demonstrate  how  focusing  is
concerned  with  the  manifestation  of  figure/ground  alignment  both  in  the
inherent organization of separate concepts, as well as in the syntagmatic
organization of an unfolding discourse. In a word, what has been established
in the preceding discourse is  a  necessary prerequisite and central  motivator
for any novel construal. This holds true also for the sub-dimension of focusing
called scope.
Scope is used in Cognitive Grammar to refer to the amount of information
that  is  activated  in  each  cognitive  domain  that  contributes  to  the  overall
meaning of an expression. For example, the scope of flickering light in spatio-
visual domain subsumes not just the light itself but also enough space to the
light to be contained and conceptualized as an independent entity. If a given
concept is based on a complex matrix, scope is instantiated separately in each
domain thereof. Scope is divided into so-called immediate and maximal scope
within  a  domain  or  a  matrix.  Immediate  scope  pertains  to  the  minimal
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semantic background enabling conceptualization whereas maximal scope is
“the full coverage [of an expression]” (CGBI: 65).
The  customary  example  of  scope  is  provided  by  the  hierarchy  of  the
concepts for body parts: concept of ‘body’ works as the maximal scope for any
concept for a body part, whereas immediate scope is prototypically the concept
hierarchically next to the foregrounded entity. “body > arm > hand > finger”
(ibid. 64) is one possible organization, so that the immediate scope enabling
the conceptualization of ‘finger’ is formed by the concept ‘hand’.
One  linguistic  manifestation  of  this  hierarchic  order  is  the  restriction
concerning the selection of a reference point (CGBI: 83, Langacker 1993a; on
application on Finnish genitive, see Jaakola 2004).  A reference point provides
the interlocutor with access to a subsequent concept. This requires that the
reference point manages to disambiguate whatever it is the reference point of.
The restriction is  manifested in the infelicity  of  the following example:  *my
right arm’s index finger. The anomaly of this construction shows how only the
central domain that is within the immediate scope of the expression can serve
as an explicit reference point. In some cases, this restriction could be explained
based on sheer interactional relevance: a concept that does not help to provide
useful information about another is simply redundant. However, the
anomalous expression in example 10 actually manages to convey information,
despite its obscurity: we are able to infer what specific finger the expression is
about. In other words, there needs to be a more specific explanation for the
expression’s unnaturalness.
According to Cognitive Grammar (CGBI: 64–65), the profile/base
segregation of the semantic unit explains the infelicity of certain lexical
combinations.  When  a  noun  phrase  is  re-construed  as  a  compound,  it  is
required that the profile of the adjunct is compatible not just with the profile
of  the head but with its  conceptual  base as well.  The compatibility,  in turn,
requires that the adjunct’s’ profile can be categorized by a schematic structure
within the conceptual  base of  the head.  Another necessary condition is  that
there are no significant intervening structures between the profile of the head
and  the  schematic  structure  that  categorizes  the  adjunct.  Otherwise  the
conceptual linkage between the adjunct and the head may be cancelled, as in
the case of *my right arm’s index finger.31
In addition to the syntactic reference-point constructions, the notion of
scope can be applied to patterns of semantic patterns at the discourse-level as
31 It should be noted that the arranging of experience into part-whole-relationships is not a universal
constant but varies from one language to another. This concerns also experientially constant entities,
such as body parts. The Finnish noun käsi, for example, can refer both to the hand and to the whole
upper limb, which makes the genitival construction oikean käden etusormi ambiguous between the
interpretations ’right hand’s index finger’ and ‘right upper limbs index finger’. The generalization
nevertheless holds: in either case the immediate scope of ‘finger’ is profiled the most immediate whole
to which the concept belongs: it is only the scope of this whole that varies.
67
well. In example 12, the scope of an expression is defined by the directly
preceding segment.
12. Virikkeitä siis oli muttei ylettömästi. Järvisen mukaan osastolla pyritään
yksinkertaiseen elämään säännöllisine uni- ja päivärytmeineen. Potilaiden
elämäntilanne pyritään saamaan mahdollisimman tasaiseksi ja impulssit
kuriin. ”Tarkoitus on, että ihminen kohtaa oman tilanteensa […]”
’So there were activities but not excessively. According to Järvinen, the
goal that is strived for at the ward is simple daily living with regular sleep
and day rhythms. The conditions of the patients are kept as constant as
possible, and patients’ impulses are controlled. “The purpose is that the
person faces her/his situation […]”
(MT 4/2010: 15)
While the excerpt in example 12 does not involve scope-related semantic
restrictions on an explicit level, it nevertheless illustrates how the semantic
scope of a lexical concept serves as a source of cohesion. Tarkoitus ‘purpose’
is  a  concept  that  is  directly  dependent  of  its  reference  point:  a  purpose  is
always the purpose of something or someone, which is readily describable as a
schematic entity within the concept’s immediate scope. This makes the noun
and  the  corresponding  noun  phrase  reactive  with  regard  to  its  immediate
discursive context. In example 12, purpose refers back to the summarized
activity carried out in the mental ward. As a form of professional healthcare,
this activity is intentional, goal-oriented and hence purposeful. Therefore, the
subsequent  mention  of  ‘purpose’  is  a  form  of  focusing  within  the  overall
scheme of the described activity. Conversely, all the positive semantic content
of  ‘purpose’  is  given  in  the  preceding  description,  which  elaborates  the
schematic reference point within the concept’s scope.
There is still one sub-dimension within dimension of focusing: composition
(FCG-1: 448–460, CGBI: 60–62), which subsumes the associated notions of
compositionality (e.g. CGBI: 167–170) and analyzability (e.g. CGBI: 170, 351–
352). Compositionality refers to the aspect of a complex expression’s meaning
that is based on the combination of the independent meanings of its parts and
on the possible different hierarchical levels of constituency that are formed by
the expression’s components (CGBI: 167).
Composition relates closely to the novelty of a given expression. Novelty or
non-conventionality determines to a certain extent to which the relationship
between an expression’s component and its composite meanings contribute to
the semantics of the expression as a whole. This influence of composition is
referred to in Cognitive Grammar as analyzability (e.g. FCG-1: 292–298).
Different expressions may be referentially synonymous but differ
semantically relative to their analyzability, that is, to the effect and traceability
of their compositional paths (CGBI: 61) within the overall conceptualization.
It is important to acknowledge that while Cognitive Grammar allows for
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compositional structures in its description of semantics, the theory explicitly
rejects universal compositionality (ibid.). Even an entirely novel expression
incorporates much more linguistic as well as extra-linguistic information than
can be derived from the components and their composition alone. Similar to
other aspects of focusing, composition also makes a gradual phenomenon. The
different parts of a composite structure are foregrounded to different degree,
a matter which is directed by linguistic convention as well as adjusted by the
concurrent pragmatic needs.
In conclusion, focusing is a dimension of semantic asymmetry that includes
the selection of conceptual content and its arrangement into foreground and
background. The selection and arrangement of conceptual content vis-à-vis
foreground/background distinction is extended to the analysis of discourse by
implementing  the  concept  of  CDS.  As  with  specificity,  the  dimension  of
focusing is applicable both to the description of an individual utterance as well
as  to  analysis  of  textual  phenomena.  Next,  we  will  turn  to  another  case  of
semantic asymmetry, the dimension of prominence.
2.4.3 PROMINENCE
The third dimension of construal is prominence (or “salience”, CGBI: 68–73),
a  highly  abstract  parameter  that  encompasses  a  wide  range  of  different
semantic asymmetries. These asymmetries are related to the general
accessibility of concepts, sub-conceptual structures, and inter-conceptual
relations within actual linguistic expressions. For example, Langacker
presents  focusing  as  one  of  the  “dimensions  of  prominence”  (ibid.  68).
Focusing  “fits  comfortably  under  this  rubric,  since  everything  selected  is
rendered prominent relative to what is unselected, and a foreground is salient
relative to its background” (ibid.). Langacker, however, presents other two
conceptual asymmetries that are exclusive to prominence: profiling and
trajector/landmark alignment.32 This section assesses the applicability of
profiling and trajector/landmark alignment to written discourse.
Profiling  refers  to  the  duality  of  a  semantic  unit’s  inherent  structure.  As
discussed above (pp. 25–26), Cognitive Grammar divides a semantic unit into
its  profile  and  base,  which  is  a  linguistic  application  of  the  general
figure/ground alignment (see pp. 25–26). A concept’s base is defined as its
overall  semantic  scope  within  all  the  domains  that  constitute  its  semantic
content;  the base can be further elaborated by dividing it  into the concept’s
immediate and maximal scope (CGBI: 63–65). Profile is the most prominent
substructure  within  a  concept’s  base,  the  focus  of  conceptualization,  which
stands for the referential object of an expression. To return to the body part
example,  the concepts ‘head’,  ‘leg’,  and ‘arm’ evoke as their  conceptual  base
32 To make things less consistent, it should be noted that both profiling and the trajector/landmark
alignment can be described as linguistic manifestations of foregrounding or figure/ground organization
summarized above.
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the domain of human body; none of them would have any meaning without a
conception  of  the  human corporeal  existence.  In  other  words,  they  have,  to
some extent, similar semantic content: ‘head’ evokes ‘body’, which includes
‘leg’,  and  so  forth.  From  this  perspective,  any  objectivist  notion  that  these
concepts would simply refer to distinct objects would not suffice to capture the
combination of their semantic distinction and interrelatedness. One has to
differentiate concepts that refer to the parts of the same entirety by resorting
to the relative prominence of the substructures (‘head’, ‘leg’, etc.) against the
global structure (‘body’), and the most prominent substructure is, of course,
the profile.
Profile is the foregrounded entity at the intersection of the cognitive
domains that make the concept’s conceptual background. Logically, the notion
of  profile  is  required  by  the  fact  that  a  conceptual  description  of  an
expression’s meaning involves semantic content that does not pertain to the
referent itself. Descriptively, profile is required by the fact that the nature of
the  profiled  (conceptual)  entity  is  presumed  by  Cognitive  Grammar  to
correspond to the grammatical class of the resulting expression.
Semantic  units  are  taken  as  profiling  conceptual  entities  of  two  kinds,
things  and  relationships.  A  thing  refers  to  a  conceptual  entity  that  has  an
autonomous  being  (expressed  by  a  noun),  in  that  it  is  not  construed  as  a
relation between two entities. In contrast, relationships are conceptual entities
that relate other entities (such as verbs expressing e.g. interaction of two
entities) and are therefore conceptually dependent.
Profiling thus defines the most prominent substructure within a cognitive
domain,  and  the  nature  of  this  substructure  defines  the  conceptualization
either  as  autonomous  or  relational.  As  complementary  forms  of  selective
focusing [sic],  things and relationships are useful  conceptual  archetypes for
construing  the  same  semantic  content  in  alternative  ways.  The  customary
example by Langacker (CGBI: 67) involves wheel and its parts; hub, spoke, and
rim. These all evoke the same semantic content that includes the other
structures  just  named  but  profile  only  one  among  them.  This  involves  the
dimension of specificity as well, which, however, cannot be applied here as the
explanatory concept, since hub, spoke, and rim are predicates of comparable
value on this dimension.
On  the  other  hand,  profiling  pertains  also  to  evoking  same  conceptual
content relative to substructures of a different kind. The selected substructure
can be either a conceptually autonomous thing or a dependent relationship.
For instance, the same state of affairs may be referred to very differently, i.e.
either  by  a  verb  clause  or  by  a  nominalization.  This  has  the  apparent
conceptual advantage that the switching of the profile type enables different
types of  elaboration.  Conversely,  certain patterns of  discourse would not be
possible without the syntagmatic flexibility offered by the alternate profiling.
This can be observed in the following examples 13 and 14.  These have been
excerpted  from  a  magazine  article  that  covers  a  psychoanalytical  survey
carried out on sibling relationships.
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13. ”Olen ollut erityisen kiinnostunut, miten vanhempi lapsi on kokenut ja mitä
muistaa siitä, kun äiti hoitaa nuorempaa lasta ja kun nuorempi sisarus saa olla
äidin sylissä”, Malmberg kertoo.
‘”I have been especially interested in how the older child has experienced and
what she remembers about how her mother nurtures the younger child and how
the younger sibling gets to be in mother’s lap”, Malmberg says.’
14. Tätä tilannetta hän kutsuu Madonna-konstellaatioksi […]
  ’It is this situation that she calls a Madonna-constellation […]’
                   (MT 4/2010: 34)
In example 13, the interviewee describes her foremost academic focus of
interest: Olen ollut erityisen kiinnostunut ’I have been especially interested
in’. However, what is of interest here is the complement structure, which starts
a construal pattern continued by the later noun phrases.
The complement is a complex relative wh-clause, which starts with miten
‘how’ and describes the past experience of a non-specific subject remembering
her childhood. The access to the past experience is described with two mental
predicates (on kokenut ’has experienced’ and muistaa ’remembers’). The
predicates are mutually co-ordinated, but the semantics of the verbs and the
applied tenses33 prompt the interpretation of the process of ‘experiencing’ as
the object of ‘remembering’. The remembered experience is described in the
subsequent embedded wh-clause, starting with kun ’when’. This wh-clause
involves the interaction between mother and the younger sibling, both of
whom are construed as grammatical  subjects: äiti hoitaa, ’mother nurtures’
and nuorempi sisarus saa olla, ’the younger sibling gets to be’.  This complex
of  agents  and  their  mutual  relationhips  can  be  expressed  formulaically  as
follows:
Or→ (Oe→ (Mn↔Yg)) ,
in which O is the ‘older child’, M is ‘mother’, and Y is the ‘younger child’. The
processes these subjects instantiate are given in the subscript, so that r stands
for ‘remembering’, e for ‘experiencing’, n for ‘nurturing’ and g for ‘getting’ (to
be in mother’s lap).
As  we  may  witness  in  example  14,  a  complex  of  temporally  extended
activities  is  quite  easy  to  condense  into  a  single  noun  phrase.  In  general,
various nominalizations and event nouns (such as the noun tapahtuma ’event’
itself)  are  frequently  applied  to  this  kind  of  semantic  condensation.  In  this
case, the set of relations is referred back to as a recurrent state of affairs by the
33 I.e. the present perfect on kokenut ’has experienced’ and present muistaa ’remembers’.
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noun phrase tätä tilannetta (’this situation’), which is immediately renamed
by a technical title Madonna-konstellaatioksi (’Madonna constellation’).
The present construal phenomenon, in brief, pertains to the re-profiling of
multiple conceptual relations in example 13 as a single, conceptually
autonomous thing in example 14.   The change between examples 13 and 14
involves evidently a  significant amount of  schematization,  as the number of
distinct profiles is reduced to one. The most important change, however, is the
change in grammatical status from embedded wh-clauses to a noun phrase.
The  expressions  in  examples  13  (starting  from miten ‘how’)  and  14  are
essentially co-referential: the very function of anaphoric demonstrative tätä
’this’ is to explicate this referential synonymy. Yet they differ in that the
network of relations established in example 13 constitutes the implicit
conceptual base relative to which the profiles in example 14 are demarcated.
Note, however, that the profiles of ‘this situation’ or ‘Madonna-constellation’
cannot be reduced to a substructure of the profile of the wh-clauses in example
13. Rather, the novel profiles in example 14 schematize the overall semantic
structure  constituted  by  the  clauses  in  example  13  and  re-construe  this
structure into an autonomous conceptual entity.
Finally, example 14 involves yet another case of re-construal. The technical
compound Madonna-konstellaatio ’Madonna constellation’, maintains the
construal of tätä tilannetta ’this situation’ as a thing. The use of the specific
biblical  proper  name  as  the  adjunct  adds  another  layer  to  the  construal,
however: the adjunct evokes metonymically a well-entrenched piece of
Christian imagery, thus emphasizing the mother/child dyad within the overall
triadic setting. The metonymic reference leaves this dyad (as well as the triad
the dyad is a part of) un-profiled: it profiles a type of interpersonal experience
of  an  informant  as  a  whole  by  a  combination  of  a  salient  substructure
(‘Madonna’) and an expression that refers to the whole itself (‘constellation’).
Given the imagic background and the very motivation of the metonymy, it is
nevertheless safe to assume that the expression organizes the different
substructures of the overall ‘constellation’ so that the dyad is more prominent
than the triad. The selection of profile thus affects the internal organization of
the expression’s conceptual base as well. This effect cannot be scrutinized here
further, but it serves to illustrate that profiling should not be interpreted as a
simplistic notion of reference rephrased in cognitivist terms.
Whereas prominence in the form of profiling corresponds to an asymmetry
within predicate, the so-called trajector/landmark alignment captures
prominence as a comparative property of separate and individually expressed
concepts.  The  trajector  is  the  more  prominent  of  the  two,  whereas  the
landmark, which is often optional, is a concept used to specify some property
of the trajector. The most obvious example is provided by spatial expressions,
which also provide the metaphoric motivation for these analytical concepts. As
far as pragmatic  constraints are excluded,  we may refer  to the same spatial
setting of  two objects  in two different ways by evoking the same conceptual
content but choosing the most prominent object differently: the lamp above
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the table vs. the table below the lamp (e.g. CGBI: 71). What is different
between these examples, aside from the preposition, is the choice of entity that
is  localized  relative  to  another.  The  first  noun  phase  refers  to the lamp,
whereas the second noun phrase refers to the table:  the  expressions  are
“about” different objects and place the focal prominence accordingly.
The essential nature of trajector/landmark alignment is proven by the fact
that there exist concepts that not only share a common conceptual base, but
also have the same profile and still differ semantically from each other. Thus,
distinct relational concepts may interconnect the same two entities, still
differing  in  the  so-called  directionality  of  the  relationship.  For  example,  to
slightly alter the kinship-based example favored by Langacker (CGBI: 72), we
may have two expressions that evoke the same relationship, given that also the
entities involved in this relationship are maintained the same: She has an aunt
vs. She has a niece. In the case of verb clauses such as these, the subject is the
trajector,  while  the  object  is  the  landmark,  which  exhibits  secondary  focal
prominence.
The application of the conceptual trajector/landmark dichotomy is not
without  exceptions  or  without  difficult  borderline  cases.  The  analysis  of
Helasvuo and Huumo (2010), for example, shows that the selection of trajector
and subject both depend in Finnish on clausal construction types and cannot
be given construction-independent semantic definition applicable to all cases.
The most prominent constituent within a construction is not necessarily the
clausal  subject  syntactically,  or  vice  versa.  This  is  especially  true  for
constructions  with  only  focal  participant,  such  as  those  discussed  next.  In
Finnish,  there  are  one-argument  verbs  referring  to  mental  or  physiological
states  that  form  pairs  of  conceptual  reversals  with  regard  to  the  source  of
activity  (see  Siiroinen  2001,  2005).  One  subset  of  these  involves  verbs  of
emotive expression (such as nauraa ‘laugh’) and their causative counterparts
(such as naurattaa ’be made to laugh by ∅’).  It is not uncommon to find such
emotive reversals in quick succession within the same piece of discourse, such
as the article from which the following examples have been excerpted.
15. Jo         pienenä    häntä      nauratti
     [already small-ESS s/he-PTV cause.laugh-PST]
‘Already as a small child, she [was made to laugh by Ø]’
16. Miksi Saara nauroi
     [why  Saara  laugh-PST]
‘Why did Saara laugh’ (MT 5/2010: 5)
The expressions refer to the positive demeanor of the subject of the article,
Saara. While example 15 describes her tendency to spontaneous laughter, the
interrogative in example 16 ponders her reasons for this behavior. The relevant
difference, however, concerns the predicate verbs and the arrangement
between the verb and its primary constituent. Whereas nauraa ‘laugh’,  in
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example 15, assumes a prototypical, agentive subject, its counterpart, the
emotive causative verb naurattaa ‘make laugh by’ in example 16, requires a
partitive-case object that “goes through” laughter caused by some external or
internal factor.34 Note  that  this  latter  option  could  also  include  an  actual
subject, for instance:
Jo pienenä häntä nauratti eräs vanha vitsi
     ’already when she was a small child, an old joke made her laugh.
These expressions, in any case, refer to the objectively same situation, evoke
the  same  relationship,  and  profile  the  same  focal  participant  in  the
relationship. They construe the relationship differently, however. This is due
to a change of causal direction that is analogous to that with the case of having
an aunt vs. having a niece above, except the examples such as 15 and 16 only
have a single focal participant.
In example 15 with causative, the partitive demonstrative häntä ’she’  is
construed as the object and therefore corresponds to the definition of the
secondary focus within a relationship (CGBI: 71), except that it is indeed the
only possible focal point within the construction. In contrast, in example 16,
Saara is presented as the subject, i.e. the primary focus or the trajector. Now,
the  absence  of  the  other  participant  in  the  examples  makes  the  construals
impossible to distinguish by the amount of prominence alone. However, the
possibility of clausal subject in example 15, and its respective impossibility in
example  16,  illustrates  the  character  of  a  prominence-based  hierarchy  as  a
metaphorical depiction of conceptual asymmetry that correlates with syntactic
positions. Moreover, the interchangeable status of the constituent as either
trajector or landmark demonstrates that even a causal directionality may
overruled by means of construal.
The co-existence of complete trajector/landmark reversals such as having
an aunt and having a niece within the same piece of discourse is not very
common.  The  change  of  status  of  a  conceptual  entity  with  regard  to
trajector/landmark status is nevertheless a source of conceptual flexibility,
which also has concrete syntagmatic manifestations. Furthermore, if a reversal
for an expression can be envisaged in absentia,  we  may  consider  the
expression a motivated instance of a trajector/landmark construal. In written
discourse, a particular trajector/landmark alignment is likely to be motivated,
in part, by the immediate textual context, which makes the distinction directly
relevant for syntagmatic discourse relations.
In  sum,  the  dimension  of  prominence  poses  a  generalization  over  a  vast
variety  of  semantic  asymmetries.  Its  sub-dimensions,  i.e.  profiling  and
trajector/landmark alignment, can be applied to semantic characterization of
34 The example is less than optimal, for naurattaa has also the semantic variant of  ‘urging to laugh’
that is, urge that can either be repressed or given in to. In this case however, I consider it to express
actual laughter.
Conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal
74
the  basic  grammatical  and  syntactic  categories  (such  as  those  of  major
constituents).  As  a  result,  the  syntactic  choices  within  a  discourse  can  be
described as conceptual choices motivated by, inter alia, the immediate
pragmatic context. In this section, the possible contextual motivations for the
analyzed construals were only discussed in brief, but the context-dependence
of construal will be treated in depth in chapter 4. The next section, in turn, will
present one more dimension of construal.
2.4.4 PERSPECTIVE
Perspective  is  “the  way  the  scene  is  viewed”  (FCG-1:  591),  that  is,  the
dimension  of  construal  that  is  most  clearly  dependent  on  the  metaphorical
viewing arrangement discussed above (pp. 34–35). Perspective includes two
major components: the viewing arrangement and temporal dynamicity (CGBI:
73).  Since  Cognitive  Grammar’s  account  of  temporality  has  already  been
presented alongside the conceptualizer above (section 2.3.1), this section will
concentrate on the viewing arrangement and its inherent dimensionality
referred to as subjectivity.
As  mentioned  above  (section  2.3.2),  the  viewing  arrangement  can  be
simplified as the relation of the subject and the object of conceptualization or
“viewers” and “the scene being viewed”35. The “viewers” refer to the speaker
and hearer, whereas the “scene” is the semantic content of some expression
(CGBI:  55).  As  opposed  to  the  general  characterization  of  dimensions,  the
elements of viewing arrangement evoke the viewing relationship rather than
the participants of the relationship or some properties pertaining to them. For
example, tense has only a relational temporal meaning: it specifies (perhaps
utilizing a temporal reference point) the temporal relation between the subject
and the object of conceptualization, not some absolute property of the former
or the latter.
Though  not  modality-specific  in  any  sense,  the  viewing  arrangement
certainly  puts  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  expressive  potential  of  the  spatio-
visual metaphor. The linguistic phenomena considered with the viewing
arrangement often involve the expression of spatio-visual orientation and its
metaphorical extensions. The classic example is provided by the contrasting
prepositions ‘behind’ and ‘in front of’ (CGBI: 76). Yet again, these provide the
speaker  with  alternate  construals  for  the  objectively  same setting:  ‘the  rock
behind that tree’ ≈ ’the tree behind that rock’.  However, in contrast with the
earlier  example  of  ‘above’  and  ‘below’,  the  correctness  and  the  mutual
interchangeability of these prepositions hinges on what Langacker
metaphorically calls the vantage point (ibid. 75) of the conceptualizer. Here,
the prerequisite for “the rock” to be behind “the tree” is that the two entities in
35 It is not straightforward task to distinguish the definition of viewing arrangement from that of
perspective in general. Langacker himself states that “perspective is the viewing arrangement” (2008:73)
just before including dynamicity in the scope of perspective.
75
question  are  aligned  not  just  relative  to  each  other  but  relative  to  the
conceptualizer  as  well;  the  property  of  ‘being  behind’  is  dependent  on  the
conceptualizer’s location within the overall spatial setting. The speaker’s
location is the default vantage point, but she may assume some fictive vantage
point  as  well  (e.g.  when  giving  directions  to  someone  by  phone: behind the
building in front of you),  or  she  might  be  forced,  or  at  least  prompted,  by
linguistic convention to choose a canonical vantage point (e.g. a building with
a distinct façade: behind the house).
The  vantage  point,  or  perspective  in  general,  is  not  limited  to  spatial
domain, however. For example, tense relates the activity described by verbs to
the temporal  vantage point,  which either is,  or  is  related to,  the moment of
speaking (CGBI: 76–77). Another important property of perspective is the
wide metaphorical use of spatial directionality. For instance, the metaphorical
use of motion verbs for expressing changes in one’s experience and mental
state is extremely common. Expressions akin to example 17 may thus not strike
as metaphorical in the first place.
17. Läsnäolo antaa rohkeutta kohdata asioita, joita elämä tuo eteen. […]
Joskus jännitystä ja vitkastelua voi tuoda se, että ei pysty soittamaan jotakin
tärkeätä puhelua.
’Presence gives courage to face the things life brings before you. […]
Sometimes anxiety and avoidance can be brought on by the inability to
make an important call.
        (MT 6/2010: 5)
Emotional  states  and  life  experiences  are  not  physical  entities  that  move  in
space. Instead, they fluctuate between existence and non-existence in one’s
mental  life.  However,  this  fluctuation  is  analogous  to  the  movement  of
physical objects (in our experience) with regard its inherent temporality and
the type of  change involved:  a  change that  involves object’s  presence in the
subject’s experience. This motivates the metaphorical ‘coming’ and ‘going’ of
feelings and experiences. Such conceptualizations mandatorily assume the
vantage point of the experiencer, regardless of the utterer’s identity. There can
be no coherent metaphorical extension in which an experience would ‘go to’
the experiencer as observed from a distal location. However, the very existence
of a subjective vantage point is crucial: when using a spatial metaphor, one is
forced to assume a subjective perspective.
Cognitive Grammar defines perspective as a fundamental property of any
conceptual meaning. This stance is illustrated and motivated by the notion of
default  arrangement  (CGBI:  74),  which  we  have  touched  upon  in  the
discussion of ground. The default arrangement pertains to a setting in which
“the interlocutors are together in a fixed location, from which they observe and
describe actual occurrences in the world around them” (ibid.). The default
setting manifests linguistically as a simple declarative form and “the absence
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of  special  marking”  (ibid.).  On  the  other  hand,  Langacker  recognizes  “how
much  of  a  special  case  the  default  arrangement  really  is”  (ibid.),  as  is
demonstrated by the sheer ubiquity of modal expressions, virtual entities and
abstract concepts in actual discourse. These include many elements that serve
either to ground or to profile some of ground’s substructures, thus objectifying
them. Moreover, the distinction between the interlocutors and the objects of
conceptualization is not at all that clear, and it should be considered a scalar
property. This property is analyzed under the rubric of subjectivity, a concept
which has a specific linguistic meaning in Cognitive Grammar.
Subjectivity  refers  to  the  extent  to  which  the  subject  (or  the  viewer)  of
conceptualization is included in the conceptualization (the scene being
viewed). In the default arrangement, where the separation between the subject
and the object of conceptualization is maximized, the subject does not enter
the  conceptualization  at  all.  In  this  case,  the  subject  is  said  to  represent
maximal subjectivity, whereas the object, i.e. the conceptualized scene,
represents maximal objectivity. This constellation correlates with “the absence
of  special  marking”  (CGBI:  74),  as  manifested  in  simple  declarative  clauses
that  do  not  refer  directly  to  the  ground  or  make  use  of  it  by  profiling  the
speaker-hearer interaction (e.g. imperatives and interrogatives).
Regardless of the relative rarity of so-called simple declaratives, Langacker
considers the default arrangement represented by them an “essential part of
the conceptual substrate” (CGBI: 74) that enables the variety of different
construals. Moreover, the default arrangement serves expository needs: a
maximal subjective/objective asymmetry constitutes the logical starting point
for the description of the construal phenomena that reduce this asymmetry. A
noteworthy example is the special marking of non-existence in language: the
use of modal verbs and adverbs relates the conceptualized issue to the beliefs,
urges,  and  convictions  of  the  utterer  –  and  imposes  these  entities  on  the
hearer.
A relevant conceptual distinction prevails between the so-called grounding
elements (e.g. CGBI: 259–264; see section 2.3.2 above) and the expressions
that profile parts of the ground. Consider the following examples, which are
excerpted  from  a  column  on  the  teacher’s  educative  role  vis-à-vis  growing
teenagers. The author of the column is a teacher herself.
18. Nuorilla pitää olla mahdollisuus kokeilla omia rajojaan […]
 ’The young have to have the possibility to try their boundaries  […]’
19. Oppilaiden ei kuulukaan pitää hänestä
      ’The pupils are not meant to like her [the teacher]’
20. Hänen ikävä velvollisuutensa on edustaa pysyvyyttä […]
      ’Her [the teacher] unpleasant duty is to stand for stability […]’
(MT 6/2010: 37)
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The  common  denominator  of  the  expressions  in  examples  18–19  is  that
neither  of  them  describes  actual  action  or  a  realized  state  of  affairs  in  the
objective  world.  In  contrast,  the  expression  in  20  does  so  by  profiling  an
existing  moral  obligation  (velvollisuutensa on ’duty is’). Still, all three
expressions  convey  similar  deontic  information  of  a  moral  necessity  while
leaving the source of this necessity un-profiled.
Examples 18–20 thus involve subjectively construed moral  authority but
evoke this  subjective entity in rather different ways.  The modal  verb chains
pitää olla (’have to have’) and ei kuulukaan pitää (’are not meant to like’) serve
a grounding function (see pp. 36) by bringing a moral/practical necessity from
the subjective level of the utterer–hearer or writer–reader to the objective level
without  profiling  an  element  of  the  ground.  They  situate  “the  profiled
relationship with respect to the speaker’s current conception of reality” (CGBI:
259).  In  contrast,  what  the  nominal Hänen ikävä velvollisuutensa (’Her
unpleasant duty’) does is that it profiles such element: instead of grounding a
concept other than itself, ‘duty’ explicates (as a free-standing nominal) a facet
of the ground, a part of a moral belief-system to which the person in question
succumbs.
The status of the concept ‘duty’ as part of the common ground may seem
questionable, but with a correct understanding of the pragmatic factors
involved it appears quite credible. First of all, the very nature of ‘duty’ concerns
socially shared obligations that lead from moral justification to overt behavior:
‘duty’ therefore relates subjects to their actions as a causal factor. Accordingly,
it can be analyzed by default as a ground-related concept: this is also justified
by the fact that an actual grounding element, such as the deontic modal pitää
(’have to’), can be used to refer to the very same obligation. This leads to the
second  point  that  the  schematic  concept  ‘duty’  is  elaborated  through  the
discourse (excerpts 18 and 19 as well as some other points in the text) and by
our common knowledge of what kind of obligations come with the teacher’s
profession.  Thus,  ‘duty’  becomes  a  repeatedly  updated  part  of  Current
Discourse  Space.  In  sum,  the  whole  paragraph,  where  a  teacher  (the  writer
herself) discusses her profession, serves to explicate the (largely implicit)
moral  obligations  that  guide  her  concrete  day-to-day  work.  The  initially
implicit and exclusive knowledge thus becomes the shared and objectified
knowledge of the writer and the reader. Modal verbs ground the action (e.g.
kokeilla omia rajojaan ’try their boundaries’) to this shared knowledge, and
the nominal velvollisuutensa ’her  duty’  objectifies  a  substructure  of  the
ground.
These are different ways in which the meaning of explicit expressions
relates to what is implicitly shared by the interlocutors, that is the ground. In
actual  discourse,  the  ground  is  continuously  updated,  which  in  Cognitive
Grammar is explained with recourse to CDS. Anything uttered will contribute
to  the  updating  of  the  ground  and  in  doing  so  will  enable  new  kinds  of
construals based on the CDS. The ways of referring to necessity in examples
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18 to20 show that multiple constructions that involve grounding elements will
at least make the profiling of a substructure of the ground natural.  This will
add to the cohesion of the text while structural redundancy is avoided.
It can be argued that every expression relates, in some manner or other, to
the  ground,  and  that  it  is  therefore  analyzable  relative  to  the  dimension  of
subjectivity. This, and the fact that subjectivity-related phenomena are seldom
strictly separable from other dimensions of construal, makes it difficult to give
an encompassing and clear-cut picture of the distinct patterns of subjectivity
within  discourse  (consider  CDS,  which  is  categorized  under  the  rubric  of
focusing).  Let  us  therefore  consider  one  more  pattern  of  subjectivity  that
incorporates  elements  from  other  dimensions  as  well:  that  is,  fictive
dynamicity (or “fictive motion”, Talmy 2000a: 99–175; for several treatments
on  fictive  dynamicity  in  Finnish,  see  Huumo  2005,  2007,  2009)  and  the
related notion of mental scanning (e.g. CGBI: 82).
Fictive dynamicity pertains to a construal in terms of a dynamic change of
a state of affairs that objectively does not involve change. Mental scanning, on
the  other  hand,  refers  to  the  conceptual  operation  that  is  used  in  Cognitive
Grammar to explain fictive dynamicity: instead of conceptualizing an actual
event of change, we mentally shift through different parts of a static structure,
which  yields  a  change  in  our  focal  attention.  Typical  examples  in  Cognitive
Grammar  involve  spatial  constellations  (e.g. The  hill  gently  rises  from  the
bank of the river, CGBI: 82), but the scope of the concept is wider. Consider
the following excerpt, which is from a commentary article that discusses the
moral  issues  involved  in  the  coercive  care  of  patients  with  mental  health
problems:
21. Ydinkysymykseksi nousee kysymys vastuusta: kuka kantaa lopullisen vastuun
‘The core question is the question of responsibility: who has the final
responsibility’
                   (MT 5/2010: 39)
The point of interest here is the predicate verb nousee (’rises’). The verb’s
standard  spatial  use  involves  a  change  in  the  location  of  the  grammatical
subject. In example 21, the grammatical subject is elaborated the noun phrase
kysymys vastuusta ‘question of responsibility’, whereas the translative case
predicative adverbial Ydinkysymykseksi expresses a result of the change the
agent  expressed  by  the  subject  goes  through.  Note  that  the  translative,  the
modern  use  of  which  involves  spatial  relations  only  peripherally,  gears  the
interpretation toward a non-locational, inherent change. Thus, it would seem
that  the  ‘rising’  in  example  21  refers  to  an  actual  change,  either  in  the
conceptualized matter itself or in its public observability.
A closer inspection reveals this interpretation to be insufficient, however:
instead,  there is  a  projection of  change on an actually  static  state of  affairs.
This seemingly counter-intuitive interpretation requires some background
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information. The beginning of the commentary, omitted here, describes on a
generic level the health and social capacities of a person who has come down
with  a  (severe)  mental  health  problem.  What  the  excerpt  in  example  21
describes, is a permanent property of such a situation: a serious, debilitating
mental health issue is always a question of responsibility for the practitioner
making the decisions about the care of the patient. Of course, an unexpected
moral dilemma might emerge, but this not the question in example 21. What
motivates the choice of the predicate verb nousee ‘rises’ is the shifting of one’s
focus within the overall scheme of matters. The verb corresponds to the fact
that conceptualizer mentally focuses on the part of the CDS that is formed by
the  previous  text  and  thus  produces  conceptual  change vis-à-vis an un-
changed conceptual structure.
The fictive dynamicity thus described is not an unrelated sub-dimension of
construal. On the contrary, it involves a simultaneous dynamic change in the
conceptualizer’s perspective, “a focal adjustment”, in the restricted sense of
shifting one’s conceptual focus and profiling (with the predicate verb) a result
of the processing activity as a temporally extended relation (a process).
This is only a cursory overview of the vast range of phenomena related to
perspective. Dynamicity itself encompasses a considerable amount of complex
semantic  phenomena.  I  have  aimed  to  illustrate  certain  core  properties  of
perspective  and  to  show that  it  in  fact  cannot  be  separated  in  any  clear-cut
manner from other dimensions of construal.
2.5 DISCUSSION
In  the  previous  sections,  I  have  sketched  an  overall  characterization  of  the
conceptualizer  and  the  dimensions  of  construal,  while  emphasizing  certain
points that  are relevant for the up-coming discussion.  Instead of  describing
these  analytical  concepts  in  full,  I  have  aimed  to  illustrate  their
interconnectedness and their applicability to analysis of actual (in this case,
written) discourse. The interconnectedness of the dimensions of construal has
been amply discussed in previous literature. For example, Verhagen (2007:
53–58) discusses the different classifications for construal in the Cognitive
Linguistic literature. These classifications, as I have mentioned, vary even
within Cognitive Grammar, and other authors, such as Talmy (1988, 2000a),
as  well  as  Croft  and  Cruse  (2004),  have  presented  their  own taxonomies  of
construal phenomena.
Croft  and  Cruse,  who  aim  to  synthesize  Talmy  and  Langacker’s
classification systems, point also to the inevitable amount of arbitrariness in
any given segmentation of construal phenomena (Croft & Cruse 2004: 43–46).
Verhagen (2007), on the other hand, points out how the increase in linguistic
coverage  attained  by  Croft  and  Cruse’s  system  seem  to  increase  also  its
arbitrariness, making it difficult to see how the posited categories are
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motivated  by  underlying  conceptual  operations;  motivation  which
nevertheless is necessitated by the cognitive commitment.
Verhagen  (2007:  57)  brings  this  difficulty  back  to  the  double  nature  of
construal:  its  structure  is  based  on  putative  conceptual  operations,  but  it
actually  classifies  linguistic  units,  which  are  in  constant  change.  It  is  thus
expected that a certain structure may correspond to two different construals
either for a language-using subject or within speech community. This makes a
strict categorization of construal not impossible but cognitively unrealistic.
This obviously does not concern the speaker, who uses and mentally processes
the structure in question according to the conventional linguistic knowledge
she possesses.
At the same time, the speaker’s activity involves simultaneously multiple
facets of processing that correspond to different dimensions of construal,
which  requires  that  any  comprehensive  (or  so  intended)  analysis  of  an
utterance must involve multiple or all dimensions of construal. While this task
is possible, it is rather unrealistic to assume that a final conclusion may ever
be achieved even for a specific utterance or that the analysis is able to pinpoint
the  relations  between  different  dimensions  of  construal  in  a  way  that  is
ontologically realistic. Rather, the dimensions of construal are discernible
exactly as analytical tools, whereas the facets of meaning they capture are fluid,
evasive  and  dependent  of  the  conceptualization  they  characterize.  It  is  not
therefore unexpected that Langacker himself states that the segmentation of
construal into separate dimensions is “mostly for expository convenience”
(Langacker 2007: 421–462, n. 22).
The  other  characteristic  of  construal  that  I  have  illustrated  is  its  double
nature. Construal expresses the subjectivity of the conceptualizer, and this
subjectivity corresponds to alternative construals for the same objective
situation.  (In  some  cases,  such  as  in  that  of  profiling,  construing  the  same
conceptual content may lead to referential difference). These aspects of
construal,  subjectivity  and  selection,  may  and  often  do  result  as  semantic
patterns  within  discourse.  In  this  sense,  construal  is  not  only  a  theoretical
relationship between an actual expression and its potential alternative (the
paradigmatic plane), but an actual interrelation between semantically related
expressions within a written or spoken discourse (the syntagmatic plane).
In both of these cases, the subjective aspect of construal can be easily over-
emphasized.  The construal phenomena discussed above may be categorized
as subjective in the sense of ‘non-objective’, for they inevitably evoke the
conceptualizing subject and her perspective. However, as noted in Verhagen’s
(2005,  2007)  analysis  of  the  ground,  the  conceptualizer’s  perspective  is  in
many (if not most) cases construed as being in alignment with the perspective
of another conceptualizer. On an even more intersubjective level, the evoked
conceptualizer  of  an  expression  is  not  simply  a  conceptual  origo,  but  also  a
perspectival position the recipient is invited to assume. In this sense, construal
is  reactive  to  the  interactional  context  and  thus  a  function  of  the  ongoing
discourse. As the discourse involves multiple participants by default, the very
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premise of positing construal as a (primarily) conceptual phenomenon can be
questioned. The very possibility of such questioning demands a closer look at
the theoretical groundwork of Cognitive Grammar.
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3 CONSTRUAL AND IMAGERY
This chapter describes in detail the theoretical foundations on the basis of which
Cognitive Grammar argues for its conception of linguistic meaning. The chapter
is primarily concerned with the argumentative relationship between Cognitive
Grammar and the existing literature it refers to, rather than the linguistic theory
as such. Regrettably, the reference made by Cognitive Grammar to its theoretical
precursors  is  relatively  scarce,  which  requires  that  any  claims  made  about  its
theoretical argumentation are prefaced by thorough reconstruction. Therefore, to
enable a detailed but concise analysis, I must concentrate on one specific aspect
of Cognitive Grammar’s argumentation: its use of the notion of “imagery”.
By imagery, Cognitive Grammar refers both to linguistic and mental types of
iconic representation (see section 2.2.1 for discussion on iconicity in Cognitive
Grammar). The relationship between these two variants proves essential for
understanding  the  way  in  which  Cognitive  Grammar  conflates  distinct
ontological levels in its attempt to ground meaning in mental activity. Thus, the
question  of  imagery  can  serve  as  an  illustration  of  Cognitive  Grammar’s
ontological stance as a whole. Furthermore, the term ‘imagery’ is used in tandem
with  construal  to  refer  to  the  non-objective  side  of  linguistic  meaning,  and  is
therefore directly relevant for this treatment of the dimensions of construal.
Indeed, imagery ties together the argumentative structure and the analytical
apparatus of Cognitive Grammar.
Neither the significance of imagery in Cognitive Grammar nor the associated
argumentative shortcomings of the theory have been left unnoticed in previous
literature. My analysis will discuss the criticisms levelled against Cognitive
Grammar to the effect that the dimensions of construal are based on a mentalist
conception of meaning (e.g. Itkonen 1997, forthcoming), i.e. that they compose
meaning as it is represented in the mind of an abstracted psychological subject,
and that this mentalistic conception of meaning is physicalist/reductionist by
nature (Kenttä 2003).
I accept both criticisms to the extent that Cognitive Grammar suffers from
inadequate argumentation and ontological inconsistencies. I also concur that
there  exists  a  strong  justification  for  the  conclusions  to  which  both  lines  of
criticism lead. Cognitive Grammar does indeed explicitly state that meaning lies
in the head of a single representative speaker/hearer, and it therefore conflates
two ontological levels, that of higher mental activity (conceptualization) and that
of  its  physical  basis  (neural  activation).  However,  both lines of  criticism fail  to
recognize characteristics of Cognitive Grammar that speak against these
conclusions. First of all, Cognitive Grammar is anything but definitive concerning
ontology and the relationship between the individual and the social level. Second,
while  Cognitive  Grammar  emphasizes  mental  structure  in  the  description  of
meaning, it nevertheless is a usage-based model that continuously refers to the
social  aspect  of  language  acquisition  and  usage;  and,  as  a  result  from its  non-
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modular and experiential view of cognition, Cognitive Grammar is more heavily
based on social phenomena than it is willing to admit.
 Together these reservations make another constructive line of criticism
possible. This criticism considers Cognitive Grammar a linguistic theory
compatible with a social account of meaning and communication. In so being, the
approach allows for a better appreciation of the argumentative structure between
Cognitive Grammar and its theoretical sources of influence. This, however,
requires a more subtle understanding of  the social  level  – both in general  and
relative  to  the  formation  of  subjectivity  –  than  is  made  possible  by  Itkonen’s
insistence  of  the  strong  autonomy  of  linguistics  or  by  Kenttä’s  focus  on  the
argumentative weak-points in Cognitive Grammar.
Regardless  of  the  psychologistic  proclamations  it  puts  forward,  there  is  no
doubt  that  Cognitive  Grammar  is  more  about  ‘grammar’  than  it  is  about
‘cognitive’  aspects  of  language,  and  this  is  also  evident  in  its  theoretical
prerequisites. This is not to say that Cognitive Grammar’s ontological delineation
of language as a cognitive phenomenon does not bear effect on how language is
segmented into substructures and properties. Rather, this ontological mentalism
calls for close scrutiny on how Cognitive Grammar deals with the divide between
the  individual  and  the  social  aspects  of  conceptual  meaning.  The  focusing  on
imagery  in  this  chapter  serves  exactly  this  goal.  By  concentrating  on  the  dual
nature of the notion of concept and the semantic properties that are categorized
by this notion, I will show that the metatheoretical self-conception of Cognitive
Grammar is distorted by a vague conception of what counts as ‘cognitive’.
In this respect, my analysis is in line with the tenacious criticism of Cognitive
Grammar by Itkonen. But if there is something fundamentally wrong with the
general orientation of basing linguistic meaning on mental processes, then why
analyze the details of the theory’s reference to some psychological studies instead
of simply stating the invalidity of such a practice? The argument I make in this
chapter is that the individual-psychological interpretation of these sources that
Cognitive  Grammar  provides  is  not  the  only  one  possible,  and  that  the  way
Cognitive Grammar describes linguistic meaning may be informative with regard
to the necessary interaction between individual and the social level of linguistic
organization. The analysis at hand will therefore be begun by stating the question
that is central to the present concerns: how semantics as envisaged by Cognitive
Grammar should be positioned vis-à-vis psychological and social ontology.
3.1 OUTLINE
The object of analysis, i.e. the argumentation for a specific semantic conception
of Cognitive Grammar, is approached here with a focus on how it justifies, or fails
to justify, the ontological stance assumed by the theory, on the one hand, and the
structuring of meaning into the triad of conceptualization, conceptualizer, and
construal, on the other. The treatment of these questions will emphasize the role
of construal, i.e. the organization of semantic content. The metatheoretical
analysis  of  semantic  theory  will  hence  apply  to  the  dimensions  of  construal
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specifically. The two main sections of this chapter correspond to two standpoints
from which the theoretical structure of Cognitive Grammar may be approached:
section 3.2 discusses the essential features of Cognitive Grammar’s theoretical
self-justification from a general ontological perspective, whereas section 3.3
focuses to the notion of imagery as a particularly illustrative facet or this
justification. The summary in section 3.4 provides a synthesis of the
argumentative structure revealed by the preceding chapters’ analyses and
considers its significance for the concept of construal.
On occasion, the following analysis will delve into minute details of Cognitive
Grammar’s theoretization on linguistic meaning. While not at all historical, the
present analysis will also address the changes that occurred in the organization
of the dimensions, when these prove to be theoretically significant. The data for
the analysis has been selected from the volumes FCG-I and CGBI, which cover
over two decades of the theory’s development. I will continue to use the term
“dimensions of construal”, but when there is the need to emphasize some specific
phase in the development of this notion, I will use the term “focal adjustments”
(e.g. FCG-I) or “dimensions of imagery” (e.g. CIS).
3.2 MEANING IN THE HEAD
The most obvious language-philosophical notion Cognitive Grammar endorses is
that of situating linguistic meaning in the head of the single (representative)
speaker/hearer (e.g.  CGBI:  27);  this  is  to say that  meaning is  described as it  is
experienced by an idealized individual.  This places Cognitive Grammar on the
“internalist” side of the general internalist/externalist debate in philosophy of
language (see e.g. Putnam 1973, 1975; Dummet 1978; Searle 1983; Itkonen 1997).
The specific formulation of Cognitive Grammar’s internalism, including the pre-
emptive counter-arguments against possible criticisms, contains subtleties that
demand closer inspection.
In this section, I will discuss how Cognitive Grammar specifies the “location”,
or the psychophysiological basis, of meaning (subsection 3.2.1), and then I will
discuss the definition of meaning given in Cognitive Grammar (subsection 3.2.2).
The division of these topics into two subchapters reflects, to a certain extent,
Cognitive Grammar’s own division of analytical conduct into so-called processing
and phenomenological standpoints vis-à-vis linguistic  meaning.  While
concentrating  on  the  term  ‘cognitive  processing’  and  its  rooting  in  the
neuronal/material  function  of  the  mind,  section  3.2.1  aims  to  deconstruct  the
physicalistic justification for Cognitive Grammar’s psychologism in semantic
ontology. Section 3.2.2 then shifts the attention to the phenomenological aspects
of  meaning  and  offers  an  account  of  the  properties  of  linguistic  meaning  that
result  from  individual-psychologism,  as  established  in  the  earlier  section.  The
difference between these first two sections is only of a perspectival nature, as their
themes overlap heavily. In section 3.2.3, I will address the criticisms directed
against Cognitive Grammar’s ontology of meaning (namely, criticisms articulated
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by Itkonen 1997, 2008b, forthcoming; Kenttä 2003). In doing so, I will provide a
summary of the aforementioned themes.
3.2.1 PROCESSING AND PHYSICALISM
To discuss the “location” of meaning is obviously to make reference to meaning
via  conceptual  metonymy:  it  is  not  suggested  here,  or  by  Cognitive  Grammar
itself,  that  meaning  could  be  located  in  the  manner  of  physical  artefacts.  The
locative metonymy is nevertheless applied repeatedly by Cognitive Grammar to
justify  a  mentalist  conception of  semantics.  This patently ill-devised use of  the
metonymy  serves  well  as  the  starting  point  for  the  present  discussion  as  an
illustrative example of the inconsistencies in Cognitive Grammar’s ontological
grounding.
As pointed out by Kenttä (2003: 73–81), Cognitive Grammar’s rhetoric
repeatedly evokes a form of physicalism or reductive materialism, i.e. an
ontological stance in which the existence of different ontological levels is
accepted, but reduced, directly or indirectly, to the physical or material level 36. In
practice, reductive materialism entails that everything that exists can ultimately
be explained by referring to physical concepts. Cognitive Grammar’s reference to
phenomenological and processing standpoints to meaning (e.g. CGBI: 31) does
not do much to cancel such interpretation: the explanation shifts in a somewhat
confusing way from experienced meaning, through an unconscious processing
level, to underlying neural patterns. Moreover, neurophysiological operations are
not operationalized in any systematic way but they are simply stated as a physical
precondition for (linguistically  relevant)  thoughts to occur.  Physicalism is  thus
evoked when convenient but it is not systematically elaborated.
Kenttä (2003) analyses Cognitive Grammar with reference to Popper’s (1972)
postulation of three worlds, i.e. three realms of distinct ontological constitutions:
the  physical  (“world  1”),  the  mental  (“world  2”),  and  the  social  (“world  3”).
Relative to Popper’s three worlds, there are two possible, yet mutually
inconsistent, forms of physical reductionism to which Cognitive Grammar
succumbs.
First, it can be claimed that Cognitive Grammar rejects the relevance of the
social  level  in  language  related  phenomena,  as  it  emphasizes  (individual)
cognitive  aspects  as  the  central  factors  in  the  organization  of  language.  This
aspect is presented more carefully in sections 3.2.2 and 3.4.
Second,  Cognitive  Grammar  can  be  said  to  conflate  the  physical  and  non-
physical aspects of mental experience in its conception of cognition. Indeed,
combinations of (partly inconsistent) definitional sentences can be found in
Cognitive Grammar that justify such a conclusion: meaning (linguistic) is defined
as conceptualization (psychological, e.g. CGBI: 30), and conceptualization is
36 The terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are used here interchangeably as is the case in a large
portion of the literature that discusses these strands of thought.
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“explicated as” (FCG-1: 5), or “resides in” (CGBI: 31), cognitive processing, which,
in  turn,  is  constitutive  of  mind  (FCG-1:  100).  The  term  ‘processing’  lacks  an
explicit  definition,  but  Cognitive  Grammar  seems  to  posit  it  as  a  series  of
“cognitive events” (ibid.), which “designate a cognitive occurrence of any degree
of  complexity,  be  it  the  firing  of  a  single  neuron  or  a  massive  happening  of
intricate structure and large-scale architecture”.
While these excerpts imply materialistic reasoning, they hardly constitute any
programmatic form of ontological reductionism: Cognitive Grammar does not
claim  to  explain  the  mental  and  social  phenomena,  let  alone  the  distinct
ontological realms they belong to, with regard to physical concepts.
The  type  of  reductionism  Cognitive  Grammar  falls  prey  to  appears  to  be
restricted and inconsistent by nature. According to Cognitive Grammar, it seems,
the  mind  is  the  principal  setting  for  language  and  neurological  activity  is  the
defining  property  of  the  mind.  This  interpretation  alone  equals  a  serious
accusation.  Were  it  proven  justified,  it  would  mean  that  Cognitive  Grammar
neglects the fundamental social ontology of language (Itkonen 1978, 1997, 2003)
and confuses the phenomenological  and physical  aspects of  the mind.37 In this
section, we will concentrate on the latter of these two implications.
It should be emphasized that the parts of Cognitive Grammar that suggest a
physicalist interpretation are vague at best, and it is doubtful that the theory
would  support  the  interpretation  of  all  cognitive  activity  as  a  mere  firing  of
neurons. As noted above, the parts of Cognitive Grammar which might justify a
reductionist interpretation (a reduction from psychological to physiological
phenomena) concern the so-called processing-related and phenomenological
aspects of mind and conceptualization (e.g. CGBI: 31). These aspects of mind are
posited to justify theoretical notions and descriptive procedures; as we have seen
in section 2.3.1, the latter include, inter alia, the description of the processual
meaning  of  finite  verb  clauses  and  the  distinction  between  processing  and
conceived time as components of sequential scanning. The example is not
optimal, however, since the relationship between conceived and processing time
is relatively remote. The overall interconnectedness of the processing and
phenomenological standpoints in Cognitive Grammar is both more integral and
more complex.
The phenomenological standpoint pertains to the way in which linguistic
meaning appears to the representative speaker/hearer. This standpoint is taken
to be more fundamental for linguistic analysis, as it is “obviously more accessible
and  amenable  to  investigation  via  linguistic  evidence”  (CGBI:  31).  The
operationalization of cognitive processing could hence be seen as a special case
37This is not to say that a physicalist account of mind would be automatically false, but that it would lead
to problems with other aspects of Cognitive Grammar. Some type of physicalism is actually the most frequent
position in the modern philosophy of mind (for a non-reductionist physicalist account, see for example Tye
1999, 2003, 2009). It is obvious, however, that positing definitional relations between phenomenal and
physical aspects of mind does not assent to a specific physicalist theory, let alone constructs one. Rather, this
is only a manifestation of inconsistency within Cognitive Grammar.
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that stems from explanatory needs, as in the case of verbs, but the term has been
given a wider interpretation in the theory.
Whereas the phenomenological standpoint refers to what appears, the notion
of processing in Cognitive Grammar refers to the activity that constitutes
whatever  appears.  Cognitive  Grammar  is  ambiguous  about  the  term,  but
processing  can  be  associated  with  forms  of  pan-cognitive  activity  that  serve  to
structure experience and, given the holistic orientation of the theory, linguistic
conceptualization as well.  For example,  Cognitive Grammar postulates a set  of
domain-independent “cognitive abilities” (FCG-1: 99–146), primary aptitudes
that relate pieces of information and structure both perception and conception.
The cognitive abilities include extremely general processes. For instance,
comparison  (FCG-1:  101–105)  establishes  a  relationship  between  two  or  more
entities and registers their mutual similarities, as well as their discrepancies. As
a whole, the cognitive abilities are not explicitly based on any specific theoretical
paradigm, albeit Langacker on occasion refers to perceptual psychology (FCG-1:
101;  Arnheim  1969),  cognitive  psychology  (FCG-1:  5;  Miller  &  Johnson-Laird
1976), and mental imagery research (FCG-1: 110; Shepard 1978; Kosslyn 1980).
Despite these references, the cognitive abilities Cognitive Grammar posits can be
thought  of  as  logically  necessary  minimum  abilities  that  relate  pieces  of
information and form coherent conceptual structures. For example, in sequential
scanning,  the  detection  of  change  or  no-change  inevitably  involves  the
comparison of successive component states.
 The distinction between the phenomenological and the processing level
corresponds to some extent to a delineation of psychological phenomena relative
to their accessibility to conscious introspection. Although Langacker does not
explicitly apply this criterion, it can be inferred from the different methodologies
he  associates  with  the  two  different  levels  (CGBI:  31).  The  division  of  the
processing and phenomenological levels is not unproblematic, however.
Zlatev (2010) criticizes prominent cognitive linguists, i.e. Lakoff and Johnson
(1999; Johnson 2005), for a stupefied conception of phenomenology as analysis
of  focal  consciousness.  For  instance,  Johnson  (2005:  21)  defines
phenomenological study in opposition to what is needed in the analysis of sub-
conscious conceptual processes underlying linguistic meaning. Thus, in this view,
phenomenology is a study of what appears to consciousness as such. Zlatev rebuts
this  misconception  and  emphasizes  the  nature  of  phenomenology  as
systematization of elements that make meaningful conscious experiences
possible  but  that  reside  themselves  in  the  “margins”  (Zlatev  2010:  422)  of
consciousness. The necessary result of such focus is that phenomenological study
must discard any strict division between conscious and sub-conscious
phenomena.
This conclusion is automatically relevant any linguistic theory that claims to
make use of phenomenological methodology. In so being, Zlatev’s analysis casts
a  considerable  doubt  on  the  way  in  which  the  categories  of  processing  and
phenomenological levels are formulated and operationalized in Cognitive
Grammar. For instance, the category of “cognitive abilities” may be questioned
for lack of internal integrity and ambiguous character vis-à-vis phenomenology
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of meaning.  Is  a  cognitive ability  posited as an actual  subconscious processing
mechanism, or is it a conscious correlate of such mechanisms? Or is it, perhaps,
a  non-thematic  aspect  of  overt,  conscious  experience?  Without  solving  this
confusion, one may not be able to associate the level of cognitive processing with
any systematically defined ontological position.
Indeed, by positing several mutually inconsistent definitions for mental and
linguistic phenomena, Cognitive Grammar makes an effort not to be associated
with any systematic ontological viewpoint.38 It is clear, however, that there are
two  categories  of  mental  activity,  processing  and  phenomenological,  that  are
pivotal for linguistic meaning from Cognitive Grammar’s standpoint. In order to
prove  that  Cognitive  Grammar  exhibits  physical  reductionism,  one  must
demonstrate  that  the  integrity  of  both  of  these  categories  is  denied  in  favor  of
physicalist explanation.
This interpretation, however, is efficiently cancelled by the statements
Cognitive Grammar makes about the phenomenological and processing
standpoints, their mutual relation, and their status relative to the material, i.e.
neuronal, foundation of cognition. Let us turn back to the locational metonymy
Cognitive  Grammar  evokes  in  defense  of  a  cognitive  point  of  view  in  the
description of meaning:
Where  are  these  [linguistic]  meanings  to  be  found?  From  a  cognitive
linguistic perspective, the answer is evident: meanings are in the minds
of the speakers who produce and understand the expressions. It is hard
to imagine where else they might be. (CGBI: 27.)
Langacker  certainly  is  right  in  considering  that  the  experience  of  linguistic
meaning  is  also  an  event  in  the  material  realm:  the  physical/physiological
correlate  of  meaning  can  only  be  located  in  the  heads  of  interlocutors.  The
naturality of this conclusion stems from the fact that it is a relevant answer to
locative question,  which is  already committed to an ontological  categorization,
when taken literally. In so being, the answer is correct but the question itself is
formulated on the basis of considerable ontological naïveté.
However, what Langacker seems to imply here, instead of materialism per se,
is  exactly  a  naïve  type  of  mentalism-ex-matter. For Langacker, the material
boundedness of meaning in the heads of interlocutors seems to serve as a ground
for  inhibiting  the  scope  of  the  semantic  theory.  This  is  a  category  error par
excellence but of a very different kind than that of reducing mental phenomena
categorically to physical occurrences. In the passage by Langacker, a property of
the  physical  realm  (boundedness)  is  imposed  onto  an  object  belonging  to  the
38 “Processing”  in  Cognitive  Grammar  is  in  many  ways  comparable  with,  but  also  differs  from,  the
“cognitive unconscious”, which was introduced by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 103–104) and posited as an
intermediate level of cognitive organization between the phenomenological level and neural embodiment.
Zlatev  (2010)  provides  a  critical  review  of  this  postulate.  Since  it  tries  to  incorporate  aspects  of  both
intentionality and biological causation, the concept is incoherent and its explanatory value is questionable.
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mental  realm  (meaning  as  a  mental  phenomenon)  in  order  to  justify  the
categorization of the meaning as mental. The reasoning behind this is circular:
1. Meaning is what is mentally experienced by a subject.
2. The physical correlate of meaning as experienced by a subject is located
in the brain of the subject.
3. Because  the  physical  correlate  of  meaning  is  located  in  the  brain,
meaning must be a mental phenomenon.
To avoid this circularity, one would only need to accept the reduction of meaning
to its physical correlate; this, however, would make the whole chain of inference
redundant. Langacker is understandably unwilling to take this step; what he does
instead is that he shift his position according to the given argumentative need.
Indeed, the aim seems to be to underline the need for a mentalistic view in the
description of meaning at the expense of consistency. Cognitive processing, in
turn, serves to bypass the problem of the mind-brain-gap.
In FCG-I (p. 97), Langacker states unambiguously that “meaning is a mental
phenomenon that must eventually be described with reference to cognitive
processing”.  Langacker  then  proceeds  to  associate  his  view  of  meaning  with
Chafe’s  (1970:  74)  conceptual/ideational  account.  Palmer  (1976:  26–30)  and
Lyons (1977: 113), on the other hand, are introduced as adversaries to the adopted
conceptualist/ideationalist position. In the passage Langacker refers to, Lyons
presents his objections to conceptualist semantics. According to Lyons (ibid.),
mental lexical concepts cannot be shown to have this or that functional role in
“ordinary language-behaviour”39,  and  the  significance  of  mental  imagery  for
meaning is beyond empirical enquiry40. Palmer, on the other hand, attacks the
notion  that  concepts  (and  the  mental  experience  from  which  they  arise)  are  a
mediating link between symbols (linguistic forms) and their referents (1976: 26).
Cognitive  Grammar  can  be  reasonably  described  as  an  antithesis  to  these
views, for it defines symbolic function of language relative to pairings of meaning
and  form  that  are  internalized  as  a  whole.  Mental  representations,  and  the
processing  activity  that  gives  rise  to  them,  are  therefore  indispensable  for
semantic investigation.
What is processing then? Above, I have stated that, despite the fact that it has
not  been  explicitly  defined,  we  can  treat  “processing”  as  an  umbrella  term for
those mental abilities that give rise to the experience of meaning but reside at the
39 Certainly  well-informed  from  a  strict  epistemological  point  of  view  (how  could  one  know  with
scientific accuracy what some other individual knows?), this criticism is insufficient in the light of the fact
that all language-behavior necessarily bases itself on the expectations of what the others know or might
know, and on the specific supposition that the other one agrees with the interlocutor on what linguistic
expressions mean.
40 This actually does not hold true as long as meaning is understood in psycholinguistic terms: consider
for example Dual-coding Theory (Paivio 1971, 1991, 2006; Paivio and Begg 1981; Sadoski & Paivio 2004),
which considers exactly the two-modal parallel processing (propositional and pictorial modes) in
understanding and producing linguistic expressions.
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background of that experience. The actual use of the term in Cognitive Grammar
is ambivalent. Langacker states that “Cognitive Grammar […] equates meaning
with  conceptualization  (explicated  as  cognitive  processing)”  (FCG-I:  5),  and
elsewhere (ibid.  138) states that  “[…] a conceptualization is  an occurrence of  a
cognitive event”. Moreover, Langacker defines mind as being “the same as mental
processing” (FCG-I: 100), so that our mental experience both results materially
from  neuronal  activity  and  is  constituted  from  “a  flow  of  events”  (ibid.).  A
cognitive event is defined as “[a]ny cognitive occurrence of whatever degree of
complexity, from firing of a single neuron to the comprehension of a complicated
expression” (FCG-1: 489).
The primary conclusion that derives from above statements is that meaning,
mind (or cognition), conceptualization, cognitive processing and neuronal
activity cannot be separated in any absolute way. Moreover, the definition of a
cognitive event invokes the physicalism by placing neuronal activity on the same
continuum (of complexity) as “comprehension”. This dissolves the concept of
cognition, and the mention of comprehension gives rise to a question concerning
the phenomenological standpoint Cognitive Grammar claims to endorse.
The dissolution of the notion of cognition is especially clear if we rephrase the
definitions  given  above.  When  investigated  more  closely,  they  give  away  five
equivalencies: i) Meaning equals conceptualization, ii) Conceptualization equals
an occurrence of a cognitive event, iii) Mind equals a flow of cognitive events, iv)
A flow of events equals cognitive processing, and v) A cognitive event equals both
complex cognitive processes involving conscious comprehension and neuronal
activity.41 It seems that Cognitive Grammar inescapably commits itself to a type
of  materialism according  to  which  everything  in  the  category  of  the  neuronal-
mental is relevant to meaning.
It should be emphasized, however, that the statements above have been
collected from separate parts of the theory (albeit all can be found in FCG-1), and
it is highly unlikely that they are meant to form a coherent theoretical construct.
It  is  thus  the  opposite  that  seems  more  realistic:  a  case  of  unintended
incoherence. This incoherence can be better understood if we take a closer look
at the relationship between cognitive processing and cognitive events, and if we
relate them to the phenomenological aspect of meaning.
As cognitive processing lacks an explicit definition, it can only be defined post
hoc relative to the cognitive abilities posited in the theory, the afore-mentioned
equivalences, and the phenomenological/processing distinction presented above.
There are two important hindrances, however.
First of all, if we subscribe to the equivalences i–v, we are saying that meaning
(among other forms of thought) is constitutive of mind, rather than saying that
41 Note that the equivalence relations in i-iii are not absolute; e.g. conceptualization covers also non-
linguistic processing and cognitive events are likely to include other events than those of conceptualization.
Given the non-modular emphasis of CG, however, it is reasonable to posit equivalences such as those above
as generalizations of the mind-meaning-relationship as in CG terms. Vice versa, to specify properties
belonging to the conception of mind is to specify the nature of linguistic meaning, among other forms of
thought.
91
meaning is a property of mind. If this equivalence between linguistic meaning
and cognition is taken to its logical conclusion, the potential of non-linguistic
cognition to explain linguistic phenomena is obviously lost. That is, if there is no
distinction between language,  or  some domain of  language,  and cognition,  any
property of the latter is automatically attributed to former. This kind of reductive
position  would  in  fact  make  any  independent,  non-psychological  study  of
language  simply  redundant  and  Cognitive  Grammar  itself  could  be  dispensed
with.
Indeed, for meaning to be explainable in terms of mind/cognition, it has to
have  some  amount  of  ontological  integrity.  The  problem  with  the  above
equivalences is nevertheless primarily rhetorical; meaning is defined elsewhere
in Cognitive Grammar relative to linguistic conceptualization (FCG-1: 99). While
this type of conceptualization is structured by the abilities of general cognition, it
can  nevertheless  be  demarcated  as  a  separate  category  by  the  linguistic
intentionality alone.
The  second  problem  is  more  serious.  The  holistic  operationalization  of
‘processing’ seems to leave no room for what is ‘phenomenological’ about
linguistic meaning. In fact, if we look at the equivalences posited above, it is hard,
if  not  impossible,  to  see  how  experience  or  the  phenomenological  aspect  of
meaning would fit in the picture. The problem, which would not occur if Cognitive
Grammar implemented a systematic physicalistic account of mind (cf. p. 85, fn.
37), stems from the fact that Cognitive Grammar gives cross-referential
definitions for conceptualization, processing, events etc. that stand at odds with
the processing/phenomenological segregation Cognitive Grammar postulates
elsewhere. It thus seems that Cognitive Grammar lacks a systematic ontology of
mind, and as a result, it conflates phenomena of distinct ontological categories
that it has itself posited.
When justifying its mentalism, Cognitive Grammar disregards the subjective
experience and restricts itself to draw explanation from the mind’s material
organization. Cognitive processing and cognitive events are posited as the basis
of explanation for semantic phenomena, and, at the same time, the application of
these terms shifts uneasily between the material and the mental levels (“firing of
a single neuron” vs. “comprehension”). The posited cognitive abilities, as well as
the overall descriptive procedure presented within the theory, reveal this shift to
be illusory, however.
Cognitive abilities, while presented in a somewhat abstract manner, link
directly to experience, not to some underlying computational or connectionist
model of neuropsychological information processing, let alone to the materialism
of neural activation. This includes, for example, ‘focal adjustments’ (FCG-1: 116–
137), which in practice are equal to the dimensions of construal and hence pertain
to the relationship between the experiencing subject and whatever is being
experienced. In general, Cognitive Grammar makes absolutely no use of any
neuropsychological or physiological models in explaining linguistic structure.
The  scarce  references  to  such  theories  are  impressionistic  at  best.  The
connections Cognitive Grammar draws between physical and mental phenomena
are thus irrelevant in two respects: they do not serve the argumentative function
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they have been given, and they do not have any effect on the further formation of
the theory.
The reference to research and theoretization that only seemingly justify one’s
argument makes an obvious instance of ignoratio elenchi. A negative solution to
such fallacy would be to deem the theory in question invalid as a whole. In the
case of Cognitive Grammar, however, a positive alternative can be formulated as
well. This is due to the very inconsistency of Cognitive Grammar: the physicalistic
and psychologistic tendencies of the theory remain disconnected. In so being, the
key terms these tendencies should be associated with, i.e. ‘processing’ and
‘events’, may be given an alternative reading that relates them to
phenomenological aspects of linguistic meaning.
To be specific, the solution is to give ‘processing’ a descriptive or perspectival
interpretation rather than an ontological one: anything that happens in the mind,
including the experience of linguistic meaning, needs to obey certain general
cognitive principles of organization. Processing refers to these principles.
However, as these principles structure the explicit content of mind, it would be
natural to consider them as the actual target of phenomenological survey; that is,
what  is  non-thematical  but  thematizable  within  the  consciously  accessible
activity of mind (see Zlatev 2010: 422).
This interpretation is justified by the context in which the term of processing
presents itself: an analysis of pan-cognitive abilities related to conceptual and
perceptual experience, and the semantic description of certain linguistic concepts
(most  notably  the  scanning  of  subsequent  component  states  in  processing  of
finite  verbs  phrases).  What  is  shared  by  these  processes  is  that  they,  in  fact,
pertain to principles of cognitive activity that give rise to phenomenal experience
without  being  objects  of  that  experience  themselves.   Thus,  they  can  be
incorporated  in  actual  phenomenological  analysis,  as  pointed  out  by  Zlatev
(2010). Moreover, they can also be combined with an ontological perspective that
accepts the primacy of sociality for language as its basic tenet (these points are
further developed in chapter 4).
A  synthesis  of  the  observations  presented  above  will  now be  provided.  The
locational metonymy our discussion began with is indeed illustrative of Cognitive
Grammar’s argumentation, but it does not constitute a systematic ontological
standpoint. First of all, the mind is the primary setting where semantics happen,
regardless of the fact that the mind, in a sense, is constituted of that happening.
Cognitive  Grammar  exploits  the  material  basis  of  meaning  (the  neuronal
workings of the brain) to justify the concentration of linguistic meaning on the
individual/mental level. Second, the mutual dependence of the concepts
“meaning”, “conceptualization”, “mind”, “processing” and “event” in Cognitive
Grammar demonstrates that the above materialistic stance is manifest in the
theory’s definition and understanding of linguistic meaning. Relative to the
formulation of the equivalences i–v, meaning in Cognitive Grammar is presented
in processual terms. In this sense, meaning is what mind does, and mind itself is
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constituted by psychophysiological occurrences.42 Third, the materialistic
proclamations by Cognitive Grammar are shown to be doubly irrelevant for the
theory.  As  a  form  of ignoratio elenchi,  they  do  not  connect  with  the
phenomenological  aspect  of  the  theory.  Moreover,  the  concepts  to  which  one
could  attribute  the  materialism  of  Cognitive  Grammar  can  be  interpreted  as
capturing non-thematical aspects of phenomenological meaning rather than
genuine neuropsychological constants. This interpretation is intentionally
favorable to Cognitive Grammar, but the very possibility of such interpretation is
sufficient to demonstrate that the conception of Cognitive Grammar as a
physicalistic theory is not reasonable.
3.2.2 MEANING AS CONCEPTUALIZATION
We  have  established  that  Cognitive  Grammar  equates  linguistic  meaning  with
conceptualization, the dynamic activation of linguistic concepts within a single
representative  language  user.  We  also  saw  that  conceptualization  can  be
approached  either  from  a  processing  or  a  phenomenological  standpoint.  The
processing  standpoint  could  be  associated  with  the  neurophysiological,  i.e.
material, constitution of the brain, but it is more reasonably associated with the
pan-cognitive abilities that structure the phenomenal, experiential level of
meaning, and thus does not constitute a separate ontological level or a link with
the material level. The next question is whether the phenomenological aspect of
meaning  should  be  associated  with  a  form  of  mentalism  or  individual-
psychologism.
Given the definition of meaning as conceptualization, the answer would seem
obvious.  Cognitive  Grammar  sees  language  as  “an  integral  part  of  cognition”
(FCG-1: 12), the description of which “should articulate with what is known about
cognition in general” (ibid.). Moreover, it is taken “as self-evident that meaning
is  a  cognitive phenomenon and must eventually  be analyzed as such” (ibid.  5).
Individual-psychological  semantics  is  thus  in  the  core  of  theory’s  self-
understanding. However, as Cognitive Grammar pays significant, albeit scarce,
attention to the sociality of language acquisition and change, it can be questioned
if this self-understanding is correct.
To answer this question, we shall scrutinize the notion of conceptualization.
Since it is included in the definition of conceptualization, the notion of cognitive
processing is included in the present analysis as well. The aim here is to relate it
systematically to what Langacker means by “phenomenological” with regard to
semantic investigation.
Cognitive Grammar defines conceptualization as an occurrence of a cognitive
event  that  can  be  explicated  in  terms  of  cognitive  processing.  Langacker  also
42 This definition of meaning as a process, as opposed to some static object of mind, has multiple
argumentative advantages; here it suffices to mention the propagated fluidity of meaning thus defined. What
unfolds through time may be altered by intervening factors, such as on-going discourse etc.
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states that “Semantic structure is conceptualization tailored to the specifications
of linguistic convention” (FCG-I: 99). There are three important conclusions that
may be drawn from this seemingly simple statement. First of all, meaning is (a
type of) an experience (e.g. CGBI: 31). As we will see below, the cognitive events
Langacker describes do not manifest the type of “firing of a single neuron” but the
“comprehension” of conceptual structure by a conscious subject. Second,
meaning is a process. Langacker (e.g. CGBI: 30) emphasizes the dynamicity (the
ability  to  be  adjusted  with  regard  to  variable  contexts)  and  temporality  of
conceptualization,  and  wishes  to  challenge  the  conception  according  to  which
meaning,  based  on  conceptualization,  is  rigid  and  incompatible  with  an
interactional point of view. Third, meaning relates experience to convention.
Who or what would be responsible for the “tailoring” Langacker refers to in the
quote above is unknown; conceptualization seems nevertheless to concern
internalized yet socially defined entities and their individual interpretation. This
gives  away  a  major  ontological  discrepancy  to  which  we  will  return  in  section
3.2.3.
Taken together, these points amount to meaning as an ongoing experience
that accompanies the instantiation of a linguistic convention. Conventionality,
intrinsically linked with the formulation of Cognitive Grammar as a usage-based
model, e.g. FCG-1: 46, is emphasized throughout the theory. It is defined as “[t]he
degree to which an expression conforms to the linguistic conventions of
language” and as “the measure of well-formedness in Cognitive Grammar” (FCG-
1: 488).  In this formulation, the speech community has been given the authority
over  “form”,  which  is  analyzed  as  inseparable  from  meaning.  The  usage-
basedness  of  Cognitive  Grammar  entails  that  the  speech  community,  to  some
extent, has the authority over meaning as well. The correct usage of conceptual-
semantic  units  in different contexts is  sanctioned not by one individual  but by
many. In this sense, the social level could be interpreted as basis for the theory.
Langacker, however, argues exactly for the opposite:
We  can  validly  distinguish,  however,  between  what  a  single  speaker
knows  and  the  collective  knowledge  of  a  whole  society.  The  former  is
arguably more basic,  since collective knowledge consists  in (or at  least
derives from) the knowledge of individuals. (CGBI: 30.)
[Continuing in the footnote:] Societal knowledge is also stored in books,
database, the design of artifacts, and so on, but ultimately these reduce
to the activity of individual minds in creating or using them. (CGBI: 30,
fn. 3.)
Considering the relationship between the individual and society, Langacker sees
the individual as more basic, and consequently, sees individual “knowledge” as
primary,  relative  to  social  and  shared  knowledge.  The  primacy  Langacker
attributes to the individual is ontological, as is manifest in the predicates “consists
in” or “derives from”.  This formulation is  arguably not only simplistic  – social
knowledge is constituted in social practices that largely define what is known by
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individuals  –  but  it  is  also  at  odds  with  the  usage-based  nature  of  Cognitive
Grammar.
The challenge here is that it is practically impossible to construe a usage-based
grammar that does not involve a social component: if linguistic units are acquired
in use, and use pertains to (typically successful) communicative acts, linguistic
units are internalized as socially valid. Cognitive Grammar is therefore obliged to
bridge social and cognitive aspects of language and meaning. The critical error
Cognitive  Grammar  makes,  as  noted  by  Itkonen  (1997:  51),  is  that  the  theory
relates the social and cognitive aspects of language exactly in the opposite manner
to what is the case in actual communication. That is, it is true that the existence
of social phenomena, including linguistic ones, is dependent on the existence of
a multitude of  individual  subjects.  However,  the fact  that  x  is  constitutive of  y
does not mean that any property of y could be described simply as the property
of x (or any representative of x); the quality of y may depend on being constituted
of a multiple instances of x. Thus the existence of a constitutive relationship in
one  direction  does  not  imply  a  relationship  of  reducibility  in  the  opposite
direction. This relates directly to the concept of common knowledge, to which we
will return in section 3.2.3.
In  what  seems  to  be  an  attempt  to  avoid  this  inherent  discrepancy,  the
semantic-descriptive conduct of Cognitive Grammar is focused on the structuring
principles of linguistic meaning as experienced. Conceptualization, or the mental
experience of meaning, is thus about the individual grasping of meaning and the
principles according to which this grasping happens.43 The notion of
conceptualization  is  not  as  much  defined  as  it  is  elaborated  in  terms  of  the
substructures of “semantic structure” (FCG-1: 97–98). Conversely, the meaning
of  the  term  “conceptualization”  is  determined  by  the  systematic  analysis  of  a
variety of semantic phenomena. The open question is to what extent the actual
analysis  as  envisaged  by  Cognitive  Grammar  is  actually  restricted  by  adopted
cognitive psychological models. We may nevertheless presume that the
theoretical  notion  of  conceptualization  is  firmly  rooted  in  what  the  analyst
apprehends  intuitively  in  a  close  inspection  of  linguistic  expressions.  The
analyst’s  description,  in  turn,  is  a  systematic  generalization  over  a  set  of
experiences and hence is presumed to be representative of the experience of any
given speaker of the language in question.
One aspect of conceptualization that may help specifying the notion is its exact
grammatical  form:  “[…]  meaning  is  not  identified  with  concepts  but  with
conceptualization,  the  term  being  chosen  precisely  to  highlight  its  dynamic
nature” (CGBI: 30). As noted above, this is presented in the context of rebutting
accusations to the effect that a conceptualist form of semantics is not able to deal
43 As a technical note, according to the above explanation of “semantic structure” as a tailored form of
conceptualization, Cognitive Grammar leaves room for two types of conceptualization: general (a) and
linguistic (b). I assume the latter to be a subtype of the former so that b has all the properties of a but not
vice versa. It is b, therefore, on which I will concentrate. I will also assume that by conceptualization
Langacker specifically refers to its linguistic realization, if not otherwise stated. Furthermore, note that this
dual nature of conceptualization is in concord with Nuyts’ (2002: 434–437) separation between conceptual
and linguistic meaning, discussed earlier in chapter 2.3.2.
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with the demands of flexibility in actual interaction. Resorting to a
nominalization is hardly a sufficient counter-criticism by its own right. Cognitive
Grammar’s descriptive procedure, however, provides the rhetorical move with
actual substance.
First of all, the linear order of an expression is shown to be significant variable
in the semantic-grammatical organization of complex sentences. Word order and
constructional order are associated systematic semantic correlates, which may be
hypothesized to reveal underlying constants of linguistic online processing.
Second, semantic concepts that capture these order-related phenomena are
suggested to be applicable to various discourse-level phenomena (see e.g. chapter
13,  “Discourse”,  in  CGBI:  457–499).  Given  the  non-modular  approach  to
cognition, this applicability is rather unsurprising. The result may nevertheless
be taken as indicative of linguistic phenomena that pertain to different levels of
complexity being processed in somewhat uniform manner.
The dynamicity the term “conceptualization” attributes to the mental
experience seems to be more important, however. Langacker continues to define
the scope of the term in the following passage:
Conceptualization is broadly defined to encompass any facet of mental
experience. It is understood as subsuming (1) both novel and established
conceptions; (1) [sic] not just “intellectual” notions, but sensory, motor,
and emotive experience as well; (3) apprehension of the physical,
linguistic, social, and cultural context; and (4) conceptions that develop
and unfold processing time (rather than being simultaneously
manifested). (CGBI: 30.)
In the context of Cognitive Grammar, the items 1–3 that conceptualization
“subsumes” are to be taken as possible sources for semantic content, and item 4
consists of the possible modes of activation for semantic content (processing). In
what follows, the notion of conceptualization is characterized as a whole.
Ultimately,  conceptualization resides in cognitive processing.  Having a
certain mental experience resides in the occurrence of a certain kind of
neurological activity. […] As neurological activity, conceptualization has
a temporal dimension. Even the simplest conception requires some span
of  time  for  its  occurrence,  and  with  a  more  elaborate  conception  its
temporal progression is subject to awareness. (CGBI: 31.)
In the excerpt, Cognitive Grammar once more conflates between distinct aspects
of cognitive organization: processing, neurological activity, and awareness. It
should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  main  point  of  the  excerpt  is  to  establish
conceptualization as actual occurrences of mental activity, whatever the character
of the said activity.
If  meaning  is  associated  with  actual  occurrences,  as  opposed  to  a
generalization  over  such  occurrences,  what  is  required  next  is  a  more  specific
description of what an occurrence consists of. Regrettably, Cognitive Grammar is
97
in  the  habit  of  relating  an  occurrence  of  meaning  with  neuronal  activity  (e.g.
CGBI: 32). Such reference to neurology would require and additional explanation
of the significance of neuronal activity for linguistic theoretization. These kind of
explanations, however, are either extremely vacuous or lacking entirely.
This  does  not  prevent  Cognitive  Grammar  from  being  partial vis-à-vis
different processing theories. To be specific, it is stated that “Cognitive Linguists
are  more  inclined  to  imagistic  accounts”  (ibid.),  i.e.  theories  that  assume
analogical or simulative processing mechanisms. This view is claimed to be more
advantageous for reflecting the nature of mental experience more directly (ibid.
33).  The  stance  Cognitive  Grammar  assumes  may  be  called  an  experiential  or
phenomenological argument: phenomenological appearance of meaning is taken
as favoring a specific conception of processing. This is an interesting point in two
ways.
First  of  all,  the experiential  argument in question is  a  weak argument,  as  is
shown by the amount of controversy related to the neuropsychological function
of imagery (to which we will return in section 3.3.1). What appears in or to our
consciousness cannot be, as such, taken as a proof of existence for any particular
mode of processing. Albeit researchers supporting the functional (contra
epiphenomenal) nature of mental images claim that there is a direct causal link
between phenomenology and an underlying type of information processing, they
maintain that to achieve this conclusion one has to combine independent
empirical evidence from both the phenomenological and the processing level (see
e.g.  Kosslyn  et  al.  2006:  48).  Second,  by  showing  preference  for  the  so-called
pictorialist (i.e. “imagistic”) paradigm of visual processing, Cognitive Grammar
associates conceptualization with a non-conscious level of conceptual
organization in a way that is reminiscent of the physicalist tendencies discussed
above. Albeit the domain to which the conceptualization is attributed is different,
the  criticism  presented  above  still  holds.  Even  if  one  would  reject  linguistic
meaning based on individual cognition, what remains relevant for the sociality of
semantics is consciousness, which is the necessary context of meanings are being
grasped and conventions being internalized and put in use.
The allusions to mental imagery Cognitive Grammar makes in the description
of  conceptualization  remain  shallow,  which  is  true  for  other  cognitive  or
neuropsychological theoretical resources as well. In other words, scrutinizing
“conceptualization” does not help to specify in what way “cognitive abilities” are
derived from, or relate to, the pre-existing psychological theories. The
formulation  of  cognitive  abilities  can  thus  only  be  regarded  as  a  condense
expression of the type of psychologism Cognitive Grammar advocates.
However, the problematic notion of processing, as considered in section 3.2.1,
threatens to separate conceptualization from the direct, conscious experience of
meaning to underlying neuropsychological mechanisms. This again threatens to
make the concept incoherent as a whole. As I suggested, processing should first
and  foremost  be  associated  with  the  non-thematical  structural  principles  that
govern different phenomenal experiences. Furthermore, there is an explanatory
divide between “non-thematic” structures of consciously grasped meanings,
which  make  the  field  of  enquiry  for  the  most  of  perceptually  and  conceptually
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oriented cognitive-psychological models CG exploits, and neuropsychological
mechanisms of information processing, such as the imagistic accounts by Kosslyn
(1980) and Shepard (1978). The latter differ from the neurophysiological models
in  that  they  aim  to  explain  the  neuronal  basis  of  the  mind’s  functioning  as
opposed  to  that  of  the  brain  alone.  However,  their  primary  objective  is  not  to
explain conscious experience, let alone conscious comprehension of social
conventions.  It  is  thus  on  Cognitive  Grammar’s  responsibility  to  explain  the
relevance of these accounts for linguistic theoretization.
Cognitive Grammar’s recourse to neuropsychological research, however,
manifests a lack of self-understanding relative to its level of analysis rather than
an ill-devised analysis per se.  Since  the  so-called  cognitive  abilities  seem  to
elaborate non-thematic structures and principles of consciously accessible
experience, there exists inconsistency between the argumentation and the
sources of theoretical influence the argumentation is based on. Elsewhere,
Cognitive Grammar discusses models that consider primarily or exclusively
conceptual  operations  (e.g.  Roschian  category  theory,  Gestalt  psychology,  and
conceptual semantics by Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976). It is thus peculiar that
these models are not explicitly considered in the definitions of cognitive abilities
or conceptualization.
In so being, the take on semantics that Cognitive Grammar presents is hardly
clarified  by  equating  meaning  with  conceptualization.  On  the  contrary,  the
ambiguous nature of conceptualization serves to illustrate how the different levels
of mind/brain organization are systematically conflated by the theory. A task in
which the notion of conceptualization succeeds is the specification of meaning as
actual occurrences of mental activity. This specification, however, demands for
an explanation of how individual activity may be associated with socially shared
meanings.  The  lack  of  a  systematic  account  in  this  respect  leaves  Cognitive
Grammar vulnerable to criticisms of mentalism or individual-psychologism. Such
line of criticism is discussed in what follows.
3.2.3 ONTOLOGICAL CRITICISM
The single most articulate criticism against conception of meaning in Cognitive
Grammar is levelled by Itkonen (1997, 2008b, forthcoming).  In particular,
Itkonen’s criticism concerns the concept of imagery and its function in the overall
theory. Itkonen’s critique includes three distinct but interrelated points (the
formulations here are my own):
i) Linguistic meaning has to be (primarily) social rather than mental. To
enable  communication  and  make  it  sensible,  meanings  need  to  be
normative in the sense of being socially conventionalized. Regardless
of any idiosyncrasies in individual representations of meaning, the
non-idiosyncratic shared forms of meaning make the primary level of
semantic analysis.
ii) The distinction between the mental and social aspects of meaning as
research objects corresponds to the distinction between the
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methodologies of psycholinguistics and “autonomous” linguistics,
respectively.  The  latter  studies  language  as  it  appears  through  usage
and  the  linguistic  intuition  of  the  researcher.  The  properties  of
meaning that Cognitive Grammar claims to scrutinize belong under the
scope  of  psycholinguistics  (characterized  by  the  method  of
introspection) rather than to the scope of autonomous linguistics.
iii) The analytical concepts that Cognitive Grammar presents, that is, the
dimensions of  imagery (construal),  grasp properties of  meaning that
belong  to  the  social  rather  than  the  mental  level.  There  is,  in  other
words, a discrepancy between the theoretical claims and actual
descriptive procedure conducted by Cognitive Grammar.
The three points Itkonen raises are well justified: any sufficient theoretical
grammar needs to be able to account for the inherent sharedness of meaning, and
Cognitive  Grammar  does  not  present  a  serious  attempt  at  this  task.  The  main
point,  however,  is  that  the  lack  of  attempt  results  not  in  coherent  but  in
inconsistent reductionism. Consequently, the discrepancy to which Itkonen’s
third (iii) point refers is commensurate with the inconsistency detected in
Cognitive Grammar’s allusions to neurophysiology and neuropsychology,
discussed in the preceding section. While the discussion above concerned mainly
with the confusion between the levels  of  cognitive organization,  this  confusion
was  also  shown  to  concern  the  question  whether  the  analytical  apparatus  of
Cognitive  Grammar  was  consistent  and  capable  of  accounting  for  consciously
accessed public meanings.
What has to be kept in mind here is that the distinction between social and
mental does not equal dissociation; as Itkonen himself notes, “[…] the former is
constructed out of (an indefinite number of instances of) the latter” (1997: 51). In
fact, the focus of Itkonen’s criticism against Cognitive Grammar is not the neglect
of the social per se but the neglect of how the social and mental are intrinsically
and elementally bound together. Itkonen (ibid.) obviously accepts that individual
minds are requisite for any conventionalized linguistic meaning ever to occur. In
so being, the non-linguistic qualities of cognition, despite that they are hard to
delineate reliably, may also be accepted a priori as conditions that define the
character of linguistic meaning as well. They do not do so in any absolute manner,
however: the primary criterion for linguistic meaning is how a linguistic sign is
used, and the valid usage is always defined socially.
The conclusion must be that psychological and social phenomena need both
be included in description of meaning, albeit they show different functions vis-à-
vis semantic  description.  While  social  phenomena  provide  meanings  with
definition proper (meanings reside in the ontological realm that gives them their
distinctive character), psychological phenomena provide meanings with non-
distinctive properties (i.e. those that are shared by linguistic and non-linguistic
thought).  This,  however,  is  not  a  conclusion  Itkonen  seems willing  to  draw,  at
least explicitly. Rather, the dimensions of imagery are presented by Itkonen as an
incoherent notion that fails to adequately describe the semantic phenomena it is
applied to. This conclusion is considered, in the present perspective, unduly
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harsh. To see why, more detailed depiction of Itkonen’s formulation of social
ontology must be provided.
Itkonen’s (1997) analysis starts with a short historical introduction to the
philosophy of meaning, with his focus on Frege’s (1949 [1892]) separation
between a linguistic sign and an image. Frege defines the meaning of a sign in
negative terms relative to (mental) image that a subject may associate with the
sign. According to Frege
The image is subjective; the image of one person is not that of another […]
The image thereby differs essentially from the connotation of a sign, which
latter may well be common property of many and is therefore not part or
mode of the single person’s mind […]. (Frege 1949 [1892] 87–88.)
The excerpt manifests – although indirectly – three distinct ontological realms
according to which Frege structures his philosophy of meaning: i) the outer, i.e.
physical, ii) the inner, i.e. mental, and iii) the third realm, realm of thoughts. This
partition is analogous to that of Popper (1972), as noted by Itkonen himself. Both
Popper and Frege’s objective is the definition of objective knowledge; considering
Frege’s  work  as  a  logician,  this  stems  clearly  from  his  aspiration  to  rebut
psychologism and,  by doing so,  to free logic  from the concept of  intuition (see
Baker & Hacker 1984).
Suffice it to say, Frege’s inner realm, includes classical psychological entities
such as mental representations, memories, and images; whereas the ‘thoughts’
included in the third realm are objective, logical, and socially valid. For instance,
two subjects may be asked to evoke a mental picture in which the bat is on the
mat. While the two images evoked are distinctly idiosyncratic, the thought of the
bat being on the mat as  a  logical  relation  of  two  objects  that  pertain  to  the
material  world  is  shared  by  the  two  subjects.  The  third  realm  is  inherently
vulnerable to the questioning of  how individual  minds may entertain thoughts
that are not individual. Linguistically, however, one does not need to enter this
line  of  reasoning;  the  objectivity  of  the  third  realm  may  be  reinterpreted  or
naturalized  as  a  logical  consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  realm’s  contents  are
established in shared activities. If this interpretation is accepted, the third realm
can be re-defined as the category of social entities. Naturally, the most apparent
body  of  knowledge  that  can  be  described  as  social-objective  in  this  sense  is
provided by language, which is the main argument of Itkonen (1997).
As  a  rough  approximation,  Itkonen’s  position  may  be  seen  as  a  favorable
linguistic  reinterpretation  of  that  of  Frege.  The  social  realm  (or  “level”  in
Itkonen’s  wording)  is  presumed by  those  properties  of  linguistic  meaning  that
cannot be reduced to, or derived from, the first two of realms. Moreover, as these
properties  are  not  reducible  or  derivative,  they  can  be  reasonably  analyzed  as
definitive. Hence, meanings are primarily social in this conceptual framework.
According to Itkonen, this non-reducible social ontology of meaning is
opposed to the reductionism of prominent cognitivists (e.g. Johnson 1987) as well
as generativists (e.g. Jackendoff 1992). Itkonen’ critique is levelled accordingly at
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the weaknesses that both the representative cognitive and generative accounts
share.
The  general  weakness  of  these  theories,  according  to  Itkonen  (1997)  is  the
ignorance concerning both the social ontology of language and well-known
philosophical formulations of social ontology. Namely, “social” is falsely
interpreted by the linguists in question as referring to universal truths of Platonic
variety and detached from the physical and psychological constitution of actual
social  phenomena,  such  as  language.  In  so  being,  any  attempts  to  describe
language as a social phenomenon are dismissed out of hand.
What is manifest in such position is the inability to appreciate the constitutive
relation  between  the  social  and  mental  realm,  namely  that  “the  former  is
constructed out of (an indefinite number of instances of) the latter” (Itkonen
1997: 51), as already cited above. The dismissal of sociality altogether, then, is a
logical extension of the inability to see its interconnectedness with the individual
psyche. When sociality is treated separately from its mental (and physical)
constitution, the Platonic misinterpretation of the notion becomes
understandable – yet peculiar for a philosopher of language such as Johnson.
Johnson (1987: xxx) nevertheless suggests a detached view of the social realm,
speaking of it as “this strange third realm” which “Frege he needed […] to insure
the objectivity of meaning and the universal character of mathematics and logic”.
A similar position is attributed by Itkonen to Jackendoff, who associates Frege’s
conception  of  meaning  as  a  publically  available  entity  with  a  conception  of
language as “independent of language users” (Jackendoff 1992: 26–27).
As  is  pointed  out  by  Itkonen  (1997),  Jackendoff’s  assumption  that  “public”
equals  “independent”  (of  language  users)  unveils  a  reductionist  reasoning  in
which  only  mental  and  physical  levels  are  posited.  Under  this  assumption,  an
entity not reducible to these two levels  may only be interpreted as an artificial
construct. Interestingly, as Itkonen notes, this is the interpretation Jackendoff
(1992) offers for Chomsky’s (e.g. 1986) E-language.
Whatever the details, the major similarity between the positions of Johnson
and Jackendoff is strikingly clear: the social, in the sense associated with Frege’s
account,  is  detached  from  its  physical  and  mental  bases,  separated  from
cognizant subjects, and essentially labelled either non-existent or irrelevant. The
question is  whether this  view of  the social  level  may be attributed to Cognitive
Grammar as well.
As  we  have  seen  in  sections  3.2.1–3.2.2,  the  ontological  statements  (or  the
statements analyzed as such) of Cognitive Grammar promote mentalism, albeit
in a somewhat incoherent manner: meaning is defined as conceptualization,
which is defined both in phenomenological and processing terms. This emphasis,
however, does not automatically correspond to the aforementioned double
neglect of the social level.
Langacker, in fact, goes to great lengths to mediate between “distributionism”
(CGBI:  29,  used  as  synonym  for  externalism)  and  mentalism.  According  to
Cognitive Grammar,  both the social  and the individual  level  are real,  and their
relevance depends on the linguistic phenomena that are being scrutinized (e.g.
CGBI: 30). The individual’s linguistic knowledge is explained with reference to
Construal and imagery
102
the  knowledge  of  many:  “An  individual’s  notion  of  what  an  expression  means
develops through communicative interaction and includes an assessment of its
degree  of  conventionality  in  the  speech  community”  (ibid.).  Langacker  also
addresses the constitutive relation between the plurality of subjects and the social
level in a way reminiscent of that of Itkonen.
What  separates  Langacker’s  position  from  that  of  Itkonen,  however,  is  the
question  of  primacy  between  the  two  levels,  namely,  primacy  with  regard  to
language and linguistic meaning. As noted, Itkonen maintains that language is
primarily social for so are all distinctively linguistic phenomena. Langacker, in
turn, argues exactly for the opposite: meanings are constituted by use and they
are  distributed  across  speech  communities,  but  they  are  primarily  defined
relative to their phenomenological and cognitive status for individual subject.44
Hence, unlike Johnson and Jackendoff, Langacker does not dismiss sociality of
language altogether but simply considers it a lesser priority.
Whether this contrast has any significant manifestations in the descriptive
apparatus of Cognitive Grammar is a distinct matter. To answer this question, we
must return to Itkonen’s argumentation and concern the analytical character of
the dimensions of construal.
Once  Itkonen  has  explicated  the  reasons  for  the  irreducibility  of  the  social
ontology of linguistic meaning, he proceeds to present his specific formulation of
social ontology with reference to the concept of ‘common knowledge’. The
definition requires necessarily three levels (Itkonen 1997: 55):
A knows x
A knows that B knows x
A knows that B knows that A knows x
This three-level model is easily demonstrated to be a necessary condition for
meaningful social action and interaction. Itkonen’s eccentric example illustrates
that institutional interaction wouldn’t be possible if we weren’t as aware of the
sharedness of the given convention (level 2) and of the other’s awareness of the
sharedness of the convention (level 3), as we are of the convention itself:
For instance, the only reason why, when approaching a bank teller, I do
not start shouting “I know what to do, you don’t have to tell me!”, is that
I possess the relevant three-level knowledge: I know that the clerk knows
that I know what to do. (Itkonen 1997: 55.)
In short, social ontology does not just contain knowledge that presents itself,
by some accident, as the same from one individual to another; rather, it manifests
as three-leveled knowledge that is acquired through social encounters where it is
observed to be same to a multitude of individuals.
44 See also the terms “entrenchment” and “conventionalization” which in CG refer to the establishment
of linguistic units in the levels of subjects and communities, respectively, e.g. CGBI: 21 n.13.)
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Itkonen’s point is that linguistic meaning has to assume the form of common
knowledge: the meaningfulness of interaction comes from the supposition that
A knows that x means ‘x’
A knows that B knows that x means ‘x’
A knows that B knows that A knows that x means ‘x’.
Regardless of possible idiosyncrasies of interpretation (e.g. mental imagery), the
form of shared meaning as explicated in these three levels is what makes linguistic
communication  possible.  Even  if  I  utter x only to find out that my fellow
interlocutor does not understand me, my attempt has been based on these levels
of knowledge and the fact that they are tied to an institution (the linguistic praxis
in a speech community) that guarantees their validity.
Social  meaning  is  further  defined  as  the  primary  semantic  target  of
(autonomous)  linguistics  as  opposed  to  psycholinguistics,  the  latter  of  which
studies the mental aspects of meaning as well as the mental being of language in
general. The final chapter of Itkonen’s paper (1997) then addresses several
examples of the division of labor between linguistics and psycholinguistics, and
provides further arguments of the division. Our concern, however, is the analysis
Itkonen  offers  of  the  dimensions  of  imagery  and  the  role  of  mental  images  in
linguistic explanation.
In  subsection  B  of  the  final  chapter  (“Situations  vs.  mental  images  of
situations”, Itkonen 1997: 68–69), Itkonen criticizes cognitive linguistics for the
way it exploits pictorial diagrams in semantic description. More specifically, these
are  visual  diagrams  that  often  depict  visual  or  spatial  settings.   The  images,
according to Itkonen,  are meant in CL to depict  corresponding mental  entities
(the example is from Langacker 1991/CIS: 28). However, what a picture does by
definition is that it depicts some entity or setting by way of reproducing certain
of its visual properties in a way that is shared by many. Thus, pictures that are
meant to be representations of mental entities are ambiguous in that they exploit
conventions of explicit pictorial representations, but are controversial as
hypothetical mental entities. In this, their usage reflects the more general
tendency of cognitive linguistics to conflate the subjective–mental and the
objective–social.
In the title of subsection C, Itkonen states abruptly that “[t]he ‘dimensions of
imagery as linguistically coded are not (primarily) psychological” (Itkonen 1997:
69). Itkonen discusses the five dimensions of imagery presented by Langacker
(CIS:  5–12)  and  chooses  two  of  them,  salience  and  perspective,  for  closer
inspection.  Salience is  discussed relative to the choice of  preposition and word
order  in  the  construction  of  sentences  that  include  prepositional  phrases.
Consider, for instance, the reverse constructions the lamp is above the table vs.
the table is below the lamp. Here, the subjects  (lamp and table, respectively), or
in the terminology of Cognitive Grammar, trajectors, are analyzed as exhibiting
maximal salience, so that the sentence structure represents the underlying
mental accentuation of the items in question. Itkonen states that Cognitive
Grammar does not in fact describe “some individual-psychological or cognitive
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entity which lies under the level of consciousness” but merely depicts a semantic
property, which is directly observable and a part of the “socially valid” meanings
the  expressions  in  question.  This  analysis  is  extended  to  other  dimensions  of
imagery as well (Itkonen 1997: 70).
In  other  words,  Itkonen  denies  the  primarily  cognitive  status  of  the
dimensions of  imagery and reinterprets their  content as primarily  social.  This,
obviously,  is  not  to  deny  their  relevance  for  linguistic  analysis  but  exactly  the
opposite is true. Inasmuch as an analytical concept captures a valid generalization
over  multiple  uses  of  a  semantic  unit,  it  can  be  considered  a  feasible  concept,
despite the generalized meaning is of non-objective or perspectival character.
This  view  is  in  concord  with  the  argument  to  be  developed  below  that  the
imagery embedded in “the dimensions in imagery” is of an organizational type, a
set of general, publicly observable properties of linguistic meaning. These
properties need be strictly opposed to any modality-specific processes of mental
simulation.  However, albeit Cognitive Grammar has recently (e.g. CGBI) shifted
the argumentation behind the dimensions toward an organizational stance, as is
suggested  by  the  change  from  the  title  “dimensions  of  imagery”  to  the  title
“dimensions of construal”, the original justification for positing the dimensions
is closely associated with an assumption that there exists strong parallels between
perceptual experience and linguistic meaning. Itkonen’s further analysis of
mental images in linguistic explanation is therefore relevant for the analysis of
the dimensions as well.
In subsections D to F Itkonen (1997) discusses the relation of images (in the
Cognitive Linguistic literature in general) to consciousness, the necessary
interpretation of images, whether mental or extramental, and the relevance of
mental (visual) images for cognitive semantics. In subsection D (ibid. 70–71) in
particular, Itkonen points out a discrepancy, common in Cognitive Linguistics
and especially manifest in Lakoff (1987: 446–453) which prevails between the
interest toward unconscious, automatic aspects of cognition, and the phenomena
that are actually  described.  Itkonen states that  the “conventional  images” both
Lakoff  (ibid.)  and  Langacker  (CIS:  61)  claim  to  study  are  in  fact  available  to
conscious inspection.
This  argument  links  Itkonen’s  criticism  to  the  above  discussion  on
“processing” in relation to neurophysiology (the alleged physicalism of Cognitive
Grammar,  chap.  3.2.1)  and  neuropsychology  (the  definition  of  meaning  as
conceptualization, chap. 3.2.2). We have seen that the cognitive abilities
Langacker associates with processing are not in any way derived from, or reduced
to, neuronal activation or neuropsychological information processing per se;
instead, they are logically necessary minimum requirements for a coherent
conception or perception to occur. The (very reasonable) hypothesis by Cognitive
Grammar is that there prevails isomorphism between conceptual and perceptual
domains that is (to some extent) constituted through cross-domain reapplication
of certain processing principles. However, were this reapplication simulative in
nature or not, the isomorphism, such as construal, amounts to shared abstract
parameters of content in two domains, not to some similarity of the content itself.
Construal, in brief, does not pertain to a mental image in any pictorial sense.
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In an analogous manner, Itkonen separates the notion of (presumably non-
linguistic) “conventional imagery” from the linguistic “dimensions of imagery”,
and states that the former are not social in any “normative sense”. This dictum
does not take into account the possible functional dissociation between
experienced  imagery  and  imagery-based  information  processing,  but  it
nevertheless corresponds to the shown discrepancy between what Cognitive
Grammar claims to study (underlying cognitive mechanisms) and what it actually
describes (conventional linguistic meaning).45 This is also in line with Frege (see
above), in separating mental images from meaning.
In  subsection  E,  Itkonen  (1997:  71–72)  discusses  the  philosophical
implications of explaining meaning relative to images, with appropriate reference
to Wittgenstein (1953: 54 = 2009 [1953]: 60). Itkonen repeats Wittgenstein’s
(ibid.)  dictum  that  an  image  as  an  uninterpreted  object  is  not  capable  of
conveying  meaning.  It  is  only  through  “rules  of  interpretation”,  established
conventions that are grounded in our social normative being that we may map
meaning onto images. This is presented by Itkonen as antithetical not only to a
large part of the western philosophical tradition “[e]ver since Aristotle and Plato”
(ibid. 71), but also possibly to Langacker. Indeed, according to Jackendoff (1996:
110),  mental  pictures seem to be self-explanatory to Langacker.  Itkonen (1997:
72)  finds  an  analogy  between  Wittgenstein  and  Putnam  (1981:  18)  to  whom
something  mental  “intrinsically” referring to things is “wrongheaded”; to
Putnam,  something  referring  to  something  is  a  concept,  which  again  is
functionally defined as (a sign) being used in a specific manner.
 Finally, in subsection F, Itkonen evaluates critically the significance of mental
imagery  research  for  cognitive  linguistics.  Itkonen  states  that  the  argument
against the intrinsic meaningfulness of images applies directly to mental imagery,
and that some rules of interpretation are necessary if the psychological findings
on the matter are to be proven linguistically relevant. It is reasonable to assume
that, even in this case, it is relevance for psycholinguistics that Itkonen refers to.
Let  us  now  consider  the  implications  of  Itkonen’s  analysis  for  construal  at
large. First of all, the formulation of common knowledge by Itkonen is both
correct and relevant for construal. The three-leveled model of common
knowledge  is  intrinsically  required  by  the  sheer  possibility  of  meaningful
linguistic communication; the fact that it is three-level logically presumes its
sharedness, and it therefore cannot be reduced to the capability or property of a
single individual.
Second, Itkonen correctly points to the fact that Cognitive Grammar presumes
the  primacy  of  individual’s  grasp  of  meaning  vis-à-vis  the  social  reality  of
communication. Even though the significance of the speech community is
acknowledged in the acquisition and change of linguistic units, the main context
of meaning is the individual mind.
45 As  Kosslyn  (1994:  6)  points  out,  the  academic  debate  on  mental  imagery  as  a  possible  format  of
information processing has never been primarily concerned with the pure phenomenological character of
imagery. However, the conscious experience of imagery has had a somewhat ambiguous role in the debate,
as is discussed below.
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Third, the second point would not be problematic if Cognitive Grammar would
acknowledge that, while it is concentrating on semantic phenomena, it is dealing
with  internalized  social/normative  meanings.  As  this  requirement  is  not  met,
Cognitive Grammar fails to distinguish genuinely linguistic from idiosyncrasies
of linguistic interpretation, e.g. the possible mental imagery entertained by a
subject.
Accordingly, Cognitive Grammar is unable to distinguish methodologically
between intuition and introspection in linguistic analysis. Albeit methodology is
not the central concern here, the distinction between introspection and intuition
is of fundamental importance for the definition of construal. To be exact, Itkonen
(1981: 127–128) establishes three main categories of cognitive acts on the basis of
their object: observation, which is directed via the senses into intersubjectively
shared spatiotemporal reality; introspection, which is directed to “the subjective
sensations caused mainly, but not exclusively, by spatiotemporal things and
events” (ibid. 128); and intuition, which “pertains to concepts or rules existing in
an intersubjective normative reality” (ibid.). Linguistic meanings, as objects of
common knowledge,  are  then  by  definition  objects  of  intuition  (Itkonen  1997:
63),  whereas  the  mental  content  these  meanings  evoke,  such  as  images  and
biographical associations, are objects of introspection.
It  is  obvious  that  default  linguistic  behavior  does  not  build  on  explicit  self-
analysis of what in our communicative understanding concerns socially shared
meanings  and  of  what  pertains  to  our  psychological  experience.  The  division
between introspection and intuition nevertheless holds a priori: any sensible
attempt  at  linguistic  communication  conforms  to  the  criterion  that  deems un-
shared meaning to be unfit for use. Conversely, any successful communication in
terms of a novel linguistic sign deems the previously un-shared meaning now
valid. It is therefore a category error (that Cognitive Grammar openly submits) to
associate  public  meanings  and  their  analysis  (which  are  valid  as  long  as  we  as
readers agree with them) with introspective method and facts about psychological
experience per se.
Category  of  linguistic  meaning  is  therefore  in  large  part  defined  by  the
cognitive act of intuition that correlates with objectively valid conceptions. The
immediate linguistic implication is that the dimensions of imagery/construal
need to be separated from any form of mental imagery, whether evoked
consciously or applied as functional representations in cognitive processing.
The separation between linguistic “imagery” (construal) and mental
depictions  may  now  be  stated  as  a  logical  extension  of  the  more  general
separation between linguistic and mental domains (see pp. 96). As mentioned,
this separation does not pertain to absolute dissociation between the two levels.
As the multiple instances of mental or cognitive are constitutive of social, there is
a necessary non-absolute relationship of definition between the former and the
latter. Now, the conclusion that Itkonen draws on the mental imagery is that it is
irrelevant for linguistic considerations. The stance I adopt here is more cautious.
To be specific, the necessity of rules of interpretation in understanding pictorial
representations, or in entertaining and interpreting mental imagery, does not
entail that ability to evoke mental images, or analogic representations in general,
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could not have any role in semantic description. Meaning cannot be equated with
mental representations, but the latter may nevertheless carry specified function
in how meanings actualize and evolve in communication.
It is clear that Itkonen’s account of Cognitive Grammar pertains to the
rehabilitation of the dimensions of imagery as a linguistic constructs, not to their
dismissal. As conceptually separated both from phenomenological and
processing aspects of mental imagery, linguistic imagery remains to be explained
and rooted relative to social ontology. However, this does not equal the separation
of the dimensions of construal from individual experience.  The actual challenge
is to describe the codification of experiential (including subjective) properties
into linguistic meaning without falling prey to mentalism.
Paradoxically, overcoming this challenge may require systematic investigation
into those properties of cognition that are necessary for occurrence of linguistic
meaning for a representative subject. That is, also a valid social semantics appears
to include experiential and conceptual facets of meaning, such as those captured
by the dimensions of construal. If we are willing to move from inclusion toward
explanation, we must investigate what aspects of cognition are necessary for the
explanation of each experiential and conceptual facet. Moreover, these cognitive
aspects need be subjected to analysis with regard to the social context of actual
use:  otherwise  the  result  will  be  no  more  realistic  than  the  mentalistic  models
already in existence.
Still,  it  is  an  open  question,  whether  the  mentalism  manifest  in  Cognitive
Grammar  allows  any  coherent  synthesis  between  individual-psychological  and
social standpoints. Itkonen most clearly answers in negative, although the strict
division he makes between psychological and social may prevent such synthesis
altogether. It is nevertheless apparent that, before any attempt to integrate
Cognitive Grammar with a socially based semantics, Cognitive Grammar’s
conception of linguistically relevant aspects of cognition needs to be clarified. As
Cognitive  Grammar  makes  repeated  reference  to  notion  of  imagery  in
explanation of experiential semantics, it is this concept that we need to scrutinize
next.
3.3 IMAGERY AND CONSTRUAL
We have  seen  above  that  Itkonen,  in  agreement  with  Frege  (1949  [1892])  and
Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]), and in accordance with Popper’s (1972) ontology of
three worlds, distinguishes between social linguistic meaning and the individual
imagery that  may be associated with different linguistic  senses.  Moreover,  this
distinction motivates also the distinction between two kinds of imagery in
Cognitive Grammar: “conventional imagery” which is simply a metaphor for the
overall  semantic  superstructure  of  language,  and  mental  imagery,  which  is
evoked to justify the former. Langacker’s vague notion of cognition and especially
his  notion  of  imagery  seems  to  prevent  him  from  applying  this  dichotomy:
linguistic imagery is described in mentalistic terms and is therefore difficult to
separate from what is a modality-specific activation of mental imagery.
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 As  already  mentioned,  the  present  account  agrees  with  Itkonen,  and  thus
disagrees  with  Langacker,  on  the  general  ontological  question  of  the
mental/linguistic dichotomy: linguistic meaning is considered to be primarily
social. It has also been argued that the same mental/linguistic dichotomy can and
should  be  applied  to  the  two  distinct  senses  Cognitive  Grammar  attributes  to
imagery. Even with this ontological dichotomy, however, the mutual interaction
of mental and linguistic imagery is not precluded entirely. It is the possibility of
interaction that will be explored in the subsequent pages.
Unfortunately,  Cognitive  Grammar  does  not  succeed  in  giving  a  credible
account  of  this  relationship  between  the  two  kinds  of  “imageries”,  but  only
implies  some  interaction  between  the  two.  In  this  section,  I  will  clarify  this
relationship and consider its significance for semantic description in Cognitive
Grammar.  Section  3.3.1  offers  a  brief  excursion  into  mental  imagery  and  its
position in neuroscience. Section 3.3.2 discusses the notion of mental imagery in
Cognitive Grammar and how this  notion is  related to mental  imagery research
(e.g. Kosslyn 1994, Kosslyn et al. 2006) and the related theoretization on “mental
simulation”  (Barsalou  et  al.  1993;  Barsalou  1999).  In  section  3.3.3,  I  will
scrutinize the argumentative and ontological relationship of linguistic and mental
imagery  in  Cognitive  Grammar  and  discuss  the  apparent  weaknesses  in  the
analysis that tries to establish a causal link between these two. Section 3.3.4 will
offer a positive account of how the concept of linguistic imagery, i.e. construal,
should be analyzed as reflecting conscious experience (and hence related but not
reducible  to  perception)  but  also  the  determination  of  semantics  through
interactional and normative aspects of language use. This is not only compatible
with but can be predicted from a social ontology of linguistic meaning.
3.3.1 THE IMAGERY DEBATE
The following is not meant to be an exhaustive historical description of the
imagery debate in cognitive science but rather a brief excursion to facilitate later
discussion of its implications for linguistics (for a detailed view of the debate, see
Tye 1991; see also Kosslyn 1994: 1–21; Kosslyn et al. 2006: 3–23; Pylyshyn 2001,
2002).  Keeping  this  brief  is  challenging  for  historical  reasons;  the  idea  that
information  presents  itself  in  the  mind  as  mental  pictures  is  age-old,  reaching
back  to  Plato  (the  wax  tablet  -metaphor)  and  Aristotle’s  cognitive  theory  (the
concept of “phantasma”). Modern western philosophy (starting from Descartes’s
distinction between ideas and images in Meditations, 1641) and the forefathers
of scientific psychology, Wundt and James, devoted much attention to
understanding the role of imagery in epistemology and mental function (see e.g.
James 1950 [1890]; Wundt 2007 [1912]). After being institutionalized, however,
empirical psychology soon parted ways with the philosophical tradition of
scrutinizing  mental  experience.  In  order  to  establish  psychology  as  a  genuine
science, Behaviorism developed its empirical-methodological purism into
extreme, devoted itself to the systematic taxonomy of stimulus-response pairings
and refuted the mental experience as too evasive for a scientific object.
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In retrospect, it is obvious that this disregard of the mind was not to last. The
advent  of  modern  cognitive  science,  driven  by  the  needs  of  military,  brought
about the focus on cognitive competence.46 The new paradigm was largely guided
by two main objectives: development of an artificial intelligence and control of
the  factors  that  contribute  to  the  cognitive  performance  of  soldiers.  that  is,  by
what  exact  means  would  the  combination  of  hardware  (computer/brain)  and
software (program / cognitive system) turn the input into the desired output most
efficiently.
The  immense  subvention  of,  and  subsequent  rapid  advance  in,  computer
science  contributed  to  the  overall  orientation  of  the  cognitive  paradigm  as  a
whole: the computational theory of mind (Putnam 1980 [1961]) likened mind, as
the title suggests, to a computer operating on abstract symbols. In this context, it
was  natural  for  the  new  cognitive  psychology  to  concentrate  on  sub-personal
information processing and to approach this from a computational perspective.
This,  however,  was  not  all  there  was  to  the  psychology  of  that  era,  and  within
cognitive psychology there was opposition to the “normal” paradigm. Cognitive
psychology had reintroduced the notion of representation to psychological
description but was treating it as a relational unit for a subpersonal processing
system. A contrasting perspective to mental representations was provided by
Paivio  (1971),  who  introduced  his  influential  dual-coding  theory  of  learning,
based  on  organizing,  storing  and  retrieving  information  in  the  mind’s  two,
mutually supporting codes, the visual and verbal. The imagery debate, however,
started when the work of early “imagists” took the focus from visualizing as an
aid for learning to the actual nature of the mental images as such (Pylyshyn 2001).
To be exact,  the starting point for the debate was Pylyshyn’s  (1973) famous
critique  of  mental  imagery  as  a  theoretical  construct,  which  also  presented  a
sketch for a propositional theory of mind. His proposal was that mind, including
imaged  objects,  was  best  described  as  working  on  descriptional,  propositional
strings  of  symbols  rather  than  actual  mental  pictures  (for  a  comprehensive
presentation of a propositional theory of vision, see Pylyshyn 2003). Kosslyn and
Pomerantz  (1977)  marked  the  establishment  of  the  pictiorialist  camp  by
providing a model of how visual information may be instantiated in the brain by
topographically organized visual areas and how information can be provided by
a format that is based on spatial relations. There would, in other words, be at least
one distinct cognitive format that would reserve the modality-specific nature of
information from a distinct modal source. Moreover, there would be a format of
information  processing  that  would  be  accurately  reflected  by  the  phenomenal
experience that it produces.
The debate evolved around this correspondence between the experience of
images  and  their  cognitive-psychological  function,  which  was  defended  by
pictorialists and attacked by descriptionalists. The debate, however, focused from
46 The concept of linguistic competence was made famous by Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
(1965). However, it is Chomsky’s earlier (1959) stark criticism of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Skinner 1957)
that is often considered as the starting point for the decline of behaviorism and the opening salvo for the so-
called cognitive revolution.
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the start on a host of questions pertaining to optimal processing, the explanatory
role of images, and the very conceptual feasibility of positing image-like
structures in the mind. Until today, the debate has witnessed multiple changes of
focus,  which  accompany  the  rapid  development  of  neuroimaging,  but  it  is
questionable  whether  this  empirical  advance  has  resulted  in  any  substantive
conceptual resolution concerning the main points of dispute. These, as listed by
Pylyshyn (2001), include:
 A disagreement about whether the form of representation
underlying  mental  imagery  is  in  some way  special,  and  if  so,  in
what way it is special – whether it is special because it uses distinct
mechanisms specific to imagery or whether it is special because it
deals with information about how things look (i.e., because of what
imaginal representations are about or their subject matter);
 a disagreement about whether images are “depictive” or
“descriptive”;
 a disagreement about whether or not mental imagery “involves the
visual system,” which itself raises the question of what exactly is
the visual system and in what way it may be involved;
 a disagreement about whether certain phenomena observed
during  episodes  of  mental  imagery  are  due  to  the  fact  that  the
brain evolved in a particular way resulting in  a “natural harmony”
between the way things unfold in one’s imagination and the way
they unfold in the world or in one’s perception of the world (what
Shepard, 1975, has called “second order isomorphism”);
 A disagreement about whether some of the phenomena observed
during  episodes  of  mental  imagery  arise  because  (1)  people  are
reasoning  from  what  they  know  about  the  situation  being
imagined,  and  are  simulating  what  they  believe  would  have
happened if a real event were being observed, or because (2)
special image-specific mechanisms are deployed when one
reasons using mental images. (Pylyshyn 2001: 62.)
The  “phenomena  observed  during  episodes  of  mental  imagery”  involve
behavioral, phenomenal and physiological analogs between imagery and actual
perceptual experience; e.g. temporal differences in image rotating tasks that are
dependent on the required amount of rotation (e.g. Shepard and Metzler 1971),
“scanning” of mental images with temporal differences that correspond to the
distance scanned (e.g. Kosslyn 1973; Kosslyn et al. 1978) and activation of brain
areas devoted to perceptual processing in imagery tasks (see Kosslyn 1994: 12–
20 for a summary).
This last type of evidence has become increasingly topical in the later history
of the debate. In his 1994 monograph, which summarizes the different stages of
the dispute, Kosslyn considers the imagery debate to remain unsolved, but he also
claims that it has moved to a third stage. In this stage, data from neuroimaging
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help the scholars to answer the conceptual  questions about imagery,  an aspect
that is highly interesting in multiple respects.
First of all, pictorialists have steadfastly maintained that the depictive
conception of representations is not dependent on the physical arrangement of
the neuronal network that is responsible for imagery processing; instead, what
has been posited is a so-called functional space, the parts of which represent parts
of objects that are imagined but does not represent their original relations in any
iconic  manner  (see  Kosslyn  et  al.  2006:  14–18).  Second,  if  pictorial
representations can be presented in a functional space, the actual spatial
organization of a representation becomes irrelevant. We are tempted to interpret
neuroimaging results that show picture-like entities in the brain as picture-like
entities of the mind, but these are entirely separate matters. With these
perspectives in mind, it is peculiar that the pictorialists have been quite eager to
interpret the evidence of physiological activity as evidence of a specific mode of
computational operations. Third, in this “resolutional” phase, Kosslyn clearly
distinguishes  the  neuropsychological  study  of  images  from  that  of  the
phenomenal experience of images. The weight has shifted entirely to the sub-
personal  information  processing,  where  the  concept  of  image  has  only  a
functional definition.
It seems, then, that the philosophical remarks made about the imagery debate
in its most acute phase are still relevant. Block (1983: 510) points out the fact that
we don’t actually see mental images, but simply “have” them. We don’t, orient by
some part of our mind/brain that serves as the “mind’s eye” to another part of our
mind/brain that serves as a visual display. If we did, we would need to postulate
an internal observing homunculus, and this would lead to an infinite regress. The
phenomenal  experience  of  “seeing”  images  thus  cannot  in  any  way  serve  as
evidence for the format of visual thought. This might explain why the pictorialist
camp are involved in a paradoxical relationship with the experience of images, as
a vague index of the underlying processes.
Block addresses a similar point in connection with the so-called “no seeum”
objection (Block 1983: 511)47 leveled against the third-person perspective to the
neuronal  activity  in  the  brain,  which  is  related  to  the  dependence  that
representation  has  on  a  representational  system.  We  cannot  tell  that  a
representation  is  a  representation  just  by  looking.  The  problem is  not  just  the
explanatory gulf between what we experience mentally and what cognition does
on the level of information processing. It is also the divide between different (1st
and  3rd)  perspectives,  which  is  not  easy  to  bridge.  At  the  bare  minimum,  this
involves the establishment of a sufficient amount of correspondences between
two representative systems or perspectives, which in turn presupposes
experiential access to both of these systems or perspectives. When the systems
consist of one’s mental activity and the topographical realization of one’s brain
activity, the establishment of correspondences becomes difficult; and even in a
successful brain imaging study, the methodology cannot bypass the fact that the
47 See  also  Block  on  objections  against  mental  pictures  based  on  Leibniz’s  law  (ibid.  515–519)  and
paraphernalia (in the sense of physical apparatus needed for “handling” pictures, ibid. 519–526).
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attribution of a representative function to a certain pattern of activity is always
hypothetical in nature and cannot disclose the character of the representation for
a given subject.48
To  put  it  differently,  while  there  may  be  a  causal  link  between  the  spatial
organization of the visual areas in the brain and the representations it gives rise
to, these are still clearly two different matters. If we looked in a test subject’s brain
and saw a highly realistic 3D picture of a Japanese dormouse, we would still not
have  seen  the  experience  of  that  picture  as  a  mental  image,  or  witnessed  the
function  of  that  picture  in  an  information  processing  system.  The  discovery  of
such a picture would reasonably be considered non-trivial and indicative of what
is going on in the mind. However, at this point, all the work to prove a specific
causal  link  between  the  physical  third-person  image  and  a  mental  first-person
image would still remain to be done. Furthermore, even if this line of research
would grant us the final answer on visual processing, it would not collapse the
first person visual experience into its visually observable spatial organization in
the brain.
This is not to say that there could not be progress in a simultaneous, mutually
informative  study  of  processing  based  on  spatial  or  visual  representations  and
their  neurophysiological  implementation.  This  indeed  is  the  main  concern  of
Kosslyn and associates; though the research analyzed here (Kosslyn 1973, 1980,
1994; Kosslyn & Pomerantz 1977; Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser 1978; Kosslyn,
Thompson & Ganis 2006) does not address the conceptual problems associated
with the no seeum problem in a satisfactory manner. From the current point of
view, however, a more interesting point is the function of mental images and their
relation to conscious experience and, ultimately, to language.
According to Block, pictorialists and descriptionalists nevertheless seem to
share the assumption that there is some kind of “similarity of representations of
imagery and perception” (Block 1983: 509). This does not tell us anything about
the underlying format of information processing, but simply helps us to delineate
the problem of possible representations with the necessary property of similarity.
The  real  question  is  which  one  of  the  accounts  succeeds  better  in  explaining
mental imagery as a functional part of the overall cognitive architecture; but the
focus  on  the  validity  of  pictorial  and  descriptive  structures  as  a  means  of
information processing seems to steer the debate to a direction that has little to
do with the relationship between experienced mental imagery and the proposed
formats of processing.
Mental pictures that convey spatially organized information thus seem to be a
plausible component in cognitive architecture, though they do not stand out as
the  most  realistic  option.  As  shown by  Block,  however,  the  feasibility  from an
information-processing standpoint does not mean that mental pictures, as they
stand, are sufficient for epistemological explanation, i.e. an explanation of how
mental representations relate to the world. The phenomenal similarity between a
48 Instead, this leads to the “hard problem” of consciousness, the question why we have phenomenal
experiences and how these experiences relate to the physical basis of mind. Again, for a physicalist attempt
in solving this problem, see Tye 2003.
113
perceptual experience and an experience of mental imagery is not enough to
explain that we know that the image and percept relate to each other. In fact, what
seems cognitively impenetrable (outside the scope of conscious volition), is the
sheer  knowledge  of  this  relation;  I  know,  for  example,  that  when  I  evoke  the
image of the summer cottage of my family that I imagine the summer cottage of
my family, but if asked to spell out the grounds for my conviction, I could hardly
give any other justification than the conviction itself49.  This  shows  that  to  be
meaningful in a true representational sense, images have to be embedded in
intentional states that are accompanied by the knowledge of their referential
value (Thompson 2007b). This sense, however, does not need to take the specific
format of instantiation of images into account.
 We have  discussed  two  distinct  yet  intertwined  topics:  neuropsychology  of
mental imagery and the philosophy of mental imagery. Discussing either of these
topics more intensively would exceed the scope of this chapter; however the very
existence of a vast controversy associated with both of these fields is enough to
promote caution against justification of linguistic claims on the basis of mental
imagery. The imagery debate remains both at an empirical and conceptual level;
at  the  same  time,  implications  of  the  debate  for  language  have  hardly  been
discussed within Cognitive Linguistics.
More  importantly  still,  what  also  remains  to  be  discussed  is  the  manner  in
which the epistemological complexities of neuropsychology prevents definitive
cross-disciplinary conclusions. For example, Anderson (1978) shows that it is
possible to devise a propositional theory that is able to mimic the properties of a
depictive one. Pylyshyn (2006), in turn, combines his propositional theory with
truth-value  based  semantics.  However,  if  a  propositional  system  can  mimic  a
depictive system, there is no reason why a propositional system would not be able
to mimic an imagery-based representational system, where concepts link with
external  entities  partially  by  means  of  similarity,  i.e.  mental  simulation.  It  is
therefore a question of optimality, not the possibility, of different processing
systems to bridge sensory-based information with linguistic meaning.
 Cognitive  Grammar  does  not  consider  this  particular  question  at  all,  but
simply  assumes  an  imagistic  position  on  the  basis  of  the  argument  from
experience  that  was  pointed  out  above  (section  3.2.2).  What  is  lacking  is  a
systematic account of the possible constraints the choice of an optimal processing
theory  bears  on  semantic  theory.  Instead,  Cognitive  Grammar  not  only  makes
reference to imagery research but also to a psychological theory of concepts that
exploits simulative processes: Barsalou’s (1999; Barsalou et al. 1993) Perceptual
Symbol Systems. The relationship between these three theories is discussed in
the following section.
49 This is meant as analogous to the certainty related with the meanings of words and expressions. When
asked about the grounds for this certainty “I could give a thousand, but none as certain as the very thing they
were supposed to be grounds for” (Wittgenstein 1969: §307).
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3.3.2 ALLUSIONS TO MENTAL IMAGERY
As we have seen in chapter 2 and section 3.2 above, Langacker suggests a close
correspondence between linguistic meaning and thought, so that meaning, and
language in general, is seen as a function of global cognitive abilities (e.g. FCG-I:
13). Language-specific abilities are not ruled out entirely, but no such ability is
seen as relevant for a cognitive theory of language.50 With this delineation,
Langacker  expresses  his  moderately  non-modular  view  on  global  cognitive
architecture. At the same time, the processing of linguistic meanings is supposed
to  exploit  the  capabilities  associated  with  perceptual  processing,  which  are
modality-  or  sense  specific.  This  goes  in  hand  with  Cognitive  Grammar’s
conception of meaning as encyclopedic.
Note, however, that encyclopedic meaning does not entail any specific mode
of processing; for instance, visual information of the world can be presented in a
propositional form. A fundamental aspect of cognition is its autonomous ability
to raise percept-like images  that are sense-specific (e.g. FCG-I: 5, 110–111; see
also section 3.2.2 above), but language and the conceptual capability in general
are seen as general systems that are able to exploit this autonomous ability in a
global  manner,  thus  making  language  non-modular.  This  combination  of
modality-specific information and non-modular systems is actually compatible
with the weak modularity accepted for example by Kosslyn et al. (2006), to whom
Langacker refers approvingly.
Cognitive Grammar speaks of mental, sensory, conventional, and linguistic
imagery in an eclectic  way that  tends to leave their  definitional  and functional
relationships vague. It is noteworthy that more recently (CGBI) Cognitive
Grammar has given up the term “imagery” entirely51. Mental imagery research is
cited only in brief and it is associated with the research on image schemas that
has been put forward elsewhere in Cognitive Linguistics. However, a concept
similar to mental imagery, i.e. mental simulation (CGBI: 293), is introduced with
reference  to  the  work  of  Barsalou  (1999),  whose  model  of  Perceptual  Symbol
Systems (PSS) seeks to integrate the operations responsible for the processing of
sensory information with conceptual activity. Langacker states that:
[A]s one of its facets, conceptualizing an action involves a mental
simulation  of  it  (Barsalou  1999).  What  this  amounts  to  is  the
“disengaged”  occurrence  of  the  mental  operations  that  occur  when  we
actually perform the action or otherwise experience it […]. (CGBI: 293.)
This  is  excerpted  from  context  in  which  Langacker  describes  the  semantics  of
quantifiers  as  a  conceptual  “disengagement”  from  everyday  interaction  with
concrete objects. More generally, Barsalou’s theory concerns the grounding of
50 Conversely, Langacker denies that he would be making categorical statements about the nature of
thought while describing his view of semantics (cf. e.g. FCG-I: 99).
51 Here I will nevertheless use this term for expository purposes: ‘imagery’ with all its related confusion
is in fact more illustrative of Cognitive Grammar’s ontological position than the distinct notions of
‘simulation’ and ‘construal’.
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conceptual operations, in which processes that developed to handle perceptual
information  are  exploited  in  autonomous  conceptual  processing  through  said
disengagement and abstraction. It is noteworthy that PSS is effectively a
conceptual  counterpart  of  the  information  processing  theory  that  is  based  on
imagery.  This  is  manifest  in  the  manner  in  which  meaningful  “perceptual
symbols” are presented as the basis of conceptual operations:
”[Perceptual symbols] are records of the neural states that underlie
perception.  […]  Essentially  the  same  assumption  also  underlies  much
current work in imagery: common neural systems underlie imagery and
perception […] The proposal here is stronger, however, further assuming
that  the  neural  systems  common  to  imagery  and  perception  underlie
conceptual knowledge as well.” (Barsalou 1999: 582.)
Barsalou  also  notes  that  an  imagery-based  processing  is  not  sufficient  for
conceptual operating, for a perceptual symbol requires a propositional
component to establish the symbolic relationship with its referent. This does
not  entail  consciousness,  however.  In  the  theory,  conceptual  operations  are
supposed to occur on two levels:  conscious experience and “an unconscious
neural representation” (ibid. 577). The latter is given the main emphasis, since
conscious experience is optional and unreliable. Moreover, “conscious states
typically follow unconscious states when processing sensations and initiating
actions,  rather  than  preceding  them  […]”  (ibid.;  referring  to  Dennett  &
Kinsbourne, 1992; Libet, 1982, 1985).
Barsalou  (1999),  in  other  words,  assumes  a  specific  form of  information
processing and then expands it into a conceptual system with simulations that
are  “about”  external  referents  and  objects.  The  model  is  tightly  linked  with
neuropsychological  organization,  thus  defining  a  perceptual  symbol  as  a
“record of the neural activation that arises during perception” (ibid. 583). As
the conscious experience of imagery is deemed secondary to the unconscious
processing,  Barsalou’s  theory  does  not  even  attempt  to  bridge  the
phenomenological and processing standpoints that Cognitive Grammar claims
to occupy. The differing orientations of PSS and Cognitive Grammar give an
interesting perspective to the evaluation of Langacker’s earlier remarks on this
issue:
How  and  to  what  extent  sensory  imagery  figures  in  conceptual  and
semantic  structure  is  an  empirical  question  […]  I  am  nevertheless
convinced  that  sensory  imagery  is  a  real  phenomenon  whose  role  in
conceptual  structure  is  substantial.  We  can  plausibly  suppose  that  a
visual  image  (or  a  family  of  such  images  presupposing  different
orientations  and  levels  of  specificity)  figures  in  our  knowledge  of  the
shape  of  an  object;  and  certainly  one  aspect  of  our  conception  of  a
trumpet assumes the form of an auditory image representing the sound
it makes. (FCG-1: 111.)
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Barsalou  (1999)  shows  that  the  notion  of  images  that  relate  to  concepts  can
indeed be given a systematic theoretical elaboration. However, it is unclear how
Barsalou’s model would be compatible with the aspect of Cognitive Grammar that
emphasizes the phenomenological aspect of meaning.
Cognitive Grammar nevertheless demonstrates its affinity with PSS by
replacing the term “mental imagery” with that of “mental simulation” (CGBI:
293). Meaning/conceptualization is seen as inheriting properties from perceptual
experience, and support for this conception is sought from psychology. PSS seems
to  express  the  same  basic  idea  independently  of  Cognitive  Linguistics,  but  is
essentially concerned with sub-conscious processing and thus does not explain
conscious experience or its role in language use, other than considering it to be
an  optional  consciousness  of  underlying  operations  that  are  carried  out  on
perceptual symbols. It is noteworthy that Langacker does not pay any attention
to this discrepancy in his approval of Barsalou (Langacker 1999: 625).
The analysis in Cognitive Grammar and Barsalou’s (1999) analysis pertain
therefore to two clearly distinct ontological levels. In order to make these theories
mutually integrable, one would need to either a) assume that Cognitive Grammar
is  a  language  processing  theory  (which  it  is  not),  rather  than  a  theoretical
grammar; b) extend Perceptual Symbol Systems to the conscious level (to which
it actually has been originally attributed, see Barsalou et al. 1993); or c) posit a
systematic description of how the conscious and the sub-conscious levels interact
in the constitution and use of language. All these options would nevertheless
likely prove ultimately unsatisfactory: none of them would help to explain how
individual cognition relates to the social constitution of linguistic meaning.
To see why, let us turn back to the task of this section: the bridging of social
and  individual  aspects  of  meaning.  As  Itkonen  shows,  social  entities  such  as
language  are  based  on  ‘common  knowledge’,  which  is  by  nature  normative
(Itkonen 1997). Following Itkonen,52 Zlatev  (2008a)  explores  the  idea  that
consciousness is a necessary condition for language to be a normative entity. First
of all, common knowledge is necessarily accessible to conscious reflection. Even
though  our  everyday  language  use  does  not  require  such  reflection,  it  is  still
always  possible.   We  know  (pre-theoretically)  whether  a  sentence  S  is  a  valid
representative of our language or not (Zlatev 2008a: 41). This, in turn, is due to
the fact that language and linguistic units are normative entities. That is, a
linguistic sign does not simply reside among multiple subjects in the manner of a
shared experience of an object or a non-intentional social-psychological tendency
such as drug abuse. Instead, it does so as a social object that is defined by criteria
of correctness or well-formedness.
Normativity, as is repeatedly noted by Itkonen (see e.g. Itkonen 2008b: 302–
303)  cannot  be  reduced  to  consistency  of  behavior,  for  it  resides  in  acts  of
consciousness that involve recognition and interpretation of signs according to
pre-existing conceptions. This entails the conclusion that language cannot be
52 A substantial part of Itkonen’s work is devoted for formulating and defending a normative conception
of language (e.g. Itkonen 1974, 1978). For the present discussion, Itkonen’s more recent papers (2008a,
2008b) are especially relevant for they address also the development of Cognitive Linguistics.
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reduced to unconscious processing, for one cannot do so to a socially constituted
criterion – or a corresponding judgement – of correctness (Zlatev 2008: 42).
Formal  correctness,  however,  is  only  one  part  of  the  picture.  In  authentic
linguistic  communication,  the  highly  automatic  recognition  of  a  unit  is  only
prerequisite for semantic and pragmatic interpretation, both of which also rely
on what the recognized linguistic units are taken to mean in that given language.
This  implies  that,  albeit  not  reflected  upon  by  default,  the  linguistic  conduct
necessarily preserves the threefold structure of a genuine sign, which includes a
linguistic vehicle, meaning, and the referent. Now, one’s conscious experience
does not usually  emphasize the inherent three-fold structure of  a  sign.  Yet  the
very  first-person  consciousness  of  one’s  linguistic  action  is  not  only  real  (try
imagine speaking to someone without knowing it), but also relies on the fact that
it is a signitive activity mediated by the specific linguistic means. The
apprehension of meaning therefore implies the recognition of linguistic
symbolization as discernible from other intentional activities (such as fantasizing,
remembering  or  perceptually  observing)  and,  essentially,  distinct  from  the
subject herself (Zlatev 2008a: 45).
If we adopt a socio-normative conception of language, then consciousness is
not  only  indispensable  for  language  but  it  is  also  the  most  relevant  aspect  of
cognitive organization from linguistic standpoint. From this perspective, the
status of any theoretical model of neuropsychological information processing vis-
à-vis linguistics  is  not  explanatory,  but  remains  to  be  explained  relative  to
conscious experience, a task on which neither Langacker nor Barsalou are willing
to embark. It is not surprising that Langacker gives a skeptical statement on the
significance of (visual) mental imagery for semantic theory.
Though visual imagery (and sensory imagery more generally), is indeed
significant for semantic structure, it is certainly not exhaustive of it, and
in fact the theory would be little affected if there were no such thing. (CIS:
347, fn. 7.)
In short, mental imagery is expected to have some role in semantics as the way
in  which  meaning  appears  to  a  subject,  but  this  aspect  of  processing  is  not
included in Cognitive Grammar itself. Where a lexical concept is concerned, one
possibility  would  be  that  the  conceptual  base  of  a  predicate  would  include  a
modality-specific domain and a corresponding profile within that domain, which
would equal a mental image of the predicate’s referent. In fact, when applying the
profile/base -distinction to lexical items, Cognitive Grammar often implies a
percept-like conception of certain semantic properties of a linguistic concept, for
instance,  the  said  association  between  the  lexical  concept  of  trumpet  and  the
auditory image of the trumpet’s sound.
The  most  primitive  semantic  properties  of  concepts  are  associated,  in
Cognitive  Grammar,  with  so-called  basic  domains  (cf.  section.  2.2.4).  Basic
domains present “cognitively irreducible representational spaces or fields of
conceptual potential” (CIS: 4). Furthermore, Langacker (FCG-1: 149) considers
sensory-based domains to be an important sub-category of the basic domains. As
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opposed to the causal relation between the trumpet and the sound it makes, the
relation between a concept and its basic domain, as described in CG, is often more
fundamental. For example, the basic domain of three-dimensional space gives
rise to a set of concepts that are primarily spatial, so that their constitutive
semantic  import  is  defined  as  a  delineation  in  that  particular  domain,  e.g.
geometrical  figures  such  as  ‘line’  and  ‘circle’  (FCG-1:  149).  However,  lexical
concepts typically cannot be reduced to a configuration in a basic domain, but are
complex and also include sensory information of different modalities; in addition,
abstract  concepts  (consider  epistemic  adverbs  such  as  ‘perhaps’)  may  not  be
associated with any sensory images at all.53
Mental  imagery,  when  analyzed  in  this  way,  would  seem  to  be  potentially
relevant only for a limited subset of lexicon. In contrast, to assume that cognition
includes modality-specific information, whatever the format, is rational both
phenomenologically and from a processing standpoint. This amounts to the fact
that  an  encyclopedic  view  of  meaning  does  not  imply  any  specific  type  of
processing.  We have visual  information and we have auditory information,  yet
this implies nothing about the manner of activation of either information types.
Moreover, we may posit a dissociation of modality-specific information and
modality  specific  processing  both  at  the  phenomenological  and  the  processing
level  separately.  First  of  all,  the  subjective  experience  of  sensory  images  is  an
indisputable  fact  (for  some subjects),  and  whether  these  conscious  images  are
functional or merely epiphenomenal, they prove that autonomous mental
experience distinguishes between the senses.
Second, the manifest ability to recollect sensory-like information from long-
term  memory  is  proof  of  existence  of  the  modal  tractability  of  cognition.  For
instance,  consider  the  classic  example  of  the  basic  visual  domain  in  the
autonomous processing of geometric figures. Whether it involves the experience
of seeing with the mind’s eye or not, the subject’s ability to succeed in tasks such
as  those  operationalized  in  Shepard  and  Metzler  (1971)  does  prove,
independently  of  the  mode  of  processing,  that  we  have  the  ability  to  evoke
modality-specific information autonomously, according to the task at hand.
In  sum,  both  the  conscious  experience  and  sub-conscious  processing  show
modal  discernibility;  yet  this  fact  does  not  prove  anything  about  the  actual
neuropsychological or physiological nature of processing or its relationship to
overt experience. Moreover, as semantic predicates are typically complex, that is,
they  are  intersections  of  multiple  conceptual  domains  and  corresponding  sub-
profiles, their cognitive grammatical description does not depend on the fate of a
certain domain, domain type or a specific neuropsychological status of a concept’s
profile.
It is therefore apparent that not even the description of lexical concepts of
sensory experience would force Cognitive Grammar to take a specific stance on
cognitive processing. Nevertheless, Cognitive Grammar’s combination of
53 The relationship, which implies the relative autonomy of its participants, between imagery and
abstract language is also studied experimentally, see e.g. Sadoski & Paivio (2004) on imagery and
comprehension in reading.
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theoretical restrictiveness (relative to cognitive processing) and descriptive
flexibility (relative to the semantic content of predicates) allows the theory to
associate itself with the psychology of mental imagery, and even to grant it some
theoretical significance and consider its potential linguistic applications, without
establishing any argumentative ties between actual mental imagery research and
the theory itself.
3.3.3 LINGUISTIC VS. MENTAL IMAGERY
With  the  argumentative  confusion  outlined  above,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that
Cognitive  Grammar  implies  multiple  senses  for  the  concept  of  imagery.  These
different  senses,  however,  do  not  align  with  the  conscious/unconscious
segregation  but  they  are  defined  with  regard  to  their  linguistic  function.  This
section specifies the relationship between two different imageries Cognitive
Grammar makes reference to: mental and linguistic. The question is whether
these two imageries necessitate each other in description of conceptual meaning.
In establishing his notion of linguistic imagery, Langacker distinguishes it
both from mental imagery and from what the term traditionally has stood for in
the study of literature and poetic language: metaphor, metonymy and other such
tropes. This is illustrated by the following excerpt:
The term imagery is often employed as an equivalent of metaphor (or
figurative language),  which  I  also  consider  an  inherent  and
fundamental aspect of semantic and grammatical structure. […] Image
and imagery also describe the occurrence of a perceptual sensation in the
absence of the corresponding perceptual input. […] I understand the term
image and its derivatives in a third (and somewhat idiosyncratic manner:
they  describe  our  ability  to  construe  a  conceived  situation  in  alternate
ways  –  by  means  of  alternate  images  –  for  purposes  of  thought  or
expression. (FCG-1: 110, emphasis in the original.)
The  distinction  between  different  types  of  imagery  is  inevitable,  but  not
absolute.  Indeed,  Langacker  suggests  that  they  are  mutually  related  to  some
extent  in  that  they  are  all  expected  to  bear  some  relevance  for  grammar  as
symbolization.  If  imagery  in  the  sense  of  figurative  language  is  set  aside,  the
question  is  what  kind  of  connection  is  posited  between  mental  and  linguistic
imagery. It should be remembered that linguistic imagery refers to construal and
the  multiplicity  of  ways  in  which  an  objective  situation  may  be  interpreted  or
conceptualized by a subject.
[Cognitive Grammar] assumes that the meaning of an expression is not
fully  given  by  an  objective  characterization  of  the  scene  it  describes.
People have the capacity to construe a scene by alternative images, so that
semantic  value  is  not  simply  received  from  the  objective  situation  but
instead is in large measure imposed on it. (CIS: 35.)
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Given this definition, linguistic imagery approximates construal in the general
sense of the term (e.g. in social psychology, see Aronson et al. 2010), that is, the
construal of a state of affairs from a subjective point of view. As we have seen with
the dimensions of construal, Cognitive Grammar attributes this constructivity of
language especially  to grammatical  meaning,  so that  semantic  content is  more
manifest  in  the  lexicon.  This  tendency  is  also  present  in  the  dimensions  of
imagery. Cognitive Grammar refers constantly to this correspondence between
grammar  and  semantics  as  “conventional  imagery”  that  grammar  offers  to  the
use of speakers. However, the phenomenological or processing-related status of
these  conventional  images,  by  means  of  which  the  different  construals  are
achieved, is not specified.
While Cognitive Grammar promotes a clear demarcation between linguistic
and other forms of imagery, it is difficult to relate these different forms to each
other,  which  holds  true  for  other  psychologistic  constructs  as  well.  This  is
illustrated by the following diagram that collects the main categories of cognitive
activity posited by Cognitive Grammar.
COGNITIVE ABILITIES
Mental Experience
Autonomous Processing
Focal Adjustments (Dimensions of Construal)
Transformation
Figure 3
To  be  specific,  Figure  3  depicts  the  category  of  so-called  “cognitive  abilities”
(FCG-I:  99–146),  a  set  of  linguistically  relevant  mental  capabilities.  The
subcategory “Mental experience” (FCG-I: 99–109) represents a set of
perceptually grounded principles of cognitive processing (including, for example,
comparison,  FCG-1:  101–105)  that  are  assumed  to  be  relevant  for  linguistic
meaning and to structure other subcategories in the diagram. In “Autonomous
processing”  (ibid.  109–116),  Langacker  discusses  the  ability  of  entertain  and
utilize  mental  imagery  for  purposes  of  thinking,  and  presents  the  dichotomy
between  mental  and  linguistic  imagery  (ibid.  111).  On  the  same  occasion,
however, Langacker also emphasizes the putative significance of mental images
for conceptual meaning, and thus repeats the category error of identifying mental
121
experience with cognitive processing.54 The  third  of  the  categories,  “Focal
adjustments” (FCG-I: 116) equals the dimensions of construal. The relationship
between the focal adjustments and the autonomous processing in general is not
explicated, but the adjustments can reasonably be seen as a specific form of this
processing. Finally, “Transformation” (FCG-I: 138) introduces the ability to shift
between construals or different modes of attending mentally to a scene.
 The  category  of  “Cognitive  Abilities”  may  thus  be  characterized  as  a
discontinuous collection of cognition-general and language-specific abilities that
partly  overlap.  At  first  glance,  this  would  seem  to  violate  the  principle  of
explaining  language  with  regard  to  cognitive  abilities  that  are  not  domain-
specific. Once again, this is as a problem of rhetoric. Cognitive Grammar merely
presents the posited cognitive abilities  as general  or  linguistic  according to the
domain  in  which  they  manifest  more  prominently.  This  is  not  the  optimal
strategy, for it adds to the general confusion of how different facets of cognition
are  mutually  related  by  the  theory.  As  a  result,  the  grounding  of  construal  in
general cognition requires substantial clarification of different cognitive abilities.
As  is  established  in  chapter  2  above,  the  content  requirement  of  Cognitive
Grammar results in diagrammatic iconicity between grammatical form and
meaning:  certain general  semantic  parameters,  some of  which are captured by
the  dimensions  of  construal,  are  correlates  of  grammatical  parameters  of
selection: e.g. complexity and detail in grammatical structure correlates with
semantic complexity and detail, which is describable in terms of the dimension of
specificity. Diagrammatic iconicity, by definition, is restricted to correlation
between relations of signs and relations between semantic units. Cognitive
Grammar, however, seems to be willing to recourse (implicitly) to imagic iconicity
in explanation of semantic features; that is, experiential or non-objective
semantic features are derived from iconic correspondence between a cognitive
(autonomous) representation of an entity and direct (non-autonomous)
experience of the said entity.
Note  that  no  such  argument  of  imagic  iconicity  is  openly  made.  The
experiential argument (see section 3.2.2, p. 96), under which imagistic accounts
are preferred, nevertheless involves the same point: a cognitive theory most
suitable  to  inform  a  cognitive  grammar  is  one  that  best  reflects  phenomenal
experience.  This,  in  fact,  reveals  the  methodological  primacy  of
phenomenological  analysis  for  Cognitive  Grammar.  However,  this  also  reveals
multiple inconsistencies in Cognitive Grammar vis-à-vis phenomenology and
mental images.
First of all, as is already pointed out above in the discussion on imagery debate
(pp. 122), the conscious experience of imagery does not automatically reflect an
underlying processing mechanism. In addition, Thompson (2007) points out that
both sides in the debate also seem to misinterpret both phenomenology in general
54 Autonomous processing, to my understanding, is supposed to exploit, share, or inherit properties from
perceptual processing, a view that is compatible in a general way with the imagery theory by Kosslyn and
PSS by Barsalou. The identification of processing with experience allows Langacker to assume a strong
analogy between perceptual experience and meaning.
Construal and imagery
122
and  phenomenal  mental  images  in  particular.  As  is  made  apparent  by  Block
(1983),  description  of  the  experience  of  imagery  as  a  type  of  viewing  mental
objects  is  seriously  flawed.  As  opposed  to  such  discernible  mental
representations, Thompson seeks out for a realistic phenomenology of imagery
by concentrating to the very experience of images. As experiences such as these
are abound (albeit not universal), they can be said to be phenomenologically real,
which  makes  them  also  a  valid  object  of  analysis,  inasmuch  the  focus  is
deliberately shifted from neuropsychological considerations to investigation of
conscious experience. This move nevertheless calls for a substantial revision of
the manner in which conscious imagery is understood.
The main argument by Thompson (2007: 143) states that  conscious mental
imagery does not necessarily correspond to depictive representations. What is
defined by the imagery’s phenomenal character, however, is that it involves an
enactive experience of imagery (ibid). That is, we are aware of experiencing
images that correspond to real or imagined perceptual occurrences, but nothing
in our experience defines the correspondence as iconic by its nature. Rather, it is
the  experience  itself  that  carries  the  representative  function,  in  that  it  is  an
intentional experience of an image of an entity.
Thompson’s  approach  is  both  realistic  and  economical.  By  denying
phenomenal imagery and underlying processing mechanism a strictly
corresponding relation, it is possible to concentrate on how experienced imagery
stands in an intentional-representative relationship vis-à-vis external entities
and states of affairs without succumbing to a representational account of mind.
The model is also capable of accounting for the fact that many do not experience
imagery but are still able to report spatio-visual properties of entities and states
of  affairs:  one  may  have  an  enactive  experience  of  an  entity  or  state  of  affairs
without simulating it in any explicit, modality-specific manner.
The critique Thompson levels against common misconceptions of conscious
imagery  is  applicable  to  Cognitive  Grammar  as  well.  The  conscious  mental
imagery that Langacker evokes seems to be needed for bridging the perceptual
experience to linguistic meaning, thus allowing the explanation of the analogous
properties  of  these  domains.  However,  the  concept  of  mentally  simulating  a
perceptual experience in order to grasp an expression’s meaning is exactly what
Thompson’s analysis of phenomenal imagery argues against. That is, we do not
need analogical representations to evoke experiential content if we are able to
enact the given experience.
Not only is this approach preferable over common neuropsychological
conceptions of  phenomenal  experience of  imagery,  it  is  also particularly fitting
for Cognitive Grammar that attempts to describe experiential meaning with
recourse phenomenological analysis. To be specific, the abstract isomorphism
Cognitive Grammar assumes between (conscious) perceptual experience and the
(conscious) meanings of linguistic expressions may be based on linguistic
intentionality itself.  For instance, when learning the character of a Cairn terrier
and then linguistically meaning the terrier afterwards, my intentional acts
preserve the constitutive properties of the canine breed. What this means is that
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it is the similarity of the acts vis-à-vis their object and direction of intention that
define their content, not their phenomenal parity.
On one hand, this viewpoint underlines the irrelevance of processing
mechanism: the Cairn is perceived as an animate creature regardless of presence
of analogous mental structure. On the other hand, the viewpoint underlines the
non-modal,  non-sensual  nature  of  linguistic  imagery.  Linguistic  imagery,  so
conceived,  stands  “simply”  for  language/world  isomorphism  of  the
perspectival/non-objective type. The dimensions of construal may themselves be
applied to illustrate the nature of isomorphism. Within the dimensions, what is
preserved is not the phenomenological quality of the experience; e.g. what it is
“like”  to  see  an  instance  of  the  aforementioned  Scottish  breed.  Instead,  the
dimensions manifest the preservation of knowledge. For instance, the specificity
value of the concept ‘cairn’, and the parameter of specificity itself, reside on the
level  of  abstraction  that  is  completely  irrespective  of  mode  of  sensuous
experience.
So defined, linguistic imagery is not imagic in any actual sense but isomorphic
with experience on the highest conceivable level of abstraction. As an attribute of
linguistic meaning, it can be hypothesized to consist of experiential
characteristics that are mediated by non-modular conceptual abilities.55 The
latter, however, are contingent theoretical postulations and secondary to the
properties  of  meaning  itself.  Moreover,  analogical  simulation  in  terms  of
conscious images is not needed in this model at all.
A trivial conclusion follows that linguistic imagery is associated with domain-
general  attributes  also  attributable  to  (conscious)  mental  imagery  –  we  may
define  imagery  as  schematic  properties  within  conscious  mental  imagery.  This
conceptual confusion is a reason acute enough to replace the term of linguistic
imagery with the term construal. More important, however, is the argumentative
function attributed to the conscious experience of mental images. The theoretical
and ontological status of the concept suffers from all the discrepancies involved
55 This leads to the question how the isomorphism should be explained. Within Cognitive Linguistics,
the explanation has typically been based on non-modularity of cognition. Non-modular cognition works
optimally by extending the use of primary bodily based (sensorimotor) cognitive structures to novel domains
by specified mechanisms of mapping, e.g. metaphor. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff
1993), the metaphoric extension of cognitive structures are restricted by invariance principle (presented
originally as “invariance hypothesis”, Lakoff 1990). The principle states that the so-called cognitive topology
of  the  source  domain  (from  which  a  cognitive  structure  is  selected  for  mapping)  is  preserved  by  the
metaphoric mapping. As a result, the non-modular cognition is characterized by bodily-based, image-
schematic reasoning, in which recurrent cognitive structures of sensorimotor experience (image schemas)
come to characterize also the more abstract and complex domains of conceptualization. For example, Lakoff
and Núñez (2000) apply this approach to the emergence of mathematical reasoning. A partial non-
modularity (or weak modularity) is accepted also by the present study for the grounding of linguistic analysis,
and,  accordingly,  a  cross-domain mechanism of  extension is  included.  It  should be noted,  however,  that
emphatically individual-psychological basis of image schemas in Cognitive Metaphor Theory makes them a
rather weak candidate for the grounding of meaning in experience. A critical review and a positive alternative
are provided by Zlatev (e.g. Zlatev 2005) and discussed below in section 4.4.
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with  the  conflation  of  conscious  mental  experience  with  cognitive  processing.
This  reductionist  tendency  of  Cognitive  Grammar  is  at  odds  with  the  theory’s
emphasis on the phenomenological character of meaning and processing, and it
lacks systematic justification in the form of theoretical unification of
consciousness  and  processing.  Moreover,  Cognitive  Grammar  fails  to  refer  to
studies  that  would  support  such  an  approach,  and  presents  images  as  a
phenomenon of consciousness without grounding this postulation in a model that
would treat images on such level.
Second, the argumentative function of the concept of mental imagery relative
to linguistic imagery is implicit. Conscious mental images are not given a definite
explanatory function but rather only implied to have a “substantial” (FCG-1: 111)
role in conceptualization. This reference to imagery is impressionistic and can be
interpreted  in  two  (not  mutually  exclusive)  ways:  that  a)  some  “perceptual
sensations” are attached to some linguistic concepts as parts of their meanings
(e.g.  the sound of  a  trumpet),  or  that  b)  existence of  “perceptual  sensations” is
proof of the nature of some concepts and thus proof of a partial analogy between
perception and conception, and is thus a putative reason to expect the conceptual
realm to inherit properties from the perceptual realm (e.g. the dimensions of
construal). Both of these functions are phenomenologically grounded, and
therefore their specific association with the existing processing theories is
ambiguous.  In  any  case,  what  is  theoretically  more  important  here  is  the
supposed mediating function of mental imagery between experience and
meaning.
This  leads  to  the  third  point,  which  is  the  redundancy  involved  with  the
mediating function of conscious mental imagery in linguistic meaning.
Establishing  conscious  mental  imagery  as  the  correlate  of  linguistic  meaning
would  help  to  explicate  some similarities  between  linguistic  meanings  and  the
experiences to which the meanings refer. However, this would not help explain
linguistic meanings, for the idea of a mental image is inherently impressionistic.
In visual  processing,  according to Kosslyn et  al.  (2006),  an image refers to the
activation of a functional space, which arguably reflects the geometrical features
of  the imaged objects  in “real”  space.  On the conscious level,  we may have the
experience of a mental image, but this experience is inherently already
interpreted as such in consciousness. The phenomenological argument for this,
presented  by  Thompson  (2007),  is  so  obvious  it  seems  paradoxical:  as  we
experience something as a mental image we experience it as a mental image of
something. The notion of mental image can be posited to describe the subjective
quality of  this  experience,  but as such it  fails  to explain the “aboutness” of  the
experience. Thus when we describe our introspective experience of linguistic
meaning, we have no way of telling the nature of our knowing from the nature of
the object of our knowing.
Tackling this shortcoming of a conscious mental image would easily lead to
the question of representationalism vs. direct realism in the philosophy of mind;
that is, are internal representations needed in the first place to account for the
mind’s connectedness to the world? Many philosophers answer in the affirmative
(e.g.  Dretske 1995;  Tye 1995),  and while this  view is  attacked by direct  realists
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and  modern  phenomenologists  (e.g.  Drummond  2012),  the  question  here  is
whether Cognitive Grammar is able or willing to provide a systematic account of
how internal representations relate to semantic theory. Here, I will content
myself with stating that Cognitive Grammar does assume a representationalist
position in reducing linguistic meaning to internalized cognitive processes. This
specific take on representationalism, with regard to both mental representations
in  general  and  mental  images  in  particular,  is  far  from  being  explicit  or
systematic, however. The Cognitive Grammar’s representationalism is
insufficient exactly because it lacks a description how mental representations
attach to linguistic  signs on the one hand and on mind-external  objects  on the
other.
If we simply take the experience of imagery as a representative example of how
the mind works in retrieving information as subjective and experience-like in its
richness, we are not only being redundant but we are also committing ourselves
to a questionable causal  explanation.  We have seen that,  as  both camps in the
imagery debate have agreed, the type of information processed by a system is not
dependent  on  the  specific  format  of  this  information.  This  is  true  of  linguistic
information as well, although we must acknowledge the ontological requirements
that are specific to semantics. If we adopt the view that meaning is an object of
common knowledge and grounded in public use, we also have to accept that this
knowledge has to be internalized in some way or another. Yet the mode of this
internalized knowledge has to be distinguished from the object of this knowledge,
as is demonstrated, inter alia, by Husserl (Logical Investigations 2001b [1901]).
Since every (cognitive) act of knowing is different, the object of knowing needs to
have  a  constitution  that  is  independent  of  any  particular  act;  and  if  there  is
independence from any given act, there is also independence from any
characteristic  of  any  given  act,  including  the  modality  in  which  knowledge
presents itself in one’s consciousness.
Obviously, the object of knowledge, such as the meaning of the expression the
lamp is  above the table, may include perspectival or subjective properties, but
only  as  properties  that  are  publicly  shared  and  grounded  in  intersubjective
practices. The challenge is to explain this intersubjective subjectivity as a social
phenomenon grounded in an indefinite number of individual cognitions, without
recourse to specific types of mental events. This, however, is yet another a task
Cognitive Grammar is not willing to embark on.
The  result  is  that  conscious  mental  imagery,  in  the  context  of  Cognitive
Grammar, is neither needed nor suitable to explain linguistic imagery. Instead,
the notion only offers a hypothetical indication of how linguistic thought may also
operate.  To  summarize,  conscious  mental  imagery,  as  posited  in  Cognitive
Grammar, is a problematic concept in the following respects:
i) Conscious  mental  imagery  conflates  conscious  experience  and
underlying information processing without explaining why or how
these levels interact.
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ii) Conscious  mental  imagery  is  devised  to  explain  commonalities  of
experience and meaning, but this mediating function is not explicitly
defined, which makes the use of the concept impressionistic, confusing
and susceptible to interpretation as ignoratio elenchi.
iii) The nature of conscious mental imagery is not specified relative to the
social/normative  aspect  is  meaning,  which  makes  the  postulate
vulnerable  to  the  standard  criticism  against  pictorial  models  of
linguistic or conceptual meaning.
iv) Conscious  mental  imagery  fails  to  explain  or  validate  the  notion  of
linguistic imagery.
What  has  been  demonstrated  is  that  one  specific  theoretical  source  of
influence  for  Cognitive  Grammar,  i.e.  the  depictive  or  simulative
neuropsychological theories, manifests in a hypothetical construct that is
inconsistent both internally and with regard to its theoretical origin. This is not
to say that  any research on human’s conceptual  capabilities  should be deemed
irrelevant for linguistic considerations a priori.  Rather,  the  influence  of  any
psychological  model  has  to  be  carefully  assessed  with  regard  the  conceptual
requirements that are posited by the nature of the object of scientific interest.
3.4 DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I have scrutinized the way in which Cognitive Grammar aims to
justify  its  conception  of  semantics  by  borrowing  the  notion  of  mental  imagery
from  neuropsychology  (e.g.  Shepard  1978;  Kosslyn  1980)  and  by  making
reference to mental simulation in Barsalou’s  Perceptual Symbol Systems (1999;
Barsalou  et  al.  1993).  I  have  also  discussed  two  distinct  criticisms  against  this
view  of  semantics  leveled  by  Konstenius  ([Kenttä]  2003)  and  Itkonen  (1997,
forthc.,  see  also  Itkonen  2003).  The  first  one  accuses  Cognitive  Grammar  of
theoretical inconsistency and reductionist physicalism, and the second one
demonstrates the ontological discrepancy between what Cognitive Grammar
claims  to  study  (meaning  as  a  mental  phenomenon)  and  what  it  actually  does
study (publically observable, social meanings).
With regard to the first line of criticism, I have demonstrated that the rhetoric
of Cognitive Grammar does indeed suggest physicalism in its reference to
neuronal activity, but that this reference is far from a systematic mind-
philosophical stance. Instead, Cognitive Grammar counteracts a materialistic
interpretation by its explicit distinction between processing and
phenomenological standpoints, neither of which actually is ontologically
reducible  to  neuronal  activity.  With  regard  to  the  second  criticism,  I  accept
Itkonen’s  claim  of  sociality  of  linguistic  meaning.  While  Cognitive  Grammar
analyzes meanings exactly as conventionalized, and hence shared, it mistakenly
associates meaning either with phenomenological autonomous experiences,
underlying cognitive operations or neuronal events. The case of mental imagery
was  chosen  as  an  example  of  how  Cognitive  Grammar  conflates  distinct
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ontological  levels.  Cognitive  Grammar  refers  to  neuropsychological  and  to
cognitive psychological research to justify a notion that pertains to
phenomenology of meaning, despite the fact that the cited studies explicitly
dissociate themselves from the conscious experience of sensations associated
with processing events.
For  Cognitive  Grammar,  the  main  upshot  of  the  imagery  debate  within
neuropsychology is that the phenomenological experience as such does not
suffice to prove a specific conception of cognition is correct or incorrect. At the
same time, phenomenological consciousness is indispensable for the analyst or
the  ordinary  language  user  to  grasp  the  sense  of  any  expression  as  in  true
representative sense. This leads to the need to distinguish between at least two
modes or acts of consciousness that correspond to different kinds of objects of
consciousness (or knowing).  Conveniently, these two acts of consciousness are
the ones of introspection and intuition, discussed above (Itkonen (1981).
If we accept the classification of linguistics as an intuitional science (Itkonen
1981: 131–132), then the task is to describe meaning as an object of intuition. This
again  leads  to  a  need  to  explain  the  experiential,  perspectival  and  subjective
aspects  of  meaning,  that  is,  the  dimensions  of  construal,  as  properties  of  the
object in question. This is the task of the following chapter, in which I will show
that a correct understanding of the dimensions of construal is dependent on the
concept of intersubjectivity. That is, construal is explainable relative to the
codification of experiential constants into meaning and immanent in the
adjustment of expression according to pragmatic needs; moreover, both of these
aspects of construal are inherently dependent on intersubjective co-activity.
The intersubjectivity of construal
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4 THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF CONSTRUAL
The previous chapters have scrutinized the dimensions of construal as an integral
part of Cognitive Grammar’s descriptive apparatus (chap. 2) and their theoretical
justification  (chap.  3).  This  chapter  will  include  a  concise  synthesis  of  these
separate analyses. Synthesis is not the goal itself; rather, the purpose is to lay the
groundwork for a re-evaluation of the dimensions of construal that appreciates
their intersubjective nature. This reinterpretation is illustrated by the analysis of
construal phenomena in written discourse.
Since the results of chapters 2 and 3 obviously determine the nature of their
synthesis, a brief recapitulation is in order.
The analysis in chapter 2 demonstrated that “construal” and “conceptualizer”
are mutually dependent subparts of “conceptualization”, which is defined as the
actualization of linguistic meaning for a representative language user. The scope
of construal phenomena as depicted in Cognitive Grammar was laid out, and the
connections of related analytical concepts to the theoretical presuppositions of
the theory were discussed. The treatment of conceptualizer demonstrated that
there is a close association between construal and common ground (Nuyts 2002;
Verhagen  2005,  2007).  A  complex,  structured  ground  that  involves  multiple
conceptualizers is needed for the description of a host of construal phenomena,
which  implies  a  type  of  intersubjective  alignment  built  in  language’s
representative capacity. The analyses of excerpts from Finnish magazine texts, on
the other hand, illustrated how the dimensions of construal relate closely to the
informational advance of discourse and the build-up of shared knowledge, which
can  be  described  in  terms  of  Current  Discourse  Space  (CGBI:  59–60).  This
motivates a segregation between the paradigmatic axis (the selection of linguistic
units for expression) and the syntagmatic axis (the semantic interpretation on the
basis of preceding discourse) of construal; both of these have been shown to be
relevant for the coordination of discourse vis-à-vis multiple conceptualizers.
Chapter 3 scrutinized the theoretical foundations of Cognitive Grammar, and
placed  the  main  emphasis  on  the  theory’s  individual-psychologism  and  its
manifestation in the so-called phenomenological and processing standpoints.
The notion of imagery was chosen as the analysis’ focal point; this was motivated
both by the notion’s problematic nature relative to the ontology of mind-internal
phenomena and by its association to construal (often denoted as “linguistic
imagery”  until  recently).  The  first  half  of  chapter  3  addressed  the  ontological
criticism  leveled  against  this  conception  of  meaning  (Itkonen  1997,  2008b,
forthc.; Kenttä 2003). The established criticisms were found adequate to the
extent that the argumentation of Cognitive Grammar suffers from ontological
inconsistencies; the theory attributes cognitive-psychological ontology to
semantic phenomena that are actually primarily social, and this conflation is
especially manifest in the concept of imagery. The second half of the chapter then
shifted the focus onto the relation of linguistic imagery to its mental counterpart,
i.e. the ability to evoke percept-like images in the absence of corresponding
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stimuli.  The  conclusion  was  that  mental  imagery  needs  to  be  separated  from
construal not only for ontological reasons (the discrepancy between mental image
and social linguistic meaning), but also because of the fact that the realization of
subjectively construed meaning in individuals is not dependent on any specific
form of cognitive processing.
Taken  together,  these  analyses  show  that  the  concept  of  construal  (and
conceptualizer), as separated from mental imagery, is needed for an adequate
description of a natural language’s semantic potential. However, the criticism in
chapter 3 only reveals the need for a social grounding of construal. The manner
in which this grounding should be carried out is the topic of this chapter.
While  it  stems  from  a  commitment  to  the  view  that  the  notion  of  social
ontology of linguistic meaning is correct, the task at hand is primarily a linguistic-
theoretical instead of philosophical one. The question this chapter will explore is
how does Cognitive Grammar’s notion of construal relate to actual language use,
and  what  are  the  conceptual  prerequisites  for  the  adequate  description  of
construal from a socially grounded perspective. This is obviously an instantiation
of a more general question of how the sociality of linguistic meaning manifests
itself in the linguistic interaction.
In  linguistics,  these  questions  are  typically  addressed  under  the  heading  of
intersubjectivity. Within the fields of interactional linguistics and conversation
analysis, intersubjectivity has been operationalized as a category for reciprocal
sense-making, understanding and interaction (see e.g. Heritage & Atkinson 1984:
10–11; Linell 2009; Sacks et al. 1974; Schegloff 1992). On the most abstract level,
intersubjectivity can be defined as the construction of social entities, such as
understanding  and  objectivity,  in  co-operation  with  multiple  subjectivities.  In
Conversation Analysis, this has been elaborated, inter alia, by the analysis of the
understanding of previous turn by the present speaker (e.g. Sacks et al. 1974) and
by the analysis of the manifestations that institutional contexts show in the
interlocutors’ actions (e.g. Drew & Heritage, eds., 1992).
The present analysis assumes a perspective on linguistic intersubjectivity that
differs from these interactionist accounts in that it concentrates exclusively on
the  formation  and  organization  of  semantic  content.  The  purpose  here  is  to
present a formulation of intersubjectivity that makes a coherent, socially
grounded description of construal possible. Accordingly, discourse and
communicative setting are included in the analysis as sources and determinants
of conceptual meaning. This semantically inclined approach to intersubjectivity
links the present study to the ongoing discussion on the necessity of grounding
cognitive  linguistics  in  the  sociality  of  actual  language  use  (e.g.  Haser  2005;
Verhagen 2005, 2008; Zlatev 1997, 2005; see also Foolen et al., eds., 2012; Zlatev
et al., eds., 2008).
Two interpretations, or groups of interpretations, of intersubjectivity are
especially  relevant:  1)  intersubjectivity  is  one  of  the  key  concepts  both  in  the
Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenological analysis of objectivity and the
social  constitution  of  experience;  and  2)  intersubjectivity  has  a  dual
interpretation as a descriptive and theoretical-explanatory concept in
evolutionary and developmental psychology. In this study, a specific formulation
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of  intersubjectivity  is  adopted  that  stresses  the  latter  use  of  the  term,  while  it
associates  it  with  the  phenomenological  approach  to  semantics;  namely,  the
hierarchical model of intersubjectivity by Zlatev (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a,
2008b, 2013). This formulation can be outlined as follows (adopted with slight
alterations from Zlatev 2008b):
i) Intersubjectivity is the sharing of experiential and representative
states (cf. Zlatev 2008b: 215) either in an immediate embodied or
in a symbolically mediated manner.
ii) Intersubjectivity is not a unitary concept, but a functionally
defined category for processes, structures and properties of
human action which characterize joint intentional action and
knowledge.
iii) The categorizing a process, structure or property of human action
or  knowledge  as  intersubjective  amounts  to  defining  it  as
irreducible to individual intention, embodiment or cognitive
structure.
Intersubjectivity  can  thus  be  defined  as  referring  to  the  alignment  and
organization of social phenomena in the actual everyday interactions. However,
any definition of intersubjectivity is necessarily based on some ontological
preoccupations, and the definition given above is not neutral in this respect.
This is illustrated by the competing accounts of intersubjectivity in empirical
psychology. The so-called Theory-of-Mind approaches (e.g. Fodor 1983, 1994;
Goldman  1989)  seek  to  explain  intersubjectivity  skills  in  accordance  with  the
development of individual intellect and/or with hardwired cognitive processes.
The so-called enactivist  approaches,  in turn,  model  intersubjectivity relative to
the emergent properties of social interactions and embodiment (e.g. Gallagher &
Hutto 2008; Gallagher 2009; 2011a, 2011b; Hutto 2009). The former are most
often criticized for their relative inability to account for infant intersubjectivity or
the phenomenological directness of one’s experiences of the intentions and states
of the other. The most substantial limitation of the enactivist models of
intersubjectivity is their relative inability to account for the higher forms of social
understanding in a cohesive manner, for instance, those involving hypotheses,
beliefs  and  analogies  about  other  people’s  mental  life  (see.  e.g.  de  Bruin  &  de
Haan 2012). A sufficient compromise would therefore seem to be a model that is
based  on  body  and  interaction,  and  that  allows  for  some  mediated  forms  of
intersubjectivity, such as the representational conceptual capacity associated
with natural language.
The representative function of language is characterized by a systematicity
and a conventionality that depend on norms that exhibit at least some autonomy
and stability  over  their  specific  instantiations.  As  a  normative  entity,  language
constitutes an object of common knowledge, and this objectivity translates into a
distinction between the object and the subject of a linguistic act. Language can be
and most often is pre-reflectively experienced as a direct expression of one’s
subjectivity, but it nevertheless is expressive as a set of acts that are distinct from
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their subject. Language therefore presupposes the more primary levels of
intersubjectivity, which is an experience both of foreign subjectivity and shared
objectivity that cannot be constituted by linguistic praxis alone. This implies that
both  the  acquisition  and  the  use  of  language  hinge  on  more  rudimentary
intersubjective abilities.
 A model that accounts systematically for both ends of the intersubjectivity
continuum  is  provided  by  Zlatev  in  his  mimetic  hierarchy  (e.g.  Zlatev  2008b,
2013).  Zlatev  builds  his  model  on  the  notion  of  bodily  mimesis  (adopted  from
Donald 1991), which refers to non-conventional symbolization through the use of
the  body.  Mimesis  hierarchy  is  also  a  developmental  stage-model  (e.g.  Zlatev
2008b: 219). Most importantly for present purposes, the mimesis hierarchy
serves  as  a  conceptual  framework,  according  to  which  language  as  a  fully
conventionalized semiotic system may be embedded in the larger domain of
human intersubjectivity.
This  leads  to  the  argument  I  will  develop  and  defend  through  this  chapter;
namely that construal needs to be related to intersubjectivity. I argue that the
content of the term in Cognitive Grammar presupposes intersubjectivity in a
manner that exceeds a “mere” social ontology of meaning. The argument, which
will  be  presented  in  full  in  section  4.5,  can  be  concisely  expressed  in  three
assertions.
First of all, construal as a selection is carried out among semantic units that
are  by  definition  socially  shared;  this  part  of  argument  is  largely  in  line  with
Itkonen (1997), but its elaboration will also include a phenomenological approach
to  pre-linguistically  shared  objects  of  expression.  Second,  following  Verhagen
(2005, 2007, 2008), I argue that meaning is not intersubjective only in the sense
of its constitutive sociality, but also in that it includes types of intersubjective
alignment that are conventionalized into expression. In other words, expressions
are  not  only  constituted  and  distributed  intersubjectively  but  also  signify
intersubjectivity, and this signified intersubjectivity is an essential part of what
the construal nature of a given expression is. Third, since it involves the selection
of semantic representation, construal cannot be comprehensively described
without being grounded in actual interaction and both the linguistic and extra-
linguistic context. This context includes the multiple interlocutors, their
interactive motives and their shared understanding of the extra-linguistic
circumstances the communication is about. In other words, construal is described
correctly as reflexive vis-à-vis what is not construed.
This three-partite argument thus relates construal both to the conventional
semantic value of an expression as well as to its pragmatic specification. What is
relevant here is that neither conventional nor contextually variable elements of
construal can be adequately described irrespectively of the intersubjective
organization of communication. It is this fundamental attribute of construal that
is elaborated throughout this chapter.
A  few remarks  on  the  nature  of  this  analysis  are  warranted  First  of  all,  the
integration of construal with an intersubjective perspective is necessarily
schematic, for the scope of both notions is as vast as the scope of language itself.
The resulting redefinition of construal is nevertheless coherent and, moreover,
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extends the traditional scope of the term, especially in the domain of pragmatics.
The linguistic analysis of selected construal phenomena is in turn carried out on
a  very  constricted  set  of  semantic  constructions,  thus  making  use  of,  and
providing support for, a rather narrow proportion of the overall model of
intersubjectivity. I argue, however, that this analysis succeeds in its primary task
of providing proof of the existence of pragmatic attributes of construal that
presuppose a structured, pre-linguistically constituted intersubjectivity, and that
rebut a strictly psychologistic explanation for construal.
The reevaluation of construal from an intersubjective perspective may seem
to  violate  the  original  spirit  of  the  term,  which  is  one  of  Cognitive  Grammar’s
central  semantic  constructs.  One  could  argue  that  construal  cannot  be
distinguished from its cognitive basis without distorting its overall theoretical
status,  and  therefore  should  be  accepted  as  a  concept  that  refers  to  individual
language  processing,  whether  this  is  consistent  with  Cognitive  Grammar’s
analytical practices or not. I claim, however, that this reevaluation is precisely
motivated by the actual analytical scope of the notion of construal, and can
therefore be attributed to the conceptual clarification (instead of the dismissal or
reversal) of Cognitive Grammar’s view of what construal is about.
Cognitive  grammar  claims  to  assume  a  phenomenological  approach  to
semantic analysis (CGBI: 31), i.e. it approaches linguistic evidence as it appears
to the analyst, albeit this methodology is most often carried out only implicitly.
In contrast, Husserlian phenomenology emphasizes the inherently public nature
of most experiences; indeed the notion of intersubjectivity is applied exactly to
describe the inevitable role of others in one’s grasp of objectivity as well as one’s
own subjectivity. Given that this constitutive intersubjectivity is a recurrent
element of Husserlian and post-Husserlian analyses of experience, it would seem
that Cognitive Grammar exhibits a rather shallow understanding of the
phenomenological method. This is only an expected methodological corollary of
Cognitive Grammar’s ontological confusion with regard to its research object
(Itkonen 1997, 2008a, 2008b, forthc.; see discussion in section 3.2.3). What these
points suggest is exactly the need for the complementation of Cognitive
Grammar’s analysis of meaning with a phenomenologically informed conception
of intersubjectivity; and it is Cognitive Grammar itself that implies the need for
such complementation.
4.1 OUTLINE
The content of this chapter is divided into three main sections. In section 4.2, I
will explore the philosophical foundations of intersubjectivity in Husserlian
phenomenology,  and  discuss  the  relation  of  intersubjectivity  to  the  notion  of
intentionality. Section 4.3 analyzes the connection of these foundations to the
modern conceptions of intersubjectivity in different varieties of developmental,
social  and  clinical  psychology,  as  well  as  in  linguistics.  Finally,  section  4.4
addresses  the  compatibility  of  linguistic  construal,  as  presented  in  Cognitive
Grammar, with the selected formulation of intersubjectivity. The main objective
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of this  section,  however,  is  to ground the linguistic  analysis  put forward in the
following chapter 5. Finally, section 4.5 assesses the felicity of this task as well as
recollects the main points of this chapter at large.
4.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CONCEPT
Intersubjectivity  had  its  first  appearance  in  1885  in  the  philosophical  work  of
Johannes  Volkelt,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  Edmund  Husserl,  the  founder  of
phenomenology, was the first to integrate this concept into the development of a
systematic philosophical program. Husserl’s work, despite the frequent radical
departures of later phenomenologists, can still be considered representative of
the phenomenological movement at large (see Zlatev 2010: 415). Furthermore, I
consider it central for the understanding of the functions intersubjectivity has
been given in fields other than philosophy.
The purpose of this section is to explicate the philosophical grounding of the
notion of intersubjectivity. Instead of a comprehensive historical introduction,
my  presentation  will  provide  a  brief  account  of  the  term’s  status  within
Husserlian  phenomenology  (especially  as  presented  in  Zahavi  2001a,  2001b,
2003a,  2003b)  and  its  implications  for  semantic  analysis  from  a  cognitive
linguistic perspective. Before that, I will discuss how intersubjectivity is
indispensable for a phenomenological approach to knowledge, and how
understanding this requires a grasp of how knowledge relates to one’s conscious
experience.  In  following  section,  this  relation  is  addressed  through  an
introduction to the Husserlian concept of intentionality.
4.2.1 INTENTIONALITY
For Husserl, epistemology does not concern mind-independent reality;
phenomenology, as presented in Logical investigations (Logische
Untersuchungen, vol. 1: 2001a [1900–1901], vol. 2: 2001b [1901]), avoids
commitment to any metaphysical position (see e.g. Zahavi 2002, 2003a: 8, 39).
The primary question Husserl is concerned with is how knowledge is possible via
the processes of consciousness. Yet Husserl, especially in the first investigation of
Prolegomena to Pure Logic,  provides  a  substantial  critique  against  the
psychologism of his era, which sought to naturalize epistemology by reducing it
to psychical processes. Husserl (2001a: §24) points to the fact that knowledge, or
the  object  of  knowledge,  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  act  of  knowing,  for  this
reduction would make recurrent reference to universal logical truths impossible.
This stems from the axiom that every act of knowing is or might at least be slightly
different by some formal characteristic, however peripheral. If knowledge equals
both this act of knowing and another act separately, the very notion of knowledge
dissolves.  Thus,  there  has  to  be  distinction  between  the  act  and  the  object  of
knowing. The problem for, and raison d’être of,  phenomenology is  to describe
how the subjective act of knowing reaches knowledge which is inherently
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objective; that is, phenomenology seeks to describe the subjective conditions of
objective knowledge, without recourse to psychophysiological causation (Zahavi
2003a: 13).
The phenomenological method, or collection of methods, is thus a systematic
survey into the structures and processes of consciousness that constitute of our
experience  in  its  entirety.  These  structures,  which  are  the  analyst’s  “data”,  are
approached as they appear upon close inspection;  and this  has led to a host  of
tenacious  methodological  criticisms  (for  a  concise  review  in  favor  of
phenomenology, see Cerbone 2012). The methodological challenge is to unveil
structures  that  are  logically  and  universally  essential  to  experience,  and  thus
transcend individual subjectivity. Phenomenology does not establish itself in
mere introspection, but seeks for the ideal conditions of knowledge, which may
or may not be revealed by reflection on conscious experience.
For Husserl, there is a group of experiences within our conscious life that hold
special value for the constitution of world knowledge and for experience as such.
These are the experiences of  objects  external  to our consciousness,  that  is,  the
experiences that manifest intentionality.56 The specific interpretation of this term
is what characterizes Husserl’s anti-representational account of consciousness,
and thus prefaces the description of intersubjectivity.
Intentionality is not an explanatory concept but a property of consciousness
that needs to be either explained or meticulously described (the latter being the
path  phenomenologists  choose),  that  is,  the  essence  of  what  enables  mind  to
connect with the world (Zahavi 2003a: 14). An objectivist approach would explain
intentionality by saying that an intentional relationship with an object is
established  when  the  object  affects  the  mind  causally.  According  to  Husserl,
however, this cannot hold for the simple reason that there are non-existent,
paradoxical and abstract objects, which lack causal power: e.g. hallucination, by
definition,  is  not caused by the object  that  is  being hallucinated (ibid;  see also
Drummond 2012). This tends to lead to subjectivism and representationalism; if
intentionality is a relation and, for a relation, both relata need to exist, there needs
to be something mind-internal to which an intention attaches (Drummond 2012:
118; Zahavi 2003a: 15). Epistemologically, however, this view can also be proven
wrong: by positing an intra-mental or act-immanent (dependent on the act of
consciousness)  entity  as  the  object  of  intention,  one  faces  the  impossibility  of
objective knowledge or even of recurrent experiences of the same object, as is the
case with psychologism (ibid.).
In  contrast,  Husserl  can  be  considered  a  proponent  of  non-metaphysical
direct realism (Zahavi 2003a: 28–60, 66), to whom the act of knowing and the
object of knowing need to be strictly separated. The object itself cannot be act-
immanent, that is, immanent to an act of our consciousness; if this were the case,
56 There are experiences that lack an intentional object, e.g. emotional states. These experiences made
Husserl diverge from Brentano, to whom intentionality is a characteristic of consciousness as such.
Intentionality is nevertheless indispensable for the subject to have an experience of the world. Therefore, I
consider it a key feature of phenomenological epistemology in general, not just of the understanding of
intersubjectivity.
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we would not be able to constitute identity, for example, when observing the same
object on multiple occasions. This is simply because every occasion of observation
would constitute its own object, which then could be connected to other objects
only by their similarity to them. Similarity, in turn, does not suffice to constitute
identity; the multiple reasons for this insufficiency are a prominent topic in the
phenomenological literature (see e.g. Drummond 1995; 2012: 131).
Husserl thus refutes both objectivist and subjectivist conceptions of
intentionality. Instead, he describes intentionality as an intrinsic property of
consciousness  (Zahavi  2003a:  21).  The  subject  is  inherently  directed  outward,
transcending itself, and this makes the intentional object a part of the experience
itself.  In the case of both real (perceptually apprehended, non-illusory) objects
and  the  objects  of  our  imagination,  objects  are  intended  as  transcendent,
extramental objects.
But  how  can  an  extramental,  non-existent  object  be  the  object  of  our
intention?  If we do not posit mental representations, are we not then forced to
posit some third ontological category whose members exist independently of both
the cognizing subject and the objective world? Husserl’s answer to this question
would be a steadfast  no.  Husserl  does not deny the material  and psychological
constitution  of  thought:  the  psychophysiological  structure  and  activity  of  our
bodies is not only a necessary precondition for consciousness, but also its
significant determinant (e.g. Zahavi 2003a: 98–100). This physicality per se is
simply not the issue phenomenology is striving to solve.57 Intentionality,
however,  is  not  a  physiological  phenomenon  but  a  relationship  between
consciousness and the objects  that  appear to it.  Choosing consciousness as the
seat of explanation does not entail that material and immaterial objects are
analyzed the same by a phenomenologist. On the contrary, the entities
apprehended perceptually are given primary significance in the
phenomenological  account  of  how  we  are  in  the  world.  It  is  only  that  this
centrality  is  described  relative  to  the  manner  of  givenness  in  which  objects
present themselves in our experience and, ultimately, relative to our acts of
intending.
We  may  flesh  out  this  general  characterization  by  considering  the  three
elements of experienced objectivity according to which we may segment and
analyze an intentional act. We may either concentrate on 1) the intentional object
and the way it is given in our experience; 2) the intentional content, that is, the
meaning  the  experience  bears  for  us;  and  3)  the immanent content of  the
experience, the very stuff of experience, which requires our objectifying
interpretation in order to become or give rise to an intentional act (Zahavi 2003a:
22).
 For instance, when I observe a cup, I am faced with a stream of perspectival
sensuous experience, a set of visual profiles. This immanent content, as it stands,
is not meaningful, yet I perceive the cup as a cup, not as a random detail in my
57 This is not to say that the body is not fundamental to phenomenology (see e.g. Merleau-Ponty 2003
[1945];  Violi  2012),  but  this  significance  does  not  derive  from  the  mere  physical  being  as  a  complex  of
biomass.
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overall  visual  experience.  This  is  exactly  because  I  intend  the  cup  as  such;  its
preceding experiential significance is presupposed by the fact that I am able to
orientate to it as an object of a specific kind. Thus the intentional content is what
establishes  the  object  just  as  it  is  intended,  providing  it  with  identity  over
manifold of sensations. But the meaning, the intentional content, still has to be
separated from the object; my intention is attached to the cup, not to the
intentional act that equips the cup with its “cupness”.
In turn, the phenomenological analysis of non-existing intentional objects can
be characterized as follows. The intentional object needs to be separated from the
intentional act, for this would lead to subjectivism. The intentional object,
furthermore, cannot be equated with any intramental representation, since a
representation  itself  is  parasitic  for  our  direct  perception  of  things.  Indeed,  a
representation presupposes the presentation and interpretation of what the
representation  is  about.  This  leads  to  the  fact  that  whether  the  objects  of  our
intention  exist  or  not,  they  are  intended  as  objects  in  the  world;  as  I  have
mentioned, both real and irreal objects are extramental and transcendent
(transcending the intentional act). The way we experience objects is naturally
affected  by  our  history,  interests  and  perspective;  the  intentional  object  in
phenomenology is equal to the object exactly as we intend it, so it is our intention
that harnesses the object with its sense or significance for us (Drummond 2012:
123). This does not, however, entail that the object’s significance relates only to
how  we  experience  it.  On  the  contrary,  sense  attaches  to  an  object  which  we
apprehend  directly  as  residing  in  the  world.  Thus,  we  need  to  distinguish  the
directly perceived object from its sense; this sense is mediated in that it is based
on our historical, cultural and previous bodily experience (Drummond 2012:
128). An irreal object thus bears significance for us even while being extramental
and non-existent as such.
This neither makes an indisputable case for a non-representational model of
intentionality, nor does it need to; it only needs to be acknowledged that such a
model is possible in principle.58 The idea that a subject may experience, and thus
effectively intend, an object without an intervening mental substitute does not
provide us with a ready explanation of how we experience foreign subjects, but it
establishes the starting point for a phenomenological survey to that end. As will
be  discussed  in  sections  4.3.3  and  4.4,  this  account  does  not  exclude  the
possibility of internalized representations per se; indeed, representations can be
posited  as  a  necessary  component  not  only  of  the  linguistic  capability  of  the
individual but of the constitution of language as a social phenomenon; it is only
that representations are denied the default status in explaining of how the mind
connects with the world.
In sum, the intentional object, regardless of its ontological status, transcends
any  single  intentional  act;  I  may  observe  a  physical  object  several  times  from
different angles or with different needs (the so-called intentional quality), but the
object itself retains its identity. Therefore, how we arrive at objectivity, identity,
58 For an elaborate non-representational, or presentational, model of intentionality, see Drummond
(2012).
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and ontological categorization of intentional objects is a synthesis of different
kinds  of  experience.  Phenomenology  is  thus  not  a  subjectivist  theory  but  one
seeking to ground objectivism in the networks of different kinds of intentional
acts,  including  intersubjective  ones,  which  provide  us  with  verification  for  our
epistemological stances toward the objects and the states of affairs we witness in
our experience. Needless to say, different kinds of objectivity exist; my intuition
of the present object, say this cup of coffee, which is present and intuited not just
by me but also by you when you sit next to me is of a very different kind than our
shared conviction that the Earth is round, that two plus three equals five, and that
I  am  writing  this  thesis  in  (tolerable)  English.  However,  every  definition  or
experience of objectivity is derivative from the relationality between multiple
subjects.
4.2.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Phenomenology’s methodological concentration on the way things appear to us
has led to claims that phenomenology is solipsistic in nature. Paradoxically, one
of the main motives for implementing methods that focus on the subject’s grasp
of the world59 is exactly to show how little the subject can do on her own (Zahavi
2003a: 111).  In fact,  when considering what makes intentional  objects  and the
subjectivity that transcends intentional acts possible, Husserl turns to our ability
to experience other subjects, that is, the intersubjectivity of our experience.
Objects present themselves as experienced publically, because their very
objectivity rests on an intersubjective constitution.
The  scope  of  this  work  allows  only  for  a  cursory  characterization  of
intersubjectivity. In contrast, Husserl himself devotes a substantial portion of his
work to intersubjective constitution of experience and knowledge60.
Intersubjectivity, similarly to intentionality, is for Husserl a basic property of our
experience already from a pre-reflective point of view: we experience the world
and  its  objects  as  publically  observable  (2003a:  110)  and  we  experience  other
subjects as foreign, yet self-given (ibid. 113–114). Beyond this immediate
experience lies the constitutive role of intersubjectivity that phenomenology aims
to disclose; intersubjectivity as a condition for there to be subjectivity, objectivity
and  intentional  relations  in  the  first  place  (ibid.  111).  While  intersubjectivity
manifests itself, inter alia, in our apprehension of objects, it is the experience of
a foreign subject that is given the constitutive function of intersubjectivity itself.
Indeed, Husserl himself considers the relationship between mother and child as
the original of all relations (Zahavi 2003: 113). The question then is not how we
59 E.g. transcendental reduction, systematic detection and exclusion of psychological and worldly (i.e. causal,
social etc.) interpretations from experience, in an attempt to unveil the experience at its core (cf. Crowell
2012).
60 As pointed out by Zahavi (2003a: 157/n.33), Husserl had an appreciation for the significance of
intersubjectivity for the phenomenological project already when he wrote Ideen I;  and  even  though  the
expression of this appreciation was postponed until the posthumous publication of Ideen II, intersubjectivity
can nevertheless be considered a key concept in Husserlian thought.
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apprehend the Other on the basis of how we experience foreign objects, but vice
versa. The subject-subject relationship is nevertheless not an unanalyzable
primitive for Husserl but something that needs close inspection: this is the only
way to grasp the way we grasp the world.
A challenge seems to arise: in order not to fall into skepticism or solipsism,
one needs to posit the foreign subject not just as an experiential fact but as an
actual  subject;  but  how  are  we  ever  able  to  really  experience  the  other  in  our
mundane experience, and how can we as phenomenologists ever describe that
experience as more than just distinct from the experience of an object?
The  answer  to  this  question  requires  the  acknowledgement  and  analysis  of
different kinds of intersubjectivities. One would not be able to recognize a foreign
subjectivity without one’s body and its dual status both as a subject and an object
of one’s experience. Indeed, I am not only capable of embodied action, but I am
capable of  action that  is  directed towards myself;  I  am able to touch my hand,
feed my mouth,  and scratch the back of  my head etc.  (ibid.).  For Husserl,  this
foundational  double-sensation  (Zahavi  2003a:  104)  of  one’s  body  is  a
precondition for the experience of the bodily presence of the Other: the
recognition of a subject-object duality that is similar to, and distinct from, ours.
Yet the Other remains transcendent and inaccessible to the experiencing subject.
For Husserl, it is exactly this elusive, inaccessible self-givenness of the other that
we experience when we experience the Other proper. Husserl’s standpoint is
summarized by Zahavi (2003a) as follows:
“That I have an actual experience of the Other, and do not have to do with
a mere inference, does not mean that I can experience the Other in the
same way as the Other experiences himself or herself, nor that the
consciousness of the Other is accessible to me in the same way as my own
is. […] [I]t is only because the foreign subject eludes my direct experience
in this way that he or she is experienced as an Other at all. […] The self-
givenness of the Other is inaccessible and transcendent to me, but it is
exactly this limit that I can experience.” (Zahavi 2003a: 113–114.)
In other words, we witness a subjectivity that bears resemblance to our own, but
that is transcendent in its self-givenness. This occurs in immediate experiential
terms; we may be able to generate elaborate theories on the motives behind the
actions of the Other, but these constructs presuppose a pre-theoretical
experience.
By positing the Other as transcendent yet immediately experienced self-
givenness, phenomenology adopts an oppositional position toward the previous
solutions to the problem of other minds that are based on the so-called argument
from  analogy.  This  argument,  formulated  and  defended  by, inter alia, John
Stuart Mill, states that the subjectivity of the Other is attained through a stepwise
inference of covert psychological states from overt behavior: I, for example, yawn
when I am tired, and I am capable of reflectively associating my overt activity with
my psychophysiological subjective state. Then, when I observe other bodies that
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are performing similar activities, I proceed to attribute their hidden subjectivities
with the subjective state that I myself have previously experienced.
Husserl (e.g. in Cartesian Meditations,  1999  [1950]),  among  other
phenomenologists (e.g. Scheler 2008 [1923]), has nevertheless refuted this
seemingly unproblematic solution. This is due to the fact that the explanation
presupposes  what  it  seeks  to  explain:  the  foreign  subjectivity  itself.  The
recognition of similarity between the actions of two separate subjects does not,
upon closer inspection, result directly from an act of comparison, for it involves a
mapping between two perspectives and between two different sensory
modalities; there are my first-person proprioceptive, auditory experience of my
own action (as well as my subjective state of tiredness) and my third-person visual
and auditory experience of the Other (Zahavi 2001b: 152–153). In order to make
such a mapping possible, we already need to have some grasp of the subjectivity
of  the  Other  as  someone  who  is  actually  performing  these  acts  and  is  able  to
exhibit a subjective state similar to that of our own.
In addition, an inferential solution to the problem of other minds violates our
experience  of  the  Other,  in  which  her  mental  state  and  its  expression  are
experienced  as  a  unified  whole  and  intrinsic  to  the  recognition  of  the  Other’s
action (Scheler 2008 [1923]: 254). Considering the constitutive status of the
Other  for  the  mode  of  one’s  being  in  the  world,  a  phenomenologist  such  as
Husserl or Scheler would maintain that approaching other minds as an inferential
challenge  is  to  entirely  misconstrue  the  epistemological  nature  of  human
condition.
The bodily-based experience of the Other is elementary for any understanding
of a foreign subject, but it is only a starting point for a philosophy that aims to
establish  objectivity  on  the  grounds  of  intersubjectivity.  We are  faced  with  the
fact, that for Husserl, intersubjectivity is not only constituted but also
constituting.  In fact, Husserl goes as far as to say that the ego that experiences
other subjects is itself constituted intersubjectively. How is this achieved without
falling prey to circular thinking?
 Different types of intersubjectivity come into play here. The bodily encounter
with the Other is the constitutive cornerstone of our experience of foreign
subjectivity, as the Other’s experience and intentions are observable in their
bodily manifestations, but are transcendent in their specific subjective quality.
This encounter does not only posit a new category of Other, but also irrevocably
alters our experiential categories in their entirety. We come to experience that, in
our triadic interaction with the Other and the present objects, the objects indeed
are not “merely” intentional objects but objects in their own right, as they retain
their status as independent of the specific subject. In this, the transcendence of
the  Other  becomes  the  origin  of  all  transcendence  (Zahavi  2003b:  235):  the
transcendent objectivity of our experience is grounded in the fact that it is public
to  the  indefinite  number  of  Others.  At  the  same  time,  Husserl  considers  that
intentionality itself presupposes intersubjectivity. This is grounded in the
horizonal intentionality of objects, i.e. the identity of an object that is constituted
over an indefinite number of its perspectival appearances (Zahavi 2001b: 154–
155). When we observe a building from the street, our intention is not directed
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toward its façade but toward the building proper, which implies all the different
perspectives  from  which  the  building  can  be  observed.  This  plurality  of
perspectives merges with the intrinsic public nature of my observing: any of the
indefinite perspectival appearances can be ascribed to an indefinite foreign
subjectivity. In this, my perceptional intentionality manifests what Zahavi (1997:
312) refers to as open intersubjectivity of experience, an a priori reference to a
multitude of subjects.
Intersubjectivity, which is grounded in the experience of a transcendent
Other,  is  at  the  core  of  the  phenomenological  account  of  objectivity,
intentionality, and of transcendence itself. The next question is how we proceed
from these premises toward an understanding of the subject, which is at the very
onset of the phenomenological survey. To put it simply, we do this by bringing
focus back to the necessary first-person orientation of phenomenology.
Intersubjectivity is only made possible by an asymmetry, that is, an ontological
separation, between self and other. Intersubjectivity thus presupposes
subjectivity. But then in what way does the former help to constitute the latter?
For subjectivity to attain its relative ontological independence, its constitution in
intersubjectivity has to be partial. There are, in other words, intrinsic, sui generis
moments  of  subjectivity,  such  as  the  temporal  flow  of  consciousness  (for
discussion, see Zahavi 2003b), that do not presuppose the Other. However, the
intersubjective nature of a fundamental portion of our experience, the experience
of  the  intersubjective  validity  of  the  objects  we  perceive,  provides  the
experiencing ego with the fundamental separation of what it experiences. That is,
the  nature  of  subjectivity  as  a  constitutive  ego  (an  ego  that  constitutes
transcendence and transcendental objects) is defined by the fact that we are able
to constitute objects as valid objects to subjects in general. Without this sociality
of our experience, the very distinction between subject and object would not hold,
at least in the sense we know it.
It must be re-emphasized that Husserl, despite having once called his project
one of “descriptive psychology” (a term adopted from Brentano), did not claim to
offer a causal psychological explanation, but a description of the ideal conditions
for knowledge, that is, the structures of experience that constitute its objective
validity. Paradoxically, this restrictiveness makes his formulation of
intersubjectivity relevant for any psychological consideration of human social
capacity. While the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity is clearly non-
empirical,  it  still  may  provide  an  accurate  description  of  the  subject  as  an
experiential phenomenon, and it may inform empirical psychology by providing
logical constraints for the definition and formulation of analytical questions and
concepts  (for  discussion,  see  Zlatev  2010).  The  single  most  important
characteristic of Husserl’s position relative to intersubjectivity is its direct,
bodily-grounded and non-inferential nature, as opposed to the philosophical
approaches that rely on an inferential capacity when solving the problem of other
minds. This approach, however, has not been greeted with unreserved acceptance
by  modern  psychology  of  social  mind;  instead,  empirical  research  on
intersubjectivity is characterized by a paradigmatic division, which interestingly
rekindles the philosophical debate on the argument from analogy.
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4.3 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS AN EMPIRICAL CONCEPT
The  concept  of  intersubjectivity  has  been  adopted  by  modern  schools  of
psychoanalysis (e.g. Atwood & Storolow 1984; Ogden 1994; Stolorow 1997, 2013;
Stolorow et al. 2002) and developmental psychology (e.g. Meltzoff & Moore 1977,
1994, 1997; Stern 1971, 1977; Trevarthen 1979, 1980), with Vygotsky (1978) and
Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]) as important mediators. From developmental
psychology the use of the concept has spread, inter alia, to neuropsychology
(Barresi & Moore 1996, 2008; Gallese 2004; Iacoboni 2009; Franks, ed., 2010)
and linguistics (Foolen et al., eds., 2012; Zlatev et al., eds., 2008). The impetus to
this expansion results in part from the growing interest in the origins of distinctly
human forms of higher intersubjectivity, such as sophisticated symbolic
interaction and exceedingly complex forms of culture (see e.g. Zlatev et al. 2008).
These forms of intersubjectivity nevertheless seem to rely on more rudimentary
social capacities that are also found in other animals, an observation that fuels
comparative evolutionary psychology of intersubjectivity (see e.g. Hutto 2008;
Pika 2008). Whatever the persuasion of the researcher, much of the controversy
concerning intersubjectivity revolves around the emergence of intersubjective
skills in neonates and young infants. Since the understanding of this
developmental phase bears directly on how language and its acquisition should
be depicted,  we will  proceed to discuss infant intersubjectivity in the following
section.
4.3.1 INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
In  developmental  and  evolutionary  psychology,  intersubjectivity  may  be
explained  roughly  in  two  ways:  either  based  on  the  subject’s  theoretization  or
inference about others, as in the so-called Theory-of-Mind models (henceforth
ToM);  or  based  on  the  subjects’  mutual  and  direct  recognition  of  their
orientations (“intersubjective” or “enactivist” approach).61
The scientific discussion on the development of intersubjectivity skills in early
infancy  has  been  dominated  by  various  approaches  that  belong  to  the  ToM
category. Despite notable variation among these approaches, they typically share
“the  commitment  to  the  idea  that  social  cognition  is  primarily  about
mindreading” (de Bruin & de Haan 2012: 226). “Mindreading” here refers to the
reflective interpretation of others, which is based on their recognition as subjects
that hold beliefs  and desires which may or may not correspond to ours.  In so-
called  Theory  Theory  (henceforth  “TT”,  e.g.  Gopnik  &  Seiver  2009),  the
mindreading capacity is explained as a form of inference, which in turn is based
on a “theory”, a set of overt generalizations of the interrelations between internal
states (beliefs and desires) and external behavior (intentions and actions).
Simulation Theory (“ST”, e.g. Goldman 2006) is typically presented as a rival to
61 In practice, the models for intersubjectivity in grown-ups tend to be multi-leveled and include both mind-
theoretical and enactivist aspects. The classification of models into separate categories may nevertheless be
carried out on the basis of the theory’s primary emphasis.
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TT models, and motivated as a reaction to the over-intellectualism attributed to
the Theory Theory. According to ST, one interprets the underlying mental state
of  the  other  by  ‘placing  oneself  in  the  other’s  shoes’  and  mapping  one’s  own
suitable mental state on the other with respect to the other’s overt behavior. In
sum, TT and ST are similar with respect to the emphasis they place on internal-
external mapping but differ in the explanation for the specific mechanism behind
this mapping.
The ToM -models of  both of  these varieties have been criticized for the fact
that the mindreading skills to which they attribute our social sense-making rarely
show up in conscious experience (Gallagher & Hutto 2008: 18–19). Moreover,
their recourse to implicit processing, e.g. by means of mirror neurons, leads ToM
models  to  the  problem  of  how  sub-personal  theories  or  simulations  could  be
applied to mediate between first- and third-person perspectives in social
interpretation  (ibid.  19).  Finally,  evidence  from  newborns  and  small  children
shows  that  the  capability  of  mutual  sense-making  between  the  child  and  the
caregiver  emerges  earlier  than  ToM  models  would  predict,  and  exhibits  a
behavioral sophistication that ToM models are not able to account for (ibid. 20).
Enactivist  and  related  approaches  (e.g.  Gallagher  2003;  Hutto  2007;
Gallagher & Hutto 2008; Thompson 2007a; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991) in
turn take this sophistication of infant interaction as their starting point. They
hypothesize that even small children are able to experience meanings directly as
inherent properties of others’ overt actions, without the intervention of
theoretical or simulative mentalistic representations. This direct kind of social
understanding is accompanied by the ability to use one’s body expressively,
starting with different primary, protoconversational practices and little by little
taking conscious control of body as a symbolic mediator.
As opposed to ToM models, the enactivist approach has been criticized for a
relative inability to account for higher social-cognitive skills (e.g. de Bruin & de
Haan 2012); the direct, experiential understanding that enactivism builds on is
not easily extended to the description of, for instance, complex folk-psychological
propositions concerning others’ motives. It would thus seem that an optimal
description of intersubjectivity in adults would require a compromise between
these two models. However, given the variety of shortcomings with the ToM line
of  thought,  an optimal approach would actually  be a multiple-level  model  that
would  build  higher  forms  of  intersubjectivity  progressively  from  more
rudimentary  ones.  It  is  exactly  this  kind  of  model,  which  complements  an
enactivist description, rather than compromising it in favor of ToMs, that Zlatev
(e.g. 2008b, 2013) provides. To have clear picture of such a multi-leveled model,
let us consider the developmental-psychological basis of enactivism closer.
Enactivism  has  been  greatly  influenced  by  the  seminal  studies  of  Bateson
(1979), Stern (1971, 1977, 1985), and Trevarthen (1979), who independently
examined the close, embodied proto-conversational interaction between infants
and caregivers. These studies concentrated on the nuances of the interaction in
which the mother gave sensitive, affective support during the child’s application
of  new  attentive  and  motor  skills.  Trevarthen,  for  one,  found  “complex
conversation-like engagements in which both infant and mother exhibited
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intuitive  competence  for  sharing  their  impulses”  (Trevarthen  2008:  IX).  Most
importantly, these engagements necessarily preceded any conceptual mind-
reading capacity, which suggests that they involve the ability of the infant to
directly attune to the other’s mind, by assuming the same or remarkably similar
state  or  orientation.  However,  the  ability  was  not  perceived  as  a  unitary
phenomenon but  one  with  stepwise  evolution,  which  gave  rise  to  Trevarthen’s
notion of Primary and Secondary Intersubjectivity.
Primary Intersubjectivity is present in the interaction between a newborn and
her mother from birth, but the child’s ability to participate in this relation is likely
to evolve before birth (Trevarthen & Aitken 2001: 7). It consists of non-referential
interplay and rhythmic imitation between mother and child, which presupposes
an intermodal mapping between child’s vision (caretaker’s face) and
proprioceptive sense of her own body (Zlatev 2008b: 220; cf. Husserl’s “double-
sensation” above, pp. 12). Primary Intersubjectivity is characterized by an
involuntary engagement in non-representational interaction with the caretaker,
as well as by a lack of differentiation between self and other. In other words, the
interaction between newborn and parent at this stage is intersubjective in that it
involves reciprocal reactivity that presumes a modal reversal from perceived to
executed activity, a rhythmic attunement in the patterns of facial, vocal, and
gestural interplay, and, above all, a recognition of the other exactly as the other
subject.  At  the  same time,  this  recognition  is  not  conscious,  since  this  kind  of
consciousness would automatically result in a differentiation between self and
other, which is manifest in the intersubjective capacities of later developmental
stages.
Because of this lack of representational capacity and the lack of differentiation
between self and other, Zlatev (2008b: 220) refers to the child’s interaction with
the caretaker in Primary Intersubjectivity as proto-mimetic. The manifest
capabilities of the child at this stage serve to ground proper mimetic and post-
mimetic  skills  later  on,  but  do  not  in  themselves  constitute  imitation  in  a
conscious and representative sense. Primary Intersubjectivity, however, posits an
evolution  of  its  own.  From  birth,  neonates  may  not  be  able  to  discriminate
between self and caretaker in a conscious manner, but they nevertheless show an
“innate protoconversational readiness” (Trevarthen & Aitken 2001: 7) to regulate
the self-other relationship. The behavior of small children as young as 2 months
old  starts  to  involve  rhythmic  motor  play  with  caretakers,  which  shows  early
intersubjective motives (ibid. 5). The increasing complexity of this interaction
throughout the first 9 months of life is accompanied by simultaneous increase in
interest toward external objects. It is then the integration of the child’s
intersubjective and subjective (here, object-oriented) motives that marks the
onset of Secondary Intersubjectivity at the age of 9 months (ibid.).
In the beginning of Secondary Intersubjectivity, the infant starts not only to
grasp the other’s orientation toward an outside object but also the object itself,
and to perceive the relation of the two as intentional. That is, the child starts to
detect intentional relations as goal-directed, contextual actions; and thus this
stage can also be called pragmatic intersubjectivity (Gallagher & Hutto 2008: 23).
The enactivist interpretation (ibid.) of this ability is that intentional relations are
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apprehended as inherently meaningful in their own contexts, without inference
of implicit beliefs, desires or other motives from the explicit situation, objects,
and the others gestures. Rather, the relation between the other and the object is
meaningful as such: for example, when the child sees the caretaker approach the
door and her hand reach for the door knob, it is the perceptual meaning of that
action  that  presents  itself  as  the  intention  of  opening  the  door,  not  some
interpretation of a hidden desire.
This  stage  has  also  been  shown  to  have  an  evolution  of  its  own.  The
development  of  a  child’s  attentive  control,  from around 9–14  months  onward,
starts to manifest in that the child repeatedly follows the gaze of the caretaker to
the object that is being observed and then checks back to the direction of the gaze
(ibid.  24).  Around  18  months,  the  child  already  detects  the  adult’s  intentions
toward an instrument and is even capable of correcting the inadequate use of a
toy (see Meltzof & Brooks 2001). Gallagher and Hutto (2008: 24–25) interpret
these  abilities  as  in  line  with  Gibsonian  affordances  (Gibson  1979).  The
environment does not represent itself as a blank slate but as situations that are
endowed  with  meaning  through  the  observation  of,  and  co-operation  with,  a
functioning care-taker. This entails that neither objects nor subjects are observed
neutrally, but relative to their possible uses or intentions in given contexts. This
leads to an action-oriented, holistic understanding of the other, not primarily as
a  mental,  calculating  subject  but  as  an  interactant  in  relation  to  the  exact
pragmatic situation in which she is observed.
 Primary and Secondary Intersubjectivity can thus be described with reference
to the recognition of a foreign subject and to a developing capacity to discern the
other’s intentional relations in pragmatic contexts. Conversely, these stages can
be described without need to posit mentalistic abilities, such as inference from
overt behavior. The question is how far this kind of pragmatic, non-mentalistic
action interpretation can be extended in the description of higher intersubjective
skills.  The  answer  proposed  by  some  enactivists  (e.g.  Gallagher  2001;  Hutto
2007,  2008;  Gallagher  &  Hutto  2008)  is  that  the  abilities  established  during
Primary and Secondary Intersubjectivity not only stay in place in adults, but also
constitute the foundational part of our understanding of the other. The ability to
grasp mental predicates that characterize the other’s attitude toward overt action
is grounded in these abilities, but it is cultivated to its full extent by exposure to
language and specifically to one genre of linguistic interaction between children
and adults: narratives. Folk psychology thus originates in intersubjective
encounters,  which  simply  include  forms  of  interaction  that  are  increasingly
indirect.
In  this  model  (e.g.  Gallagher  &  Hutto  2008),  language  is  evoked  as  an
explanatory factor. However, it is unclear, whether the model as such is sufficient
for explaining the linguistic capacity itself. To address this question, let us turn to
the enactivist analysis of intersubjective abilities in adults.
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4.3.2 INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN ADULTS: ENACTIVISM
Enactivism is an approach that aims to explain cognition relative to an organism’s
interaction with its environment62. Cognition is defined as “the enactment of a
world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in
the world performs” (Varela et al. 1991: 9). This is a seemingly vague formulation,
which nevertheless unambiguously refutes a context-independent constitution of
mind. The theoretical foci of enactivism are closely linked to intersubjectivity, as
the interaction between conspecifics is essential for cognitive ontogenesis and the
manifestation of fundamental psychological traits, such as the conception of self
and autobiographical memory63.  Enactivism  draws  from  multiple  sources,
including biology, general systems theory, and phenomenology. The influence of
the latter is evident in enactivism’s general principle to “study the mind in a way
that does justice to human experience while remaining scientifically sound” (de
Bruin  &  de  Haan  2012:  229).  A  central  manifestation  of  this  principle  is  the
substantial emphasis enactivism places on second-person perspective in the
analysis of interaction. This emphasis is motivated by the phenomenological fact
that our experience of others is primarily of the second-person character: while
we may nurture highly elaborate theories about the mental  lives of  the others,
these theories are only made possible and meaningful by the face-to-face
encounters that preceded them. These encounters are not of third-person
mentalizing  kind,  but  are  direct  and  directed  toward  a  genuine  second-person
interlocutor. Moreover, these encounters maintain this direct basis regardless of
the higher social-cognitive abilities that build on it. (De Bruin & de Haan 2012.)
Enactivism presents itself in contrast to “cognitivist” accounts of human mind,
of which ToM approaches are a folk-psychological representative. This contrast
is best illustrated relative to the question of representations. Loyal to its
phenomenological foundations, enactivism discards the cognitivist concept of
mind as an information-processing system that operates on mental
representations  (for  discussion,  see  de  Bruin  &  de  Haan  2012;  on
representationalism, see Fodor 1981; Tye 1995, 2000). Instead, the interaction
between  an  organism  and  its  environment  is  direct  in  the  sense  that  the
environment presents itself as meaningful via the meaningfulness of the objects,
events and actions that are manifest in our interaction. This general principle is
applied to intersubjectivity specifically. Gallagher characterizes the enactivist
account of social cognition as follows:
62 Gallagher presents this view under the rubric of Interaction Theory (e.g. Gallagher 2004), which can be
defined as another variation of enactivism.
63 The exact impact of society for the constitution of the self continues to be a hotly debated theoretical issue,
especially between current socio-psychological theories (see e.g. Novak et al. 2000), which derive from
symbolic and other forms of interactionism (e.g. Mead 1950), and evolutionary psychology, which
emphasizes innate motives for  human behavior (e.g.  Pinker 2002).  What is  not  debated,  however,  is  the
axiom that intersubjective experience shapes self-conception both as a pragmatic accommodation to
immediate circumstances and as a long-term accommodation to continuous tendencies of others’ behavioral
responses.
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(1*)  Other  minds  are  not  hidden  away  and  inaccessible.  The  other
person’s intentions, emotions, and dispositions are expressed in their
embodied behavior. In most cases of everyday interaction no inference or
projection  to  mental  states  beyond  those  expressions  and  behaviors  is
necessary.
(2*) Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is  not third-
person, detached observation; it is second-person interaction. We are not
primarily spectators or observers of other people’s actions; for the most
part  we  are  interacting  with  them  in  some  communicative  action,  on
some project,  in some pre-defined relation;  or  we are treating them as
potential interactors.
(3*) Our primary and pervasive way of understanding others does not
involve  mentalizing  or  mindreading;  in  fact,  these  are  rare  and
specialized abilities that we develop only on the basis of a more embodied
engagement with others. (Gallagher 2013: 60.)
The resemblance between these points and the discussion on phenomenology
above is not accidental. Gallagher’s anti-representational social cognition can
indeed be interpreted as an instance of naturalized phenomenology (see e.g.
Gallagher  2012;  Petitot  et  al.,  eds.,  2000)64.  The  idea  of  this  approach  is  to
combine the explicit phenomenological analysis of consciousness with empirical
cognitive-psychological methods so that conceptual restrictions on both of these
approaches  can  be  attained  (e.g.  Gallagher  2012:  78–80).  The  influence  of
phenomenology is especially manifest in the conviction that in normal daily
interaction the intentionality of the other is by default directly apprehended as an
immanent experiential property. However, the possible non-immanent, long-
term goals and the conceptual schemes of how to achieve these goals remain not
only hidden, but are fundamentally secondary to the necessary immediacy of our
experience of the other.
What  is  latent  in  Gallagher’s  formulation  is  a  general  methodological
guideline on which enactivism builds. An organism is what it does, and what it
does  is  fundamentally  reactive;  so  the  proper  unit  of  analysis  is  the  organism
within its environment, or even more radically, the organism as a feature of that
environment.  In  the  following  extract,  de  Bruin  and  de  Haan  characterize  the
application of this notion to social cognition:
The proper unit of analysis is not the individual (let alone the individual
brain)  but  rather  the  coupled  system  as  a  whole,  including  the
participants, their dynamic interactions, and the context in which these
interactions take place. (de Bruin & de Haan 2012: 229.)
An  analogical  point  is  made  by  Leavens  et  al.  (2008)  with  respect  to
communication in biological terms:
64 This can be seen as a manifestation of the larger naturalizing trend within contemporary phenomenology
(see e.g. Petitot et al. 2000; Gallagher 2012).
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Because communication is distributed across boundaries of transduction
and because networks of transduction exist at all levels of living systems,
from  cells  to  organisms  and  societies,  and  because  cognition  (the
discrimination and use of information) is hence an inherently
communicative act, therefore it is a category error to interpret
communicative behavior as an index to unseen cognitive processes. […]
It  might  be  argued  that  networks  of  communication  between  neurons
comprise functional cognitive systems, or modules, that are properties of
individual  brains,  but  because  of  the  distributed  nature  of  cognitive
processes, where no cognitive activity can develop or be manifested in a
sensorimotor  vacuum,  all  cognitive  activity  is  co-constituted  by
organisms plus the physical consequences of action and sensation.
(Leavens et al. 2008: 189.)
These  claims  share  the  conviction  that  if  the  valid  analysis  of  a  functional
organism is  in  fact  an  analysis  of  the  organism in  its  environment,  and  if  one
fundamental attribute of that environment are the conspecifics (to which we
orient in a direct manner), the proper unit for the analysis of intersubjectivity is,
as a minimum, a pair of conspecifics. This is what de Jaegher and di Paolo (2007)
refer to as a coupled system, in which the depicted processes presume the system
as a whole, while the parts of the whole are attributed autonomous control over
their function.
We  have  seen  that  intersubjectivity  without  a  mentalistic  component  is  a
possible  if  not  indisputably  the  only  valid  description  for  social  cognition  in
neonates  and  small  children  at  least  until  the  age  of  two  years.  By  that  age,
children have acquired the understanding that  others have “internal  goals  and
wants” that differ from their own (Wellman & Phillips 2001: 130). The question
is how children from that age on develop a fully-fledged capacity to understand
others as not only acting and interacting but also thinking subjects.
Let us briefly consider and the proposal given within the enactivist framework.
Narrative  Practice  Hypothesis  (NPH,  Hutto  2007,  2008;  Gallagher  &  Hutto
2008) is a further development of enactivism and it is directly devised to account
for intersubjective action-interpretation and folk-psychological understanding.
As the name suggests, NPH explains the folk psychology as a result from an infant
“being  introduced  to,  being  made  familiar  with,  and  actively  engaging  in  folk-
psychological narratives: stories about reasons for actions” (de Bruin & De Haan
2012: 240). The core of the hypothesis is that the very foundation of psychological
explanation is stored and conveyed in fables and fairy tales that people tell their
children everywhere.
As an enactivist enterprise, NPH offers an account of narrative competency
that enables a direct form of understanding of others, of which folk-psychological
understanding is one sub-category. This is due to the fact that folk-psychological
narratives and the corresponding competency in these are embedded within the
wider context of narratives in general. What children are exposed to is a constant
overflow  of  linguistically  represented  descriptions  of  actions  for  reasons,  and
The intersubjectivity of construal
148
psychological  reasons that  are only a subtype of  these albeit  an important one
(Gallagher & Hutto 2008: 28).65  Folk-psychological  narratives,  of  which Little
Red  Riding  Hood  is  a  prime  example  (ibid.),  provide  actions  with  subjective
reasons,  i.e.  goals  and  motives  that  are  internalized  by  the  characters.  The
recurrent exposure to narratives of this variety equips children with a model that
they can use when the overt features of the observed action of the other fail to
explicate the other’s intentions. Gallagher and Hutto state that:
[Folk-psychological  narratives]  generally  only  come  into  play  in  those
cases  in  which  the  actions  of  others  deviate  from  what  is  normally
expected in such a way that we encounter difficulty understanding them.
[…] Appeal to folk psychology may come into play when culturally-based
expectations are violated. For the most part, well-rehearsed patterns of
behaviour and coordination dominate. (Gallagher & Hutto 2008: 30.)
Narratively induced folk psychology, in other words, is presented as a problem-
solving mechanism. As a hypothesis, the realism of NPH depends on whether one
accepts  a  heavily  pragmatic  conception  of  action  interpretation  on  a  more
general, non-psychologistic level. For example, our reasoning of why our remote
acquaintance  is  going  to  India  involves  a  synthesis  of  multiple  epistemic
strategies (Gallagher and Hutto, ibid: 26–27). According to NPH, however, all of
these strategies are grounded in our previous experiences of our acquaintance or
of  people  in  general  acting  for  reasons.  In  both  of  these  cases,  the  interpreted
reasons  or  motives  derive  from  the  history  of  culturally,  intentionally  and
interactively motivated actions, rather than from posited mental states. On the
contrary, the mapping of mental states on the other is only made possible by the
general narrative structure of people acting for fundamentally external reasons.
This  mentalizing  capability  is  thus  secondary  and  supplementary  to  the  direct
narratively constituted intentional framework of default action interpretation.
NPH as such is attractive, but it is difficult to grasp in what way it is capable
of  accounting for higher forms of  social  cognition in a direct  manner.  In other
words,  it  is  not  clear  how  narrative  practice  provides  one  with  a  distanced
understanding of others without the internalization of some folk-psychological
theory. If making sense of others’ actions through narrative practice is based on
learning through repetition, is it not likely to involve a schematic representation
of the belief–action-relationship? Or if narrative practice is to be interpreted as a
strategy for understanding in problematic contexts, is it not still a strategy for
interpretation? All in all, NPH may implicitly rely on inferential capabilities in its
explanation of folk psychology, as noticed by de Bruin and de Haan (2012).
Interestingly, de Bruin and de Haan criticize enactivism for shortcomings in
exactly  what  NPH  provides:  the  bridging  of  the  so-called  cognitive  gap  (de
Jaegher and Froese 2009: 439) between direct embodied interaction and higher
cognitive intersubjectivity. De Bruin and de Haan’s verdict is that the available
65 Just consider the amount of different kinds of why-questions to that adult caretakers are required to
answer when explaining social norms or their own behavior to their children
149
enactivist  solutions  lead  to  two  types  of  inconsistency:  enactivism  either  a)
remains loyal to the notion of direct coupling and thus fails to account for folk
psychological action interpretation (de Bruin & de Haan 2012: 238–240), or it b)
succeeds in the description of “higher” social cognition but only by letting go of
the direct, embodied grounding of interaction (ibid. 241–243).
De Bruin and de Haan only propose a putative solution to this dilemma, but it
is  worth  discussing  as  it  leads  to  the  intersubjectivity  of  language.  What  they
suggest is that the problem of enactivism lies in the notion of direct coupling: this
is the concept which defines the constitutive relationship between
intersubjectivities of different levels of complexity. The revision of direct coupling
needs to start with a discussion of the polysemy of “direct”. This term may refer
to  the  “immediacy  of knowing” (without e.g. inference or representation, de
Bruin and de Haan 2012: 243, italics in the original), on the one hand, and to “the
immediacy of the presence of the participants in a social situation” (ibid., italics
in the original, on the other. To be a viable theory of social cognition, enactivism
needs to explain how social cognition works when the latter kind of situational
immediacy is canceled: the indirect reflection on people’s mental states is itself a
phenomenological fact. But what about the immediacy of knowing? De Bruin and
de  Haan’s  analysis  of  NPH  shows  that  the  application  of  the  skills  gained via
narrative  practice  cannot  be  described  without  the  operationalization  of  some
amount of inference or folk-psychological concepts: the actual action
interpretation involves, after all, the projection of hypothetical covert motives.
This leads to the conclusion that a strict commitment to direct coupling needs
to give way, to a certain extent, to mediated social cognition, which is what in fact
takes place in NPH’s version of enactivism. Anti-representationalism needs to be
refined so that it is only opposed to mental representationalism as a categorical
mind-philosophical standpoint. In this manner, the immediacy of experience can
be preserved, even when the experience may have representations as its objects,
that is, culturally transferred concepts and conceptions but also mental images,
memories, fantasies etc. that appear in explicit stand-for relations vis-à-vis their
representational objects.
 This is maintained by de Bruin and de Haan (2012: 244–246) in their revision
of the notion of coupling itself. Instead of discarding the concept altogether, they
suggest that it should be seen as a dynamic, cyclical concept decomposable into
phases of de-coupling and re-coupling (ibid. 245). De Bruin and de Haan (ibid.
244)  consider  de-coupling  as  an  integral  part  of  coupling  itself:  a  systematic
adjustment  of  the  response  to  a  situation  on  the  basis  of  previous  encounters.
This adjustment may include reflection as well  as  a  comparative function with
respect  to  psychologizing  concepts.  However,  since  it  is  grounded  in  the
immediate pragmatic context of the concurrent interaction and based on previous
interactions, de-coupling can in no way be absolute, but is itself a function of the
directness of coupling (ibid.).
De  Bruin  and  de  Haan’s  (2012)  critique  of  enactivism is  accurate,  but  as  it
stands,  it  pertains  more  to  a  demand  for  complementation  than  to
complementation in its own right. The question that is left to be answered is how
intersubjectivity is extended by culturally transferred concepts. In this, language
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constitutes both a medium for, and an object of, transference. Both enactivism by
Gallagher  and  Hutto  and  its  critique  by  de  Bruin  and  de  Haan  point  to  the
significant function of language in mediated social understanding; yet they only
characterize vaguely the possible lines of study. In contrast, an explicit account of
this function is presented by Zlatev (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2013),
who ties language and intersubjectivity in bodily mimesis.
4.3.3 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND LANGUAGE
Zlatev (2008: 217) characterizes his conception of intersubjectivity as exhibiting
three  main  properties:  1)  it  is  non-unitary,  involving  the  understanding  of  a
variety of mental, entities from emotions and attention to “proposition-like
entities”; 2) it is stage-like developmentally, evolutionarily, and structurally; and
3) it is bodily-based. Zlatev (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2013) presents
a model in which human intersubjectivity (both in ontogeny and phylogeny) is
seen as developing through different levels of bodily mimesis.  In this 5-level
mimetic system, the first three levels give rise to linguistic competency, along
which more sophisticated forms of social cognition develop (Zlatev 2008a: 138).
However,  language  is  seen  as  a  direct  continuation  of  the  mimetic  ability,  and
intersubjectivity  is  described  as  co-evolving  with  mimesis  in  ontogeny  (and
phylogeny). Zlatev, in other words, posits a hierarchy of intersubjectivity skills,
some  of  which  ground  language  and  others  that  are  themselves  grounded  by
linguistic practice. The hierarchy is presented as developmental and evolutionary
(since it captures similarities as well as differences between humans and non-
human primates), but also as applicable to the description of intersubjectivity in
adults.  In  what  follows,  I  will  summarize  Zlatev’s  model  chiefly  from  a
developmental perspective, but only to explicate the full-blown intersubjective
capability adults manifest in linguistic interaction.
Zlatev’s model of mimesis hierarchy (2008b: 218–221) is based on Donald’s
(1991)  theory  of  human evolution,  which  seeks  to  explain  the  modern  state  of
human cognition as a result of mimetic practices and representations, as well as
a corresponding mimetic culture; in our ape ancestors, this has involved tool-use,
ritual dance, and gestural communication, for instance. Most important here are
the mimetic representations which Donald defines as “conscious, self-initiated,
representational acts that are intentional but not linguistic” (ibid 1991: 168). The
fact that they are not linguistic links these representations with bodily mimesis in
particular  (Donald  2001:  268).  As  a  rough  generalization,  Zlatev’s  mimesis
hierarchy  draws  from  Donald’s  notion  of  bodily  mimesis,  while  seeking  to
elaborate the concept with respect to its internal (hierarchical) organization, the
role of consciousness in mimesis, and the ontological nature of communication
(see Zlatev 2008a: 138).
Bodily mimesis, in general, involves a mapping between exteroception and
proprioception (see section 4.3.1 on primary and secondary intersubjectivity),
iconic or indexical  correspondence between a bodily act  and an object,  and an
intended stand-for-relation (e.g.  Zlatev 2013:  51).  Language is  based on bodily
mimesis both ontogenetically and synchronically, but it also involves a departure
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from  the  immediacy  of  mimesis  in  that  it  bases  its  representative  function  in
conventionality/normativity and systematicity/ compositionality. On the basis of
this, Zlatev presents his five-level hierarchy:
1. Proto-mimesis: associated e.g. with neonatal imitation, mutual attention
and 1st order mentality
2. Dyadic mimesis: shared attention, understanding of other’s intentions, 2nd
order mentality (understanding others through projection)
3. Triadic mimesis: joint attention, having and understanding
communicative intentions, 3rd order mentality (attention and intentions)
4. Post-mimesis1/protolanguage: semantic conventions, 3rd order mentality
(expectations)
5. Post-mimesis2/language: (false) belief understanding, 3rd order mentality
(beliefs)
                   (Zlatev 2008b: 219.)
As mentioned, this hierarchy is not only evolutionary and developmental, but also
describes the synchronic organization of mimetic abilities in adults; and while it
explicitly  concentrates  on  mimesis,  it  simultaneously  classifies  the  levels  of
intersubjectivity based on said abilities. The first two stages in this hierarchy
correspond approximately to the Primary and Secondary Intersubjectivity
presented by Trevarthen (1979) and adopted by Gallagher and Hutto (2008). The
third stage in this model proves significant, not only in that it appears to be the
diverging point in the development of humans and non-human primates, but that
it constitutes the necessary predecessor of language (Zlatev 2008b: 229). Zlatev
points out the interesting logical necessity that the perceptual intersubjectivity
witnessed at this stage requires a so-called third-order mentality, that is, ability
“to see that you see that I see X” (ibid. 230), which is directly analogous to the
structure of common knowledge posited by Itkonen (1997: 54–62, 2008b: 286–
290; see section 3.2.3 above). This is called “joint attention” (Zlatev 2008b: 230),
a  mutual  orientation  to  a  shared  object  with  the  necessary  reciprocal
consciousness about the mutuality of the orientation itself.
Joint attention presupposes the understanding that my own gaze serves as an
indication of my orientation to the other in the same way that the gaze of the other
indicates  her  orientation  to  me.  An  understanding  follows  that  I  may  use  an
embodied act in a communicative function, and that the other may do so as well
(ibid. 229). This understanding, which is present in perceptual intersubjectivity,
is  simultaneously  manifest  in  the  abilities  that  involve  using  one’s  body
signitively, for instance, declarative pointing and other indexical gestures (ibid.
230). In other words, children and enculturated apes that have reached this stage
have acquired the understanding of the other not only as an intentional subject
but a as subject with communicative intentions. This is not something that small
children may reflect on or explicate linguistically in a propositional form; rather,
this understanding pertains to expectations that are latent in the observation of
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the other’s behavior and requires later development of meta-representational
skills to be conceptualized and explicable.
Triadic mimesis constitutes an intersubjective structure that is basic to
intentional  communication;  it  includes  the  self,  the  other,  and  the  shared
representation,  as  well  as  the  appropriate  reciprocal  understanding  of  what  is
shared.  Most  importantly,  this  structure  is  attained  by  means  of  embodied
interaction. The explanation offered by Zlatev refutes both mentalism and
solipsism: it refutes mentalism in that it bases the understanding of the other in
direct, contextual apprehension of the other’s intentions; and it refutes solipsism
in that the skills that manifest and constitute this understanding are learned in a
careful, embodied tuning-in with the other in mimetic practices.
Thus triadic mimesis is the precursor of linguistic ability; it is only a precursor,
however, for it lacks two fundamental characteristics of language: conventionality
and systematicity. These, according to Zlatev (2008b), are acquired through two
subsequent levels of post-mimesis: post-mimesis1, which involves semantic
convention, i.e. using symbols without the direct, indexical or iconic involvement
of body; and post-mimesis2, which involves the mastery of language as a system
that interprets units by relating them mutually. The two levels of post-mimesis
thus  are  two  subsequent  steps  away  from  the  immediacy  of  embodied
intersubjectivity. Post-mimesis1 equals proto-language, which again involves the
apprehension  of  semantic  convention.  At  this  stage,  children,  as  well  as  some
enculturated  apes,  are  able  to  comprehend  and  use  signs  with  a  completely
arbitrary  and  conventional  signitive  function  (ibid  232).  Yet  the  use  of  signs
shows none or only weak signs of systematicity; that is, the relations of signs, such
as their sequential order, may not yet produce constant semantic effects. It is in
the level of post-mimesis2 that the distinctively combinatory nature of human
language is  manifest:  the ability  to relate symbolic  units  by means of  syntactic
constructions thus arriving at increasingly complex conceptual structures (ibid.
234).
Despite the arbitrariness of the signitive function in both the proto-linguistic
and linguistic levels, neither of these should be considered as independent of the
preceding intersubjectivity skills or of the accumulative structure the different
levels  of  hierarchy constitute.  First  of  all,  although the categorization of  proto-
language and language as “post-mimetic” is justified by their divergence from on-
line imitation proper, the conventionality and systematicity they respectively
exhibit builds on and preserves the capabilities manifest earlier in ontogenetic
development. That is, while conventionality and combinatory nature are a sign of
divergence, cross-modality, availability for consciousness and the stand-for-
relation witnessed in triadic mimesis continue from mimesis to post-mimesis.
This is why Zlatev’s theory is a layered model “where earlier capacities continue
to  co-exist  with  the  newer  ones,  which  may  subsume  but  not  abolish  them”
(Zlatev 2008: 219; Stern 1985). In contrast, the characteristic traits of post-
mimesis, while non-direct in that they are relatively independent of the context
of  use,  are  themselves  1)  products  of  interpersonal  exchange,  in  that  both
conventionality and systematicity are emergent properties that are learned via
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active participation in recurrent intersubjective actions and, and 2) dependent of
the set of units they are properties of.
Conventionality  and  systematicity  of  language  are  thus  based  on  forms  of
intersubjectivity characterized by non-conventionality and non-systematicity; yet
they  pertain  to  the  representative  function  of  language,  which  is  yet  to  be
explained.  How  do  we  get  from  the  immediacy  of  bodily  mimesis  to
representations that mediate objects, events and states that are not present or
even perceptually observable? As mentioned above, enactivist accounts of
intersubjectivity  discard  mental  representations,  and  in  doing  so  seems  to
become unable to account for the highest forms of social cognition. Zlatev seems
to endorse the enactivist agenda to the effect that language is seen as a facilitator
of the folk-psychological understanding of the concept of belief. The
representative capacity of language itself is hypothesized to “carry with it training
in  the  understanding  of  others’  beliefs”  (Zlatev  2008b:  236).  The  existence  of
mental predicates, such as believe and know, as well as the very use of language
in discourse that promotes a mutual perspectival exchange between interlocutors
are also underlined as linguistic facilitators of folk-psychological understanding
(ibid.). From an intersubjective perspective, it seems implausible that language
acquisition would be based on exposure to usage simpliciter, it seems rather that
it presupposes preceding capabilities of internalizing meaningful structures.
What distinguishes Zlatev’s account from an enactivist understanding of
higher social cognition is that it posits mental representations as a prerequisite
for  language  (Zlatev  2005,  2007a,  2007b).  The  posited  “mimetic  schemas”,
however, are radically different from those usually presented in cognitive science.
These schemas, as the name suggests, are schematizations over multiple mimetic
acts, or “[c]ategories of overt or covert bodily mimesis” (Zlatev 2007b: 134), such
as GRASP-X and JUMPING; they are conceptual, covert re-enactments that are
internalized  from  overt  imitations  of  the  actions  of  the  other.  While  mimetic
schemas are supposed to be internalized early on, in level 2 of Zlatev’s mimesis
hierarchy (which corresponds to Trevarthen’s secondary intersubjectivity in child
development), their intentional communicative use occurs in level 4, giving rise
to the above-mentioned non-systematic communication, which serves as the
necessary precondition for acquiring and using linguistic signs (Zlatev 2013: 66).
 Mimetic schemas are accessible to consciousness in their full representative
function: that of standing for something else. In other words, they are identical
to  the  classical  definition  of  sign  as  a  three-partite  structure  consisting  of
expression, content, and subject (Zlatev 2013: 66). Zlatev thus posits a category
of representational thought proper, as opposed to classical cognitive science,
which typically defines the notion of representation functionally to include any
piece of information a posited system operates on. Zlatev’s account preserves the
anti-representationalism of phenomenology in that he does not mimetic schemas
as the basic form of thought or consciousness, but as a form of internalized social
representations, which themselves are capable of serving as intentional objects.
In  rehearsing  and  thus  reinforcing  socially  apprehended  skills,  these
representations could also serve to ground imagination, which is a central factor
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in Donald’s  (1991) evolutionary model  and a phenomenological  fact  by its  own
right,
The fact that mimetic schemas concern mimetic acts grounds them in bodily
action in an intersubjective setting (Zlatev 2007b: 144); that is, they are grounded
in an imitation of action which involves: 1) observing the action of the other; 2)
mapping this visual, third-person information of the other to the proprioceptive
1st person sense of one’s own body; and 3) carrying through the observed, cross-
modally mapped action by oneself (ibid. 131). This sequence of action, or rather,
this repetitive series of actions, through which the child monitors and adjusts the
relationship between her mimetic acts and the ones she is imitating, is
internalized both in its intended representativeness and in its proprioceptive
experiential meaning as a generalization over multiple instances. The pivotal
factor is  that,  albeit  being internalized,  the origin of  mimetic  schemas in overt
imitative action makes them internalized representations of a social kind (ibid.
143). An act of bodily mimesis is intersubjective a priori: it presupposes not only
the other and the imitated action of  the other but also the very intersubjective
supertructure of the situation, the recognition of the other as an intentional agent
of the same kind as oneself. A mimetic schema as the internalization of a mimetic
act thus inherits its intersubjective validity (ibid.). While in small children this
hardly involves explicit consciousness, mimetic schemas are nevertheless
internalized  as  presenting  a  cross-modal  unity.  This  in  turn  implies  a  proto-
communicative  function:  when  I  imitate  you,  I  present  you  with  a  similar
perceptual-proprioceptive experience to the one you presented me with your
original action.
Mimetic schemas are thus shared representations in a pre-reflective sense, as
opposed to language, which is an object of social knowledge. They are supposed
to be shared by members of a community who engage in a close “body-to-body”
communication (Zlatev 2007b: 143), and are analogous to language in that they
are grounded in “culturally salient activities and actions” (ibid: 144). Mimetic
schemas nevertheless depart from language in their restricted nature with respect
to  number,  consciousness  and  compatibility.  For  Zlatev,  it  is  exactly  this
intermediate nature of mimetic schemas that motivates their postulation as a
necessary link between non-representational (i.e. proto-mimetic) and
conventional-representational (i.e. post-mimetic) stages of intersubjectivity.
Being grounded in overt bodily activity, they can be posited as an extension to the
mimetic  capacities  that  are  already  in  place,  above  all  the  recognition  and
corresponding exploitation of observable and thus potentially signitive
characteristic of the other’s intentional acts. Simultaneously, they manifest the
novel  capacity  for  schematization,  which  is  in  a  necessary  condition  for  later
internalization of linguistic units in a usage-based model. Mimetic schemas are
not merely ad hoc entities, however, but are motivated by established behavioral
contingencies of small children.66
In brief, language can be seen as a further extension to pre-established
mimetic capabilities via the mediation of mimetic schemas, which are a model
66 Including pathologies of interpersonal psychological development (see Zlatev 2007b: 143–144).
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for internalized experiential representations, that is, stand-for-structures for
certain crude motor activities and spatial constellations. Post-mimesis1 (proto-
language) and post-mimesis2 (language) extend the representational structure of
mimetic schemas by adding conventionality and systematicity, respectively.
While hypothetical by nature, Zlatev’s model of intersubjectivity surpasses the
others we have considered in its scope and ability to account for the emergence
of  language.  It  does  so  exactly  by  resorting  to  representations  that  ground
language and linguistic meaning, and that constitute folk-psychological
understanding. The conception of representation as an object of consciousness
nevertheless remains loyal to the phenomenological experience: we do in fact
entertain thoughts that involve a clear, representational about-relation vis-à-vis
their extramental referents. At the same time, this conception of representations
is not only compatible with Itkonen’s (1978, 1997) social ontology of meaning but
also complements it: mimetic schemas serve to model how linguistic
symbolization may be grounded in pre-conventional communication, in which
the intersubjective validity stems from direct bodily identification with the other.
Thus  Zlatev’s  mimesis  hierarchy  not  only  manages  to  ground  language  in
wider  a  scope  of  intersubjective  capabilities,  but  also  manages  to  provide  a
consistent general depiction of those capabilities. What has not been discussed
yet  is  that  mimesis  hierarchy  also  introduces  an  experiential  component  to
semantics. If semantic units are attained similarly to mimetic schemas through
generalization  over  instances  of  use,  they  are  not  simply  constituted  by  their
extra-linguistic objects but by instances of subject/object-interaction, which
suggests that non-objectivity as captured by the dimensions of construal derives
directly from a phenomenological experience of language use. This is promising
for  the  purposes  of  the  study,  but  Cognitive  Grammar’s  concentration  on  the
mental representational content of semantic units obscures the fact that this
content is not sufficient for linguistic meaning. The integration of the notion of
construal  within  a  hierarchical  model  of  intersubjectivity  therefore  requires  a
substantial re-evaluation of this model, to which we turn next.
4.4 CONSTRUAL AND INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
The above discussion of intersubjectivity describes a strand of thought that
extends from early phenomenology to present-day developmental and
evolutionary psychology. Phenomenological, enactivist, and other
representatives of this strand of thought share the conviction that the human
condition is marked by a direct, experiential and constitutive sociality that cannot
be reduced to folk-psychological reasoning about the other’s mental life.
With  respect  to  philosophy,  in  the  first  half  of  our  discussion,  Husserlian
intersubjectivity  was  shown  to  be  a  plural  concept,  which  includes,  but  is  not
limited  to,  perceptual,  social  and  psychological  forms  of  experiences  of  the
presence and intentions of the Other, all of which, however, are fitted into a non-
representational  conception  of  the  phenomenal  mind.  The  second  half  of  our
discussion demonstrated that the philosophical opposition between direct and
The intersubjectivity of construal
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mediated conceptions of intersubjectivity is largely duplicated in the current
empirical  research  on  the  psychology  of  intersubjectivity.  We pointed  out  that
direct or enactivist models of intersubjectivity surpass mentalist ToM approaches
with regard to their ability to plausibly ground intersubjectivity in empirically
observable  behaviors  and  in  that  they  give  a  credible  description  of  the
development of intersubjectivity skills from nuanced interaction between small
children and their caregivers. However, enactivism was found to require a re-
formulation that includes more distanced capabilities for intersubjectivity that
were nevertheless grounded in immediate interpersonal co-operation (de Bruin
& de Haan 2012). This requirement was then shown to be met by Zlatev’s (2008b)
five-level mimesis hierarchy, which includes internalized representations called
mimetic schemas (Zlatev 2008a).
While mimetic schemas are mental in the sense of being internalized and thus
autonomous vis-à-vis the situations in which they have been acquired, they are
not cognitive in a strict sense. Instead of a specific mode of processing, they fulfil
the  function  of  a  true  sign  in  that  they  consist  of  expressions  that  stand  for  a
certain  content  for  a  subject  (Zlatev  2007b:  134).  Mimetic  schemas  are  not
linguistic  but  bodily-based  and  non-systematic  in  the  sense  that  they  lack
symbolic interrelations. They nevertheless serve as a model for how the signitive
function evolves through intersubjective practices: most importantly, this
involves a mutual agreement by the interactants on the signitive function as well
as an understanding of the intersubjective nature of this agreement. Thus
mimetic schemas both presuppose certain capabilities of intersubjectivity and
constitute such capabilities themselves. What is presupposed is the experience of
foreign subjectivity as such and the recognized similarity between the self  and
this subjectivity, which itself presupposes a cross-modal mapping between vision
and  proprioception.  This  mapping  can  then  be  harnessed  to  serve  a
communicative function. The capability mimetic schemas thus embody is that of
“understanding and expressing communicative intentions” (Zlatev 2007b: 123).
With these attributes combined,  mimetic  schemas can be claimed to bridge
the bodily-based and direct and the conventional and symbolically mediated
forms of sociality. Accordingly, mimesis hierarchy avoids representationalism at
least in subject-to-subject-relationships, reserving the status of representation
for genuine stand-for structures, and considering these structures secondary
relative to the direct experience of others.67 This conception of representations
can be accepted as an a priori requirement both for linguistic communication and
for a theoretical description thereof. Language is defined by its symbolic function,
and,  moreover,  the  fact  that  this  symbolic  function  transcends  particular
67 It is crucial to acknowledge that this position vis-à-vis representationalism is not dependent on the
inclusion or exclusion of representations but derives from the role granted for representations in
epistemological theory. Whereas representationalism (e.g. Fodor 1981; Tye 1995) posits an indirect mind-
world relationship, mediated by mind-internal representations of the world, mimetic schemas, for example,
“only”  pertain  to  intersubjectively  grounded,  both  overtly  expressible  and  covertly  (cognitively)  stored,
representations that retain the structure of a true representation as consciously differentiated content and
expression for that content (Zlatev 2008a: 133–135).
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instances and subjects entails internalized generalizations over instances and
subjects.  The  specific  theoretical  value  of  mimesis  hierarchy  is  that  each  of  its
distinct levels is constituted progressively from pre-existing intersubjective skills,
which serve to ground a new semiotic capacity as the child’s development allows
her  to  grasp  it  through  pragmatic  contexts  (Zlatev  2008b:  219).  Mimesis
hierarchy thus provides a promising approach to the integration of  conceptual
semantics as presented in Cognitive Grammar to a more encompassing semiotic
theory.  This  integration  also  provides  systematic  means  to  explain  the
conventionalization of experience into linguistic meaning. However, the means
provided necessitate once again a critical re-evaluation of how the relationship
between experience and meaning has been originally explained by Cognitive
Grammar.
4.4.1 DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND MEANING
The starting point for analyzing the relationship between experience and
meaning is provided by the phenomenological treatment of so-called non-actual
movement  clauses  by  Blomberg  and  Zlatev  (2014).  These  expressions  of  non-
actual movement show a linguistic mapping of movement of entities that are “in
reality” conceived as stationary: e.g. the highway goes through the forest (ibid:
411)68.  Expressions  such  as  these  are  treated  in  Cognitive  Linguistics  as
paramount examples of the necessarily cognitive nature of semantics: the
movement in question cannot be traced back to the actual circumstances so it has
to be a matter of individual’s conceptual strategy. Blomberg and Zlatev explicate
the  major  weaknesses  of  the  standard  Cognitive  Linguistic  explanations  (by
Langacker 1987; Talmy 2000; Matlock 2004a, 2004b) for this expression type,
and  show that 1) mental simulation (e.g. Barsalou 1999, 2009; cf. the discussion
above  in  section  3.3.2)  is  not  a  sufficient  explanation  for  either  actual  or  non-
actual  movement in linguistic  expression (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014:  398–401);
and that 2) the expression type is in fact constituted of different sub-types with
distinct experiential motivations (ibid. 2014: 402–410). More important than
this  critique,  however,  is  Blomberg  and  Zlatev’s  account  of  the  relationship
between the experiential motivation and the actual semantics of non-actual
movement clauses.
While  Blomberg  and  Zlatev  discard  sub-personal  simulative  processes  as  a
basis of semantics, they (ibid. 413) also oppose the strict dismissal, namely by
Itkonen (2008a), of the cognitive linguistic description of non-actual motion.
When he considers mental  scanning,  Itkonen argues steadfastly  for  its  a  priori
irrelevance  to  meaning  that  is  constituted  by  socially  binding  norms.  Mental
scanning is strictly individual, while norms are inherently social (ibid. 23).
Itkonen  thus  adapts  the  critical  remark  he  has  made  earlier  on  the  notion  of
imagery (see section 3.2.3)  to mental  scanning.  While Blomberg and Zlatev do
68 In Cognitive Grammar, this phenomenon is referred to as “abstract” (Langacker 1986), “subjective”
(CIS), “fictive” (CGBI), or “virtual motion” (Langacker 1999b). The term “dynamic construal” is also used by
some cognitive linguists (e.g. Huumo 2007).
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not explicitly argue against the ontological differentiation between the individual
(psychological)  and  the  social,  they  aim  to  describe  the  way  in  which  social
meanings  are  grounded  in  individual  experience,  suggesting  a  “middle  road”
(Blomberg & Zlatev 2014: 413): that of experiential semantics, which is informed
by  the  phenomenological  analysis  of  meaning,  and  where  the  regularities  of
individual experience are allowed to enter semantics in principled and restricted
manner.  The  principles  and  restrictions  of  this  view,  referred  to  as
consciousness–language interactionism (ibid. 397), are explicated through
application of the Husserlian notion of sedimentation (1970 [1936]; Woelert
2011).
 In Origin of geometry (Husserl 1970 [1936]), Husserl introduces
sedimentation  and  discusses  the  way  in  which  linguistic  meanings  build  on
endless repetitions and appropriations, that is, by accommodating use in an ever
increasing set of contexts and referents. This repetition and accommodation leads
to  a  sedimentation  or  burial  of  the  original  motivating  experiences,  while  the
totality of sedimented uses and thus related experiential settings define the
expression’s conceptual content (Woelert 2011: 119–120). Sedimentation thus
pertains  to  a  double  process  of  loss  in  specificity  and  gain  in  “communal
availability” (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014: 413), which also manifests in the “creation
of stabilized, typifying structures of meaning” (Woelert 2011: 120).
What Husserl describes, and Blomberg and Zlatev summarize, comes close to
the process of conventionalization and schematization of meaning via use that is
central to the emphasis Cognitive Linguistics places on the usage-based
learnability and dynamism of natural language. The point in which Blomberg and
Zlatev, as well as Husserl, diverge from Cognitive Linguistics is that in this model
the continuous appropriation of meaning is seen as bleaching from consciousness
the experiential origin of the given linguistic expression, while simultaneously
forming the implicit basis for the use of this expression. Sedimentation thus
results in a cognitive dissociation between an experience and its corresponding
meaning. Yet, Blomberg and Zlatev (ibid. 414) emphasize that the dissociation is
only partial: the ability to autonomously “reanimate” the original experience is at
least to some extent preserved even in “naïve” speakers, as opposed to educated
phenomenologists. More importantly, however, pre-reflective linguistic meaning
preserves not only characteristics of the experienced object but also specific
characteristics of how it is experienced. In other words, the semantic differences
between referentially synonymous expressions and expression types can be
grounded in different ways of perceiving things (ibid. 415).
While concentrating on non-actual movement, Blomberg and Zlatev are
actually suggesting a phenomenological characterization of construal.69 To sort
69 Or, rather, a conceptual basis for such a model. To construct such a cross-disciplinary framework, an
extensive supplementation (or “productive reciprocal fertilization” (ibid. 416), flowing in both directions
between phenomenology of language and cognitive linguistics, is required. Blomberg and Zlatev suggest,
that with regard to the sedimentation of the manner in which the object is intended, Cognitive Linguistics
may  inform  phenomenological  survey,  which,  at  least  in  some  cases  seems  to  underestimate  the
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out its chief characteristics, including the actual operative value of sedimentation,
some reconstructive effort is required.
As mentioned, Blomberg and Zlatev are able to break down different linguistic
sub-types of non-actual movement. These types are then provided with and partly
derived  from,  distinct  motivations  that  link  expressions  to  dynamic
characteristics of perceptual experience. Especially interesting in this respect is
the motivation for the subtype that Langacker (e.g. 2006) calls subjective motion.
The original motivation provided by Langacker for this expression type is mental
scanning (also applied to the temporality of verbs, see section 2.3.1.), in which the
conceptualizer “traces an analogous mental path” (Langacker 2006: 25) along the
mentally depicted stationary object; for instance, in The trail rises steeply near
the summit (Blomberg and Zlatev 2014:  405).  This explanation is  criticized by
Blomberg and Zlatev, inter alia,  for  neglecting  the  objective  pole  of
conceptualization in emphasizing the subjective processing mechanism. What
Blomberg and Zlatev suggest as a correction is the grounding of subjective motion
in the actual perceptual experience (Blomberg and Zlatev 2014: 408) as opposed
to in its simulation. The question is how this grounding should be carried out in
practice.
The  “middle  road”  Blomberg  and  Zlatev  offer  as  a  solution  is  based  on  an
emphasis on the enactive, embodied and intersubjective basis of perceptual
experience. First of all, the perceptual experience that gives rise to subjective
motion  is  not  purely  subjective,  but  should  be  characterized  from  a
phenomenological  standpoint  by  a  mutual  interaction  of  the  subject  and  her
surroundings.  In  this  interaction,  objects  are  experienced  in  unity  with  the
affordances the interaction brings forth. For instance, the affordance of traveling
provided by The trail (ibid. 404). These affordances are in turn accompanied by
their  corresponding  perspectival  experiences,  such  as  that  of  a  moving
experiencer along the trail.70
Second, the perceptual experience itself is characterized by the subject’s own
constitutive role:  the affordance an object  is  associated with is  not its  inherent
property but a result and property of the subject-object interaction. While the
subject’s constitutive function is not typically thematized in our experience or in
semantics,  both  realms  are  largely  determined  by  the  intricacies  of  human
embodiment.
Third, as our introduction to Husserl’s conception of intentionality and
intersubjectivity show, the affordances of the experienced objects (which in this
perseverance of perspectivity in human conceptualization (see e.g. Blomberg & Zlatev 2014: 414; referring
to Sokolowski 2000: 92).
70 As  Blomberg  and  Zlatev  (2014:  405)  emphasize,  affordances  such  as  these  provide  only  one
experiential motivation for non-actual movement. The other two are: the dynamic manner of perceiving
provided by the spatial extensionality of the observed object (elongated objects without affordance of
movement); and the use of imagination (ibid. 407–409), which comes closest to the simulative processes
suggested  by  Talmy,  Langacker  and  Matlock.  For  simplicity,  I  will  here  only  refer  to  affordances  as  the
perceptual, motor or cultural properties of the observed or conceptualized object that motivate a distinct
construal pattern.
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respect are analogous to the perspectival appearances of the objects), their
objectivity as such, and the phenomenologically experienced constitutive
subjectivity of self are themselves to a great extent constituted intersubjectively.
From a phenomenological point of view, affordances are publically distributed,
i.e. taught and learned, patterns of interaction that are accompanied not only by
perspectival experiences but also by the consciousness of the public nature and
sharedness of these experiences.
These three aspects, which characterize perceptual experience, then make
mental  simulation  as  such  deficient  in  grasping  what  is  presupposed  by  the
semantics  of  non-actual  motion.  By  themselves,  however,  they  are  only  the
starting point for the definition of the relationship between experience and
meaning.
4.4.2 EXPERIENCE AND MEANING-INTENDING ACTS
To preface the definition of the relationship between experience and meaning,
Blomberg and Zlatev (2014: 403–404) elaborate the subject’s constitutive role in
objective experience with recourse to Husserl’s notion of kinaestheses. This
notion is directly linked to our discussion above (section 4.2.1) on the immanent
content of our experience in relation to the objects we experience. Our experience
of objects is basically integrative vis-à-vis the possible perspectival appearances,
which  we  interpret  actively  as  belonging  to  the  same  object. Kinaestheses in
Husserl  refers to our basic  mode not only as perceivers but as actively moving
perceivers  for  which  every  angle  of  observation  of  a  certain  object  always
presupposes all the other possible angles and corresponding appearances.
Because of this, the perceptual meaning of an intended object can be and most
often is simultaneously perspectival and holistic: we perceive the façade and yet
we orient to the building as a whole (see section 4.2.1).
At  the  same  time,  the  totality  of  the  object,  which  is  associated  with  an
indefinite multitude of possible viewing points and corresponding perspectival
appearances, presupposes its sameness to the Other. The combination of
subjective perspectivity, on the one hand, and intersubjective objectivity, on the
other, is also an inherent for linguistic meaning. The conceptual challenge here is
not just  to describe but to explain this  correlation in phenomenological  terms;
that is, to explicate its nature and mechanisms instead of merely stating the
interrelation between two domains.
Previously, we discussed how the concept of sedimentation is operationalized
by  Blomberg  and  Zlatev  to  argue  against  certain  mentalist  interpretations  of
semantics.  Now  we  will  consider  the  positive  contribution  of  the  concept  to
semantic  analysis,  which  has  to  start  with  the  nature  of  meaning,  defined
phenomenologically as the content of meaning-intending acts (Banchetti-Robino
1997: 311).
In  short,  a  meaning-intending  act  is  an  act  of  intending  that  turns  the
(physical) sign into an expression by linking it with its referent or designatum.
As Banchetti-Robino (1997: 306) notes, in the process of meaning-intending, the
intention is directed at the intentional object, i.e. the designatum, and thus the
161
meaning “as such” (ibid., original emphasis) is something we become aware of
only during “subsequent reflection” (ibid.). The meaning of the expression, i.e.
the content of the meaning-intending act, is nevertheless separate both from the
act and its referent. For all acts that intend the same object, the content is “the
ideal correlate of this single object” (Husserl 1970 [1936]: 292).
The “ideal” invariant correlate of multiple meaning-intending acts of the same
object can, however, be redressed as normatively binding sameness from one
instance to another. By this reformulation we arrive at a common denominator
between a set of meaning-intending acts that intend and are grouped together by
means of the same expression. The sameness of the expression in turn cannot be
defined by its designatum or  the  similarity  between  the  acts  but  by  the  social
norms  that  define  the  correct  use  of  the  sign  in  certain  settings  for  certain
referents.
If  it  is  accepted  that  the  subject’s  intentionality  in  a  meaning-intending  act
links meaning to its referents, the mode in which the content of the act is given
becomes irrelevant. Whether the content’s cognitive correlate is propositional or
simulative does not alter the fact that, for instance, I intend a given drowsy Cairn
Terrier by that drowsy Cairn Terrier (cf.  Thompson  2007b:  143).  On  the
contrary, what is relevant is the determination of the content and its organization
as such.
The preliminary phenomenological description of this determination can be
given by an examination of sedimentation from an intersubjective perspective. As
mentioned, sedimentation takes as its object the experiential properties of the
object that the expression refers to. Sedimentation via repetition of the
expression, on the one hand, results in the schematization of these properties:
they become lesser in number and vaguer in character by the extension of  the
number of experiential instances they cover. On the other hand, sedimentation is
effectuated  by  a  multitude  of  meaning-intending  acts,  which,  by  default,  are
intersubjectively validated. To count as linguistic, a meaning-intending act needs
to correspond to norms that specify the correct use of the expression for certain
experiential objects.
In  order  for  the  linguistic  norms  pertaining  to  the  correct  symbolic  use  of
language  to  be  graspable,  the  objects,  activities  and  situations  the  expression
refers to logically need to be intersubjectively available as well. The correct use of
an expression necessitates an agreement on the array of its possible referents.
Linguistic intersubjectivity thus presupposes more basic forms of
intersubjectivity, as is presumed by Zlatev’s (2008b) mimesis hierarchy; that is,
the validity of linguistic use includes and necessitates the intersubjective validity
of experience.71 Sedimentation can now be defined as a process that is constituted
of multiple intersubjectively validated acts of meaning-intending. In this process,
the multiple, intersubjectively-shared experiential designata, and the particular
ways they are experienced, come to define the content of the expression. The
71 Note that this formulation in terms of validity is meant to emphasize the multi-leveled character of
intersubjectivity that is involved; it subsumes, however, two distinct types of validity: one pertaining to the
common embodiment of experience and the other pertaining to the normative character of linguistic units.
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designata are not only given as such but also in their perspectival appearance to
the subjects. This perspectivity is itself also intersubjectively known: when I refer
to  the  Cairn  terrier  lying  on  the  floor,  my  present  recipient  understands  the
reference exactly as shared unity between two distinct perspectival experiences.
In typical instances of nominal reference, perspectival differences are omitted.
Specificity or schematicity can thus be grounded in intersubjective
communicative settings, in which accommodation between perspectives results
in bleaching of perspectival variables and selection of constants in meaning.
In contrast, in other types of reference, the perspectivity of the setting may
become entrenched as the content of the meaning-intending act. In non-actual
movement clauses, what is entrenched is the dynamic perceptual experience, or
its  enactive  extension  to  cases  in  which  the  nature  of  the  experiential  object
motivates such dynamism. However, as the notion of sedimentation implies, the
entrenchment or application of such a dynamic conceptualization does not
pertain to an establishment of a transparent expression/experience linkage.
Instead, well-entrenched linguistic conceptualization comprises learned patterns
of  semantic  organization,  the  application  of  which  is  guided,  to  a  significant
extent, by the linguistic convention itself.72
In this way, the perceptual and cognitive motivations for non-actual motion
discussed  by  Zlatev  and  Blomberg  (2014)  may  validate  the  acquisition  of  the
semantic pattern as a semantic extension from the prototypical expressions for
actual motion. In any case, the influence of experiential motivation for the
dynamic construal of static settings may be largely indirect; and the definitional
distance between the motivation and the pattern may increase even further
through the  entrenchment  of  the  construal  pattern  both  on  the  communal-
historical and the individual-developmental levels. This indirectness, however,
does not equal an irrelevance of direct perceptual experience, embodiment or
experientially grounded patterns of conceptualization for semantics. Woelert
(2011) considers spatialization as a basic trait of cognition, from which higher-
order  conceptual  abilities  are  derived  by  processes  of  metaphorical  and
schematizing extension. For Woelert, as for cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and
Johnson (1999), Talmy (2000), and Langacker (CGBI) this does not just provide
a  linguistic-historical  explanation,  but  largely  determines  the  character  of
cognition by constituting an “implicitly functioning cognitive-conceptual
scaffold” (Woelert 2011: 120).
While Blomberg and Zlatev defend “a reciprocal relation between prelinguistic
experience and linguistic meaning” (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014: 397), they criticize
Cognitive Linguistics for conflating these two domains (ibid. 411). Instead,
linguistic meaning needs to be constituted as an ontological category of its own,
which  is  likely  to  inherit  a  certain  subset  of  its  main  characteristics  from pre-
72 In these cases, we may see what Husserl (1970 [1936]: 36; see Woelert 2011: 119; Blomberg & Zlatev
2014: 413–414) refers to as “persisting linguistic acquisitions”, that is, the conventional construal
mechanisms of language that restrict our conceptual possibilities. From a phenomenological perspective,
this nevertheless does not lead to linguistic relativity, for the restrictions themselves are graspable by
conscious analysis (see Banchetti-Robino 1997).
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linguistic  experience,  but  it  also  needs  to  exhibit  these  characteristics  in  a
schematized and autonomous manner: the conceptualization can override
and/or rearrange the particulars of the experienced referent for communicative
purposes.  This  in  turn  is  essentially  the  same  as construing the referent in
different ways. The difference between this understanding and that of Cognitive
Grammar is that the distinction between experience and meaning genuinely
involves  two-directional  relationship.  On  the  one  hand,  the  processes  that
structure pre-linguistic experience have their sedimented corollaries in the
processes that structure meaning. On the other hand, the pre-linguistic
experience continues to be the referential target for linguistic conceptualization;
that is, conceptualization exhibits only relative autonomy from experience, since
the experiential referent (in an intersubjective setting) continues to restrict the
scope of possible conceptualizations or construals.
As noted above, both the perspectival experiences and their linguistic
appropriations,  which  constitute  the  process  of  sedimentation,  are
intersubjective. These two distinct types (experiential and linguistic) of
intersubjectivity may now be given a more specific characterization, which relates
construal to the meaning-intending act. As we have mentioned, for Husserl (1970
[1936]: 292) the meaning of an expression is equal to the content of a meaning-
intending  act.  The  content  is  in  turn  equal  to  the  ideal  correlate  of  the
designatum, and is thus separate both from the designatum and the intentional
act.  The  separation  of  the  content  from  the  act  and  the  object  can  now  be
identified with Blomberg and Zlatev’s separation of linguistic meaning both from
specific processing mechanisms and from pre-linguistic experience. This
identification, however, necessitates that the phenomenological notion of
meaning as content be opened up to include the perspectivity that is manifest in
linguistic meaning. In other words, the ideality of the so-called ideal correlate has
to be toned down, somewhat against the objectives of Husserl (see Banchetti-
Robino  1997:  311–312),  to  allow for  semantic  features  that  are  simultaneously
intersubjectively valid and subjectively constituted. What this implies in turn is
that, in addition to the intended object itself, the ways of intending bear upon the
content of the expression (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014: 414).
While Blomberg and Zlatev (ibid.) do not explicitly state so, the combining of
a cognitive-linguistic (usage-based) conception of meaning with a
phenomenological analysis actually suggests that the content of meaning-
intending acts is in large part constituted by the acts themselves. In other words,
the content of an expression comes to incorporate two types of the object’s
properties, neither of which are independent of the manner of experiencing.
These properties are: i) the experienced properties of the object that are
conventionalized as relevant for their meaningfulness and ii) the properties of
experiencing  that  may  be  prompted  by  and  characteristic  for  certain  types  of
objects while not being experienced as properties of these objects.
While  neither  of  these  types  of  properties  is  originally  independent  of  the
experience, it is exactly the autonomy from particular experiences that these
properties achieve through linguistic practice and sedimentation. In other words,
it is through the use of expressions for shared experiential objects that the very
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acts of intending come to be associated with these expressions; and inasmuch as
the quality of the given act bears communicative relevance, it becomes
linguistically objectified, i.e. independent of any given instance of intending.
Sedimentation thus involves objectification, i.e. entrenchment as the objective
content of the expression, of the subjectively perspectival properties of
experience.73 For  example,  non-actual  motion  involves  a  remapping  of  the
dynamicity experienced in instances of actual motion to the objects or situations
that prompt such mapping by the partial likeness of the experience involved. This
mapping in turn necessitates the establishment of  a  construal  type as socially-
sanctioned practice of interpreting the type of object or situation in question. This
does not result in positing a specific type of mental structure: the formulation in
terms of “objectification” simply entails that a certain form of conceptualization
has been established as a conceptual routine that is autonomous from the original
motivating experience.
Insights  from  phenomenology  may  thus  be  used  to  inform  experiential
semantics,  as  represented  by  Cognitive  Linguistics  in  general  and  Cognitive
Grammar  in  particular,  so  long  as  the  definition  of  the  expression’s  content  is
extended in the aforementioned manner. The phenomenological analysis comes
with provisos, however. First of all, the notions of intentionality and intending act
as the bases of linguistic meaning presuppose a pre-linguistic objectivity on which
particular  ways  of  intending  are  based.  Second,  this  pre-linguistic  objectivity
presupposes intersubjectivity, which in turn characterizes the entire process of
sedimentation as well as any linguistic categories that are constituted as a result
thereof, including that of construal. It seems then that experientialist semantics
is  doubly  social,  presupposing  both  the  public  nature  of  experience  and  the
normative nature of experiential semantic patterns that are established via
sedimentation.
4.4.3 INSCRIPTION OF EXPERIENCE INTO MEANING
Let us now consider a broadly phenomenological approach to description of
construal. This involves combining the aforementioned notions of experience,
meaning-intending  act,  and  sedimentation  with  a  multi-leveled  model  of
intersubjectivity.
As established above, the pre-linguistic perceptual experience that
presumably gives rise to semantic categories appears to the subject as inherently
public. Furthermore, this perceptual intersubjectivity comes with a structure that
pertains to the unity of  the perspectival  profile  and to the intended entirety of
intentional objects: the perception of an intentional object presupposes all of its
possible perspectival appearances and corresponding vantage points, which in
73 Linguistic subjectification in turn results in a shift of conceptual content from what is explicitly expressed
(i.e. profiled by the expression) to the subjective ground presumed by the expression. This is not, however,
a reversal of the type of objectification outlined above: the objectification in question involves an explication
of pre-linguistic experiential factors, i.e. a shift from the non-linguistic to the linguistic domain, whereas
subjectification is a process within the domain of language.
165
turn implies the object’s givenness to other subjects. This implication per se does
not  establish  perceptual  intersubjectivity  but  provides  it  with  a  structure.  Our
experience of the object is understood simultaneously as intersubjectively public
and  subjectively  perspectival.  What  is  logically  necessitated  by  this  shared
experience is the simultaneous differentiation and integration of distinct
perspectival appearances pertain to the same perceptual object.
Now, if experiential semantics is accepted as a valid enterprise, it needs to be
grounded not in embodied experience simpliciter but in experience that has this
basic structure of object-directedness. That is, the existence of perspectival
meaning  is  similar  to  the  existence  of  perspectival  experience  in  that  it
necessitates a segregation between the intended object and the manner, or
multiple manners,  in which the object  is  intended.  This again presupposes the
aforementioned integration of perspectives vis-à-vis the intended object in its
entirety.  Not  only  is  this  integrative  structure  a  necessary  condition  for  a
meaning-intending act, it also in part defines the nature of the meaning intending
act, as we will see next.
The sedimentation of meaning, as presented in Husserl (1970 [1936]), Woelert
(2011), and Blomberg and Zlatev (2014), necessarily makes use of intentional acts
that are not only directed toward intersubjectively available objects but that are
also in and of themselves public. This axiomatic intentionality of communication
is presupposed by Cognitive Grammar – or by any other usage-based grammar;
what  Cognitive  Grammar  is  lacking  is  an  explication  of  its  implications.  The
primary implication is that usage-basedness rules out any absolute distinction
between the rules that pertain to a linguistic unit’s correct use and the unit’s
meaning. It is only through the conventionalization of, and repetitive exposure
to, certain linguistic symbolization that we come to objectify and understand the
unit “as such”, i.e. as a context-independent symbolic structure.  Even in this case,
however, the semantic content is determined by the instances of correct use. The
extreme  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from  this  is  that  meaning  should  be
equated with the (correct) use of an expression (e.g. Itkonen 1997, forthc.). The
phenomenological  standpoint  demands,  however,  that  correct  use  of  an
expression involves experiential content that is identical between, and
autonomous relative to, multiple acts.74
What is significant for the present concerns is that the shift of the intentional
content from experience to meaning can be explained relative to meaning-
intending  acts.  The  prerequisite  is  that  a  meaning-intending  act  is  itself,  by
definition, intersubjective. In the simplest type of meaning-intending act, i.e. the
intending of a perceptual object, the object is originally physically present. In this
case,  successful  communication  involves  agreement  on  the  fact  that  verbal
symbolization corresponds to a specific intuitively given object, which again
presupposes a sharedness of the object and thus a perspectival integration in the
manner we have described above. Perspectival integration in an intersubjective
74 A correct understanding of this autonomy is critical: it is not suggested that the content exists
independently of the acts in which it is manifest, yet it can be experienced and understood as distinct from
these acts, which is a precondition for conventional semantics to transcend individual instances.
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setting, however, presupposes the presence of distinct perspectives and the
perspective of the other is often not only given a priori but sensed and understood
pre-linguistically.  In  other  words,  a  linguistic  expression  is  introduced  into  a
setting, in which the intentional act is associated with the experienced act-specific
subjective  disposition  of  the  intending  Other.  In  fact,  the  recognition  of  a
meaning-intending act requires pre-existing intersubjective capacities, and these
capacities  (such  as  the  ability  to  recognize  facial  expressions)  bring  along  the
ability to recognize different types and qualities of meaning-intending acts. This
largely  automatic  and  involuntary  type  of  cognitive  empathy  (see  Herlin  &
Visapää 2011) helps to explain the phenomenological fact that we experience the
intending Other in her actual subjectivity, predisposed to intending in a specific
way: angry, happy, remembering, anticipating, directing, orientating etc. If these
properties are inherent to the act  of  intending,  and the content of  intending is
constituted by a multiplicity  of  intending acts,  then there is  no way to exclude
these properties of the act a priori from the content of the act. Instead, in a usage-
based  model,  the  only  criteria  for  the  inclusion  or  exclusion  are  the
intersubjective intelligibility and communicative relevance of these properties.
Thus,  an experientialist  theory of  semantics produces construal  as an inherent
property of usage-based grammar.
This intimate link between experientialism and construal, however, is trivial
for the purposes of the present analysis. What is not trivial is the specification of
construal  it  brings  about.  Most  importantly,  since  it  is  grounded  in  tripartite
meaning-intending acts, the very notion of construal presupposes a non-
construed conception of the content of the construal (see Itkonen forthc.), that is,
the  referent  or  state  of  affairs  the  construal  is  about.  It  is  then  logically
unavoidable that non-construed meaning is inexpressible. However, despite the
fact that we may posit it as a logical necessity, the non-construed referent is not
simply a technical  notion but also captures an important part  of  the language-
speaker’s capability. In fact, it can be stated that a specific construal of a referent
or of a state of affairs is actually enabled by the phenomenological fact that this
construal represents something that is represented as a non-construed entity of
the objective, shared world. The construal in question may express the subjective
position of the speaker, but the actualized expression presupposes that this
position is attainable by the addressee through the non-construed entity.
A  non-construed  referent  is  never  entirely  ideal  or  conceptually  empty  but
makes use of the contextual knowledge shared by interlocutors. In the case of a
shared perceptual object, for example, the meaning-intention of that object
simultaneously  presents  an  instance  both  of  reference  and  categorization  by
linguistically  profiling  a  set  of  properties  exhibited  by  the  object  and  by  other
category-members alike. This reference and categorization in terms of profiled
attributes is not, however, equal to a reduction of the experiential object to those
attributes  or  to  the  mere  category  membership  by  either  of  the  interlocutors;
instead,  the  categorization  in  this  case  serves  the  function  of  reference,  which
again  is  directed  toward  the  experiential  object  as  a  whole.  The  nature  of
construal as selection is exactly dependent on this qualitative distinction between
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the  content  and  the  object  of  intention,  in  which  an  expression  singles  out
properties of the object as communicatively relevant.
Thus, from an experientialist perspective, construal as an inherent property of
linguistic expression is not only compatible with but dependent on a hierarchical
notion  of  intersubjectivity,  such  as  the  one  provided  by  Zlatev  (2008b,  2013).
Instead of an expression of an individual subjective state, construal builds on the
perspectivity inherent in the conventional, socially shared semantic potential of
natural language. The specific manifestation of this potential is necessarily
relative vis-à-vis the actual communicative context. Its relation to context defines
construal’s nature as selection; that is, a selection relative to the non-selected
construal options, and constituted by an intention toward the referential object
as a whole.
The embedding of construed meaning in an intersubjective framework thus
implies a methodological revision of construal as a pragmatic phenomenon. The
nature and scope of this revision are illustrated best by analysis of actual data.
Before that,  the general  argument put forward at  the beginning of  this  chapter
needs to be reassessed relative to the ramifications of the foregoing treatment of
intersubjectivity.
4.5 DISCUSSION
The foregoing analysis verifies the general argument of intersubjectivity provided
in the beginning of this chapter. To be specific, the analysis demonstrates that a
coherent conception of experiential semantics necessarily involves
intersubjectivity as its integral part. Similar to perspectival experience, the
existence of perspectivity in meaning involves separation of meaning from the
referent as a non-perspectival whole. In so doing, the perspectival givenness of
conceptualized  entities  implies  their  givenness  to  other  subjects.  That  is,  a
phenomenological analysis of objectivity requires that a conception of an entity
as  a  non-perspectival  whole  builds  on  the  integration  of  multiple  perspectival
appearances, and this integration constitutes the entity as same for many. This
dictum encompasses perceptual and linguistically construed entities alike.
The  preceding  analysis,  however,  shows  that  linguistic  construal  involves
properties that cannot be derived from perceptual or pre-linguistic experience in
any straightforward manner. The explanation and description of linguistic
construal  must  therefore  be  devised  carefully  in  order  to  avoid  reduction  of
semantics into experience (see section 4.4.1 above). In order to do so, we must
revisit the general argument to explicate the specific manner the argument is not
only verified but elaborated by the foregoing analysis.
The general argument was divided into three assertions that pertain to: 1) the
common sharedness of semantic units, 2) the conventional intersubjective
alignment manifest in an expression, and 3) the notion of construal as a form of
selection,  i.e.  the  accommodation  of  expression  according  to  the  pragmatic
context.  Below,  each  assertion  is  recapitulated  and  supplemented  with  the
relevant conclusions from this chapter.
The intersubjectivity of construal
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1.  Construal  as  a  type  of  selection  is  carried  out  among  semantic  linguistic
structures, which are intersubjective by their very nature; their intelligibility
hinges on their sharedness which in turn is based on norms of correct use but also
the  fact  that  their  pre-linguistic  designata  are  socially  reinforced  as  objects  of
shared observation and joint activity.
This first assertion of my argument can in principle be derived from Itkonen’s
formulation of social the ontology of linguistic meaning: if meaning is generally
social, then construal must be social too. However, Itkonen (forthc.) also points
to the necessity of pre-linguistic objectivity that precedes and enables construal.
Itkonen’s conclusion is also confirmed by our discussion on the phenomenology
of  experiential  meaning  (Blomberg  &  Zlatev  2014).  Thus  even  the  analysis  of
construal at the semantic level needs to account for what is construed in order to
account for how something is construed.
In  the  present  study,  the  analysis  of  the  pre-linguistic  basis  of  construal  is
based on phenomenological approach and its variant represented by Blomberg
and Zlatev (2014). In general, Zlatev’s (2008b, 2013) mimesis hierarchy provides
a  developmental,  functional  and  hierarchical  description  of  how  the
intersubjectivity  in  general,  and  the  sociality  of  language  in  particular,  is
constituted  and  manifested.  The  discussion  on  experientialist  semantics  above
shows  that  this  layered  model  is  indeed  inevitable  if  one  seeks  to  explain  and
describe the inscription of experience into linguistic meaning: subjective
experience can only be expressed if the experience itself exhibits some
intersubjective validity. By grounding experientialism in meaning-intending acts
within intersubjective contexts, one is able to discern how the extra-linguistic
context – including the subject’s co-operation, attentive co-alignment and non-
conventional communication – comes to define what shared experiential
constants and ways of intending become entrenched in semantics.
Thus,  the  main  implication  of  combining  experiential  semantics  with  a
phenomenological approach to consciousness and intentionality is that, within a
social conception of meaning, experiential meaning and intersubjectivity
necessarily presuppose each other. Moreover, the interdependence between
experientialism  and  intersubjectivity  bears  upon  how  construal  should  be
understood  as  a  type  of  selection.  Since  linguistic  categorization  and  category
formation are dynamic and to an extent ad hoc, internalized or conventionalized
units can only explain construal in part. However, construal presupposes that the
non-construed entity is a unifying structure between distinct construal options,
and, to some extent, this interrelatedness between different construals is
conventionalized into the category of linguistic knowledge. This particular type of
knowledge  is  concomitant  with  Cognitive  Grammar’s  well-known  notion  that
grammar  is  a  structured  inventory  of  linguistic  units.  The  present  account
diverges  from  Cognitive  Grammar  in  that  this  knowledge  is  defined  not  only
genealogically but ontologically social; otherwise it would not count as linguistic
meaning proper.
2.  The  semantics  of  these  structures  are  intersubjective  not  only  in  a  way
analogous  to  the  first  point  (being  shared)  but  also  in  that  they  are
conventionalized into expression of particular types of intersubjective alignment.
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In  other  words,  expressions  are  not  only  distributed  intersubjectively  but  also
signify intersubjectivity, and this signified intersubjectivity is essentially
commensurate with what counts as the construal nature of the given expression.
After the analysis in section 4.4, it can be stated that this second assertion
follows directly from the first one that refers to the intersubjective basis of
experiential meaning in general. As we have mentioned, there are ultimately no
a priori grounds  for  excluding  the  properties  of  meaning-intending  acts  from
becoming sedimented into the intentional content of subsequent meaning-
intending acts. Since meaning-intending acts are intersubjective by definition,
these sedimented properties naturally include ways of intending
intersubjectively,  which  in  turn  serve  the  function  of  coordinating
intersubjectivity (a function which has been extensively surveyed by Verhagen,
2007a, 2007b, 2008). It is from this perspective, then, that a vast proportion of
semantic characterizations of grammatical categories can be, and should be,
formulated vis-à-vis the alignment between multiple conceptualizers.
Consider, for instance, the interrogative mood, the semantics of which in fact
cannot be adequately described without evoking a primary and secondary
conceptualizer  as  separate  constructs.  The  interrogative  pertains  to  a
requirement  for  verification,  and  such  requirement  only  makes  sense  as  a
coordination between subjects who differ with regard to their epistemological
statuses.  This  coordinative  function,  however,  does  not  limit  itself  to  what  is
traditionally  referred  to  as  speech  acts  (Searle  1969).  Interestingly,  it  is
Langacker,  who  points  out  the  fact  that  also  simple  declarative  also  serves  a
certain interactional function in its lack of special marking (CGBI: 74) and that
the prototypical interactional values of the basic sentence types are accompanied
by alternative values in different social scenarios (ibid. 471). This description, as
adequate as it is, requires a correct ontological grounding: for these prototypical,
and less typical, context-dependent interactional values to count as linguistic
(and, indeed, interactional) they have to be commonly known for what they are.
This is not a mere change of rhetoric, for it immediately constricts the manner in
which  construal  should  be  defined  and  described  in  relation  to  its  pragmatic
context.
3.  As  it  involves  selection  of  semantic  representation,  construal  cannot  be
comprehensively described without grounding it in actual interaction and extra-
linguistic context, including the multiple interlocutors, their interactive motives
and shared understanding of the extra-linguistic circumstances the
communication is about.
This last point pertains to the rehabilitation of the fundamentally pragmatic
nature  of  construal.  If  we  accept  that  construal  is  a  matter  of  selection,  we
presuppose at least representative pragmatic reasons for a given selection. Given
the  pace  and  reactivity  of  spoken  discourse,  it  is  not  reasonable  to  associate
selection with premeditated rational decision-making. This does not imply,
however,  that  the  pragmatic  reasons  weren’t  there  or  that  they  were,  in  some
sense,  post  hoc.  In  fact,  pragmatically  efficient  construal  can  be  stated  as  a
necessary  condition  for  successful  communication  in  that  it  establishes  an
intersubjectively valid access to the intended referential object.
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Most important here is  the implication that,  if  in actual  communication no
expression is interpreted context-independently, then construal is context-
dependent as well. This can be addressed from two rational perspectives. First of
all,  construal  as  a  selective  process  is  intelligible  inasmuch  as  the
contextualization  of  its  end-result  is  assumed  as  a  guiding  principle  for  the
process itself; relative to this dictum, construal pertains to pragmatic adjustment
of  expression.  Second,  we  may  concentrate  on  the  construed  expression  as  an
end-result of an expressive selection, so that the expression is interpreted,
elaborated  and  disambiguated  with  respect  to  the  common  ground  of  the
interlocutors.  This  perspective  reveals,  albeit  not  in  an  absolute  manner,  the
guiding criteria of construal as a selection.
This means that selection does not concern language as a pre-organized whole
but it falls upon certain pragmatically accentuated and organized categories, and
furthermore, that the selection is guided by both linguistic and extra-linguistic
motives. The account of linguistic meaning developed here entails that none of
these motives or their  subsequent linguistic  realizations can be given a strictly
individualistic interpretation.
On one hand, construal undoubtedly has its mental correlates; it seems
reasonable to assume that no facet of construal can adequately described without
recourse to some moments of intentionality. Moreover, construal serves also the
expression of subjective states and promotion of individual goals. On the other
hand,  it  has  been  shown  that  these  acts  of  meaning-intending,  albeit  they  are
dependent on individual cognition and often devised to express cognitive states,
presuppose both linguistic and pre-linguistic intersubjectivity. The
intersubjective  constitution  of  construal  bears  upon  how  construal  should  be
defined and understood as an analytical concept. The general argument above
suggests  that,  while  built  on  semantic  convention,  construal  cannot  be
understood coherently as independent of some pragmatic context. The next step
is  to  demonstrate,  by  the  application  of  the  dimensions  of  construal,  direct
practical consequences of the argument for linguistic analysis.
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5 DYNAMICS OF CONSTRUAL AND
CONTEXT
The  previous  chapters  of  this  book  have  considered  construal  and  Cognitive
Grammar  more  or  less  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view.  This  fifth  chapter
integrates these theoretical considerations to the application of dimensions of
construal  in  analysis  of  written  discourse.  Namely,  the  present  chapter  is
structured  along  three  distinct  cases  of  linguistic  construal  patterns,  each  of
which  consists  of  multiple  construals  that  align  with  respect  to  one  or  two
dimensions  of  construal.  The  construal  patterns  have  been  excerpted  from
distinct magazine articles in the data and they are presented below with general
characterizations of each of these texts. The following analyses nevertheless focus
exclusively on the selected construal phenomena. In other words, they do not aim
at any comprehensive text-analytic description of the excerpts or the articles as a
whole.
While each analysis below contributes to the assessment of the general
argument as a whole, the topics of these analyses have been chosen so that they
illustrate  different  parts  of  the  argument.  To  be  sure,  the  three  types  of
intersubjectivity, outlined by the three assertions of the general argument, should
be simultaneously manifest in any actual expression. Conversely, any actual
construal corresponds a priori to values on multiple dimensions of construal. The
analyses below are thus necessarily restricted in scope vis-à-vis the likely
complexity of construal phenomena: albeit interaction or correlation between
multiple dimensions of construal is not at all precluded (instead, it is expected),
the  analyses  decisively  focus  on  one  or  two  dimensions  of  construal  that  are
especially central to each construal pattern.
A substantial extension of the notion of construal is suggested by the
treatment thus far, and this is reflected by the following linguistic analyses.
Hence, each analysis begins with recapitulation of the standard analytical
procedure and scope defined for the relevant dimension of construal. Then, the
chosen series of construals is depicted within its immediate textual context; this
also  involves  application  of  the  chosen  dimension  of  construal.  Finally,  each
analysis  is  concluded  by  a  treatment  of  the  types  of  semantic  and  pragmatic
intersubjectivity that are central to the construal pattern in question.
The  following  analyses  nevertheless  rely  on  the  dimensions  of  construal  as
they  are  defined  in  Cognitive  Grammar.  Indeed,  the  dimensions  of  construal
largely maintain their original character with regard to their analytical function.
This may seem paradoxical given the necessary revision of construal at large. The
discrepancy is only illusory, however. First of all, it is accepted here that construal
involves representational linguistic function and that the dimensions of construal
characterize the phenomenological qualities of linguistic representations.
Second,  the optimal formulation of  a  dimension of  construal  may be disputed,
but the adoption of an intersubjective approach does not automatically entail any
changes in how a specific dimension of construal characterizes a
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phenomenological quality of a linguistic representation. That is, we may consider
it necessary to redefine construal as a phenomenon that systematically involves
intersubjective  and  contextual  motivation,  but  it  still  needs  to  involve  a
representational  component,  which,  in  turn,  is  describable  in  terms  of
dimensions of construal.
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  analysis  of  linguistic  data  and  the  requisite
application of the dimensions of construal would not involve any changes vis-à-
vis a standard analysis in lines of Cognitive Grammar. These changes, however,
consider  primarily  the  scope  of  the  dimensions  of  construal  and  may  be
considered as an addition to, rather than a cancellation of, what these concepts
are customarily used for. For instance, the so-called conceptual background
(CGBI: 57) is originally presented as a requisite cognitive structure for a coherent
interpretation that does not pertain to the profiled entity. This basic function of
the term is maintained by the present approach (see section 5.3 below); however,
background is considered first and foremost a pragmatically mediated,
intersubjective feature of discourse that needs to be symmetrically accessible to
interlocutors to count as communicatively relevant. This in turn affects the
presumed contents of conceptual background, as the analysis below will show.
As this kind of extension of the dimensions of construal follows quite naturally
from their original definition, it is possible (and therefore preferable) to carry out
the linguistic analysis without introducing any additional terminology. The
analyses  nevertheless  involve  a  conception  of  the  analyzed  construals  as
correlates of acts of meaning-intending, as defined in phenomenological terms in
the  previous  sections.  Methodologically,  the  analyses  put  forward  reflect  a
systematic conceptual analysis of the requirements that each construal poses for
its  coherent  apprehension.  What  I  argue,  is  that  this  involves  consistent
establishment of co-referential relationships between different construals, so that
different contents of different acts of meaning-intending may be coordinated in
terms of non-linguistic intentional objects, whether these are given signitively or
not.
In a straightforward cognitivist fashion, the function of establishing co-
reference could be allotted to, for instance, a complex schematic network
consisting of distinct conceptualizations with partly overlapping conceptual
profiles (as nodes of the network). The phenomenologically oriented approach
adopted here nevertheless promotes skepticism toward such a heavily
representationalist  approach.  Not  only  would  this  violate  against  a
phenomenological description of direct experience of external objects (see
Drummond  2012),  this  would  also  be  inconsistent  with  the  notion  of
intersubjectivity endorsed here. A representational status is therefore reserved
here for necessary contents of linguistic representations proper, which also make
the  object  of  the  following  analyses.  What  the  analyzed  construals  are
representations of – that is, their extralinguistic designata – are involved in the
analyses only implicitly; the relationship between construal and non-construed
designata (including different states of affairs) is discussed in chapter 6.
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5.1 OUTLINE
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  organized  according  to  the  applied  analyses
based  on  the  dimensions  of  construal.  The  next  three  sections  thus  consist  of
analyses of series of construal in the following order. The first analysis (section
5.2)  focuses  on  specificity,  illustrating  the  role  of  conventional  meaning  for
construal,  while  it  also  emphasizing  the  inevitability  of  pragmatic  factors  in
establishing specificity-related intra-textual correspondences between partly
synonymous semantic units. The second analysis (section 5.3) involves the two
interrelated dimensions of focusing and prominence and focuses more heavily on
the pragmatic activation of distinct sub-domains within a concept’s overall
semantic scope. Finally, the third analysis (5.4) considers perspectival effects
related to the Finnish passive. Moreover, it investigates how a passive construal
involves  a  site  of  identification  for  the  reader  by  the  omission  of  an  explicit
subject/agent from the text. This example simultaneously represents a complex
subjectivity-related pattern and highlights the necessarily intersubjective nature
of the semantics and pragmatics associated with the phenomenon. Finally, last
part  of  the chapter (section 5.5)  provides a synthesis  of  the presented analyses
relative to the general argument and explicates some latent corollaries of the
phenomenological standpoint assumed here.
5.2 SPECIFICITY AND CONTEXTUAL SPECIFICATION
In Cognitive Grammar, specificity is defined as “the level of precision and detail
at which a situation is characterized” (CGBI: 55). As noted in section 2.4.1 (pp.
46), this definition can be further elaborated by explicating two sub-dimensions
in  which  the  level  of  precision  and  detail  can  be  varied:  the  naming  or  lexical
categorization of the entity (cat→ civet) and the syntagmatic elaboration of the
expression (that cat→ that strange-looking wild cat eating coffee beans). These
two sub-dimensions,  however,  blend in actual  discourse (that wild civet); they
can either be in mutual alignment, yielding a higher degree of specificity, or one
can be compensating the other, for instance if naming manifests intermediate
level of specificity in a syntagmatically elaborate expression. The existence of two
separate sub-dimensions may thus result in complex patterns of specificity
between distinct construals.
Related to these aspects of specificity are the previously introduced
syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes of construal (see section 2.4.1; Jakobson
1956, 1960): the relationship between the selected construal and its alternatives
in praesentia and in absentia. From the perspective adopted here, both of these
planes  need  to  be  integrated  by  the  description  of  construal  from  an
intersubjective perspective. Even a construal choice clearly motivated by a
syntagmatic construal pattern can only be considered a choice vis-à-vis a
paradigm of relevant construal options. Furthermore, a syntagmatic construal
pattern constitutes only one contextual motivator of selection among many. One
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therefore needs to proceed with caution when explaining construal with reference
to the linear organization of discourse.
However, an interrelationship between two co-referential construals is a
particularly solid motivating factor, for it does not serve the motivating function
alone. Two formally different yet co-referential expressions are related
semantically a priori, and their interrelation is specified by any semantic
description of either of the relata.  It is thus reasonable to concentrate on clear
cases  of  syntagmatic  construal  phenomena,  while  retaining  their  requisite
paradigmatic dimension as the relevant conceptual background of the analysis.
In this section, this approach is applied to a pattern of co-referential construals
that are mutually aligned according to their relative specificity.
In discourse, various levels of knowledge (and mental states qua beliefs about
the other’s  level  of  knowledge) are involved as pragmatic  factors that  motivate
and constitute certain construals. The naming of a referent as civet, for example,
presumes a certain level of knowledge for both interlocutors, but the specificity
of the name ‘civet’ cannot be reduced to a mental state of either interlocutor: the
conventional semantic value, the level of specificity it attains through context,
and its appropriateness as a component within the relevant linguistic context are
all defined socially.
This  does  not  entail,  however,  that  the  level  of  knowledge  needs  to  be
symmetrical. Rather, both a linguistic and non-linguistic common ground is
presupposed  by  the  sheer  possibility  of  communication,  and  construal  as  such
can be described in terms of the establishment and coordination of that common
ground within a pre-established asymmetrical distribution of knowledge.75
Indeed,  this  function  is  central  to  all  dimensions  of  construal.  Yet  the
coordination of shared vis-à-vis non-shared knowledge is especially salient in the
dimension of specificity, for the “level of precision” of an expression is clearly a
correlate of the levels of knowledge possessed by the interlocutors.
In so being, an analysis of multiple specificity-based construals must consider
both the alteration of specificity between the construals and the manner in which
the common ground motivates this alteration. This is underlined by the analysis
of the following example, which is excerpted from an article that discusses a crisis
work project aimed at the youth.
22. […] elämäntilanteen käsittelyssä saattaa nousta pintaan [a]vaikea asia,   kuten
[b]vanhemman alkoholismi, [c]äkillinen kuolemantapaus perheessä tai
[d]väkivalta.
’[…] the handling of one’s life situation may bring up [a]a difficult thing, such
as [b]alcoholism of a parent, [c]a sudden death in family, or [d]violence.
           (MT 3/2010: 30, emphasis and indexes added)
75 Only partially, for the ideational function does not provide exhaustive motivation for construal.
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In traditional terms, excerpt 22 can be described as a syntagmatic presentation
of the paradigmatic relationship of hyponymy (Lyons 1977: 291): the noun phrase
1a vaikea asia ’a  difficult  thing’  serves  as  a  superordinate  structure  relative  to
which  the  subsequent  noun  phrases  22b–d  are  represented  as  hyponyms.  In
contrast,  Cognitive  Grammar  would  describe  the  pattern  as  a  formation  of  an
emergent category 22a, followed by the elaboration of its members 22b–d. What
is relevant to our discussion is what makes this latter interpretation possible in
the first place: the schematic relations between the presented conceptualizations.
However, even the specificity of a single noun phrase is dependent on the context
in a manner that demands close inspection of the semantic/pragmatic
distinction.  The  analysis  of  construals  in  example  22  thus  requires  that  some
conceptual clarification on the nature of specificity is done.
Cognitive Grammar distinguishes between conventional linguistic types that
are abstracted from actual expressions and the instances of these types in actual
discourse  (CGBI:  264–266).  As  a  covert  linguistic  structure,  a  type  serves  a
categorizing function, whereas an instance as an overt linguistic structure serves
to refer. The shift from a type to an instance (equals notion of token) is referred
to as instantiation (ibid. 266–267). Instantiation is characterized in cognitive
terms  so  that  the  instantiated  concept  assumes  some position  in  the  so-called
“domain of instantiation” (ibid. 268). This cognitive operation also results in an
increase  of  specificity,  even  if  only  because  the  location  within  the  domain  of
instantiation is added to the concept’s base (ibid. 267, FCG-1 437–439).
Albeit instantiation is described by Cognitive Grammar as a cognitive
operation,  both  the  type  and  its  instance  are  usage-based  constructs.
Furthermore, they are mutually reciprocal and interdependent usage-based
constructs; the former as a generalization over multiple socially sanctioned
instances and the latter as use sanctioned by the schematic commonality between
the previous instances. Furthermore, a type is functionally a schema of multiple
instances, and a schema, in Cognitive Grammar, is essentially not suggested to
have its own ontological status (CGBI: 217).
Instantiation is therefore an indefinite process of specification that is carried
out  by  a  linguistic  concept  when  the  concept  is  grounded  by  the  discursive
context.  Consequently,  there  are  no  specific  measures  according  to  which  the
effect of the ground in instantiation may be demarcated. This entails that
instantiation may be indeterminate also between the interlocutors; that is, there
may be a discrepancy in what different interlocutors understand as the common
ground. Yet any ground-related communicative discrepancy between the
interlocutors logically presupposes an agreement on and a priori sharedness of
some segment of the ground. Therefore, instantiation cannot be defined
exclusively in conceptual terms but it needs to include the intersubjective setting
relative  to  which  it  may  be  described  as  a  coordination  of  the  shared  level  of
knowledge.
Now that this premise is explicated, we may return to the original example. As
mentioned  above,  the  excerpt  1  involves  the  establishment  and  elaboration  a
category: 22a posits a schematic entity, which is then exemplified by expressions
22b–d:
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22. […] elämäntilanteen käsittelyssä saattaa nousta pintaan [a]vaikea asia, kuten
[b]vanhemman alkoholismi, [c]äkillinen kuolemantapaus perheessä tai
[d]väkivalta.
’[…] the handling of one’s life situation may bring up [a]a difficult thing, such as
[b]alcoholism of a parent, [c]a sudden death in family, or [d]violence.
This conclusion presupposes an interpretation on multiple levels. First of all,
the category-membership interpretation involves that 22b–d are analyzed as
specific forms of 22a. Second, this analysis depends on a constructional meaning
(‘X such as x1, x2 … & xn’), which is evoked by the comparative conjunction kuten
’such as’: the conjunction profiles a relationship between a schematic entity and
its instances and it thus evokes schematic positions for all of these entities. Third,
the construction imposes as its default value an increase in specificity between
the  category-establishing  and  category  elaborating  instances;  this  is  a
requirement by semantic convention, which is fulfilled by expressions 22b–d.
The  dimension  of  specificity  in  example  22  is  thus  not  the  only  factor  that
enables and prompts the category-interpretation. I will demonstrate, however,
that specificity is the central semantic factor involved with the co-referential
relations between the expressions in question. Most importantly, my analysis will
demonstrate that expressions 22a–d constitute a cross-elaborative pattern in
which  each  instance  specifies  all  the  other  instances  in  the  pattern  without
changing  the  relative  specificity  hierarchy  among them.  Before  describing  this
cross-elaborative pattern, certain issues with the category-establishing
expression 22a need to be clarified.
First of all, vaikea asia ‘a difficult thing’ is a generic expression: as a singular
noun it profiles a single conceptual entity, which, however, cannot be associated
with any single object in the world. In Cognitive Grammar, a generic expression
is analyzed as a virtual instance, which corresponds to, instead of categorizing or
referring  to,  actual  instances  (CGBI:  527).  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  the
constructional  function  of  ‘X  such  as…’  is  exactly  to  enable  specification  of  a
generic conceptualization. In fact, neither the Finnish kuten nor its English
counterpart such as can  be  added  to  a  non-generic  noun  phrase,  since  the
conjunction profiles a relationship of exemplification. The instances following
this conjunction may be either generic, such as in this case, or non-generic. The
conjunction  in  example  22  thus  establishes  a  relation  of
categorization/instantiation between generic expressions that differ by their
relative specificity.
There are also socio-linguistic motives that may explain the highly schematic
construal in example 1a. Socio-linguistic studies on vague language (e.g. Cheng &
Warren  2003;  see  O’Keeffe  et  al.  2007)  point  to  its  function  of  avoiding, inter
alia, threatening, authoritative, or over-educated impressions, especially in
professional contexts and among youth. For example, a study by Adolphs et al.
(2007) demonstrated the high prevalence of vague language in British health-
communication contexts. The selection of vaikea asia ‘a difficult thing’ may well
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be an allusion to vagueness typical for social work -related discourse. This motive
does  not,  however,  alter  the  construal  pattern  found  in  examples  22a–d,  but
rather  explains  the  relative  likelihood  of  the  specification  of vaikea asia as  a
difficult ‘issue’, a sensitive theme of discussion in the mental health context. This
specification reduces the schematic gap between the category name 22a and the
category members 22b–d, adding to the cohesion of the excerpt as a whole.
The  primary  focus  here  is  on  the  manner  in  which  an  explicit  linguistic
categorization results in a cross-elaboration of the category and the categorized.
When vaikea asia ‘a  difficult  thing’  in  example  22a  is  defined  as  a  category-
establishing  phrase  by  the  following  conjunction  and  noun  phrases,  its
conceptual  base  is  specified.  To  be  specific,  the  conceptual  base  of  ‘a  difficult
thing’ is specified as a complex schematic network of various psycho-social issues,
relative to which the category title profiles one generic and non-specific
representative.  The  co-ordinate  noun  phrases  from  22b  to  22d,  in  turn,  are
interpreted as being connected by their equal membership-status. Regardless of
the varying specificity of their profile, they all profile an entity against the same
conceptual background (the category of ‘difficult things’ relevant to the context of
counseling). Notably, this holds true for example 22a as well; while the context
(in this case, examples 22b–d) adds to the interpretation of its overall semantic
scope, vaikea asia still continues to profile a ‘thing’, thus attaining its categorical
meaning metonymically.
The  seemingly  simple  paragraph  in  example  22a  actually  involves  a  quite
complex pattern of specificity. Most importantly, the description of this pattern
needs to distinguish between the level of specificity in a concept’s profile and the
level of specificity in its base. While the instantiation of a concept in a context
affects both of these levels, the effects vary between the profile and the base
according to the expression and its context. The content of instances 22b–d,
together with the relevant background information and the theme of the article,
determines the profile of vaikea asia ‘a difficult thing’ by singling out the specific
semantic variant ‘issue’ within the schematic network associated with this
polysemic noun. At the same time, the conceptual base of vaikea asia is specified
by the profile of the categorizing relationship (kuten ’such as’) and the categorized
entities (examples 22b–d).
Conversely, the generic noun phrase vaikea asia ‘difficult thing’, together with
the constructional context kuten, define a substantial portion of the base of the
entities profiled in examples 22b–d. The category-instantiating noun phrases
profile not just random entities but the members of a newly-established category.
From  a  technical  viewpoint,  the  conceptual  base  of  the  category  instantiating
expressions  consists,  to  a  substantial  degree,  of  a  schematic  network  that  is
elaborated by these expressions themselves. Since the instances of alcoholism,
death and violence are virtual, this schematic network receives an interpretation
as  far  more  complex  than  what  the  profiled  structures  in  the  network  directly
yield. Thus we have a pattern that can be referred to as a virtual categorization,
which refers metonymically to a multiplicity of categorizing instances of various
issues as ‘difficult things’.
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While this analysis may seem exceedingly complex, it is in fact illustrative of
the prerequisites for a coherent interpretation of example 22: the fact that the
‘alcoholism of a parent’, for instance, is indeed meant as ‘a difficult thing’ for its
bearer to handle. For construal as a relationship between conceptualizer and the
semantic content, this analysis bears several implications.
First  of  all,  the  coherent  interpretation  of  example  22  as  a  pattern  of
categorization requires that there is increase in specificity from 22a to the set of
22b–d.   We  may  now  specify  this  criterion  so  that  it  concerns  exclusively  the
profiles  involved.  The  reason  is  that  the  profile  is  the  prominent  substructure
within  the  concept’s  semantic  scope  that  delimits  the  scope  of  possible
interpretations; that is, it determines the set of potential referents (see CGBI:
267). For instance, both hen and Black Shumen evoke the conceptual base of
chicken breeds, but the necessary specifications of Black Shumen, i.e.
specifications that relate to its referent, make this latter concept more exclusive.
If the condition of further profiled specifications is not fulfilled, a categorizing
construal pattern such as the kuten-construction fails to provide additional
information and, consequently, fails as meaningful communication.76
Second, construal in terms of specificity is extremely context-sensitive in that
both the profile and the base of the concept are interpreted relative to the
common ground (or CDS). As noted, the determination of the profile of vaikea
asia in 1a as an ‘issue’ is reactive to the preceding linguistic context, whereas its
conceptual base is specified as categorical through the subsequent construction
and categorized conceptual entities. The selection in terms of specificity may also
be reactive relative to the wider context of the magazine text, the magazine itself,
and its hypothetical audience. It can nevertheless be stated that the coherent
interpretation of vaikea asia ’difficult  thing’  in  example  22a  hinges  on  the
specification of a ‘thing’ as an ‘issue’ by the presumed readers of the article.
Thus, the specificity of an actual expression needs to be analyzed on the levels
of the profile and the base separately, even though these two levels necessarily
interact. Essentially, neither the degree nor the function of specificity for a given
semantic unit can be adequately estimated without operationalizing contextual
knowledge,  whether  linguistic  or  extra-linguistic.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  the
analysis must involve a justified conception of the context-independent
semantics of the expression. The point is that the conventional level of specificity
for a given expression can motivate the use of the expression only as far as it is
related to the background of the communicative situation and its resulting
pragmatic implications.
This brings us back the general argument presented above. As we have
established above, construal can be dissected into two components, both of which
characterize the relation of the conceptualizer and the conceptual content: 1) the
selection of a specific construal and 2) the non-objectivity of construal. Selection
76 It is worth noting that this function of restricting possible interpretations is fundamental to any
concept in and of itself: the selection of 22a is not reactive only to the linguistic (syntagmatic) context but
also to the common ground of directing referential function with ideal precision and without excessive,
irrelevant conceptual content.
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may now be posited primarily  to be a function of  the communicative intention
within  a  given  context.  It  is  also  carried  out  among  linguistic  units,  which
manifest  semantic  features  the  amount  and  salience  hierarchy  of  which  are
determined by their experiential and communicative significance. The argument
from intersubjectivity posits that neither of these facets of construal can be
reduced  to  an  individual  conceptualization,  and  this  necessarily  holds  true  for
specificity in particular.
With respect to selection, the level of specificity is determined as a sufficient
delimitation of scope of interpretation vis-à-vis both  the  excluded  and  the
included options, and this sufficient delimitation is in turn relative to the
knowledge  shared  by  the  discourse  participants;  that  is,  the  knowledge  of  the
linguistic unit’s conventional meaning and the knowledge of the currently
relevant conceptual background. Yet these levels of equally distributed
knowledge presuppose a wider context of unequally distributed knowledge: what
is being communicated is given for one participant and new for another. This is
not meant to evoke some particular communicative situation with specified
participants but simply to note that discourse cannot be approached without the
attribution of communicative directionality or dialogism to it (see Bakhtin 1981).
Thus  a  linguistic  expression  not  only  construes  a  representative  author  and
recipient, but also represents them hierarchically. One manifestation of this
asymmetry is that, due to the intentionality of communication, the expression
represents an expectation concerning especially the level of knowledge that the
recipient has (Jaakola et al. 2014).
The central implication of this asymmetry for specificity is that the construed
level of specificity demarcates the shared level of knowledge in contrast to what
is not shared. That is, the (representative, schematic) author of excerpt 22 could
in  principle  elaborate  ‘a  difficult  thing’  on  a  much  more  specific  level  than
‘alcoholism of a parent’ or ‘death in the family’, i.e. by specific instances thereof.
While  there  is  no  pragmatic  access  to  those  higher  levels  of  specificity,  the
excerpt,  like  any  instance  of  communication,  is  made  intelligible  by  the
expectation of their existence; in this case, it is a schematic network of ‘difficult
things’ that can be further elaborated or otherwise characterized in the course of
the text. Thus, the explicit, profiled level of specificity defines a shared entry point
to  the  wider  background  knowledge,  which  is  presumed  to  be  asymmetrical
relative to its accessibility for the different conceptualizers. Furthermore, it is the
nature  of  this  asymmetry  that  defines  what  can  be  shared  between  the
participants.
The logical outcome of this reasoning thus is that the level of specificity of an
actualized expression is a correlate of the presumed levels of knowledge of the
interlocutors. Moreover, the level of specificity is dependent on a presumed
asymmetry between these levels. A striking fact, which is typically neglected for
its self-evident character, is that the adjustment of the expression in terms of
specificity would bear no communicative relevance what so ever if there were no
presumably  different  levels  of  knowledge  involved  in  the  communicative
situation.
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This asymmetry is not always clearly functional (consider, for instance,
interlocutors remembering a shared experience), but it can be stated as a default
feature of communication that is motivated by informational exchange.
Moreover, the informational asymmetry between the interlocutors is necessarily
speculative by its character: if the specific sources or points of asymmetry were
known,  there  would  be  no  asymmetry  in  the  first  place.  The  representative
informational asymmetry of the text is not some omnipresent authoritative or
patronizing esthetic effect, but pertains simply to the intentionality of
communication. An expression of exclusive professional terminology, an instance
of naming-based construal, may therefore construe a relatively well-informed
recipient, while the expressive context nevertheless specifies the content of the
term further, making the content of the expression accessible for a layman as well.
Consider, for instance, the complex noun phrase varhainen
kiintymyssuhdemalli ’early attachment model’ (MT 4/2010: 18, discussed in
Jaakola  et  al.  2014:  648–649).  The  noun  phrase  is  an  instance  of  a  lexical
contamination but nevertheless presented as a developmental psychological term
that  refers  to  the  psychological  relationship  formed  between  a  child  and  her
caretaker  in  the  early  infancy.  Despite  being  ill-formed,  the  term  is  used  in  a
straightforward manner (in an article discussing psychological structures
affecting juveniles’ mental health), which presumes a reader with a certain
professional background in psychology or psychiatry.77 However elaborated by a
given reader, the explicit expression and the text represent this expectation as a
shared knowledge. This understanding, whether elaborated by a professional or
non-professional reader, nevertheless includes an epistemic asymmetry, in which
the nature of the interpreted authorship of the conceptualized matter is largely
dependent on specificity.
I argue that the postulation of default informational asymmetry is valid for
specificity in general and for example 22 above in particular. In 22a, the meaning
of vaikea asia ’a difficult thing’ is defined largely by the context, and especially by
the  cross-elaborative  pattern  analyzed  in  the  foregoing.  As  a  construal,  it  is
therefore motivated by both intra-textual and inter-conceptual relations: these
are assumed as accessible for both the representative writer and reader alike.
However, without assuming an asymmetrical informational context, within
which the common ground and the grounded construal are embedded, the notion
of specificity cannot bear any actual communicative value (inasmuch as esthetical
considerations are excluded).
Specificity cannot therefore be reduced to a parameter that characterizes
conventionalized semantic units. Instead, it pertains to an extremely context-
sensitive  value  that  links  semantics  to  the  requisite  pragmatic  inferences  for  a
coherent reading of multiple expressions. The considerations above demonstrate
77 As  noted  by  Jaakola  et  al.  (2014:  649),  the  scientific  status  of  the  term  does  not  dictate  its
interpretation, which can also rest heavily on the overall text and/or on a layman’s conception of the affection
between child and caregiver. Yet, regardless of the multiple alternative readings, the interpretation is likely
to evoke psychological expertise as one of its components. This does not need to be actual expertise on behalf
of the reader but rather a schematic conception of such expertise what is relevant for the interpretation.
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that specificity is a factor that guides co-reference and categorization, and that
these functions can be posited as necessary conditions for an intelligible reading
of the text. However, the interpretation of excerpt 22 also involves clearly distinct
conceptualizer positions. While the dimension of specificity does not determine
whether an expression profiles parts of the ground or not, one of its pragmatic
functions is to allocate the informational asymmetry between the
conceptualizers,  which,  by  itself,  presupposes  a  complex  ground.  Specificity  is
thus relevant for both conventionally and contextually shared knowledge as well
as  for  the  default  arrangement  of  unequally  distributed  knowledge  and
communicative intentionality. The specificity of an actual expression therefore
exceeds the scope of conventional meaning as such.
5.3 DYNAMICS OF BACKGROUND AND PROFILING
The  following  analysis  concentrates  on  construal  phenomena  that  are
categorized by the dimensions of focusing and prominence. The common
denominator of these dimensions is that they capture semantic asymmetries
of conceptual centrality that are either inherent to the organization of concepts
or that reside in the relationships between concepts.
Cognitive Grammar defines the dimension of  focusing as the selection of
conceptual content and its organization into a conceptual foreground and
background. In contrast, the dimension of prominence is the parameter
according  to  which  the  conceptual  content  is  hierarchically  organized.  The
conceptual foreground, for example, is more prominent vis-à-vis the
background. Focusing is thus a linguistic manifestation of prominence (CGBI:
68; see section 2.4.3).
The separation between these two dimensions is somewhat arbitrary, albeit
warranted by a perspectival difference: whereas focusing pertains to the scope
and delimitation of necessary semantic content, prominence includes
dichotomies that characterize a concept’s profiling function vis-à-vis its
semantic content or other profiled entities. As these dimensions overlap and
interact,  the  present  analysis  will  combine  analytical  concepts  from both  of
them: the notion of conceptual foreground/background as  a  form  of
focusing, and profile/base-segregation as a sub-dimension of prominence.
The interrelatedness between focusing and prominence also serves to
exemplify the more general complexity of dimension-specific alternations in
construal phenomena.
A brief revision of the selected sub-dimensions is in place (see sections 2.4.2
and 2.4.3). The selected analytic concepts are actually pairs of concepts that
represent particular prominence-based conceptual asymmetries. Segregation
in terms of foreground and background, to begin with, hierarchically organizes
the  different  cognitive  domains  associated  with  the  concept’s  meaning.  For
instance, with respect to the meaning of ‘pencil’, its function as an instrument
for  writing  (describable  as  the  cognitive  domain  of  [WRITING]) is typically
foregrounded relative to the fact that the pencil can and needs to be sharpened
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by a pencil sharpener; yet this organization in terms of cognitive domains is
easily overruled under contextual factors (e.g. FCG-1: 164–165, FCG-2: 88). In
this case, the mere need of sharpening may be sufficient: in this pencil surely
needs sharpening the domain of sharpening is not only explicitly evoked by a
distinct profile but is also central to the meaning of (this) pencil itself.
The  profile,  in  contrast,  is  defined  in  Cognitive  Grammar  as  the  focus  of
attention and the most prominent substructure within the conceptual base,
which consists of cognitive domains and is delimited by the concept’s scope.
Additionally, the profile “can also be characterized as what the expression is
conceived as designating or referring to [...] (its conceptual referent)” (CGBI:
66).  The point is  that  within the overall  scope of  a  concept not all  semantic
knowledge pertains directly to the referent itself; it is therefore necessary to
demarcate  the  subset  that  does.  For  instance,  a  spatial  object  such  as  ‘ball’
assumes  the  profile  of  a  three-dimensionally  round  object  by  occupying  a
corresponding  form of  space  within  the  cognitive  domain  of  space.  Yet  this
profile  is  only  graspable  as  residing  in  and  distinguished  from  its
surroundings; the profile therefore always presumes boundaries and
ultimately some larger region from which it is bounded.
Once  again,  the  phenomena  that  we  will  analyze  involve  a  series  of  co-
referential alternative construals, and these are found in a small excerpt of a
magazine article. The following example 23 consists of an opening section from
a research-based (popular) article, authored by the researchers themselves,
that summarizes the findings of a project on self-coping strategies among the
clinically  depressed  population.  Note  that  this  article  is  situated  in  a
permanent section of the Mielenterveys magazine, marked with the heading
Asiantuntijalta ’from an expert’,  which presents only self-written reports  by
psychology scholars.
23. Miltä masennus näyttää masentuneen itsensä silmin, ja miten masennuksen
täyttämässä arjessa voi selviytyä? Itä-Suomen yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteiden
laitoksella tehtävässä, Suomen Akatemian rahoittamassa, [a]Masennuksen
kanssa eläminen-tutkimushankkeessa selvitetään masennuksesta kärsivien
ihmisten selviytymiskeinoja.
[b]Tutkimushanketta johtaa sosiaalipsykologian professori Vilma
Hänninen, ja muina tutkijoina ovat […]. [c]Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan
haastattelujen valossa 40–49 vuotiaiden miesten ja naisten kokemuksia ja
selviytymiskeinoja […] Kerromme tässä artikkelissa pisimmälle ehtineiden eli
nuoria ja naisia koskevien [d]osahankkeiden tuloksia.
’What does depression look like for the person suffering depression herself, and
how can one cope in daily life filled with depression? Carried out at the
department of social sciences at the University of Eastern Finland and funded by
Academy of Finland, [a]the Living with depression -research project looks
into the coping strategies of people suffering from depression.
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[b]The research project is led by professor of social psychology Vilma
Hänninen, and the other researchers are […]. [c]The research observes, in the
light of interviews, the coping strategies of 40–49 year old men and women […]
In this article, we will report some of [d]the results of the sub-projects that have
advanced the most.’
(MT 3/2010: 12, italics in the original, emphasis with bold added)
The paragraphs, taken from the beginning of the article, present the background
and motivation for the article in general; that is, the research project, which, with
its  preliminary  findings,  provides  the  article  with  its  substance:  the  actual
experiences of the research subjects. The focus here is on the reference to the
research project and the research itself. Note that the translations of the glossed
examples are, in part, more precise than the translation of the excerpt as a whole,
for the latter needs to take textual and thematic matters into account.
23a Masennukse-n kanssa elä-minen -tutkimus-hankkeessa [modifier omitted]
      depression-GEN with  live-NMLZ research-project-INE
         ’in the Living with depression -research project’
23b Tutkimus-hanke-tta
          research-project-PTV
          ’the research project’
23c Tutkimukse-ssa
       research-INE
      ’in the research’
23d osa-hankke-i-den tuloks-i-a
       part-project-PL-GEN result-PL-PTV
      ’results of the sub-projects’
In brief, the noun phrases in examples 23a–d comprise a set of references that
are different in that they exhibit different conceptual profiles within the same
constantly updated conceptual base. This pattern of interrelated conceptual
profiles reveals a more complex network of prominence-related phenomena, all
of which are pivotal for a coherent interpretation of the excerpt.
Let us begin by concentrating on the separation of the conceptual foreground
from  the  conceptual  background  in  this  excerpt.  On  a  general  level,  the
background,  against  of  which  an  expression  is  interpreted,  may  include  any
relevant content of the preceding discourse as gathered into the so-called Current
Discourse Space (CDS). The CDS is structured so that the thematic structure of
discourse  determines  which  subpart  or  domain  of  the  CDS  is  currently  most
prominent  (CGBI:  281–282).  This  may  often  be  a  linear  function  of  temporal
distance in the discourse (ibid.), but this is not necessarily the case.
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 In excerpt 23, a substantial part of the CDS has already been determined by
the context of the magazine, the title of the section (Asiantuntijalta ’From  an
expert’), the heading of the article (Miten elää masennuksen kanssa ’How to live
with depression’) and the leading paragraph, which emphasizes the importance
of  the  independent  initiative  of  the  person  suffering  from  depression.  The
opening sentence (‘What does depression look like […]”) introduces, in a
schematic manner, the subjective point of view of the depressed person and her
daily  struggle.  This  is  followed  by  a  new  sentence  and  a  pair  of  co-ordinate
participle modifiers that finally allow the first mention of the project. Example
23a, Masennuksen kanssa eläminen -tutkimushankkeessa ’in  the  Living  with
depression-research project’, presents the project by an inessive adverbial, which
expresses  metaphorical  inclusion  of  the  activity  described  by  the  following
predicate verb.
The significance of the conceptual background from the very beginning of the
excerpt can be substantiated by taking a closer look at its specific contents. For
example 23a, the relevant elements include, inter alia,  the cognitive domain of
depression, the individual’s first-person experience of depression, and the
perspective  of  a  researcher.  Especially  relevant  is  the  construal  choice  of  the
preceding sentence: the wh-question presumes a schematic set of experiences as
the interest of the research team. The meaning of 23a is essentially to specify the
evidential chain (from experiencers to researchers) that allows the elaboration of
these experiences. Conversely, the meaning of 23a as an epistemic source is
defined  by  the  fact  that  the  wh-clause  points  out  the  epistemic  challenge  the
research project is to solve.
As mentioned, the conceptual background consists of separate cognitive
domains.  In  23a,  at  least  two  embedded  cognitive  domains  are  concurrently
active. First, there is the cognitive domain of depression at large: the condition,
its symptoms, its prevalence, and its social impact. Second, there is the cognitive
domain of the individual experience of depression, evoked by the wh-question
and reinforced by eläminen ’living’,  the  head  within  the  compound  noun’s
complex modifier. For 23a, it can be stated that the experiential sub-domain is
also the most relevant one, since it is foregrounded relative to the wider
background of the mood disorder. This foregrounding is due to the fact that the
research project is presented as the context of seeking the precise perspectival,
experiential knowledge, the need of which is profiled by the preceding question.
The  ‘research  project’  in  23a  is  thus  immediately  linked  with  the  question  the
team “in” the research project seeks to answer, whereas the general cognitive
domain  of  depression  is  presumed  by  both  the  question  and  the  project  as
residing further in the background.
From 23a onward, the dual structure of these embedded domains is constantly
reinforced and re-evoked as the relevant conceptual background, while it
simultaneously exhibits slightly different functions depending on the part of the
text it is in. Most importantly, the matrix of the general and experiential domains
of depression serves as the background for a thematic development in terms of
the ‘research project’ and the semantic content thereof: the researchers, their
mutual hierarchy, the research questions and so on. Here, the background has
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explicit semantic effects that need to be described by a prominence-related
hierarchy of trajectors and landmarks (see section 2.4.3).
The distinctive pattern found in 23a–b is that all of the co-referential
expressions serve as landmarks as defined in Cognitive Grammar. The ‘research
project’ in 23a serves as a locative (Finnish inessive -ssa ’in’), 23b serves as an
partitive  object,  23c  serves  as  another  locative  adverbial,  and  23d  serves  as  a
genitival attribute for the object. Note also that all but one (23d) of the
expressions assume a theme position within the immediate sentential context.
This pattern may be analyzed in part against the background formed by the
research-oriented section of the magazine in which the article is located. It is not
only that the domain of clinical depression itself is evoked, but it is evoked as a
readily interpretable object of academic interest. Thus, the reference to research
in 23a–d equals the specification of an organizational scheme that is already part
of the conceptual background: this givenness is what makes the theme position
in 23a–d felicitous, but also relevant. A knowledge frame (see e.g. Jaakola et al.
2014),  which  is  presumably  shared  by  the  conceptualizers,  is  a  logical  starting
point  for  the  grounding  of  the  discourse:  in  Mielenterveys  magazine,  the
academic research is a continuously active part of the background for a variety of
clinical and social themes. However, the specification of the general background
by  new  information  is  what  makes  a  piece  of  discourse  meaningful.  A  well-
justified textual strategy is therefore to occupy a series of theme positions with
slightly altered framing adverbials  that  allow an increasing specification of  the
general topic as a context of distinct activities.78
 Simultaneously, the noun phrases in 23a–d exhibit the canonical landmark
function in that they specify the given trajectors vis-à-vis one specific parameter,
their relationship to the research project itself. In other words, 23a–d refer to the
overall complex matrix which the trajectors, and the processes the trajectors take
part in, specify by explicating different sub-structures: namely, objects, agents,
objectives and results, respectively. The pattern as a whole can be considered a
network  of  mutually  related,  partly  synonymic  landmarks,  which  enables  an
integration of new information into a pre-existing schematic whole; that is, the
complex matrix of the research project itself.
Essentially, an intelligible interpretation of excerpt 23 requires that ‘research
project’  be  understood  not  only  as  some  abstract,  institutional  entity  but  as  a
reification of complex processes and a co-operation of actual human subjects.
This  academic/professional  understanding  as  a  relevant  knowledge  frame  is
presumed by the interpretation of co-reference between the noun phrases in 23a–
d. First and foremost, the background specifies the particular manner in which
the partially synonymous expressions co-refer. Reference, in turn, is described by
Cognitive Grammar as a function of conceptual profiles. Let us therefore analyze
78 Note also that, while Finnish does not code definiteness by a separate grammatical category (i.e.
articles), Finnish does apply word order to express the givenness of sentence elements. The sentence-initial
position of expressions 23a–c thus signals their definiteness, which itself, however, is due to multiple
contextual factors.
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next how the profiling and conceptual background interact in expressions 23a–
d.
As has been discussed, examples 23a–d exhibit only partial synonymy, and
each of these concepts serves to elaborate the background for the each subsequent
concept.  What  is  shared  by  these  instances  is  that  they  all  instantiate  the
reification of a process, or a complex of processes, into a thing (CGBI: 119). What
distinguishes the expressions is the manner in which they evoke this process by
reifying it differently.
23a Masennukse-n   kanssa  elä-minen -tutkimus-hankkee-ssa
       depression-GEN with     live-NMLZ research-project-INE
         ’in the Living with depression -research project’
23b Tutkimus-hanke-tta
          research-project-PTV
         ’the research project’
23c Tutkimukse-ssa
        research-INE
      ’in the research’
23d osa-hankke-i-den tuloks-i-a
       part-project-PL-GEN result-PL-PTV
      ’results of the sub-projects’
The compound noun in 23a introduces a new, highly specific conceptual entity to
discourse.  However,  as  mentioned  in  the  discussion  above,  the  noun  may  be
described  as  profiling  a  previously  non-profiled  but  contextually  salient,
schematic ‘project’. The adjectival modifiers referring to a specific university, to
its  department  and  to  academic  funding  (see  the  translation  on  page  186)
elaborate an academic context that is already present. Furthermore, the
compound’s  own  complex  modifier  ‘living  with  depression’  constitutes  the
landmark or reference point (CGBI: 504–505), which reifies the previous
discourse on experience of depression and thus establishes a specific relationship
between the compound’s head and pragmatic context (see CGBI: 504–505). In
other  words,  the  head  ‘research  project’  profiles  a  salient  substructure  of  the
pragmatically central domain of research. Both the profile of the modifier and the
profile of the head are thus determined relative to different parts of the
conceptual background.
Next, the evident referential synonym of 23a, i.e. the partitive object
tutkimushanketta ‘the research project’ in 23b, re-profiles the head of 23a. The
‘research  project’  in  23b  thus  picks  up  a  substructure  in  the  complex  domain,
which has been previously defined by the more elaborate conceptual profile. Its
level  of  specification  is  evidently  high  enough  to  grant  a  co-referential
interpretation, which, in turn, further specifies the background within which the
profile  of  23b  marks  a  foregrounded  entity.  Once  identified  with  the  specific
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‘project’  of  23a,  the  ‘project’  of  23b  does  not  require  to  be  distinguished  from
other such activities.
In  an  analogous  fashion,  the  profile  of  23b  facilitates  the  specific  type  of
profiling of tutkimus ‘research’ in 23c. The Finnish noun has both nomen actionis
and nomen acti variants of meaning,79 but the overall pragmatic context the
expression  foreground  the  latter  option.  The  ‘research’  refers  to  an  ongoing
activity,  reifying the process of  ‘researching’.  In other words,  the profile  of  23c
focuses  on  the  pivotal  process  associated  with  the  compound  noun
tutkimushanke ’research project’. What is interesting here is that 23b and 23c can
be interpreted as having somewhat identical semantic scope: both ‘research
project’ and ‘research’ may evoke the content of the actual research as well as the
researchers and the institutional  settings.  It  is  thus plausible that  23b and 23c
differ from each other only relative to the semantic content that is profiled80; this
is reflected in the explicit shift from the compound as a whole (23b) to its modifier
(23c), now re-analyzed as an autonomous structure (CGBI: 199–200).
Finally, the profile of osahankkeiden ’sub-project’ in example 23d makes use
of all previous expressions 23a–c as well as the preceding discussion of the project
in general. As a compound noun, it profiles not just a project but a project in a
subordinate relationship vis-à-vis the whole elaborated by 23a–c. The modifier
osa- ’sub-’, a variant of which is a freestanding Finnish noun of its own (’part’), is
used here as a dependent structure that profiles the relationship of the head with
respect to the implicit landmark of the project as a whole.
A particular background-related effect on profiling in expression 23d can now
be detected. Note that, in osahanke ‘sub-project,’ there is no explicit reference to
the research or the academic context but the interpretation of the ‘sub-project’s’
academic nature is nevertheless self-evident. The co-referential relationship to
the previous expressions 23a–c is  naturally  a  central  factor contributing to the
salience of this interpretation. It can be argued, however, that the certainty of the
present interpretation is not a matter of background alone.
The head in 23d, which refers to the ‘project’, is in fact a particular semantic
extension of ‘project’. This extension, let us call it ‘projectr’, is largely synonymous
with ‘research project’ in that it refers to a scientific joint effort with schematic
agents, means and goals. This extension is a conventional unit of academic jargon
but can also be construed contextually, and both of these interpretive options are
possible  for  23d.  A  relationship  of  synonymy  between  ‘research  project’  and
‘projectr’  does  not  entail  that  their  profiles  do  not  differ.  In  fact,  they  differ  in
terms of compositionality (CGBI: 60–62). The compound noun ‘research project’
arrives at the targeted meaning through a compositional path that distinguishes
between schematic joint operation (project) and the activity (research) that is
then used to specify the type of the operation. The variant ‘projectr’, on the other
79 Similarly to the noun uni ’sleep’ discussed in 2.4.1. On the Finnish variants of nomen actionis and
nomen acti, see Nuutinen 1976.
80 As mentioned in 2.4.3, the descriptive motivation for the notion of profile is exactly that it is needed
for capturing differences between expressions that are analogous relative to their semantic contents (and in
some cases even relative to their referents) but still differ semantically (CGBI: 66–68).
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hand, does not separate these elements but collapses them into the same,
compositionally degenerate profile (CGBI: 61–62).
Most  importantly,  however,  example  23d  presents  a  case  in  which  the
conceptual background determines the selection of a specific profile among the
options provided by a polysemic network. Either a conventional semantic unit or
a pragmatic  on-demand construct,  the interpretation of  23d as ‘sub-projectr’ is
warranted by the previous semantic pattern of co-reference.
We may turn to the above profiling pattern and its functional motivation as a
whole. Despite the overt differences between expressions 23a–d, i.e. the use of
compound nouns and modifiers, the comparison of the expressions shows also
certain similarities that are effectively explainable with recourse to the notion of
profile. As a generalization, the different profiles in 23a–d are used to refer to the
same conceptual entity; yet they arrange its contents differently relative to the
dimension of prominence. This variation in the choice of profile can only
peripherally be attributed to stylistics and avoidance of repetition, for the choice
bears non-trivial effects on the cohesion of the text and the separate constructions
they take part in.
Above all, co-reference is a fundamental source of cohesion (Halliday & Hasan
1976: 31–32) or coherence (on the distinction between these two, see Sanders &
Pander  Maat  2006).  A  pragmatic  extension  of  this  fact  is  that  by  varying  the
specific type of reference (i.e. construal) one is able to simultaneously maintain
co-referential relations and emphasize different semantic attributes of the
profiled entity and thus facilitate the integration of new information into a given
entity in a more variable and elaborate way (see Halliday & Hasan 1976: 276).
The  notion  of  profile  thus  provides  means  to  segment  the  motivations  for
different kinds of reference. For example, the use of tutkimus ’research’ in 23c,
which  profiles  the  actual  scientific  activity  more  prominently  than,  say, hanke
’project’, enables the specification of the actual scientific scope and objective of
the project. The use of 23d Osahanke ’sub-project’  in  turn  allows  for  an
explication of attributes (e.g. methods, results, findings etc.) that are sub-project-
specific  but  can  nevertheless  be  associated  with  the  “research  project”  and  its
objectives in their entirety. New information is integrated to the pre-existing
whole  but  in  a  manner  that  presupposes  the  partition  of  the  whole  into
meaningfully ordered sub-structures.
Profiling as an arrangement and rearrangement of  semantic  content is  to a
significant extent a function of the relationship between the expression and its
conceptual background. Profiling and the foreground/background-organization
thus affect each other: co-referential profiles in discourse bear upon the
conceptual background according to which subsequent entities are profiled. By
this context-sensitivity, profiling is remarkably similar to the dimension of
specificity: both the selection of overt linguistic unit and the level of detail of its
content are reactive vis-à-vis the immediate linguistic context. Yet profiling, as
demonstrated  in  23a–d,  can  be  given  its  own  separate  function:  shifting  the
conceptual  focus  within  a  conceptual  base,  as  well  as  facilitating  more  specific
integration of new information with the existing conceptual whole. The question
is  whether  it  is  possible  to  reduce  this  particular  function  to  the  individual
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manipulation  of  conceptual  matter  in  terms  of  a  set  of  hypothetical  cognitive
operations.
Given the intersubjective perspective presented in section 4.4, the answer is
negative. To be exact, the co-referential pattern of 23a–b could be reduced on an
individual-psychological level but this reduction would inevitably truncate
pivotal aspects of the pattern’s pragmatic function. To explicate these aspects, we
must consider the relationship between the conventional and non-conventional
meaning in the analyzed instances.
Similar to the role of specificity in a syntagmatic construal pattern, the
analyzed interaction of conceptual background and profiling involves the
interaction of conventional semantics and pragmatic elaboration. The
conventional senses of each separate expression 23a–d pertain, by definition, to
objects of common knowledge.  In contrast, the constellation they constitute
together seems involve a type of inference dependent on relatively exclusive
frames of knowledge (academic research), which in turns renders the analysis of
the construal pattern in excerpt 23 relative in kind. This does not obviously pose
a  problem  for  Cognitive  Grammar,  as  the  theory  diminishes  the  difference
between semantics and pragmatics in favor of a psychologistic usage-based
interpretation of both. The psychologism of Cognitive Grammar, however, has
already been refuted as incapable to ground a coherent conception of construal.
The  description  of  construal  thus  needs  to  be  formulated  in  a  manner  that  is
intersubjectively  valid  but  allows  for  substantial  variation  in  the  background
knowledge evoked by the representative conceptualizers.
In practice, this entails an indefinite, pragmatically determined common
ground,  or  CDS,  that  may  fail  to  fulfill  its  own  ontological  criteria  (of  being
shared)  but  is  nevertheless  “presumed”  (CGBI:  59)  as  the  basis  of
communication. The contents of the CDS are thus not just indefinite but largely
non-linguistic, non-normative and indistinguishable from the relevant
background knowledge of the interlocutors. The effect and modus operandi of
this background knowledge is nevertheless mediated by the conventional
grammatical  and  semantic  means  (for  instance,  a  network  of  interrelated
semantic units). Furthermore, despite being presumed, indefinite and therefore
fallible,  CDS  is  defined  by  the  very  presumption  of  its  shared  nature.
Understanding of a text is therefore dependent of a projected intentionality as a
part of the understanding of a text as a meant semantic structure.
In fact, the determination of the conventional meanings present in examples
23a–d is dependent of a correct analysis of the cognitive domains providing their
shared conceptual background. Conversely, the selection of these expressions can
only made sensible through the expectation that this background can be accessed
through the expressions themselves. What this analysis implies is that a sufficient
description  of  the  excerpt  23  involves  an  analysis  of  intersubjectivity  both  of
conventional and non-conventional variety. Here, the latter pertains to a
complex, pragmatically constituted conceptual domain, which is not normative
but contextually necessary.
Analytically, a text-pragmatic analysis of conceptual profiles vis-à-vis a
contextually updated domain of background knowledge motivates a substantial
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revision of the relevant dimensions of construal. From the present perspective,
construal in terms of conceptual foreground/background organization and
profiling  equals  the  coordination  of  the  most  prominent  substructure  within  a
shared  informational  structure  or  CDS.  This  structure  may  be  either  a
conventionally determined domain or a pragmatically constituted/evoked larger
whole,  but  in  both  cases,  it  is  analyzed  as  intersubjectively  valid.  As  with
pragmatic inference in general, both the process of coordination and the structure
being coordinated are indeterminate by their nature. Their case-specific
definitions can nevertheless be stated on a representative level; moreover, the
interconnectedness of saliently co-referential elements in examples 23a–d
defines the scope of feasible interpretations to a relatively high extent. Moreover,
both the process of  coordination and the coordinated structure are necessarily
presumed by interlocutors as intentional and relevant for correct interpretation
of the discourse.
Contrary to the specificity-based construal pattern discussed above, the
pattern of  profiling and background evokes a domain of  equally  distributed or
accessible knowledge as the basis of interpretation. However, these pragmatic
functions  are  not  mutually  exclusive  options  but  dimension-like  in  that  they
themselves may co-occur and align in actual discourse. Accordingly, the
symmetry of information that is evoked by the notions of conceptual background
and profiling is presumed on the basis of present communicative intentionality;
namely, the intention that the reader evokes certain knowledge frames in her
formation of synthesis between expressions 2a–d (see Jaakola et al. 2014: 7–8).
Construal  in  terms  of  profiling  and  background is  thus  both  similar  to  and
different from its specificity-based counterpart analyzed above. Similarly to
specificity of a semantic unit, the shared pragmatic background construct of CDS
can  be  considered  a  relevant  semiotic  structure  only  due  to  the  asymmetrical
disposition of the distinct conceptualizer positions. The construal phenomenon
observed in examples 23a–d nevertheless differs from specificity in that the
determination of profile of an expression presupposes that a substantial amount
of  background  information  is  equally  shared  and  structured  by  the
interconnections of the distinct conceptual profiles. Construal in terms of
background and profiling is not only context-sensitive, but also inherently
intersubjective.  This is  due to the fact  that  it  presumes the coordinated (hence
directional) maintenance, updating and organizing of shared conceptual
structure by elaborating and emphasizing its sub-structures.
5.4 PERSPECTIVAL SHIFT AND THE FINNISH PASSIVE
Perspective,  as  defined  in  Cognitive  Grammar  (CGBI:  73–85),  is  the  most
complex  dimension  of  construal.  It  involves  notions  such  as  viewing
arrangement, vantage point, subjectivity and (temporal) dynamicity, all of which
lend themselves to the description of a wide array of linguistic phenomena (see
section 2.4.4). The grouping of these analytical concepts under the same rubric is
nonetheless  well  motivated.  While  construal  in  general  pertains  to  the
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relationship between the conceptualizer and the conceptual content, the
dimension of perspective evokes this notion more saliently than any other
dimension of construal: perspective, regardless of the specific sub-dimension,
can largely be defined with regard to the position the conceptualizers assume vis-
à-vis the conceptualized content (e.g. CGBI: 73).
The following analysis concentrates on one particular type of perspectival
construal. Subjectivity, in Cognitive Grammar, refers to the extent to which the
facets of conceptualization (e.g. the conceptualizers) are profiled, and thus
construed objectively, or left un-profiled, and thus construed subjectively. The
structure to be analyzed is the Finnish present tense passive indicative (e.g.
tarvitaan ’is needed’), which leaves the distinct grammatical subject un-
expressed. With the Finnish passive, the un-expressed subject would (typically)
refer to a human agent or other human participant (ISK81 2004: §1313). There are
also non-human uses of the Finnish passive (see Shore 1986), which, however,
are quite peripheral especially relative to the present topic. The analysis below
concerns  subjectification  of  a  human  agent  or  an  experiencer  by  means  of  a
present tense passive construction in a narrative or descriptive section of a
magazine text.
Morphologically, the Finnish passive in question (on the morphology of
Finnish passive forms in general, see e.g. ISK 2004: §110; Jaakola 2015; Löflund
1998) is  formed inflectionally  by adding,  after  the verb stem, a passive marker
(e.g. -tA-, -dA- tai -lA-), a possible marker of past tense and a personal suffix (e.g.
-tA-, -dA- or -lA-), a possible marker of past tense (-i) and a personal suffix (-An).
In the excerpt to be analyzed all the predicate verbs are in the present tense and
represent the same Finnish verb type, e.g. the passive tarvitaan.
With this verb type, both the stem and the passive marker include a t-element;
the inflectional form is thus analyzed as involving a fusion of the t-element of the
passive marker with that of the stem: tarvi=t=a-an.
Semantically,  the  Finnish  passive  voice  refers  to  a  process,  which  typically
involves a human as its  central  participant:  a  human agent82 or,  less often,  an
experiencer. A necessary condition is that the participant could be expressed by
the grammatical subject (ISK 2004: §1313). The anonymity of Finnish passive can
be overridden by the calque toimesta ‘by x’, but this expression is quite formal in
style and thus restricted mainly to juridical  and organizational  contexts.  It  has
been  debated  whether  Finnish  passive  corresponds  to  the  passive  of  Indo-
81 ISK = Iso suomen kielioppi [The comprehensive grammar of Finnish].
82 The  linguistic  notion  of  agent  is  obviously  far  from  un-problematic,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  long
tradition of efforts to associate it in a consistent manner with different parts of speech (e.g. case grammar of
Fillmore  1968,  1977).  See  also  Jespersen  (1993  [1924]),  who  surveys  at  length  the  discrepancy  between
grammatical and so-called notional categories (e.g. ibid. 165); the latter essentially capture semantic roles
that the former express differently from one language to another. On the other hand, the Finnish passive is
distinct from its English counterpart in that it can only be formed from verbs that assume a human agent; a
condition that can easily be tested by the formation of corresponding active construals (ISK 2004: §1321, see
also §1323). An agent is therefore assumed as a prototypical notion of an intentional human actor that is
presumed by the process the given verb refers to.
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European  languages  (e.g.  Blevins  2003;  Comrie  1977;  Helasvuo  2006;  Kittilä
2000; Larjavaara 2007; Pajunen 1991; Shore 1986, 1988). Finnish passive
nevertheless exhibits the prototypical passive function, suggested for example by
Kittilä  (2000: 290) by foregrounding the patient at  the expense of  an implicit,
typically human agent, often retrievable from the context.
Not only is the Finnish passive restricted to verbs of actions and activities with
a default human agent, the passive is often used in contexts that provide means
for elaborating the given implied agent. The analysis in this section concentrates
on  a  specific  use  of  the  Finnish  passive  in  written  discourse,  which  manifests
distinctive semantic and pragmatic characteristics but also fulfils the general
characterization of passive as prompting a contextual elaboration of the agent. To
be specific, the excerpt 24 includes multiple uniform instances of what Helasvuo
(2006: 234) calls the simple passive83, as separated from passive past participles
used with active voice auxiliary olla ‘be’. While the segregation of these types is
not unproblematic, the category of the simple passive is descriptively convenient,
as it captures the form’s pragmatic function of maintaining contextually
determined reference to the implied agent(s). This holds true for excerpt 24 as
well.
Excerpt 24 was taken from the beginning of an article that describes the work
done in SOS crisis  center,  a  non-profit  organization that  offers help for people
facing acute psychological distress. The present tense passive forms describe the
working of the customer team at the crisis center, as if the reader was brought
onto the actual scene:
24. On keskiviikko ja SOS-kriisikeskuksen asiakastiimin viikkopalaveri.
Kriisivastaanoton vastaavan Pirjo-Riitta Liimataisen edessä pöydällä on pino
keltaisia lappuja. Jokainen niistä kertoo yhden ihmisen kipeästä
elämäntilanteesta.
Kriisiaikaa [a]tarvitaan tällä kertaa 19 asiakkaalle. Joukossa ovat 19-
vuotias tyttö, jolla mahdollisesti on uhka kunniaväkivallasta, nelikymppinen
turvapaikanhakija, 22-vuotias liikuntavammainen opiskelija […].
Heidän taustallaan on monia ongelmia, jotka kietoutuvat toisiinsa:
läheisen sairastuminen tai kuolema, erotilanne, huostaanotto, aviokriisi […].
Osalle [b]tarvitaan tulkkia.
Avunpyynnöt [c]laitetaan kiireellisyysjärjestykseen, ja asiakkaat [d]jaetaan
kriisityöntekijöille. […]
’It is Wednesday and the weekly meeting of the customer team in the SOS
crisis  center.  On  the  table,  in  front  of  the  counselor-in-chief  Pirjo-Riitta
83 In one particular use, the simple passive alternates with the passive form as a colloquial first-person
plural – essentially a simple passive form with a personal pronoun me, ‘we’ – as a form of maintaining
personal reference (Helasvuo 2006: 248–251). The described action involves the speaker and possibly the
recipient(s) as well. The typical use of the present tense is to either prompt or describe future action of both
the speaker and the recipient(s).
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Liimatainen, there is a pile of yellow cards. Each of them represents a painful
situation of one human being.
This time around, crisis time [help] [a]is needed for 19 customers. Among
them are a 19-year-old girl, who is possibly facing a thread of honor violence,
an asylum seeker in his forties, a 22 year old physically disabled student […].
In the background, they have many intertwining problems: the sickness or
death of a beloved one, divorce, custody, marital crisis […]. For some of them,
an interpreter [b]is needed.
The requests for help [c]are arranged according to their urgency, and the
customers [d]are shared among/to the crisis workers.’
                (MT 2/2010: 18, emphasis added)
The excerpt starts with a straightforward depiction of the spatiotemporal and
occupational setting of the customer team at work. Quickly enough, however, the
focus shifts to the group of customers who have turned to the crisis center in their
need for help. After exemplifying the requirements of the customers’ situations,
the text moves on to describe the action taken by the customer team in organizing
their forthcoming work.
Peculiar enough, the opening paragraph is in fact the only occasion in the body
text in which the workers of the crisis center are explicitly mentioned (the leader
of the team Pirjo-Riitta Liimatainen is  mentioned  later  on  in  the  role  of
interviewee). None of them are represented as syntactic subjects either. The
compound asiakastiimin ‘customer team’ is presented as the genitival modifier
of the viikkopalaveri ‘weekly meeting’, the complement in the existential clause
expressing the context of the described activity. Liimataisen is presented as the
genitival complement of postposition edessä ‘in front of’,  which makes her the
experiential and spatial landmark relative to which the situation cards of each
customer are located.
From the beginning of the second paragraph onward, the customers presented
by the yellow situation cards are the only human referents explicitly mentioned
in  the  text.  In  other  words,  the  physically  present  workers  are  linguistically
evoked only via the activity described by passive forms, whereas the customers
mentioned explicitly  are present at  the scene of  action only virtually.  What we
witness in examples 24a–b, and to certain extent in examples 24c–d as well, is
nevertheless a depiction of an elaborate interaction between the members of the
team and their customers. The examples 24a and b may be analyzed as a complex
conceptual  blend  (e.g.  Fauconnier  &  Turner  2002):  a  set  of  temporally
intermittent actions (the previous telephone conversations, the discussion at the
meeting, the forthcoming consultations) are synthesized into a singular, currently
present, continuous and shared activity.
The  passive  verbs  24a–d  thus  receive  an  endophoric  and  plural
interpretation.84 To be exact,  they form a pattern of  maintaining the reference
84 This  use corresponds to the so-called prototype 2 of  passive posited by Shore (1988: 166–169),  which
Shore, in general, denotes as “indefinite”. Prototype 2 is characterized by a contextually determined
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established by previous mention of the agents (see Helasvuo 2006: 249–250 for
a similar function of passive in spoken discourse). The pattern in excerpt 24 does
not, however, maintain the reference unchanged, but it rather adjusts both the
scope and manner of it as the text and the co-referential pattern itself unfolds.
From example 24a to 24d the nature of the described activity, the linguistic
context of the verbs, and the previous instances contribute in the specification of
who  is  in  need,  who  arranges  (and  what  exactly),  who  shares  (and  to  whom).
What is thus in play is subjective, contextual elaboration of agents with a highly
schematic  profile.  In  terms  of  construal,  the  identities  of  these  agents  are  not
profiled,  so  they  are  construed  subjectively.  However,  the  presence  of  a  non-
specific human agent is profiled by the passive suffix, as is the temporal relation
between  the  described  activity  and  the  ground.  The  question  is  how  this
subjective construal of agency affects the relationship between the conceptualized
activity and its conceptualizers.
It must be clarified that subjectivity is not a one-dimensional dimension; it
does not only pertain to the extent to which the ground is objectified but also to
the  manner  in  which  it  is  objectified:  e.g.  certain  modal  elements  evoke  more
saliently the primary conceptualizer as a source of epistemic or deontic authority;
this again is a source for the asymmetry between the primary and the secondary
conceptualizer. Indeed, Verhagen (2005, 2007) describes the phenomenon of
perspectivization as a variety of profiling patterns between the distinct
substructures  of  both  the  objective  and  the  subjective  poles  of  construal.  This
nuanced take on subjectivity is directly relevant for our description of the present
passive in 24a–d, in which the partial subjectification of the agent will be shown
to have a differentiating effect on the conceptualizer positions.
To preface this approach to the passive, let us consider the useful analogies
provided  by  two  other  grammatical  categories  of  Finnish  that  also  are  used  in
order to subjectify the human agent, recipient or experiencer. The first one is the
Finnish zero-person construction, which presents, in a third person singular, a
process  without  an  explicit  grammatical  subject.  The  second  is  the  so-called
independent A-infinitive construction, in which the Finnish A-infinitive, typically
applied  as  the  form  of  the  complement  in  a  verb  chain,  is  presented
independently, that is, without a subject or a complement-taking predicate verb.
Both  of  these  constructions  lack  an  explicit  subject  and  construe  a  site  of
identification for the recipient; yet they do it in substantially different ways with
different pragmatic effects.
The relatively frequent Finnish zero-person construction (Laitinen 1995,
2006; see also Hakulinen & Karttunen 1973), with the zero in place of subject,
expresses a generic, virtual instance of an experience. This experience, however,
is  typically  associated  with  the  primary  conceptualizer  who  offers  it  for  the
secondary conceptualizer to relate to: täällä [Ø] sulaa ‘[one] melts down here’.
While the zero-person construction lacks a distinct grammatical subject, this lack
endophoric reference to a specific agent or a group of agents, as opposed to the generalized exophoric
reference of  prototype 1 (see ibid. 162–166). Whereas prototype 1 presupposes a plurality of agents (ibid.
162), for prototype 2, the number of agents is “irrelevant” (ibid. 167), i.e. completely determined by context.
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itself  is  pronounced  by  the  third-person  inflection  of  the  predicate  verb:  the
construction  can  thus  be  analyzed  as  involving  a  site  of  identification  profiled
indirectly  by  the  construction  itself  (see  e.g.  Visapää  2008:  76).  While  the
experience expressed by the zero-person may be associated with speaker
herself,85 it is expressed exactly as an intersubjectively valid experience: the fact
that ‘one melts down here’ applies and is relevant to the speaker and the hearer(s)
equally.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  a  zero-person  construction  evokes
subjectively a multiplicity of experiencing subjects, for whom a virtual experience
is constituted as a site of identification.
In contrast with the zero person construction, the independent A-infinitive
construction  (Visapää  2008)  is  a  relatively  peripheral  expression  type  with  a
poetic or affective effect; for instance, the shockingness of the deed described:
jättä-ä tutkimus kesken viime metreillä ‘to quit one’s research right at the end’.
The  A-infinitive  lacks  specification  both  in  tempus  and  person,  so  the  relation
between the described activity and the ground is  maximally subjective.  This in
turn  prompts  the  inspection  of  the  activity  from  the  perspective  of  a  generic
experiencing agent (Visapää 2008: 85). The construction nonetheless makes the
recipient responsible for a substantial part of the elaboration of the activity. While
canceling the specification of the activity/ground relationship, the A-infinitive
assumes  the  function  of  expressing  virtual,  i.e.  imagined,  remembered,  or
generalized activity. The primary conceptualizer therefore manifests in the
emotive tone of the expression. This emotive presence in turn co-aligns with the
typical pragmatic function of the A-infinitive construction, which is to offer the
experience to be identified with by the addressee(s).
Both the zero-person construction and the independent A-infinitive
construction thus express a generic, albeit experientially grasped, activity.
Moreover, the virtual nature of the description in these constructions entails that
the activity stands in a correspondence relationship vis-à-vis a number of actual
or potential occurrences. What distinguishes these construction types from each
other is the manner how they relate, or do not relate, this activity to the ground.
The zero-construction, with its tense and person marking (that constitute a site
of identification), grounds the virtual instance relative to the conceptualizers: for
instance, the virtual ‘melting’ above is presented as representative of spatio-
temporal occurrences that are real or potential to the interlocutors. In contrast,
the A-infinitive subjectifies all traces of the ground (Visapää 2008: 76). In other
words, the construal itself does not in any sense specify how the virtual instance
should  be  related  to  the  reality  of  the  communicative  context  in  terms  of  the
representativeness, the temporality or the reality of the expression itself. For
instance, ‘to quit one’s research’ in the example above, may quite well correspond
to an actual instance of quitting. However, this correspondence does not in any
85 As a grammatical device of generalization, the zero-person construction can be extended to contexts,
expressible by frame-setting adverbials, that do not include the speaker herself; rather, these contexts are
expressed as relevant to the addressee(s) or other participants (Laitinen 2006, examples on pages 209, 211,
213).  In such cases, however, the generalization is still applicable to the speaker as well, despite the fact that
the epistemic source of the generalization is not the actual experience of the speaker.
Dynamics of construal and context
196
way belong to the infinitival  profile,  or  even to the expression’s  conventionally
determined  base,  but  is  established  subjectively  on  the  basis  of  the  pragmatic
context.
The use of the passive in examples 24a–d resembles both the zero-person
construction and the independent A-infinitive construction in that it subjectifies
the participant that otherwise would be expressible by the grammatical subject.
However, the passive construal shows important distinctive features as well. In
contrast with the zero person, the passive construction typically receives a non-
generic  interpretation  and  implies  an  agent  who  is  distinct  from  the
conceptualizers  (cf.  pp.  194,  fn.  77),  the  identity  of  whom  is  nevertheless  not
specified vis-à-vis ground. Relative to the A-infinitive construction, the Finnish
passive differs mainly in that it presents, by default, an actual, spatiotemporally
grounded  activity,  within  which  only  the  identity  of  the  agent/experiencer  is
subjectified.
In sum, a prototypical instance of the passive construction pertains to a non-
generic, partially subjective construal. Its narrative-descriptive use in present
tense,  such  as  in  examples  24a–d,  seems  to  allow a  perspectival  identification
similarly to zero person and A-infinitive constructions. In this case, however, the
target of identification is not the agents or other participants of the described
activity but the primary conceptualizer as the observer on site (see below).
As  suggested  by  Verhagen  (2007:  60),  any  piece  of  meaningful  linguistic
communication  may  be  considered  as  an  invitation  from  a  conceptualizer  to
another to assume a certain perspective relative to the conceptualized matter. I
nevertheless argue that the passive construal in excerpt 24 exemplifies a
particularly pronounced case of perspectival accommodation between
conceptualizers;  moreover,  this  accommodation  shows  features  specific  to  the
passive construal. The question is how this effect may be described in terms of
the dimension of perspective.
Clearly,  as  the  examples  provided  by  the  zero-person  construction  and  the
independent A-infinitive construction illustrate, any construal phenomenon
involving a perspectival accommodation requires that the relationship between
the  primary  and  secondary  conceptualizer  is  adjusted.  In  fact,  the  analysis  of
examples 24a–d below shows that such an accommodation is dependent on the
default epistemic asymmetry between the conceptualizers (see sections 4.5.1 and
4.5.2 above), even when the default setting is overridden by a given construal. In
any case, the use of passive in a narrative-descriptive function involves a complex
pattern of interaction between the conceptualizers and the distinct
agents/experiencers within the text. This pattern, and the perspectival shifts it
involves,  is  illustrated best  by a piecemeal  analysis  of  examples 24a–d and the
manners in which they construe the identity of the agents.86
86 These characterizations inevitably extend the analytic scope of the conceptualizer from clausal
semantics to interpretation of a narrative as a complex of participants and activities with a consistent
thematic advance. This requisite extension brings the notions of conceptualizer and ground closer to the
notions of discourse identities and participation framework by Goffman (1981). As with Goffman’s
framework and its discourse identities, the perspectives construed by the text do not serve expression-
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In example 24a, the passive predicate tarvitaan ’is  needed’  takes  as  its
partitive object the compound kriisiaikaa ’crisis time’, which refers to the time
that is  reserved for face-to-face counseling.
[24] Kriisi-aika-a [a]tarvi-ta-an  tällä kertaa 19 asiakkaa-lle
       [crisis-time-PTV need-PASS this   time    19 customer-ALL]
       ’This time around, crisis time [help] [a] is needed for 19 customers’
The predicate verb and the partitive object evoke saliently the role of “needers”,
which  matches  that  of  customers  in  a  typical  setting.  However,  the  allative
adjunct 19 asiakkaalle ’for 19 customers’ profiles the customers as recipients, and
the need of time is actually a feature that fits the counsellors too. While it seems
strange that a counsellor would ‘need’ her own time, it is actually the treatment
of each customer’s individual situation – the cooperation of the counsellor and
the customer – that comes with the temporal requirement. The category of the 19
customers  and  the  category  of  the  employees  of  the  center  merge  to  form  a
complex domain of interaction, in which the exact customer–counsellor
relationships are left un-profiled. I therefore argue that 24a receives
interpretation of collective agency involving the counselors and customers alike,
despite the clashing profiling of ‘19 customers’ as recipients.
This also holds true for the next instance of tarvitaan in example 24b: now
the object has changed, but the need itself derives from the cooperative setting:
[24] Osa-lle [b]tarvi-ta-an  tulkk-ia.
       [part-ALL need-PASS interpreter-PTV]
       ’For some [of them], an interpreter is needed.’
The allative adjunct Osalle ’for some [of them]’ expresses the recipients of help
and serves an anaphoric restrictive function in that it delimits a sub-domain
within the previously established category of 19 customers. Still the need for
an  interpreter  does  not  come from the  subjective  need  of  a  customer  but  it
emerges from the interaction between a customer and a counsellor: they both
need the interpreter equally.
The shared agency evoked in examples 24a–b does not last, however. In
examples 24c–d, the requests for help and the persons to which they refer are
presented as objects. Moreover, the described administrative or organizational
activity clearly restricts the scope of agency to the team working at the center.
Note that neither example 24c nor 24d determines the interpretation whether
the agency is commensurate with the team as a whole, with a part of the team,
or with the previously mentioned Pirjo-Riitta Liimatainen.
[24] Avu-n-pyynnö-t        [c]laite-ta-an  kiireellisyys-järjestykse-en
       [help-GEN-request-PL put-PASS urgency-order-ILL]
specific needs but cohere to build an experientially grounded, comprehensive depiction of the described
activities.
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    ’The requests for help [c]are arranged according to their urgency’
In example 24c, the context of a weekly meeting and the nature of described
activity imply the possibility of a collective effort, e.g. the negotiation over the
relative urgency of the cases. However, neither the context nor the process
described  by  the  passive  determines  the  agent  in  any  specific  manner.  The
interpretation is necessarily a synthesis between not only the conventional
semantics of the predicates, constituents and adjuncts, but also a specific
understanding of administrative work in a meeting setting. Thus it is as likely
that the agent is only one individual, e.g. Liimatainen, within the team.
This  indeterminacy  is  repeated  and  further  illustrated  by  the  passive
construal in example 24d:
[24] ja asiakkaa-t      [d]jae-ta-an kriisi-työntekijö-i-lle.
[and customer-PL share-PASS crisis-worker-PL-ALL]
      ’and the customers [d]are shared among/to the crisis workers.’
The semantics of laitetaan ’are  arranged’  in  24c  does  not  exclude  a  collective
agency, and the activity is directed toward an object other than the team itself.
Neither does jaetaan ’are  shared  [among]’  in  24d  exclude  a  collective
interpretation. The semantics of the verb may imply a singular sharer vis-à-vis
multiple  recipients.  This  combined  with  the  contextual  knowledge  about  the
hierarchy within the team, and the allative adjunct kriisityöntekijöille ‘among/to
the  crisis  workers’  may  gear  the  interpretation  toward  a  singular  agent.  Note,
however, that the appearance of a referent in an adjunct position does not suffice
to rule out the option that the referent is an active participant of the described
activity,  as  is  demonstrated  by  24a–b.  Rather,  it  is  the  overall  semantic
contribution of the selected predicate verb, the adjunct, and above all, one’s
background  knowledge  of  the  given  activity  that  suggests  the  singular
interpretation of the agent in 24d. Finally, note that the passive forms 24c–d are
parts of the same sentence. The combination of their shared sentential context
and  homomorphism  may  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  a  shared  agent,  which
suggests that the ‘arranging’ in example 24c could also involve a singular agent
only.
The  pattern  followed  from  24a  to  24d  is  thus  characterized  by  a  stepwise
delimitation of the scope of possible agents, while the pattern simultaneously
maintains their subjective construal. From 24a to 24b the scope is kept the same,
and from 24b to 24c, the agency of the customers is excluded. Finally, from 24c
to 24d the scope of agency is not altered in any definite or explicit manner; it may
be  analyzed  as  continuous  or  as  delimited  from  the  team  to  its  representative
member(s).
As  mentioned,  the  passive  construals  from  24a  to  24d  adjust  the  personal
reference via subjective specification but also maintain the reference (see
Helasvuo  2006:  248–251)  by  their  construal  uniformity  and  the  resulting
network of partially synonymous expressions. Starting from the first instance, the
passive tarvitaan  ’is needed’ establishes a subjective reference to all
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aforementioned human agents, and the subsequent instances utilize this
relationship by suggesting co-reference through exhibiting the same grammatical
form.  At  the  same  time,  the  increasing  specificity  of  the  agency  is  not  only  a
function of each instance separately but also of the co-referential linkage between
them (see sections 4.5.1 & 4.5.2 above).87 Since the construal is maintained the
same,  the  specification  of  the  agents  is  carried  out  on  the  subjective  level:  the
schematic profile of the agent, expressed by the passive marking, is therefore
specified indirectly via its conceptual basis only.
The  construal  pattern  in  examples  24a–d  thus  involves simultaneously a
homomorphism of the objective construal (schematic profile of a human agent)
and an alternation of the personal reference on the level of subjective construal
(contextual and co-referential retrieval of agents). This of bipolar function of
maintaining and adjusting personal reference is linguistically significant by its
own right. The pattern allows a conceptualization of delicate circumstances not
just without identifying the customers and workers of the crisis center, but also
without construing the unequal distribution of agency that necessarily results
from  the  customers’  vulnerable  situation.  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  this
function is a necessary correlate of an effect that is more clearly perspectival by
nature.
This subtle construal effect is difficult to verbalize, but it can be concretized by
a coined zero-person alternative. For instance:
Kun [Ø] on kriisi, [Ø] tarvitsee kriisiaikaa
‘When [one] faces a crisis, [one] needs crisis time’
To be exact, the zero person construal allows a generalization that is applicable to
the situations of the customers but not to the situations of the crisis workers. The
zero person construction may stand as a virtual instance for a practically
indefinite number of actual instances, but the construction comes also with the
more specific site of identification, which may be occupied (virtually) only by one
conceptualizer at a time. This restriction is further illustrated by the oddity of an
allative adjunct, 19 asiakkaalle ‘for 19 customers’:
?kun on kriisi, tarvitsee kriisiaikaa 19 asiakkaalle.
‘When [one] faces a crisis, [one] needs crisis time for 19 customers’
Conversely,  it  is  indeed  the  passive  construal  that  allows  the  co-operative
interpretation in 24a–b. It may still seem unnatural to conceive the workers of
the  crisis  center  as  needing  the  crisis  time.   However,  we  now  may  refine  the
earlier  position  on  the  sharedness  of  the  need  in  question.  The  passive  allows
87 The co-referential chain leading to the originally mentioned agents gives the pattern an economical
advantage: the processual frame evoked by the verbs is elaborated contextually at a level of specificity that
allows for a coherent conceptualization without excessive detail on the possibly quite variable identity of the
agents. The combined effect of the syntagmatic increase in specificity and paradigmatic perspectival
assimilation in 24a–d exceeds mere conceptual economy, however.
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dissipating the fact that the need of help on the behalf of the customers is more
direct in character than the need on behalf of the workers, who in fact are required
to share their “own” time. Passive, in other words, allows an equal construal of
agency  in  a  situation  that  is  not  subjectively  construed  as  equal  in  any  actual
sense.
This  brings  us  to  the  central  point,  that  is,  the  intersubjective  basis  of  the
construal phenomenon in question. I argue that, consistently with Cognitive
Grammar, the non-profiling of agent’s identity by the passive construal results in
the subjectification of the distinction between the agent and the conceptualizer.
However, I also argue that this subjectification results in the lessened salience of
the  primary  conceptualizer  and,  logically,  in  an  increase  in  the  salience  of  the
secondary conceptualizer. What this adjustment of salience means in practice is
that the passive description in 24a–d does not appear as mediated by the primary
conceptualizer but as a conceptualization of experience that is immediate to the
secondary conceptualizer.
This  formulation  may  appear  counter-intuitive:  we  know  that  the  text  is
written  by,  and  represents  the  perspective  of,  an  observer  distinct  from  the
implied  agents.  Indeed,  such  background  information  is  necessary  for  the
understanding of the expressions 24a–d or the text as a whole (see below). The
question, however, is how the semantic content of the expression is construed
and profiled. Furthermore, perspectival effect I suggest may be restricted to the
context of narrative-descriptive written discourse, in which the primary
conceptualizer would, by default, have a particularly salient role as the source of
a first-hand experience. The perspectival effect is in any case subtle, indefinite
and indirect, so it needs to be described with precision. Moreover, it needs to be
described relative to the overall organization of the participants of the construal
relationship, whether they reside at the subjective or the objective pole of
conceptualization.
The  chief  component  of  perspectivity  is  the  viewing  arrangement,  which
subsumes  the  ground,  the  conceptualizers,  the  object  of  conceptualization  and
the mutual relationships between these structures (CGBI: 73–75). The so-called
default arrangement in conceptualization (ibid. 74) pertains to an explicit
construal  of  an  object,  which  is  distinct  from  the  ground,  and  to  an  implicit
construal  of  the  ground  and  the  conceptualizers.  The  result  is  a  maximal
asymmetry between the objective and subjective poles of conceptualization (ibid.
77). Yet the default arrangement involves another, less pronounced asymmetry:
the conceptualizers are defined relative to the directionality of communication
(ibid. 261–262, Verhagen 2007: 60). The primary conceptualizer of the default
setting is therefore the speaker, but also the epistemic authority of the
conceptualization, albeit the object of conceptualization is equally present for
both of the conceptualizers.
This is naturally the same epistemic asymmetry that we have witnessed in the
previously analyzed construal patterns. The asymmetry nevertheless has
particular  corollaries  in  the  passive  construal.  First  of  all,  the  chief  premise  of
preceding analysis on excerpt 24 is that the text forms a truthful, consistent
description  of  an  actual  occurrence  that  the  writer  has  witnessed  in  person.
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Second,  since  the  primary  conceptualizer  is  also  the  observer,  whereas  the
secondary conceptualizer is not, the narrative use of the passive construal yields
a maximal asymmetry between the primary and secondary conceptualizer
relative to experiential basis of knowledge. The object of conceptualization is
pragmatically available for the reader via the conceptualization alone (whereas it
is available to the construed writer as the direct correlate of observation).
The  epistemic  asymmetry  thus  results  from the  unequal  accessibility  of  the
object of description. In the case of excerpt 24, an active construal of the team at
work would involve the third person inflection, which in turn would ground the
activity as carried out by the agent separate from the observer. This as such does
not affect the specifications of separate conceptualizer positions, but this is
exactly the point: the ground would be construed subjectively “as it is”, given the
context  of  this  specific  article.  The  question  is  why  the  passive  construal  in
examples 24a–d would alter this default asymmetry.
The answer, in brief, is that it doesn’t. Instead, the passive construal, in its lack
of profiled personal distinction, reduces the asymmetry between the subjective
and objective poles of  conceptualization.  In other words,  the passive construal
dissipates a salient experiential observer, such as would be evoked by the third-
person marking as an inverse counterpart within the ground.88
This adjustment, however, entails logically that the default asymmetry
between the primary and the secondary conceptualizer is  reduced as well.  The
representative writer of the text is still present as the necessary primary
conceptualizer, but her presence as an observer at the scene of activity is left un-
evoked  by  the  construal.  At  the  same  time,  the  topic  (an  actual  activity),  the
narrative mode and the present tense necessitate a schematic and subjective
virtual observer, whose experience co-extends with the described activity.
With the dissipated primary conceptualizer, this virtual position is most
naturally  assumed  by  the  salient  conceptualizer,  whose  presence  cannot  be
canceled  by  any  linguistic  means:  the  reader.  That  is,  if  we  take  seriously  the
Cognitive Grammar’s proclamation of the inherent perspectivity of linguistic
meaning, also the segment represented by expressions 24a–d needs to be
construed relative a representative conceptualizer position. The position is
obviously pre-given by, and inscribed in, the text; yet the dissipation of person
distinction and the consequent first-person observer position results in a
construal which is simultaneously pre-given and immediate.
This adjustment of the salience of different subjective positions is obviously
relative  and  subtle  by  its  nature.  Yet  it  is  based  on  the  semantic  distinctions
Cognitive  Grammar  presents  as  the  basis  of  subjectivity  in  the  first  place.
Moreover, not only is this analysis commensurate with the analysis of subjectivity
by Cognitive Grammar, it involves and is dependent on complex ground and
subjectively construed specifications thereof: the perspectival explanation of the
passive construal is only feasible relative to two separate conceptualizer
positions.  But  the  above  analysis  has  been  dependent  on  still  another
88 Note that this is a definitional feature of grounding elements: they ground by standing in a
relationship vis-à-vis some substructure of the ground (e.g. CGBI: 259, 297).
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presupposition  that  has  not  yet  been  stated:  the  adoption  of  the  secondary
conceptualizer’s perspective in the reading of the text.
The notion of perspectival accommodation posits two requirements: 1) there
are at least two perspectives, the perspective to be accommodated and the
perspective that serves as the target of accommodation; and 2) the perspective to
be accommodated has been taken by an interlocutor. The latter requirement is
not  just  logically  inevitable  but  so  self-evident  that  it  is  easy  to  neglect.  For
instance, the unmarked basic clause, expressing the default viewing arrangement,
presents  the  object  of  conceptualization  as  equally  accessible  to  both
conceptualizers. Yet the equality of the construal derives from the discernibility
of  the  conceptualizer  positions,  and  the  instantiation  of  the  expression  in  a
communicative situation defines it equal exactly as against the background of the
directionality  inherent  in  the  communication  (see  pp.  196  above).  A  simple
declarative thus presents an equally accessible description, the communicative
momentum of which is nevertheless dependent on the assumed conceptualizer
position  through  which  the  conceptualization  is  accessed  (see  Verhagen  2008:
313–315; pp. 179–181 above).
Thus,  despite  its  social  constitution,  the  meaning  of  an  expression  is  never
entirely the same to all of the possible conceptualizer positions. This does not lead
to subjectivism, however: the construal effects that differentiate between distinct
conceptualizer positions are simply a part of an expression’s total value, and they
are equally available to any speaker of the language to apply. While the spoken
discourse manifests this asymmetry most saliently in the directionality of the
speech acts, a written narrative brings about distinctive conceptualizer-specific
effects that relate especially to the organization of semantic content. In the
passive  construal  of  examples  3a–d,  this  effect  is  the  accommodation  to  the
observer position, which is in an immediate epistemic relation with the
conceptualized activity.
 It should be acknowledged that the position of the observer does not segregate
between the conceptualizers: the described activity is presented by passive as the
object of conceptualization for the primary and secondary conceptualizer.
However,  the  very  adoption  of  this  position,  and  the  subjective  construal  this
perspectival shift correlates with, depend on a perspectival position that serves as
a standard of comparison. Consider, once more, example 24a:
[24] Kriisi-aika-a [a]tarvi-ta-an  tällä kertaa 19 asiakkaa-lle
       [crisis-time-PART need-PASS this   time    19 customer-ALL]
       ’This time around, crisis time [help] [a] is needed for 19 customers’
The example describes a concrete, practical need, emerging from the interaction
between multiple agents, albeit this interaction is abstracted from
spatiotemporally distinct activities. The need of crisis time presents itself in an
observable, spatiotemporal setting, likely as a topic of discussion. At this point,
however, we already have adopted a position of a conceptualizer with access to
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the overall viewing arrangement on-site.89 This is a simple contingent fact that
derives from the basic descriptive procedure of Cognitive Grammar, combined
with the narrative style of the excerpt: a construal relationship needs to be
established and, in this case, it needs to be established between the ground and a
real, past occurrence that is nevertheless construed as immediately present. This
involves a necessary adjustment of perspective, in which an epistemologically
mediated depiction receives an immediate construal.
Were this adjustment prompted by an active construal, the perspective of the
observer would be marked by the personal distinction, as mentioned above, and
the  other’s  (i.e.  primary  conceptualizer’s)  perspective  would  be  assumed  as  a
salient  part  of  the  ground.  In  the  actual  passive  example,  the  same  on-site
perspective is assumed but without the personal grounding. The perspectival
shift, in other words, is attained without identifying the target of accommodation
with a certain part of the ground.
 What is significant in this line of reasoning is that such a shift would be totally
irrelevant from the perspective of the primary conceptualizer: this is due to the a
priori identity between the primary conceptualizer and the observer. Most
importantly, however, the subjective construal of the identity of the agents would
be irrelevant too: the constitution of co-referential relationships on the subjective
level of the expressions is only motivated by the fact that one does not have access
to the “actual” co-referential relationships. The requisite subjective
reconstruction of these relationships, then, is coextensive with the perspectival
shift to the position of the on-site observer.
This reading of  the excerpt may appear highly subjective,  but a  criticism of
subjectivism can be refuted offhand. First of all, the use of imagistic terminology
may  give  the  impression  that  the  suggested  interpretation  is  based  on  mental
simulation or an according theory of processing (e.g. Barsalou 1999), but this is
not  the  case.  The  notion  of  observer  has  been  applied  metaphorically  only,
following the Cognitive Grammar’s visual metaphor of viewing arrangement, but
the application of the metaphor does not indicate any commitment to a certain
psychologistic stance. In my analysis, I have applied the visual metaphor solely to
express  various  epistemic  positions  and  relations,  and  the  matching  of  the
metaphor’s  source  domain  with  the  excerpt’s  visual  style  is  an  expository
adversity more than anything else.
 Moreover,  the  reading  is  offered  as  to  exemplify  asymmetrical  pragmatic
intersubjectivity, but this does not entail that reading would be subjective in the
sense of idiosyncratic, let alone arbitrary. Instead, the interpretive requisites it
presents are not only accessible to whomever who may assume the position of the
secondary  conceptualizer,  but  they  also  can  be  presented  as  the  part  of  the
intersubjectively  valid  meaning  of  the  text  as  a  whole.  As  said,  the  subjective
construal of identity may be relevant only for the secondary conceptualizer, but
the relevance alone does deem a part of meaning only unilaterally accessible.
89 Note that this is not a metaphysical access to some conceptualization of the writer but, once again, an
interpretive feat necessary to a coherent reading of the text.
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Rather,  unilateral  relevance  on  one  side  of  the  ground can  be  interpreted  as  a
motivating factor on the other.
Finally, one could contest the above analysis as too impressionistic to capture
distinctions that are linguistically significant. I acknowledge that the selection of
a  passive  construal  may  be  motivated  primarily  or  solely  by  the  need  of
anonymity. This possibility, however, does not contest the very existence of the
perspectival effect; and, moreover, this alternative, while quite probable, is not in
fact exclusive. Even when the primary motivation of a subjective construal is the
subjectivity itself, the subjectification of the agent may simultaneously serve the
function of  perspectival  accommodation as well.  In fact,  the two functions,  the
anonymity and perspectival accommodation attained by a passive construal, can
be posited as partial correlates at least, and their simultaneous presence seems to
be a requirement of many uses of the construal. The prevalence of the present
tense passive indicative, for instance, in the work instructions in nursing
industry,  is  a  prime example  of  a  subjective  construal  of  agent,  which  exhibits
anonymity and perspectival accommodation while being a clear conceptualizer-
dependent construal effect.
In conclusion, I have argued that the narrative use of the Finnish present tense
passive indicative involves perspectival alignment between the secondary
conceptualizer and the observer of concrete activities. Significantly, this construal
type reduces the salience of the primary conceptualizer, which is due to the lack
of  personal  distinction  as  grounding  devise.  However,  my  analysis  has
demonstrated that such a perspectival effect is dependent on the interpreter’s
adoption of the specific conceptualizer position. The observed construal type may
well conventionalize into a semantic variant that includes this perspectival effect
as  its  conventional  semantic  value.  At  this  point,  however,  this  effect  is  best
explained as a function that the subjectification of the agent adopts in a particular
(type of) discursive context.
Whereas previous analyses emphasized both the symmetry and asymmetry of
knowledge between the conceptualizers, the above analysis of the Finnish passive
demonstrates the grammatical structure’s function in the perspectival
adjustment between the conceptualizers and the agents of the profiled activity.
Ceteris paribus,  this  last  construal  phenomenon  derives  most  clearly  from  a
specific grammatical construction and from the intersubjective alignment this
construction imposes on the ground. Even in this case, however, the analysis has
disclosed pragmatic construal effects that cannot be described consistently within
the confines of the construed expression, or even within the linear structure of
the discourse alone. Instead, the description of perspectivity requires
specifications on the level  of  pragmatic  intersubjectivity;  namely that  a  subject
positions  oneself  relative  to  the  positions  offered  by  the  discourse.  Thus,  the
described perspectival effect of the passive construal not only distinguishes
between different conceptualizers but depends upon assuming a specific
conceptualizer position. The analysis of the Finnish passive consequently
provides  further  evidence  for  construal  as  a  context-driven  selection  of
conceptual matter and as an alignment of that matter relative to multiple
perspectives, rather than according to conceptualizer’s subjective position alone.
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5.5 DISCUSSION
The most rudimentary conclusion that can be drawn from the examples analyzed
above is that construal exceeds in scope the analytical function associated with it
by Cognitive Grammar. Not only is the notion of construal applicable to textual
wholes greater than clauses and sentences – a characteristic that is in accordance
with the unitarian principle of Cognitive Grammar. In addition, it has been shown
that construal, both as selection and organization of semantic content, is specified
and motivated by the pragmatic context. The preceding treatment has focused on
construal solely in “intra-textual” (or endophoric, see Halliday & Hasan 1976)
contexts,  but  it  should  be  evident  that  the  pragmatic  basis  of  construal  can  be
limited to language only arbitrarily.90
Moreover, the foci of the preceding analyses have been on variable construals
of the same referent or state of affairs as explicitly present in the analyzed texts.
The concentration on the syntagmatic organization of co-referential construals
has been motivated by the very definition of construal as a means of organizing
semantic content in alternative ways. What the analysis has revealed, however, is
that alternative construals do not simply co-refer in distinct ways but also affect
each other’s interpretation.
 The analysis of specificity scrutinized a pattern of co-reference that is
established by constructional meaning of the conjunctive structure kuten ’such
as’. This particular conjunctive presents the subsequent noun phrases as
instances of a category, thus evoking a category interpretation of the preceding
entity.  More  importantly,  the  analysis  showed  that  specificity  at  the  level  of
explicit  profiling  is  likely  due  to  what  is  shared  by  the  interlocutors.  In  other
words, the more elaborate the shared information structure between
conceptualizers, the more schematic construal can be allowed. However, the level
of specificity of an overt expression was shown to relate to the maintenance of a
shared information basis within a larger asymmetrical distribution of knowledge.
This asymmetry is not merely an a priori motivation for communication but a
pragmatic determinant of construal with practical consequences.
The subsequent analysis on focusing and prominence showed the dependence
of profiling, central to the semantic unit’s referential function, on linguistically
maintained background information. The analysis, in other words, confirmed the
observation  made  in  the  discussion  on  specificity  that  that  the  selection  of  a
conceptual  profile  is  largely a function of  the intersubjectively shared common
ground. At the same time, the analysis also revealed profiling-specific pragmatic
phenomena. Most importantly, the analyzed co-referential profiles were shown
to enable an integration of  new information to the profiled entity on a level  of
specificity that could not be attained by repetition of the same construal alone.
90 The emphasis nevertheless reflects the nature of written discourse: the lacking of on-line, multimodal
coordination of common ground, as well as control over the efficiency of communication, shifts the balance
of  pragmatic  inference  more  heavily  on  the  endophoric  relations  (see  Jehandrie  1999:  chap.  8).  The
generalizability of the case-specific observations made above to spoken discourse remains an empirical
question.
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Finally,  the  treatment  of  perspective  with  regard  to  Finnish  passive
demonstrated that perspectival indeterminacy at the level of profiling, due to the
subjective  construal  of  the  agent,  results  in  a  decrease  of  the  primary
conceptualizer’s salience and in a respective increase in the salience of the
secondary conceptualizer. The profiling of the agent, and the non-profiling
thereof, was thus shown to impact the perspectival and position of the secondary
conceptualizer,  an  effect  mediated  by  the  constitution  of  the  primary
conceptualizer.
The  results  apprehended  above  seem  to  follow  in  a  quite  straightforward
manner from extending the notion of construal to include immediate linguistic
context, i.e. the co-referential construals in praesentia. However, these results
are also dependent on an intersubjective conception of construal. The
preferability  of  an intersubjective approach to construal  was demonstrated not
only by the analysis of conventional-semantic ground presupposed by
perspectival  semantics  but  also  by  the  description  of  construal  relative  to  the
overall pragmatic context of the analyzed texts. Instead of being describable in
terms of cognitive processing, the analyzed construal effects explicitly involved a
coordination and maintenance of the epistemic and perspectival relationship
between conceptualizers and their position vis-à-vis the  object  of
conceptualization. The results are consistent with, and therefore provide support
for, the dependence of experiential semantics from intersubjective constitution
of language, established in section 4.4.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the analytical concepts applied
here are provided mainly by Cognitive Grammar itself. Indeed, it has been one of
the chief purposes of this chapter to demonstrate the compatibility of these
concepts and an intersubjective approach to semantics and pragmatics. Thus, the
methodology  applied  here  has  consisted  of  embedding  the  dimensions  of
construal to an intersubjective conception of meaning – instead of presenting an
entirely novel conceptual apparatus for construal phenomena. The chosen
methodology,  I  argue,  has  been  workable  because  the  dimensions  of  construal
accurately capture real and functional semantic values and differences between
multiple expressions.
The  analyses  in  this  chapter  have  thus  established  that  the  dimensions  of
construal make valid analytical constructs. As their standard theoretical
justification has been refuted (chapter 3) and replaced with an intersubjective
alternative (chapter 4), we may now state that the intersubjective alternative
provides  more  realistic  conception  of  linguistic  construal.  However,  what  still
remains  to  be  explicated  is  how  the  character  of  actual  linguistic  construal
phenomena may be explained relative to the phenomenological, intentionality-
based conception of a meaning-intending act. This task has been reserved for the
following chapter.
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6 SYNTHESIS: THE NATURE OF CONSTRUAL
Each of the preceding main chapters has extended the customary understanding
construal vis-à-vis the ontology and scope of the phenomenon. At the same time,
I have maintained that Cognitive Grammar’s analytical concepts are not
themselves  in  need  of  revision.  Rather,  the  non-standard  application  of  the
dimensions of construal to written discourse has followed systematically from
their standard definitions (CGBI: 55–89). The intersubjective approach adopted
here has required that the dimensions of construal have been extended to account
for  the  pragmatic  alignment  between  distinct  conceptualizer  positions.  This
extension, however, has not required redefinition of the existing analytical
terminology (let alone introduction of novel terminology) but a careful
explication  of  the  implications  inherent  to  the  dimensions  of  construal.  The
dimensions of construal thus apply to perspectival meaning as an inherently
social phenomenon, as has been predicted in the previous chapters (3 & 4).
The conception of construal as an inherently intersubjective phenomenon
stands in a stark contrast with Cognitive Grammar’s theoretical self-
understanding, as has already been demonstrated by Itkonen (1997). The critical
analysis in chapter 3 and the positive, phenomenologically grounded analysis in
chapter  4  provide  reasonable  basis  to  consider  the  intersubjective  approach
superior to the standard approach outlined by Cognitive Grammar.  One of  the
main reasons for this, I would argue, is that the conception of construal defended
here is associated with a genuine appreciation for the phenomenological
character of linguistic meaning as a correlate of a meaning-intending act. That is,
meaning of an expression is not associated with a mental representation in any
cognitivist sense. Rather, the meaning of an expression is the objective (socially
constituted) correlate of a meaning-intending act that is directed toward not the
meaning itself but toward the entity that the given expression is about.
This  object-directedness  of  communicative  intention  is  not  only
phenomenologically  real  and  logically  necessary  but  also  essential  for  any
genuinely intersubjective conception of interaction. Were the relationship of co-
reference  between  multiple  construals  only  a  feat  of  individual’s  capacity  of
conceptual  integration,  a  syntagmatic  construal  pattern  could  hardly  be  a
functional facet of genuine communication. It is thus assumed here that
construal, and a construal pattern for that matter, pertains to the careful
adjustment of representational content in a context that involves conventional,
shared  linguistic  knowledge  as  well  as  the  other  subject,  either  actually  or
virtually present.
The linguistic analysis in the preceding chapter nevertheless made use of the
analytical concepts of Cognitive Grammar without explicitly relating them to a
phenomenological account of intentionality. Rather, this has been an implicit
requisite for the analysis conducted above. It is therefore the task of this present
chapter  to  consider  how  the  phenomenological  account  (section  4.4)  and
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linguistic analysis (chapter 5) of construal are inherently related. This synthesis
requires that the main results of each previous chapter are reiterated once more.
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Chapter 2 offered a concise introduction to the conception of semantics presented
in  Cognitive  Grammar  and  then  proceeded  to  the  general  presentation  of  the
conceptualizer and the dimensions of construal.
This presentation of semantics concentrated on three interrelated
characteristics, i.e. the (relatively) non-modular conception of cognition (section
2.2.2), the notion of categorization based on prototypes and schemas (section
2.2.3), and encyclopedic semantics (section 2.2.4). Together, these characteristics
are applied by Cognitive Grammar to refute “objectivist” or “externalist” varieties
of semantics and, conversely, to constitute and defend a cognitivist alternative.
In  general,  language  conveys  meaning  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  objective
properties of things and states of affairs in the world, but necessarily includes the
properties of how things, states and events have been perceived and
conceptualized. Semantics thus need to be grounded in what is generally known
about cognitive processing.
The following sections then presented the notions of conceptualizer (section
2.3) and the dimensions of construal (section 2.4), which have been proposed by
Cognitive  Grammar  to  account  for  the  properties  of  meaning  that  imply  a
conceptualizing subject. The treatment of these notions provided a general view
of  how  Cognitive  Grammar  approaches  the  meaning  of  an  expression  as  a
complex of the subject (conceptualizer) and object of conceptualization, as well
as how it approaches the construal relationship between these distinct poles. The
presentation on the dimensions of construal, in particular, served to highlight the
relatively  high  descriptive  power  of  these  concepts,  by  showing  that  the
dimensions  capture  highly  relevant  syntagmatic  patterns  according  to  which
alternate construals enable the simultaneous establishment of co-referential
connections and the accommodation of an expression vis-à-vis the textual
context.
Chapter 3, in turn, scrutinized the theoretical justification for the dimensions
of  construal.  Two critical  accounts  of  Cognitive  Grammar’s  semantic  approach
were  assumed  as  the  starting  point.  Kenttä  (2003)  and  Itkonen  (1997)  have
criticized Cognitive Grammar for committing itself to a reductionist physicalism
or  psychologism  (sections  3.2.1–3.2.3)  with  its  conception  of  meaning  and
semantics. The reanalysis provided by chapter 3 demonstrated that these
accounts were generally well justified but inexact in some respects. First of all,
Kenttä’s observation that Cognitive Grammar conflates the neuronal, processing,
and  phenomenological  levels  in  cognition  was  found  correct.  However,  the
reanalysis of the points relevant to Kenttä’s critique revealed that Cognitive
Grammar’s definitions for linguistic meaning are often mutually inconsistent,
which makes a categorical ontological interpretation of the theory an unrealistic
task.
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Second, the critique by Itkonen (1997) of Cognitive Grammar as an incoherent
psychologistic semantics was shown to be well-founded. Moreover, the provided
reanalysis found agreement with Itkonen on the ontological discrepancy between
CG’s  psychologistic  argumentation  and  the  socially  shared  nature  of  the
dimensions  of  construal.  As  opposed  to  Itkonen,  the  analysis  concluded  that,
despite being socially distributed, the experiential attributes of meaning can be
given a coherent explanation starting from CG’s own premises. What is required
is a reinterpretation of the relationship between experience and semantics, the
need of which was demonstrated by the incoherence involved with the notion of
imagery.
 In  section  3.3,  Cognitive  Grammar  was  shown  to  conflate  different  senses
(especially  mental  and  linguistic)  of  imagery  in  order  to  defend  a  cognitivist
conception  of  meaning.  Cognitive  Grammar,  more  specifically,  was  shown  to
succumb to the idea that simulative processes that mediate between pre-linguistic
experience and linguistic conceptualization are needed to explain the transfer of
meaning  from the  former  to  the  latter.  The  analysis  of  the  concept  of  imagery
revealed that Cognitive Grammar, in fact, posits different kinds of simulative
mental entities, none of which adequately explains the “imagistic” properties of
semantics. It was pointed out that mental imagery in cognitive psychology (e.g.
Kosslyn et al. 2006) is posited as a format of sub-personal information processing
and that and thus fails to justify an exact (psychological or other) conception of
linguistic meaning, the latter of which is necessarily consciously accessible.
In contrast, non-objectivist semantics was shown to require an experiential
subject  (or  more  precisely,  a  multitude  of  experiential  subjects),  whose
experience is conventionalized into meaning. This fact, however, does not restrict
in any way the cognitive mode through which the experiential background shapes
meaning.  In  sum,  it  was  demonstrated  that  a  recourse  to  cognitive  processing
only resulted in incoherence in the argumentative structure of CG. Furthermore,
as  the  dimensions  of  construal  were  shown  to  reside  in  the  publicly  shared
semantic repository of language, their experiential basis needed to be sought after
elsewhere.
This  task  was  reserved  for  chapter  4,  which  approached  construal  from  an
intersubjective perspective. If construal constitutes an empirically sound
linguistic  category  (chapter  2),  which  consists  of  variables  that  characterize
meaning as distributed over speech community (chapter 3), the manner in which
construal is defined, explained and applied needs to derive from a non-
individualistic  conceptual  framework.  Such  a  framework  would  need  to  be
ontologically reasonable (in contrast to cognitivist individualism), coherent and
applicable  to  the  description  of  linguistic  meaning.  After  an  outline  of  the
phenomenological basis of the notion of intersubjectivity (section 4.2), followed
by  a  brief  introduction  into  the  developmental  and  cognitive  psychological
application of  the concept (section 4.3),  Zlatev’s  (e.g.  2007b,  2008b) mimetic-
hierarchical  model  was  found  to  meet  these  criteria.  In  particular,  mimesis
hierarchy  is  able  to  ground  proto-linguistic  and  linguistic  forms  of
intersubjectivity into the embodied and immediate forms that precede them and
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does so in a conceptually cohesive way, providing predictions for pathologies of
intersubjective and linguistic development (see e.g. Zlatev 2007b).
The  next  task  was  to  investigate  whether  Zlatev’s  hierarchical  model  was
compatible  with  Cognitive  Grammar’s  notion  of  construal,  and  if  so,  what  this
combination would yield in terms of the dimensions of construal. The inclusion
of internalized representations was established as a common denominator
between mimesis hierarchy and Cognitive Grammar. The representations
allowed in the former, however, were found to be very well-specified and
restricted  compared  to,  for  instance  the  notions  of  mental  imagery  and
simulation endorsed by Cognitive Grammar.
These representations, called mimetic schemas (Zlatev 2005, 2007a, 2007b)
are  pre-linguistic  and  grounded  in  bodily  mimesis  but  serve  to  model  how
linguistic  units  can be adopted as well.  They are not posited as units  of  a  sub-
personal processing mechanism but as true representations that preserve the
distinction between the subject, the sign, and the expression. Moreover, mimetic
schemas  are  not  posited  as  a  type  of  simulation  of  any  kind,  albeit  some
simulative capacities may in part provide the cognitive infrastructure for their
internalization (see e.g. Blomberg & Zlatev 2014).
Instead, mimetic schemas are schematizations over repetitive signitive bodily
actions involving cross-modal mapping.  This schematization and its applicability
for communicative purposes entails an internalization and a relative autonomy
from particular instances of use. As internalized representations, mimetic
schemas may involve mental rehearsal or simulative processing. The constitution
of their representative character, however, is their rooting in the intersubjective
praxis,  through  which  they  are  acquired  and  applied.  While  not  directly
applicable  to  description  linguistic  meaning,  mimetic  schemas  were  found  to
embody the minimum cognitive requirements of socially shared semantic units:
they indeed need to be internalized or abstracted from specific instances but in a
manner  that  conserves  not  only  the  relevant  experiential  characteristics  of  the
usage-events but also their pre-linguistic intersubjective validity.
Section 4.4 outlined the conceptual basis for integrating the notion of
construal with a multi-leveled model of intersubjectivity. The treatment of non-
actual motion by Blomberg and Zlatev (2014) was assumed as the starting point
for the analysis, as it provides a concise treatment of the experiential motivation
for a distinctive type of construal: the conceptualization of a static configuration
or a state of affairs by clausal constructions that involve motion verbs. In short,
Blomberg and Zlatev are able to distinguish three different experiential
motivations that corresponded to semantic types of non-actual movement, which
testifies to the non-unitary nature of non-actual movement in language.
Combined with the conventionalization and self-organizational principles of
language  (such  as  that  of  economy)  as  meaning-determining  factors,  the  non-
unity of an experiential motivation for meaning refutes a one-to-one mapping
between experience and language. What is needed, then, is a systematic account
of the mediating processes between these two domains.
Blomberg and Zlatev (2014) suggest a general approach in terms of Husserl’s
notion of sedimentation (in Origin of geometry, Husserl 1970 [1936]), which
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pertains to the gradual  bleaching of  the motivating experience as a part  of  the
structure of the expression. In my own discussion on sedimentation, I argued that
its basis in multiplicity of concrete meaning-intending acts (see Husserl 2001b
[1901];  Banchetti-Robino  1997)  entails  that  the  process  in  its  entirety  is
characterized by the practice of intending in an intersubjectively validated way.
That is, in order to meaningfully communicate experiential meaning, not only
does the act of meaning-intending but also the object and content of the act need
to  be  shared.  Moreover,  an  expression  is  not  self-constituting  but  gains  its
referential and representative functions by repeatedly occupying analogous
extra-linguistic and linguistic contexts that themselves are also necessarily
shared. My analysis thus concluded that non-objective or experiential meaning
(e.g. construal) and intersubjectivity presuppose each other. In addition,
sedimentation was shown to provide a plausible conceptual framework for how
the  representative  content  of  an  expression  is  constituted  in  a  cumulative  and
schematizing fashion via a multitude of meaning-intending acts.
Previously,  chapters  2  and  3  had  presented  two  distinct  types  of
intersubjectivity relevant for construal: the intersubjectivity entrenched to the
conventional semantics of certain constructions, treated extensively by Verhagen
(2005, 2007, 2008), and the social ontology of meaning, argued for by Itkonen
(1997). With the notion of sedimentation, Verhagen’s conventional-semantic
intersubjectivity could now be integrated as a part of a larger domain of socially
constituted experiential semantics.
The integration yielded yet another level in the overall picture. The conception
of construal as a selection among referentially synonymous expressions led to the
question concerning the criteria for the actual choice. While this question could
presuppose an untenable mentalist position, it is possible to posit that these
criteria consist of heavily restricted pragmatic factors found in the immediate
textual context. The most essential factor considered here is obviously the other
subject, which corresponds to the representational secondary conceptualizer. A
sufficient analysis of construal must therefore account for how the given
expression relates the secondary conceptualizer to the immediate pragmatic
context of discourse.
This approach is justifiable from the premises of Cognitive Grammar itself.
The conception of semantics that Cognitive Grammar promotes is eminently
context-sensitive, as a consequence of the structured nature of semantic units and
of the networks they are suggested to constitute (see FCG-1: chap. 4 “Domains”,
chap.  10  “Categorization  and  Context”).  Since  the  dimensions  of  construal
capture exactly these internal and relational properties of expressions, it is viable
to describe construal as a “selection” in a specific sense: not as linguistic correlate
of  conscious  pre-meditation  but  as  an  accommodation  of  the  scope  and
organization of the expression’s semantic content to the pragmatic context. This
accommodation constitutes the third and final level of intersubjectivity that is
relevant for construal.
Finally,  chapter  5  applied  the  dimensions  of  construal  to  the  analysis  of
written discourse in order to assess the practical corollaries that stem from the
three-partite redefinition of construal. In order to allow an analytical extension
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of  the  dimensions  as  well  as  to  control  pragmatic  variables,  three  example
analyses were carried out on separate co-referential patterns sampled from the
data. In each pattern, a certain dimension of construal, or multiple dimensions,
was particularly prominent. Despite the seeming simplicity of the examples, the
analyses revealed a complex interplay between the alternate construals and
between the construals and the linguistic context.
The first analysis (section 5.2) concentrated on the dimension of specificity as
a variable between co-referential expressions. The first of these expressions
established  a  pragmatic  category  that  was  elaborated  by  the  following
expressions. This structure of category elaboration was shown to involve
distinctive mechanisms on the levels of the profile and the base for each particular
instance: namely, the position of the given instance in the overall co-referential
pattern would bear upon the content of the instance’s base, while the selected
profiling expression would serve the function of delimiting the scope of
interpretation within that space. Thus, specificity was demonstrated to have an
interpretation-directing function within a contextually constructed conceptual
base. Simultaneously, specificity was shown to be an essential semantic variable
in  maintaining  a  common  ground  within  an  asymmetrical  distribution  of
knowledge.
The second example (section 5.3) involved the interrelated dimensions of
focusing  and  prominence  in  the  constitution  of  construal  on  the  basis  of  a
cumulative common ground, which is symmetrical by definition. The examined
co-referential pattern involved the reference to a ‘research project’ by profiling
different substructures of the complex concept, so that each reference served to
elaborate the conceptual background of each subsequent reference. Moreover,
this  background-defining  function  was  also  shown  to  eventually  affect  the
interpretation of each instance’s profiling function as well. Given the schematicity
and/or polysemy related to conventional semantic units, profiling, when
associated with a given instance,  is largely explainable as context-based profile
determinacy.
The third and final analysis (section 5.4) focused on the Finnish passive voice
as a type of construal with distinctive effects that relate to the dimension of
perspective. The analysis showed how the subjectification of the agent involved
in the expressed activity resulted in particular multiplicative effects in the
expression’s overall perspectival setting. This involved a decrease in the
(construed)  mediating  function  of  the  primary  conceptualizer  and  a
corresponding increase in the secondary conceptualizer’s salience. The observed
perspectival effect could be brought back to the conventional semantics of passive
form,  but  an  essential  part  of  that  effect  was  identified  as  prompting  an
elaboration of the agent with regard to the common ground. In other words, the
observed  construal  phenomenon  was,  once  again,  found  to  be  defined  to  a
significant extent by pragmatic elaboration.
These three examples thus underline the nature of linguistic construal as a
function  of  both  the  profile  of  a  conventional  semantic  unit  –  including  its
measure of specificity – and the semantic background relative to which the profile
is interpreted. The distinctive analytical value of each separate dimension has
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beem shown to relate to the aspects of this profile–background-relationship that
the dimension happens to capture. While the analyses in chapter 5 focused on the
context-dependent nature of construal, they nevertheless presupposed the
conventional semantic values of the expressions. Included in these were
attributes that clearly could not be reduced to the object of conceptualization but
that were related to the relationship between the object and the conceptualizers
as well as with the positioning of the conceptualizers with respect to each other.
In sum, after presenting the analytical scope of the dimensions of construal in
chapter 2, and assessing their theoretical constitution from a critical perspective
in chapter 3, chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that construal should and could be
given a novel, experiential-semantic interpretation. The formulation of an
intersubjective conception of construal showed that, in order to explain and
describe the non-objective perspectival properties of meaning, one needs to
ground the representative content of language in a pre-linguistically
intersubjective framework. The application of the dimensions to written
discourse,  in  turn,  demonstrated  how  this  grounding  necessarily  extends  the
analytical scope of construal to include the pragmatic context. At bare minimum,
the relevant contexts consists of other subject(s) and present co-referential
alternative construals.
The result is a conception of construal, according to which a construal pattern
adjusts perspectives of the primary and secondary conceptualizer. A construal
pattern builds on conventional semantic units of the given language that are, by
definition,  symmetrically  accessible to any proficient speaker of  that  language.
Yet the necessary inclusion of multiple conceptualizer positions yields also
conceptualizer-specific pragmatic effects, as demonstrated by the analysis in
section 5.4. That is, the subjectively assumed conceptualizer position vis-à-vis a
specific construal affects the manner in which other co-referential construals are
operationalized in the interpretation of each specific construal.
6.2 THE NATURE OF CONSTRUAL
Cognitive Grammar presents construal  as the capacity to mentally  arrange the
same  conceptual  content  in  alternate  ways  (FCG-1:  117,  see  also  CGBI:  4).
Moreover, this capacity is presented as divisible into subordinate attributes
(dimensions) that have direct analogues in perception (especially vision) and are
supposedly cognition-general (CGBI: 85–86). In agreement with Itkonen’s
(1997)  social  ontology  of  meaning,  I  have  refuted  this  view  as  incoherently
reductionist. Cognitive Grammar’s recourse to cognition-general properties or
capacities ignores the fact that similarities between perception and meaning do
not presuppose simulative processes that mediate between the two (see
Thompson 2007: 143; cf. Barsalou 1999). Linguistic conceptualization requires
only that we are able to correctly re-evoke experiential meaning, no matter what
the precise processing mechanism is that enables this process. Experiential
semantics, by definition, is structured by the non-objectivity of experience
(stemming from our bodily and cognitive disposition), but it would be a category
Synthesis: the nature of construal
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error  to  attribute  properties  of  meaning  to  cognitive  processes  mimicking  that
experience, when they in fact can be described relative to conventional and
communicative schematizations of the experience itself.
It is clear that only a restricted subset of semantic units refers to objects and
states of a direct experiential nature. On the contrary, a natural language boasts
a  vast  and  elaborate  inventory  of  units  that  point  to  virtual,  theoretical  and
abstract referents of no direct embodied appearance. In addition, grammatical
categories and constructions can be presented as inherently meaningful symbolic
units  (e.g.  CGBI:  170;  see also Goldberg 1995).  A sufficient semantic  grammar
thus cannot resign itself to the mere mapping of conceptual relationships between
expressions and experiential referential objects. Instead, it also needs to account
for  linguistic  phenomena  that  stem  from  conceptual  capacities  such  as
abstraction, opposition (e.g. Woelert 2011: 116–117) and grouping in terms of
part-whole-hierarchies (Langacker 1997: 4).
I argue, however, that the ontological ramifications of this conceptual point of
view  are  easily  and  commonly  misconstrued.  First  and  foremost,  underlying
processing or conceptualization mechanisms can be posited to explain cross-
linguistically prevalent semantic patterns, at least in a putative fashion. This still
does not entail that the patterns can be reduced to the mechanisms: rather, the
processing mechanisms can be hypothesized to manifest in how meanings are
constituted through a series of actual usage-events (see e.g. Woelert 2011).
This ordering of matters is not simply a rhetoric maneuver, for it bears directly
on how the role of cognition should be understood in constitution of meaning. If
the effects of our embodied (including cognitive) disposition on linguistic
meaning come into being via an indefinite amount of intersubjective usage-
events, then these effects are essentially conventionalized as properties of those
events. This in turn entails that these properties need to be distinguished from
the properties of the events’ internalization and subsequent activation: if this was
not the case, there could not be representational semantic content distinct from
an individual meaning intending act and the phenomenological account of
objective linguistic meaning would become impossible.
Take for example the schematicity of ‘unemployment benefit’. Every single
utterance of the corresponding expression unemployment benefit involves
meaning-intention  toward  a  certain  referent  by  a  certain  semantic  means  (a
complex compound noun that profiles two interrelated juridical entities). Let us
accept these means as pre-established semantic conventions. Every single
meaning-intention involves cognitive activity, which in part restricts the semantic
content of the intention in that it leads to the usage of the expression in a certain
context. For example, there is no way of restricting the scope of the encyclopedic
knowledge that enters my intention of ‘unemployment benefit’ a priori, and my
knowledge certainly motivates the choice of the expression in certain
communicative contexts.
The actual linguistic meaning associated with every instance, however, is not
determined  by  that  knowledge  but  by  the  actual  instances  in  their  respective
contexts, which restrict the semantic content shared by the multiple
interlocutors. This being the case, linguistic communication necessarily involves
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the objectification of the properties of the intentional act, e.g. what ‘benefit’
means  in  the  context  of  the  Finnish  welfare  policy.  In  the  occurrence  of  this
objectification, not only do these properties become intersubjectively constituted
but they also cease to be dependent on the distinct cognitive mode in which they
are  given.  That  is,  the  semantic  specificity  of  an  expression  does  not  result
primarily  from  the  complexity  or  type  of  the  underlying  cognitive  processes.
While there is a psychological correlation between these two, the specificity of the
expression is chiefly determined by communicative practice. Individuals
succumb to the norms of this practice to their best cognitive ability – while also
bending and breaking the norms repeatedly.
There  is  thus  a  categorical  difference  between  specificity  as  a  property  of
cognitive  activity  and  specificity  as  a  property  of  the  object  of  the  conceptual
activity. Furthermore, as the difference holds a priori,  it  holds  for  any  other
dimension  of  construal  as  well.  What  should  be  noted  is  that  this  difference
cannot be explained away by assuming a psychologistic approach to meaning, for
the difference does not only reside between the distinct ontological realms
(psychological and social) but also between the act and the object of the act on a
solely psychological  level.  That is,  if  a  linguistic  concept is  assumed as a socio-
normative entity, the representative content of which is established as a usage-
based constant, it needs to be somehow distinct – albeit not independent – from
the individual acts that grasp it91. The fact that the act/object distinction is not
easily given a naturalized description does not contest its aprioristic validity.
Conversely, one cannot preclude the fact that the same semantic content and its
construal can be processed in even slightly differently ways indefinitely.
Over the course of  the conventionalization,  there is  no obvious,  empirically
observable  point  after  which  a  specific  construal  value  is  objectified  and  thus
separated from the processing pattern that originally gave it its
phenomenological character. However, when specificity is objectified as a socio-
normative value of an expression, there is no way of bringing it back to a certain
processing pattern, starting from its phenomenological nature: this processing
pattern – as the object of conceptualization –  can be constituted by a multitude
of different cognitive acts, or even types of acts.
Positing ad hoc psychological categories to account for this property’s “leap”
from the act  of  processing to the object  of  the act  would be self-defeating.  The
leap needs to be understood, inasmuch as a phenomenological standpoint is
assumed, as an a priori condition for constant semantic values to exist.92 As such,
it nevertheless entails that the semantic content and construal of an expression
cannot reliably be brought back to a specific cognitive type of existence, for there
91 As is posited already by Husserl in the fifth logical investigation, though from another perspective.
92 This  leap  is  here  supposed  to  be  concomitant  to  the  leap  from  non-normative  to  normative  that
Itkonen  (e.g.  2008a:  27)  posits  for  linguistic  meaning.  The  leaps  share  both  an  a  priori  nature  and  an
indeterminacy with regard to ”timing”. The leap I propose could be seen as a phenomenological correlate of
the emergence of normative semantic constant, but here the more specific relationship between my proposal
and that of Itkonen has to be ignored.
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is no way of precluding indefinite amount of distinctive cognitive realizations or
even multiple categories of realizations for the same semantic unit.
It  must therefore be concluded that  an explanation of  construal  in terms of
underlying cognitive processes is not only reductionist but triply irrelevant. First,
our cognitive disposition comes to affect meaning only through intersubjective
communicative usage-events; second, the stability of meaning from one usage-
event  to  another  cannot  be  explained  away  by  the  similarity  of  corresponding
cognitive processing events, since the same conceptual content, even the same
construal, can be processed in slightly different manners ad infinitum; third,
inasmuch  as  this  similarity  can  be  brought  back  to  the  intersubjectively
determined content of the meaning-intending act (which, in principle, can be
given a naturalistic description), a processing-based explanation is simply
redundant.93
Semantics thus needs to accommodate non-objective or experiential meaning
in a manner that discards psychologism and accounts for the intersubjective basis
of semantic representation. Above, I have approached this task by formulating,
on  the  basis  of  Zlatev’s  (e.g.  2007b,  2008)  mimesis  hierarchy  and  separate
phenomenological considerations (section 4.4), a three-partite argument of
construal’s intersubjective basis (section 4.5). Given the strong conceptual basis
for this argument and the analytical applicability of the conception of construal
that ensues, I consider the intersubjective approach to construal superior to the
original formulation of the concept. At the same time, the adopted approach bears
implications for semantic analysis not all of which were explicitly operationalized
in the analyses in chapter 5. It is therefore in place to consider these implications,
largely based on Zlatev’s (2005, 2007a, 2007b) and Blomberg and Zlatev’s (2014)
analysis of experientialist semantics, for the ontology of construal.
As mentioned, Blomberg and Zlatev suggest a specific type of experientialism
that they refer to as “consciousness-language interactionism” (Blomberg & Zlatev
2014:  397;  see  also  Zlatev  et  al.  2012).  Consciousness-language  interactionism
accepts that we have subjective states, such as emotions, but maintains that
language makes reference to these states via their publicly observable, embodied
expressions (Zlatev et al. 2012: 425) and that this reference ultimately
presupposes the intersubjective validity of the states themselves (ibid. 448). With
reference to Husserlian conception of subjectivity and intersubjectivity,
consciousness-language interactionism thus contests the notion of a strictly
private experience, even in the domain of emotions, which have often been
considered its paramount representative.
Accordingly, Zlatev et al. (2012: 423–424, 447–448) also refute the strict
identification  of  meaning  with  use,  a  view  that  may  allotted  to  Itkonen  (1997,
2008a) and Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]). From their interactionist point of view,
such extreme usage-based approach threatens to exclude experiential content
from language’s expressive repertoire. At the same time, consciousness-language
interactionism seeks to avoid collapsing meaning with conscious experience by
93See section 2.3.1 on the processing and conceptualization of time.
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emphasizing language-specific organizing principles, such as economy and
communicative relevance (Blomberg & Zlatev 2014). Interactionism is offered
exactly as a means for mediating between usage-based and experiential extremes.
Meaning involves experience-based representative content, the quality of which
is defined by the properties of the (non-private) experience as well as the
communicative practice.
In section 4.4 above, I have approved this formulation of experientialism.
Accordingly,  I  have  aimed  to  demonstrate  that  an  intersubjective  notion  of
construal follows naturally from consciousness-language interactionism in that it
captures perspectival experiential properties and properties of meaning-
intending that are conventionalized into semantics. However, the linguistic
analysis in chapter 5 emphasized the pragmatic nature of construal. The question
thus is how the semantic and pragmatic aspects of construal should be bridged
together.
The first part of the answer is implied by the usage-based nature of Cognitive
Grammar: the context-sensitivity of construal witnessed in chapter 5 is intimately
linked with the context-independent semantic nature of the instantiated
expression  types.  More  precisely,  construal  as  a  pragmatic  elaboration  within
discourse is prompted by the manner in which the expression, by its conventional
value, selects and organizes conceptual content. For instance, in the analysis of
specificity, the conventional schematicity of vaikea asia ’difficult thing’ is one of
the  central  factors  enabling  its  categorizing  function  and,  conversely,  the
elaboration (or specification) of the category by other semantic units. The actual
semantic content of vaikea asia, by contrast, is both a function of the concept’s
usage (e.g. the pragmatic scope of distinct valid instances of asia ’thing’) and one
of  the  decisive  factors  with  regard  to  its  selection.  Construal  thus  cannot  be
explained away by usage simpliciter but  needs  to  involve  a  conventional-
representative component.
The fact that the context-sensitivity of construal presupposes positive
semantic content leads us to the second necessary component that bridges
semantic and pragmatic aspects of construal together: extra-linguistic objectivity.
Above,  I  have  stated  that  a  coherent  conception  of  construal  as  a  part  of
experiential semantics involves the interlocutors’ access to non-construed
entities  and  that  the  nature  of  this  access  is  suggested  by  phenomenological
analysis of intentionality. It is here that we must open up this argument in full.
Itkonen (forthc.) and Nuyts (2002) propose, albeit from different
perspectives, that the conception of semantics endorsed by Cognitive Grammar
both  implies  and  necessitates  a  more  basic  type  of  conceptualization.94 For
Itkonen,  this  implication  is  logical:  a  perspectival  nature  of  meaning  is  only
possible against the backdrop of a more neutral, pre-linguistic conceptualization
of matters. For Nuyts, the grounding  function of modal predicates in Dutch (and
their unfitness for CG’s category of grounding elements) suggests that grounding
is primarily a phenomenon of conceptual semantics, a wider holistic domain of
pragmatic and world knowledge that interacts with, but cannot be reduced to, the
94 For a similar view on meaning from a phenomenological point of view, see Lohmar 2012.
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domain of linguistic semantics proper. The analysis of experientialism (section
4.4)  confirms  the  rationale  behind  these  observations,  in  that  a  domain  of
intersubjectively valid experience is presupposed by linguistic expression in
general and by construal in particular. Simultaneously, the analysis suggests that
the  basis  of  this  domain  is  most  naturally  described  by  the  notions  of
intentionality (section 4.2.1) and (pre-linguistic) intersubjectivity (section 4.2.2).
First  of  all,  if  we accept that  language conveys representational  content,  we
have already admitted the validity of the object of representation, to which the
content of the expression attaches by our intention; vaikea asia, for example,
does  not  refer  to  its  own conceptual  content  but  to  a  thing  in  the  world  by  its
conceptual content (though not by that content alone). However, Cognitive
Grammar only considers a “conceived reality” (CGBI: 298, see also FCG-1: 114),
an epistemic position that motivates specific construals. The object of reference,
in  turn,  is  defined  in  a  purely  solipsistic  manner  as  the  profile  or  instance  of
expression  (CGBI:  269),  both  of  which  are  entities  of  cognitive  realm.  This
approach is insufficient from the perspective developed here, for it neglects the
common  experiential  basis  that  provides  communication  with  its
meaningfulness.  It  is  also  dubious  whether  this  “conceived  reality”,  given  the
above  conception  of  reference,  is  able  to  account  for  the  uncontestable
phenomenological fact that the meaning of an expression is simultaneously
dependent of, and separate from, its (non-mental) referent.
Semantic representational content is restrictive, perspectival and schematic
vis-à-vis pre-linguistic experience and is thus a valid research object in its own
right.  However,  its  very  restrictiveness,  perspectivity  and  schematicity  can  be
analyzed by linguists and grasped by language-using subjects only relative to pre-
linguistic experience, which simultaneously exhibits these properties and
transcends  them  in  its  intersubjective  validity.  In  other  words,  we  do  not
primarily experience or attend to a subjective flow of sensations but to publicly
observable, distinctive objects, properties, and states of affairs. In an analogous
manner,  we  do  not  speak  primarily  about  meanings,  let  alone  about  how  we
experience these meanings, but about things-in-world by means of these
expressions,  the  content  of  which  thus  needs  to  be  distinctive  from,  but
intentionally attached to, their referents.
Construal thus gains its independent phenomenal nature from its very ability
to  turn  “back”  toward  language  and  set  it  against  the  background  not  only  of
alternate  construals  but  of  the  non-construed  object  of  expression,  which  is
indispensable for establishing said construals as mutual alternatives in the first
place.  This  is  not  to  say  that  construal  exists  only post hoc as  a  conscious
reflection but that construal is irrevocably embedded in acts of consciousness that
are directed not toward the conceptualization or construal itself but toward the
object of conceptualization. If this was not the case, and construal pertained to
cognitive or conceptual content per se, there would be no way of distinguishing
between linguistic-semantic features and the features of experience, and the act
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of reference would be reduced into mental experience without any intersubjective
value.95
I therefore argue that the notion of construal is logically dependent on a non-
mentalist notion of reference. This inherent object-directedness of linguistic acts
of meaning-intending makes it feasible to specify construal’s nature in relation to
the  phenomenological  notion  of  intentionality.  Inasmuch  as  its  accepted  that
linguistic  meaning  pertains  to  objective  (socially  constituted)  correlates  of
meaning-intending acts, i.e. the contents of these acts, construal may be defined
as those characteristics of said correlates that have derived from previous such
acts. In other words, construal embodies properties of object-directedness that,
by definition, presuppose the conscious subject as the locus of intentionality and
the experiential origo relative to which the object is represented. This subjective
character  of  construal  as  a  linguistic  phenomenon  is  in  turn  irrevocably
dependent on intersubjective accessibility of both the subjective type of object-
directedness as well as the object itself. That is, construal is attained as a semantic
property of linguistic acts that are directed toward objects and states of affairs in
an  intersubjective  setting.  Were  it  not  assumed  as  a  property  of  linguistic
intentionality toward extra-linguistic reality, construal would not exhibit
subjective perspectivity or intersubjective validity.
This definition, I argue, constitutes the conceptual minimum requirements for
a coherent notion of  construal.  There are analytical  factors,  however,  that  also
support this definition. First and foremost, without a connection between a
construed expression and a non-construed object, there would exist no criteria
for  selecting  the  most  sufficient  or  suitable  construal  among  many.  Or,
conversely,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  the  recipient  to  integrate  different  co-
referential construals as meaningful acts that are directed toward entities outside
the  conceptual  realm of  semantics  itself.  In  fact,  it  would  not  be  intelligible  to
speak  of  alternate  construals  in  the  first  place.  Alternate  construals  could,  in
principle,  be  mutually  associated  by  means  of  an ad hoc mental  category  or  a
pragmatic domain, and thus be given a cognitive motivation. The actual selection
would  then  be  carried  out  according  to  some  subjective  criterion  or  some
conceptual  target.  This  approach is  nevertheless unsatisfactory for the reasons
mentioned above: reference is carried out by commonly known expressions and
gains its communicative significance from the fact that it is that both or multiple
interlocutors can agree upon.
In so being, construal as a selection and organization of conceptual content
stands in need of a criterion that is external to the category of alternate construals
itself. The most evident candidate for this is the manner in which the designatum
is given to the interlocutors.
In sum, construal is dependent on the notion of reference for two distinct yet
intertwined reasons. First, the very notion of construal as non-objectivity of
95 This pre-reflectivity of construal, a sub-species of the pre-reflectivity that is characteristic of
linguistic conduct in general, explains why we primarily speak of things as they are and only attend to the
ways of construing things in special circumstances, e.g. a challenging interpersonal situation, a linguistic
analysis.
Synthesis: the nature of construal
220
conceptualization  requires  an  objective  (or  at  least  more  objective)  type  of
conceptualization to be detectable.96 Second,  the idea of  construal  as a  type of
selection between alternate construals necessitates a category-external criterion,
a  criterion  of  “rightness”  (see  Lohmar  2012:  382).  What  these  points  require
together  is  that  the  linguistic  act  simultaneously  represents  the  designatum as
perspectivized  and  that  it  points  to  it  as  a  non-perspectival  whole.  The
combination of construal and reference is, in other words, remarkably similar to
the  structure  of  the  perceptual  intentional  act  in  which  the  object  of  the  act  is
perceived simultaneously as perspectivized and complete. In section 4.4, the pre-
linguistic  objectivity  instantiated  in  intentional  acts  has  been  posited  as  an a
priori condition for linguistic expression and construal. Now, it can be concluded
that this structured objectivity is not only a pre-condition but an active modus
operandi of linguistic communication; in other words, the relationship between
construal and reference is functional.
The specific function of, and complexities involved with, reference vis-à-vis
construal fall out of the scope of the present study. We may nevertheless consider
specific  requirements  that  construal  poses  for  the  notion  of  reference.  In  the
current intersubjective perspective, reference needs to be understood as an act of
establishing a relation between all relevant conceptualizers and the referent. It
consists of performing a linguistic symbolization that allows the recipient access
to the intended designatum through the correct interpretation of the speaker’s
intention.  In  so  being,  an  expression  is  construed  on  the  basis  of  a  common
ground,  or  as  Cognitive  Grammar  depicts  it  in  conceptual  terms,  Current
Discourse  Space.  Whatever  the  specific  formulation  of  ground,  construal  as  a
property of a meaning-intending act can be characterized as ordering of semantic
content according to pragmatically and intersubjectively constituted basis of
shared knowledge.
 This entails that the grasping of the expression’s meaning necessarily involves
the relating of different conceptualizer positions. While the different
conceptualizer  positions  consider  this  ground  to  be  organized  asymmetrically,
these positions nevertheless relate to each other and to the ground to be a whole.
Thus, it can be stated that the construal and the perspective it profiles for the
interlocutors  to  adopt  is  not  an  end  in  and  of  itself  but  a  means  to  grasp  the
designatum. What Cognitive Grammar defines as the object of conceptualization
(or the object-pole of conceptualization) is in fact a conceptual representation of
the actual object that lies outside of the conceptualization as such.
Construal  is  thus  guided  by  the  mutual  conceptual  accessibility  of  the
designatum  for  both  or  all  of  the  intended  conceptualizers.  Conceptual
accessibility in turn is not a binary or one-dimensional attribute but is subject to
an open-ended multitude of semantic and pragmatic variables. The referent may
96 This is not to exclude the possibility of linguistic categories affecting what is experienced and
understood as extra-linguistically objective. I decidedly refrain from taking a specific stance on linguistic
relativity, while acknowledging a reappraisal of the notion in a weakened sense (e.g. Levinson 1996; Slobin
1987, 1996). The analysis here simply presumes an experiential pre-linguistic objectivity that may be affected
by language but is nevertheless accessed by means other than linguistic conceptualization.
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be present (or “intuitively given”, in the phenomenological terminology) or not,
it  may  be  perceptual  or  abstract,  concrete  or  relational  (or  “categorial”,  in  the
phenomenological terminology), and it may relate differentially to distinct
interlocutors. What motivates the selection of a particular construal of the given
referent, then, is the givenness of the referent and how given the referent is for
each speaker. Construal, in other words, pertains functionally to conceptual
mediation between multiple perspectives; and for this mediation to be possible,
the referent is required as the site of convergence for the alternate perspectives.97
The  inclusion  of  reference  thus  completes  the  analysis  of  construal  as  a
relational entity. Construal does not pertain to the non-objectivity of meaning as
some self-constituting property of conceptualization; instead, it is graspable as a
relation between the conceptualizers and the object of conceptualization, the
latter of which cannot be reduced to a mental entity. Construal can be presented
as the linguistic manifestation of the general attribute of intentional relations in
that it captures those semantic phenomena that depend on the particular manner
of intending.
Being linguistic, however, the manner of intending that construal captures is
always  complex,  as  it  involves  not  only  the  subject  and  object  poles  of
conceptualization but also the other or secondary conceptualizer; this equips the
construal relationship with an intersubjective structure, as noted by the analyses
of Verhagen (2005, 2007, 2008). Moreover, the conventional and systematic
nature of a linguistic expression restricts and directs the possibilities of construal
as a form of intersubjective intentionality. It is therefore justified to define
construal as a partly conventional coordination of intersubjective intentionality.
In particular, it coordinates the conceptual accessibility of the designated object
between the conceptualizers through the conventional semantic value of the
expression and through the pragmatic determination (disambiguation and
elaboration) of the expression.
6.3 DISCUSSION
We have thus arrived at  a  characterization of  construal  that  rebuts a cognitive
solipsism in the speaker/hearer’s position relative to both of the other subjects
and relative to the objects of conceptualization. Despite Cognitive Grammar’s
claims to the contrary (CGBI:  28), this type of anti-solipsism contravenes with
the  manner  in  which  the  theory  associates  linguistic  meaning  with
conceptualization.  In  particular,  the  other  subjects  and  the  objects  of
conceptualization, which are entities and states of affairs in our lived experience,
cannot be reduced to a genealogical explanation for internalized and schematized
97 An individual’s attempt to establish a relation between, for example, the recipient and the designatum
may obviously fail. The sociality of reference, however, does not hinge on its actual sufficiency; we are not
speaking here about a metaphysical sociality and the existence of other subjects but about the character of
a linguistic act. In addition, construal is often, if not most often, selected in order to convey subjective
experience. This particular source of “rightness”, however, is never sufficient on its own, for
communicating subjective experience makes only sense if we presume an equal accessibility of the
experiential referent for both interlocutors.
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mental entities (cf. CGBI: 30). Instead, the fact that we have those experiences of
others  and  objects  is  the  continuously  active  component  that  enables  the  very
occurrence of linguistic meaning and construal. Only within this non-linguistic
experiential  reality,  relative  to  which  the  linguistic  act  and  meaning  are
simultaneously experienced both as dependent and separate, does an expression
come to bear meaning in general and non-objective meaning in particular.
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7 CONCLUSION
In  this  study,  I  have  aimed  to  describe  accurately  the  conception  of  construal
Cognitive Grammar endorses and develop an intersubjectively grounded
alternative that alleviates the theoretical discrepancies found in the former. The
primary  advantage  of  the  approach  developed  here  is  that  it  openly  seeks  to
integrate the analysis of representational semantic content with that of a
pragmatic context, however delimited or linguistic in character. The point is that
the  scope  of  pragmatic  considerations  can  be  further  extended  in  the  lines
envisaged here. Moreover, the approach developed and defended in this book is
in accordance with the usage-based emphasis of Cognitive Grammar itself. What
is  required  by  the  analyses  above  is  that  the  necessarily  social  character  of
linguistic representational content needs to be acknowledged, as is the case with
the mechanisms according to which this representational content is defined from
linguistic context.
The  dimensions  of  construal  as  presented  in  Cognitive  Grammar  have
repeatedly demonstrated the capability of capturing significant semantic
generalizations over referentially synonymous expressions. However, it has also
been demonstrated by the present investigation that their original formulation
implies  or  presupposes  a  social  basis  of  meaning  that  stands  at  odds  with  the
theory’s psychologistic proclamations.
It  has  been  demonstrated  on  multiple  occasions  that  Cognitive  Grammar
involves  a  social  component  by  definining  language  as  a  learned  inventory  of
linguistic units. Unfortunately, Cognitive Grammar also makes the contradictory
claim that the sociality of language is secondary to cognition, for the latter is more
“basic” than the former (CGBI: 30). The outlook manifest in this claim threatens
to  reduce  the  social  basis  of  language  into  a  restrictive  sub-component  of  an
individual’s conceptual achievement. In contrast, it has been proposed here that
it is intersubjectivity that is basic to linguistic conduct in particular and to human
experience in general. In this view, an individual’s linguistic capacity and its
manifestations  need  to  be  embedded  in  a  framework  in  which  multiple
interlocutors and the speech community at large define the unit of analysis.
The  stance  defined  in  section  4.4,  and  developed  thereafter,  posits  that  the
human cognitive make-up, which is embedded in our overall physical and sensory
disposition, can and should be included as the major determinant of experiential
meaning, and that without the inclusion of experience in their description, both
semantics and pragmatics are greatly impoverished. What is required, however,
is a correct understanding of how this cognitive and embodied disposition comes
to define linguistic meaning.
The  approach  to  semantics  assumed  here  has  been  inspired  by  the  social
ontology of  meaning formulated and defended by Itkonen (1978,  1997,  2008a,
2008b,  forthc.)  and  the  version  of  experientialism  developed  by  Zlatev  et  al.
(2012; Blomberg and Zlatev 2014). On the basis of the work by these authors, I
have proposed that intersubjectivity determines not only the linguistically
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represented properties of experience but the ontology of construal as well. In
other  words,  representational  linguistic  content  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is
construed are only accessible due to their dependency on non-linguistic and non-
construed objectivity. While it has not been possible in this study to deconstruct
the relationship between a construed expression and its non-construed
objectivity in detail, the conceptual dependence between the two domains has
been demonstrated to be foundational.
At  the  same  time,  the  limitations  of  the  present  analysis  need  to  be
acknowledged. Construal is as vast as a linguistic category as the very conception
of  semantics  it  is  a  part  of.  Similarly,  the  ontological  grounding  of  a  semantic
theory  as  the  object  of  critical  inquiry  compares  in  size  to  the  question  of  the
theory’s  meaningfulness as a  whole.   To shed light on both of  these points,  i.e.
construal  as  a  linguistic  phenomenon  and  its  theoretical  nature,  it  has  been
necessary to compromise in favor of the theoretical argument and at the expense
of  precision  (with  regard  Cognitive  Grammar’s  descriptive  finesses)  and  the
empirical  application  of  the  analyzed  concepts.  The  linguistic  analyses  I  have
presented in section 4.5 have nevertheless disclosed immediate corollaries of the
metatheoretical re-evaluation of Cognitive Grammar in the empirical semantic
and  pragmatic  study.  This  alone  suggests  the  feasibility  of  developing  the
intersubjective conception of construal further.
It  is  fair  to  recognize  that  this  task  is  best  approached  by  subjecting  the
intersubjectively framed notion of construal to rigorous evaluation by means of
an empirical discourse-pragmatic analysis of diverse construal phenomena.
While the phenomenological and ontological analysis of construal certainly may
and should be taken further, it is dubious if such work would ever be efficient on
its  own.  What  is  needed  is  a  more  precise  picture  of  the  concrete  construal
phenomena in which the proposed theoretical  claims may become manifest  or
challenged.
Empirical linguistics tends to be oblivious of its ontological commitments.
With conscious effort linguistic analysis itself can nevertheless be applied to
challenge the way in which underlying ontological commitments are instantiated
in theory formation, including the definition and specification of analytical
concepts. In addition, the analysis of actual linguistic data may provide proof of
the existence of phenomena that bridge semantic and interactional domains and
that  cannot  directly  be  explained  from  a  particular  depiction  of  construal.  A
finding such as this consequently calls for the expansion of the relevant analytical
concepts.
One specific manner of further developing CG’s descriptive apparatus has
proven particularly promising: its comparative application with methodologies
from  other  paradigms,  both  linguistic  and  non-linguistic.  This  approach  has
already taken place in cognitively inspired translation studies (Tabakowska 1993)
and cognitive poetics (e.g. Stockwell 2002), for example. More relevant for the
present theoretical purposes, however, is the extensive work done within
Fennistic studies that aims at the integration between Cognitive Grammar, text-
analysis and journalistic studies (Jaakola 2012b; Jaakola et al. 2014; see also
Jaakola 2012a), as well as between Cognitive Grammar and Conversation
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Analysis (Etelämäki & Jaakola 2009; Etelämäki et al. 2009; Etelämäki & Visapää
2014). These studies make a further case for the semantic-analytical utility of the
dimensions of construal and their related concepts, while showcasing the benefits
of  implementing  them  as  a  subpart  of  a  wider  analytical  perspective.
Representational  semantic  content  is  thus  seen  as  capturing  only  a  restricted
proportion  (albeit  a  substantial  one)  of  what  language  amounts  to  in  actual
communicative activity.
I argue that the analysis of construal presented here is compatible with this
explicit functional contextualization of cognitive semantics.98 The integration of
construal with an intersubjective perspective and notion of reference can be
expressed as a super-schematic conceptual model for a dynamic semantics-in-
use.  This  model  subsumes  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  context,  linguistic  and
non-linguistic intersubjectivity, and linguistic and non-linguistic experiential
objects.  In  so  being,  it  provides  a  systematic  account  of  the  conceptual
prerequisites of experiential meaning or construal as a part of an intentional
linguistic act, and thus answers in part to the conviction advocated by Etelämäki
and Visapää (2014: 499; who refer to Sacks, Schegloff end Jefferson, 1974) that
actual interaction is the natural home for language.
Etelämäki and Visapää (2014: 478–479) argue against the claims that
Cognitive Grammar neglects the sociality of language as profoundly unjust: the
explicitly usage-based nature of the theory places it on par with interactional
linguistic accounts that equate meaning with its actualization in discourse. The
present account departs from this sympathetic reading of Cognitive Grammar,
but only partially. Indeed, Etelämäki and Visapää correctly point to the fact that
Cognitive Grammar openly assumes a social basis for language with its emphasis
on  usage  as  the  originator  of  linguistic  units.  It  nevertheless  needs  to  be
maintained that Cognitive Grammar fails to draw the correct ontological
conclusions from its usage-based nature: that the linguistic sign is not principally
cognitive and that it needs not only to be given a social definition but also need to
be ontologically grounded in linguistic interaction and its intersubjective basis.
At  the  same  time,  I  argue  that  the  analyses  Etelämäki  and  Visapää  (2014)
provide for Finnish demonstratives and infinitives actualize exactly the approach
to linguistic symbolization in interaction that my present account suggests from
a theoretical point of view. Future research in these lines would benefit from a
further integration and comparison of conversation-analytical and cognitive-
linguistic methodology and terminology, but should also include a pronounced
critical emphasis on how Cognitive Grammar defines semantics and semantic
units.
Above, I have defended the view that the expression of subjective experiential
meaning, in fact, is dependent on the overall intersubjective constitution of both
the employed linguistic expression and the experiential designatum itself. The
consistency of this view is best assessed by the scrutinizing of the expression and
discussion of manifestly subjective, e.g. emotional and imaginary, experiences in
98 Gonzálvez-García and Butler (2006) provide a useful general outline for integrating cognitive and
functional linguistic perspectives.
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actual  discourse  (e.g.  Zlatev  et  al.  2012).  In  addition,  the  analysis  of  the
functionality of construal would benefit from the application of the dimensions
of construal in communicative situations in which the interlocutors negotiate
meanings and conceptual access to the entities serving as the topics of discussion.
The  response  of  the  interlocutors  to  insufficient  communication  is  especially
likely to reveal the inseparability of construal from the constitution and mapping
of the common ground that includes the coordination of extra-linguistic context
and the orientations of the interlocutors vis-à-vis extra-linguistic objects.
In this study, I have aimed to offer a novel perspective on the central semantic-
analytical  concepts  of  Cognitive  Grammar  that  accounts  for  the  social
constitution of meaning in a consistent manner, and thus allows for a systematic
application of said concepts to new discursive phenomena. While my treatment
has been eminently critical, its central purpose has been to clarify the theoretical
basis  of  Cognitive  Grammar  and  to  provide  reasonable  proposals  for  its
improvement.
At the same time, Cognitive Grammar continues to be applied and refined in
the analysis of semantic and pragmatic phenomena, including some that are new
to the well-established tradition of the theory. As mentioned in the beginning of
this work, Langacker has recently made public his effort to extend the scope of
Cognitive Grammar to include discourse-related phenomena and develop the
grammar  into  a  genuinely  holistic  description  of  “linguistic  structure  in  all  its
varied manifestations” (CGBI: 477). This is accompanied by the conviction that
ultimately “there is no definite boundary between discourse and grammar” (ibid.
499).  This  proclamation  opens  a  promising  view  into  the  future  of  Cognitive
Grammar in that it pushes the boundaries of now-traditional cognitive semantics
that operates on clausal constructions or lesser semantic units. Moreover, this
opens  the  view from “ideational”  (see  Halliday  2007:  183)  to  a  wider  scope  of
linguistic functionality in everyday interaction. What is necessary for this
expansion  is  that  these  new  territories  of  research  are  not  reduced  to  novel
cognitive  domains  but  accepted  as  what  they  are:  phenomena  that  exceed  the
contents of the individual mind.
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